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This thesis explores how the functional objectives of retention of title clauses, as a commercial 
mechanism, are hindered by significant legal uncertainty and judicial disfavour. A 
comprehensive critique of the law governing retention of title clauses is provided and the 
fundamental problems of a conceptual and practical nature for those parties seeking to rely 
on retention of title clauses in the event of insolvency are examined. This thesis demonstrates 
how retention of title clauses have been inadequately treated by the courts, which has 
invariably led to controversial implications and nuances in application. Areas of legal 
uncertainty, inconsistency and unpredictability are highlighted to illustrate the difficulties 
encountered under the present legal regime. The discussion will also challenge recent judicial 
decisions which have arguably produced contradictory outcomes and have significantly 
contributed to the uncertainty of this area of law. It is submitted that the unsatisfactory 
application of the law can be consistently evidenced across the breadth of legal fields in which 
these clauses are prevalent, a remit which extends far beyond the law of sales and 
subsequently, ventures into the law of property, contract law, the law of agency, company 
charges, and corporate insolvency. The arguments put forward will demonstrate that there is 
still substantial difficulty in resolving claims of retention of title and that the legal uncertainty 
is exacerbated by weak rationalisation of legal rules, inconsistent interpretation of the clauses 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1. Introduction  
 
Retention of title1 clauses are considered to be a useful mechanism in the world of commerce and 
have been prevalent for quite some time.2 Their significance and proliferation as a commercial 
mechanism surged in popularity following the 1976 Court of Appeal decision in Romalpa.3 The 
combined impact of both the Romalpa case and the unlitigated but highly publicised Brentford Nylons 
insolvency, have both been deemed contributable factors for the clauses becoming so prolific in 
commercial contracts.4 Since 1976, there has been a rapid transition from being a largely unused 
clause to such clauses becoming an integral component of boilerplate agreements of sale.5 The 
proliferation of retention of title clauses in England and Wales has since been described as spreading 
like a ‘dreadful weed,’6 a testament to their ubiquitous nature. The growth in use of retention of title 
clauses can also be attributed to their functional objective as a means of conveniently providing 
protection for suppliers and manufacturers of goods. Retention of title clauses provide sellers a way 
of addressing some of their primary business concerns: the risk of non-payment and a buyer’s 
insolvency. An incorporated retention of title clauses reduces such an eventuality by stipulating that 
the seller will retain ownership of the goods until certain specified conditions have been satisfied, 
irrespective of delivery. In most common circumstances the conditions will stipulate that ownership/ 
title will not pass until the buyer’s financial obligations to the seller have been satisfied in full. Thus, 
in its simplest form retention of title clauses ensures that the buyer will not become an owner of the 
goods until the seller has been paid. Accordingly, one of the main objectives of the clauses is to provide 
sellers an economic lifeline in the event of a non-paying/ insolvent buyer. However, despite the 
clauses deceivingly simple premise, a growing disconnect has materialised between recent judicial 
decisions on retention of title clauses and their commercial practicality. Despite the proliferation of 
the clauses in contractual agreements, the core of the issue lies with existing uncertainty as to when 
the clauses are legally valid and effective. As will be discussed, the law governing retention of title 
 
1 Otherwise known as ‘reservation of title’ or ‘Romalpa clauses’ named after the infamous Court of Appeal 
case Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 W.L.R 676. 
2 The basic principle can be traced back as far as 1895 by the House of Lords in the Irish case of Alexander Knox 
McEntire v Crossley Bros [1895] A.C. 457 HL as per Lord Herscell at [462]. 
3 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 W.L.R 676. 
4 K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English 
Law of Sales” (2018) Journal of Business Law, 229-254, at 234. 
5 J Davey and C Kelly “Romalpa and Contractual Innovation” (2015) 42 Journal of Law and Society 358-386, at 
359.  
6 I Davies, Effective Retention of Title, London: Fourmat Publishing, 1991, at 10. 
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clauses is compounded by both legal uncertainty and a general reluctance to enforce retention of title 
claims. The uncertainty of this area is also exacerbated by weak rationalisation of legal rules and an 
inconsistent interpretation of the clauses in case law.  
 
The issues surrounding retention of title clauses can be evidenced by an influx of case law, which has 
produced contradictory and unpredictable results. These controversial decisions have caused 
significant problems of both conceptual and practical nature for those parties seeking to rely on such 
clauses. Consequently, the uncertainty of the law in this area undermines the overall commercial 
utility and functional effectiveness of retention of title clauses. There are ever-increasing situations 
where retention of title clauses will be struck down by the courts and thus, the clauses will not be an 
effective legal mechanism for the seller. The apparent eagerness of the courts to strike down certain 
types of retention of title clause, is detrimental to the claimant relying on the clauses as the clauses 
fail to provide the level of protection expected from the contractual clause. As such, retention of title 
clauses as a legal mechanism are hindered from achieving their functional objectives by legal 
uncertainty and a general reluctance observed by the courts to enforce retention of title claims. The 
uncertainty stems from the English7 courts dogmatic and indecisive approach to retention of title 
clauses whereby the courts fail to achieve a degree of consistency, preferring rigid contractual 
interpretation to reaching commercially sensible decisions. As emphasised by Sealy, ‘the position of 
sellers would not be quite so dismal if the courts could be persuaded to think that some issues deserve 
to be examined less perfunctorily and given more serious and thorough consideration than has been 
the case to date.’8 The historic protection once offered by such clauses has now been detrimentally 
undermined by legal uncertainty. Retention of title clauses as a legal doctrine has subsequently 
become overstrained, in which the legal outcomes become less and less plausible. This area of law is 
riddled with confusion as the court’s ‘tend to run afoul of the legal theory upon which a simple 
retention of title clause is based.’9 As a result, the use of retention of title clauses has been 
compromised and commercial transactions hindered.10 This is of great detriment to those involved in 
the commercial field, as it is clear that the underlying objective of retention of title clauses in offering 
effective commercial security in times of economic hardship is impeded.11 Thus, the central themes 
under consideration are the extent to which legal uncertainty hinders retention of title clauses from 
achieving their functional objectives of mitigating sellers’ risk. 
 
7 Any reference to the term ‘English’, pertains to the law of England and Wales.  
8 L Sealy “Retention of Title- The Quick and the Dead” (1997) 56(1) The Cambridge Law Journal, 28-30, at 28.  
9 R Johnson “A Uniform Solution to Common Law Confusion: Retention of Title Under English and U.S. Law” 
(1994) 12 International Tax & Business Law, 99-129, at 106.  
10ibid at 99. 




The law in this area was once accurately described as ‘presently a maze if not a minefield’12 by Justice 
Staughton- a depiction which holds weight and acute significance in the twenty-first century. Almost 
forty years later, the sentiment is still accurate to describe the way the law deals with retention of 
title claims. Recent legal outcomes have caused unprecedented uncertainty and detrimental 
implications for the functional objectives of the retention of title clause, which has undoubtedly 
contributed to this minefield area of law. The accuracy of this area of law as a minefield is apt for 
several reasons: first, it relates to the concept of a legal minefield which denotes that a subject is 
significantly complicated and presents several hidden problems and dangers.13 The foreseen and 
unforeseen problematic aspects of retention of title clauses will be highlighted throughout the course 
of this thesis, to evidence that such clauses are hindered by legal uncertainty.  
 
Secondly, the depiction of a minefield is an accurate representation of the pitfalls of retention of title 
clauses, where suppliers must tread carefully when seeking to use such clauses and be readily 
prepared to be set back by unexpected drawbacks and uncommercial implications. As will be 
discussed, there are ever increasing situations where retention of title clauses are struck down by the 
courts and this is synonymous to the mine exploding and thus bringing an end to the use of the 
retention of title clause within that particular situation.  
 
Lastly, the term minefield accurately denotes the vast and all-encompassing areas of law which covers 
the scope of retention of title clauses, a remit which extends far beyond merely the law of sales. As 
such the term minefield reflects the intertwining and technical connection between retention of title 
clauses and a wide range of legal crossroads. Accordingly, an exploration of the legal minefield of 
retention of title clauses conveys the principal aims of this thesis and conveys the broad focus of this 
research enquiry.  
 
1.1 The aims of the research and original contribution  
 
The core aim of this thesis is the exploration of how the law governing retention of title clauses 
undermines the overall conceptual functionality of this commercial mechanism. It is evident that the 
inconsistent approach of dealing with retention of title clauses across a variety of different legal 
 
12 Hendy Lennox Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd [1984] 1 W.L.R, 485 as per Justice Staughton at [491]. 
13 See the definition of a legal minefield in the Cambridge University Dictionary, available at 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/minefield Accessed 06/07/20. 
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disciplines has had a detrimental and profound impact on the clauses’ overall utility and effectiveness 
within the business market. This area of law is consistently met with legal uncertainty and recent 
judicial decisions have exacerbated this issue tenfold by producing outcomes which are deemed 
contradictory, uncommercial and at times, completely illogical. These controversial implications have 
contributed significantly to the minefield of this area of law. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to highlight 
the different ways in which the functionality of retention of title clauses are commercially hindered, 
through the exploration of how such clauses operate in practice, and a critical evaluation of the clauses 
legal framework which arguably impedes their viability.  
 
An increased understanding of the law governing retention of title clause is thus necessitated and the 
thesis builds upon the existing qualitative material within the commercial legal field to achieve this 
objective. The original contribution of the thesis is made by a three-part claim. First, the originality of 
this research emanates from taking a holistic and functional approach to retention of title clauses, 
through exploring the clauses position within a variety of different legal disciplines including 
evaluating the law of sales, property law, the law of agency, corporate insolvency, company charges 
and contractual interpretation. Most existing scholarship on retention of title clauses tends to focus 
on one legal area exclusively14 or provides a simplified overview specifically tailored for the intended 
audience of businessmen, accountants, and legal advisors.15 Although it is acknowledged that there is 
literature addressing how the clauses are individually dealt with per se, such as how the clauses are 
dealt with under the law of sales etc, an evaluation of the broader scope in which retention of title 
clauses operate is needed. Thus, this research intends to contribute to the existing scholarship on 
retention of title clauses by providing a more holistic, all-encompassing, and comprehensive legal and 
critical analysis, covering the doctrines depth and breadth within a range of legal perspectives and 
disciplines. Providing a detailed and practical discussion on the law in this complicated legal minefield 
merits detailed consideration.  
 
Secondly, this thesis will provide an updated insight on recent title jurisprudence and the economic 
and practical implications for retention of title clauses within the commercial sector. The overarching 
thread to the second claim of originality stems from the thesis providing a sole, in-depth qualitative 
analysis on the English approach to retention of title clauses, without offering comparative insight into 
how other jurisdictions deal with similar provisions of title retention. An exclusive analysis to the 
 
14 However, see generally, G McCormack, Reservation of Title, 2nd Ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995. 
15 See J Parris, Retention of Title on the Sale of Goods, London: Granada Publishing, 1982; S Wheeler, 
Reservation of Title Clauses: Impact and Implications, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. 
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English approach to retention of title clauses of this depth has not been prevalent for some decades16, 
and as such, the second claim boasts two elements: confined focus and a modern outlook on retention 
of title clauses. Accordingly, sole focus will be given to assessing the present position of English law 
with reference to recent cases and the practical and economic implications for retention of title 
clauses. Recent cases have fundamentally changed the way in which some retention of title clauses 
are interpreted and thus, a more recent analysis on the cases and implications for this area of law is 
warranted. It should be noted at the outset that an international perspective on retention of title 
clauses is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be explored in detail, but some comments may 
be made in passing to inform the discussion. The literature exploring how retention of title clauses are 
treated internationally is extensive and many studies have discussed the international framework of 
the clauses and the formal establishing requirements which tends to differ greatly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.17 As such, the scope of this thesis will be refined to the English approach and how recent 
judicial outcomes have had a profound and detrimental impact on the conceptual functionality of the 
clauses. An exclusive and recent analysis on the many legal hindrances preventing sellers from relying 
on their retention of title clauses will thus be presented. 
 
Thirdly, the thesis will intend to contribute to the limited research on retention of title clauses and 
insolvency proceedings and company administrations, more specifically the impact of the statutory 
moratorium, an area of law which remains underexplored in the context of retention of title clauses. 
The literature on the interconnection between the statutory moratorium and retention of title clauses 
is sparse18, however the subject raises important questions in relation to the overall effectiveness of 
the clauses as a method used to provide sufficient protection to sellers/ suppliers in the event of a 
buyers’ insolvency or administration. It is hoped that by exploring present insolvency principles and 
procedures and the corresponding practical impact on the clauses, such research will highlight the 
complications that exist in this area of law and the need to provide greater clarity.  
 
To provide a broad summary, the central themes under consideration are the extent to which 
retention of title clauses are conceptually hindered by legal uncertainty and to highlight the general 
 
16 For example, J Parris, Retention of Title on the Sale of Goods, London: Granada Publishing, 1982; S Wheeler, 
Reservation of Title Clauses: Impact and Implications, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991; and G McCormack, 
Reservation of Title, 2nd Ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995. 
17 See I Davies, Retention of Title Clauses in Sale of Goods Contracts in Europe, Oxon: Routledge, 2017; G 
McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
18 Although corporate insolvency law is a saturated market, the research focusing on retention of title clause is 
usually confined in its scope. For corporate insolvency law, see further: R Goode, Principles of Corporate 
Insolvency Law, 4th Ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011; V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and 
Principles, 3rd Ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
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disconnect between recent judicial decisions on retention of title clauses and the implications that the 
decisions have on their functionality and effectiveness as a method of providing security. The legal 
uncertainties exposed throughout the course of this thesis support the notion that the law relating to 
retention of title clauses remains a legal minefield. As the aims and original contribution have thus 
been outlined, it is now necessary to set out the methodology used in this research enquiry.  
 
1.2 Methodology  
 
This thesis has employed different methods of conducting legal research, with the thesis substantially 
adopting the doctrinal research approach, otherwise referred to as the ‘black-letter law’ approach.19 
The doctrinal approach focuses heavily on the analysis of statutes and judicial decisions and primarily 
involves the analysis of primary and secondary sources of law. Accordingly, the research process is 
‘used to identify, analyse and synthesise the content of the law.’20 In the context of this thesis, the 
primary sources considered are the relevant statutes and case law on retention of title clauses, which 
span across the broad range of legal disciplines where retention of title clauses are prevalent in 
operation. Adopting a doctrinal approach from the onset, ensures that the interpretation of the legal 
standpoint on retention of title clauses can be reached, thus facilitating the process of investigating 
the appropriateness of the current legal position on retention of title clauses. Deriving principles from 
decided cases in the search for coherency and cohesion is intrinsically important for twofold reasons: 
firstly, it places the research firmly within the scope of doctrinal research and secondly, it is essential 
for answering this specific research enquiry.  
 
The doctrinal methodology has been referred to as ‘legal puzzle solving’, a process which critically 
analyses existing literature to inform the known body of law, with the resulting aim of achieving 
pragmatic solutions.21 By undertaking a doctrinal approach, the aim is to involve the use of problem-
solving skills, legal reasoning and existing judicial interpretation to the analysis of case law decisions. 
The following quote summarises the challenges ahead of applying the doctrinal approach:  
‘Only rarely will there be a rule that directly and unambiguously determines the outcome of the 
problem presented. Seldom will the applicable black letter rule (precedent) have been determined in 
 
19 M McConville and W Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, at 
1. 
20 T Hutchinson “Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury” in D Watkins and M Burton (eds) Research Methods 
in Law, Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, at 9.  
21 ibid at 12. 
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a case with identical facts and circumstances near in time to the problem under consideration. Seldom 
will legislation or regulations unambiguously determine the outcome of the problems which arise.’22 
Thus, conducting a systematic exposition of current legal rules is paramount for employing a doctrinal 
approach but such a process is not without its challenges. The adoption of the doctrinal approach is 
particularly apt for this research enquiry as there is an unwieldy mass of case law decisions in the 
context of retention of title clauses. As such the doctrinal approach is an appropriate method to 
evaluate the legal rules and case law decisions discussed throughout the course of this thesis. As 
analysing case law decisions will be at the forefront of this research enquiry, more focus and detailed 
attention will be given to the factual background, description, and interpretation of case law. The 
descriptive approach to the factual content of the cases will be supplemented by an explorative 
narrative and critique to ensure a comprehensive critical evaluation. Accordingly, engagement with 
the doctrinal approach is thus necessitated to gain a deeper understanding of the context of this 
research. 
 
Furthermore, aspects of this research require the adoption of the non-doctrinal approach, which 
focuses on identifying current problems with the law, with the broader focus of facilitating a wider 
understanding of the legal concepts within the contextual background in which they operate. 
Accordingly, the non-doctrinal approach represents ‘a new approach of studying law in the broader 
social and political context with the use of a range of other methods taken from disciplines in the 
social sciences and humanities.’23 The adoption of the non-doctrinal approach is intentional to 
supplement some of the fundamental weaknesses of merely adopting a pure doctrinal analysis, which 
has been heavily criticised for its narrow scope and application.24 The doctrinal approach has been 
criticised for its isolated approach to understanding the law, whereby commentators have discredited 
the pure doctrinal analysis for its ‘intellectually rigid, inflexible and inward-looking approach.’25 As 
such, adopting a pure doctrinal analysis is to confine the analysis so narrowly as to not be concerned 
with the world outside the law.26 Consequently, the social, political, economic, and moral perspectives 
of law are not examined under a pure doctrinal analysis. Accordingly, to avoid isolating the law from 
its context, a non-doctrinal analysis is also utilised to realise the aim of this research project.  
 
 
22 W Hofheinz “Legal Analysis” as quoted in D Watkins and M Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, at 13.  
23 M McConville and W Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law, op cit fn 19 at 14. 
24 See, T Hutchinson “Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury”, op cit fn 20 at 14. 
25 D Vick “Interdisciplinary and the Discipline of Law” (2004) 31(2) Journal of Law and Society, 163-193, at 164.  
26 M McConville and W Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law, op cit fn 19 at 1. 
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The variety of secondary sources consulted, ranging from journal articles, governmental reports, 
policy documents, textbooks, and practitioners’ books, places this research within the scope of 
conducting socio-legal research. Socio-legal research is an appropriate description for the research 
conducted throughout this thesis, as the research focuses on an exploration of the law in context, 
specifically analysing how retention of title clauses operate with the present business market and how 
the clauses are hindered from achieving their functional objectives. A qualitative approach to the 
analysis of documents will be applied in this thesis, rather than a quantitative numerical approach.27  
Adopting a qualitative socio-legal approach, facilitates the process of gaining a deeper understanding 
of the topic in question and subsequently, aids with the objective of this research enquiry which is 
primarily concerned with the interpretation of different legal texts. The advantage of employing a 
socio-legal approach and relying on a variety of secondary sources, is that it provides contextual 
knowledge and allows the research to build upon existing literature in the field, which arguably is at 
the forefront of any research enquiries.  
 
Another informative source which again facilitates the exploration of law in context, is relying on the 
secondary analysis of official statistics. This is of importance when looking at the insolvency context 
of retention of title clauses, where the official statistics can provide significant insight into the market 
in which retention of title clause operate. It can be argued that such an approach leans towards taking 
an economic analysis of the law28, which will be particularly useful for supporting the wider discussions 
on the current insolvency framework. In this context, it can be said that a partial economic analysis29 
will be followed to investigate a set of rules pertinent to the insolvency framework. To this end, making 
subtle economic inferences, avoids some of the main criticisms of employing a pure economic analysis, 
which centre on the interpretation of law itself.30 Consequently, economic inferences will be alluded 
 
27 Quantitative/ empirical research relies on numerical data. There are two principal reasons behind adopting a 
qualitative research rather than a quantitative approach to this research enquiry. Firstly, an empirical study on 
retention of title clauses has already been observed with the seminal work of Wheeler. See further, S Wheeler, 
Reservation of Title Clauses: Impact and Implications, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Secondly, quantitative 
data on the impact of retention of title clauses is scarce as retention of title clauses do not require any form of 
formal registration. It is acknowledged than an academic enquiry is a continuous research process and thus, it 
is hoped that this thesis lends itself as a platform for assisting the author with future research projects on this 
underexplored area of quantitative research.   
28 Posner brought the economic analysis of the law to the forefront of legal scholarship. See further, R Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law, 8th Ed, New York: Aspen Publishers, 2011. 
29 Although some economic inferences will be made in the context of retention of title clauses, such 
deductions are made organically and do not rely on the seminal principles associated with the economic 
analysis of law concerned with economic theory. Accordingly, the scholarship of economic analysis of law does 
not accurately represent the methodology employed in this thesis, which primarily adopts the doctrinal 
approach.  
30 Economic analysts of law have been criticised widely for claiming that the evaluation of legal rules ought to 
be efficient and as such, a common criticism of the economic analysis of law relates to its focus on efficiency of 
the nature of law itself. See generally, S Shavell “A note on the efficiency v distributional equity in legal 
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to in the context of the insolvency framework to inform the main legal evaluation. However, 
employing a doctrinal approach combined with a socio-legal approach appropriately represents the 
methodology of this research enquiry. Accordingly, simultaneously adopting different but 
complimentary31 methodologies to examine a legal issue will facilitate a more comprehensive analysis 
of retention of title clauses.  
 
Evidently, this research has benefited from adopting a combination of different methodologies, 
primarily employing the doctrinal research approach as a starting point. To engage fully with the 
research objective and the different legal disciplines informing this research enquiry, a breadth of 
sources have been considered. As the research methodology has now been outlined, it is necessary to 
outline the structural content of this thesis.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis and outline of chapters  
 
The remaining parts of Chapter One will seek to introduce retention of title clauses and explain the 
general operation of the law as well as examining the clauses apparent utility within the commercial 
sector. This will be achieved by analysing the legislative basis for retention of title clauses, the inherent 
restrictions on the clauses usefulness, the motivation for using the clauses and other associated legal 
benefits, all of which seek to highlight the importance of retention of title clauses as an advantageous 
commercial mechanism. The discussion on the legal benefits associated with retention of title clause 
is necessary as it seeks to lay the foundation for the later analysis by outlining the necessary content 
and context from which to recognise retention of title clauses functional objectives. Accordingly, this 
section contains a discussion of fundamental importance to the rest of the thesis, by outlining the 
main functional objectives of retention of title clauses as a legal device. This section will provide the 
necessary background information on the general legal position of retention of title clauses under 




rulemaking: Should distributional equity matter given optimal income taxation?” (1981) American Economic 
Review, 414-418; L Kaplow and S Shavell “Why the legal system is less efficient than the income tax in 
redistributing income” (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies, 667-681.   
31 It is widely recognised that the socio-legal approach is complimentary to doctrinal research as both 
methodologies can be used simultaneously to gain a deeper understanding of the legal topic in question. See 
further, F Cownie and A Bradney “Socio-legal Studies: A Challenge to the Doctrinal Approach” in D Watkins and 
M Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law, Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, at 47.  
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Chapter Two continues the previous discussion on legal benefits of retention of title clauses, with a 
refined focus on the super-priority status afforded to retention of title claimants. Arguably, the priority 
afforded to retention of title claimants during insolvency proceedings is one of the most important 
functions of retention of title clauses as it accords the seller with preferential treatment in the event 
of an insolvency. However, as will be examined, this bestowed legal benefit also has the greatest 
impact on third parties during the insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, Chapter Two investigates the 
circumvention of the pari passu principle by retention of title clauses and considers the importance 
ascribed to the super-priority status. It explores the reasons why English law permits the recognition 
of security interests and quasi-security devices (in which retention of title clauses fall) and whether 
there are valid justifications for allowing immunity for retention of title claimants in insolvency 
proceedings. In achieving this aim, an exploration of the main arguments and theories for recognising 
quasi-security devices will be conducted. Correspondingly, this chapter will examine the main 
rationales behind allowing retention of title clauses to bypass the current insolvency framework, to 
the detriment of other involved parties, most notably unsecured creditors. The discussion in this 
chapter will contribute to answering the central research question of this thesis by providing the 
catalyst for analysing whether retention of title clauses are thwarted from achieving their functional 
objectives.  
 
Central to the analysis of Chapter Three will be an evaluation of the clauses objective of retaining legal 
ownership to the goods supplied. This section is intended to be a progressive examination of the issues 
pertinent to retention of title clauses, commencing with the difficulties of terminological and 
definitional accuracy found within the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Accordingly, Chapter Three seeks to 
deal with the first of the substantive challenges to the clauses by investigating the conceptual issues 
with the terms: ‘title’, ‘ownership’ and ‘property’, which are fundamentally important for the 
underlying operation and purpose of retention of title clauses. The arguments in this chapter will 
highlight that the law relating to retention of title clauses is undermined by terminological uncertainty, 
lack of definitions by the legislative instrument and nuances in both the understanding and application 
of key concepts. The analysis in this chapter relates directly to the central research enquiry as it 
evaluates the flexible scope of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the corollary effect of legal uncertainty, 
which has detrimental implications for the functional utility of retention of title clauses. As will be 
explored throughout this chapter, the elusive nature of these terms significantly contributes to the 
legal uncertainty and the minefield of issues hindering retention of title clauses from achieving their 




Chapter Four seeks to demonstrate how the interaction between retention of title clauses and 
registrable charges has invariably prevented the clauses from operating effectively. Central to this 
discussion will be the analysis of the courts’ general reluctance to enforce certain types of retention 
of title clauses and the corollary implications of the clauses being construed as registrable charges as 
per the Companies Act 2006. Accordingly, Chapter Four will extend the discussion on how retention 
of title clauses are impeded from achieving their functional objectives by identifying the challenges of 
retention of title clauses being construed as registrable charges and the corresponding nuances in the 
interpretation and application of retention of title clauses by the courts. In the instance, where a 
retention of title clause is construed by the courts as creating a registrable charge, it will no longer be 
possible for a seller to maintain title to the goods and subsequently, this chapters explores the 
complicated dividing line between retention of title clauses and company charges, which both perform 
similar security functions. In seeking to illustrate the thin dividing line between both legal mechanisms, 
Chapter Four is divided into two parts; with the former part of this chapter analysing the regime of 
company charge registration and the latter half of this chapter focusing on the various legal positions 
based on the different types of retention of title clauses. The former part of the discussion will be 
pivotal as it explains the rationales for and against the requirement of registration, a discussion which 
will bear significance for the later discussion raised in Chapter Seven when discussing potential reform 
measures. Accordingly, Chapter Four will seek to demonstrate that one of the most common 
deterrents to the clauses achieving their functional objectives, is the tendency of the courts to 
interfere with the contractual intention of the parties and to construe the agreement as conferring a 
security interest.  
 
Chapter Five will deal directly with the substantive issues associated with the cursory construction of 
retention of title clauses as either contracts of agency or sui generis contracts and the detrimental 
implications on the overall functionality of retention of title clauses. Thus, the aim of Chapter Five is 
to highlight areas of legal uncertainty, inconsistency and unpredictability arising out of three 
complicated retention of title cases. The analysis in this chapter relates directly to the central research 
question of this thesis as it examines how these three cases undermine the effectiveness and 
functional utility of retention of title clauses. Accordingly, the essence of the analysis will be concerned 
with exposing the difficulties of categorising retention of title clauses as contracts of agency or sui 
generis contracts and the corresponding implications of creating significant legal uncertainty. Thus, 
the overarching aim of this chapter is to critique three cases which have arguably destabilised the legal 
position of retention of title clauses by producing complicated and detrimental implications for those 
seeking to rely on retention of title clauses. The discussion will also seek to demonstrate the courts’ 
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troubling tendency of disregarding the intention of the parties and opting for weak rationalisation of 
legal rules, all of which significantly contribute to the exiting minefield of issues pertaining to retention 
of title clauses under the current legal regime.  
 
Chapter Six evaluates how retention of title clauses are negatively impacted by insolvency 
proceedings. The discussion in this chapter will focus intently on the potential barriers on the use of 
retention of title clauses caused by the statutory moratorium. Emphasis will also be given to how 
claims involving retention of title clauses are hindered by the wording of the legislative instruments, 
and how retention of title claimants are subjected to delays and administrative burdens. The 
arguments put forward during this chapter all seek to evidence how the clauses are impeded from 
fulfilling their functional objectives of providing a convenient mechanism which affords seller priority 
during the insolvency process. Through consulting these issues, Chapter Six will discuss the notable 
hindrances caused by the statutory moratorium during the process of administration, which imposes 
significant limitations on the enforcement of retention of title clauses. Subsequently, an analysis of 
the reactive approach taken by the courts will be conducted and this chapter will demonstrate how 
such an approach results in a lack of clarity and further inconsistency from a judicial standpoint. This 
chapter will also explore the corresponding issues of how recent judicial decisions have limited the 
ways claimants can effectively use retention of title clauses as a defensive mechanism during 
insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, this chapter directly deals with answering the main research 
enquiry by illustrating the many pitfalls facing retention of title claimants when seeking to exercise 
their title retention claims, precipitated by both the statutory moratorium and the broader insolvency 
framework.  
 
The final chapter is devoted to a discussion offering possible solutions to some of the most 
fundamental weaknesses of the current law pertaining to retention of title clauses as identified in 
earlier chapters. Accordingly, a reanalysis of the legal position will be put forward, focussing 
specifically on the viability of any future reform initiatives and any potential difficulties associated with 
reforming this area of law. Chapter Seven will thus conclude the substantive debate of this thesis by 
suggesting three potential solutions which aim to address the most significant issues currently 
obstructing the functional objectives of retention of title clauses. This chapter provides a re-
examination of the initial proposition that retention of title clauses as a legal mechanism are 
obstructed from achieving their functional objectives by significant legal uncertainty and a general 
reluctance observed by the courts to enforce claims involving retention of title clauses. The discussion 
will highlight that the piecemeal approach adopted by the courts has led to an unsatisfactory 
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development of the law and that the law pertaining to retention of title clauses can still be accurately 
described as a legal minefield.  
 
1.4 An overview of retention of title clauses  
 
1.4.1 An explanation of retention of title clauses 
A retention of title clause enables the seller to retain ownership of goods, until the purchase price has 
been paid in full by the buyer.32 As stipulated by McCormack, ‘a reservation of title clause is a clause 
in an agreement whereby the party who is transferring property under that agreement seeks to 
reserve itself the ownership of that property until certain specified conditions have been met.’33 In 
effect, the seller may reserve the title of the goods, despite the goods being in the physical possession 
of the buyer, meaning that the ownership of the goods, does not pass to the buyer until the conditions 
stipulated by the seller have been fulfilled.34 In most circumstances, the condition incorporated within 
the retention of title clauses specifies that payment must be fulfilled before ownership can be 
transferred to the buyer. As such, all goods supplied will belong to the seller, until the buyer has 
fulfilled payment by settling all invoices and any financial obligations. Retention of title clauses claims 
can only be brought by companies, individuals, sellers who have supplied goods to another and have 
incorporated the clause into their contractual agreements. Due to the nature of the business market, 
its highly uncommon for goods to remain in their original state throughout the entire credit period 
and thus, the possibility of goods being manufactured, mixed or even resold to sub-buyers is highly 
likely. Accordingly, different types of retention of title clauses are drafted to accommodate such 
varieties.  
 
Five different types of retention of title clauses have been established by courts and legal 
practitioners: simple, current account, extended, prolonged and aggregation clauses. The first type is 
simple clauses where the seller retains ownership in the goods until the full purchase price has been 
paid. The simple clause can be traced back as far as 1895 whereby Lord Watson pronounced ‘the 
property should not become vested in the purchaser until the last farthing of the price was paid.’35 
 
32 L Sealy and R Hooley, Commercial Law- Texts, Cases and Materials, 4th Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009, at 452.  
33 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, 2nd Ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, at 1.  
34 S Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions, op cit fn 11 at 8. 
35 Alexander Knox McEntire v Crossley Bros [1895] A.C. 457 HL as per Lord Watson at [468]. 
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The second type is current account clause36, where ownership of good supplied is retained by the 
seller until all debts and obligations owed by the buyer to the seller have been paid. The third variety 
is the extended clause37 which has a broader application that its predecessors, in which the seller 
retains ownership of the goods against the buyer and any sub-buyer, until the full purchase price of 
the goods has been paid or until all debts owed to the seller have been met by the buyer.38 The fourth 
type is the prolonged clause,39 where ownership of the goods supplied is retained until the full 
purchase price of the goods has been paid or until all debts owed by the buyer are met, but in the 
instance where the goods are resold to a sub-buyer, then the seller acquires ownership of the 
proceeds of sale generated from the supplied goods. This is achieved through the use of tracing or 
alternatively with a prolonged clause, it is possible for a seller to acquire the right to sue the sub-buyer 
for such proceeds of sale. The most famous instance in which a prolonged clause was recognised was 
in the Romalpa case. The final variety is the aggregation clause40, whereby the seller will retain 
ownership in the good supplied, but, if the goods are manufactured or mixed into some other 
property, then the seller will acquire ‘ownership of the resulting property or of a proportionate part 
of it equal to the contribution made to the manufacturing process by the original goods.’41 It is possible 
for sellers to use several types of retention of title clauses in combination, which adds to the overall 
convenience of the clauses. In addition, it is commonplace for sellers to include retention of title 
clauses within their standard terms in tandem with further contractual provisions of varying 
complexity.42 Typical provisions include the buyer’s duty to store the goods separately as to ensure 
that the supplied goods always remain identifiable and distinguishable from the buyer’s own goods. 
Additionally provisions deal with matters such as allowing the buyer to resell the goods, terms 
purporting to keeping any proceeds of sale, licences permitting the buyer to use or consume the goods 
in the ordinary course of business and so forth. All of which highlight the utility of incorporating 
retention of title clauses as a standard term in contractual agreements.    
 
36 Also referred to as ‘all monies clause’ and ‘all-liabilities clause’. 
37 Also known as ‘continuing clause’. 
38 The extended clause is not frequently found in England and Wales due to two fundamental conceptual 
problems. Firstly, the doctrine of privity of contract prevents a person who is not a direct party to the contract 
from having contractual obligations imposed upon him. In the context of retention of title clauses, since sub-
byers are not parties to the original contract of sale, sub-buyers are not bound by such terms. Secondly, the 
operation of section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 allows a sub-buyer who knows nothing of the retention of 
title clause to receive good title to the goods. See further, J Parris, Retention of Title on the Sale of Goods, London: 
Granada Publishing, 1982, 27-28. See generally Forsythe International (UK) Ltd v Silver Shipping Co. Ltd [1993] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 268; Re Highway Foods [1995] 1 BCLC 209.  
39 Otherwise known as the ‘tracing clause’.  
40 Otherwise known as ‘enlarged clause’. 
41 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 2.  
42 D Fox, R Munday, B Soyer, A Tettenborn, P Turner, Sealy and Hooley’s Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and 




Therefore, a contract which incorporates a retention of title clause is considered essential for a seller 
as it provides a method of guaranteeing payment. It has been purported that retention of title clauses 
are ‘an invaluable tool for the modern businessman, for its utility as a cheap method of granting 
credit’43 and as an ‘economic lifetime in times of recession.’44 Retention of title clauses essentially 
create a security interest over the goods in question as a means of securing the seller’s claim to the 
price of the goods. However, the benefits associated with retention of title clauses are not merely 
limited to providing security for payment of the purchase price as the purpose of the clauses extends 
much further. This was emphasised by Oliver LJ in Clough Mill v Martin:45 
‘I question the correctness of the assumption that the whole purpose of the clause is to give 
the plaintiff security for the payment of the purchase price. No doubt that is a part, and an important 
part, of the purpose of the clause, but put in more general terms its purpose is to protect the plaintiff 
from the insolvency of the buyer in circumstances where the price remains unpaid.’46 
In circumstances such as a buyer’s insolvency, in which the buyer cannot pay for the goods, a pre-
incorporated retention of title clause has the potential to afford the seller better protection compared 
to the position of an unsecured creditor. Within a competitive market, retention of title clauses are 
hugely appealing to sellers/ suppliers, as the protection offered allows the goods to be seized and 
reverted back to the possession of the seller. As such, even if the goods are not in the possession of 
the seller, the seller will be able to lay claim to the goods themselves. Depending on the exact wording 
of the retention of title clause, the seller may also extend to claiming for any proceeds of sale, new 
products made out of the supplied goods or claim against a sub-buyer for the price of the goods in the 
event of the goods being resold to a subsequent purchaser.47   
 
In the event of a buyer’s insolvency, sellers who negotiate valid retention of title clauses are afforded 
higher priority over other creditors, meaning that the sellers do not enter insolvent estate. Specifically, 
the seller’s goods cannot be used to settle the creditor’s claims of insolvency. This is particularly 
significant because as an unsecured creditor, they ‘rank after preferential creditors, mortgagees and 
the holders of floating charges and they receive a raw deal.’48 Accordingly, the seller will not be left 
with an unsecured claim for the purchase price and will be afforded higher priority against competing 
 
43 W Davies “Romalpa thirty years on- still an enigma?” (2006) 4(2) Hertfordshire Law Journal, 2-23, at 23.   
44 J Feld “Retention of Title, Seller v Receiver” (1992) 89 Law Society Gazette, 8 as mentioned in W Davies 
“Romalpa thirty years on- still an enigma?” op cit fn 43.  
45 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1985] 1 W.L.R 111.  
46 ibid as per Oliver LJ at [122]. 
47 See sections 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 5.1.1 for a comprehensive discussion and examples of both prolonged and 
aggregation retention of title clauses.  
48 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25 as per Templemann LJ at [42]. 
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claims in the event of a buyer’s insolvency. Without the use of valid retention of title clauses, the 
priority order for the distribution of assets is deemed unfavourable towards suppliers of goods.49 Thus, 
‘the conferring of immunity and priority by retention of title clauses render them a powerful weapon 
in the advent of insolvency.’50 Under the protection of retention of title clauses, it is clear that seller’s 
losses and exposure to risks of non-payment are minimised. In the event of a buyer’s failure to pay 
the full purchase price of the goods, sellers are not left in a vulnerable position of having an unsecured 
claim for purchase price. Retention of title clauses are a convenient legal mechanism in commerce as 
the clauses are of means of ensuring that payment will be forthcoming and that the sellers will be 
provided with some of protection.51 A more detailed analysis of the legal benefits of retention of title 
clauses will be addressed further on in this section.52  
 
1.4.2 Legal background 
Originally, property in goods could transfer only by delivery.53 However, two notable exceptions 
developed, firstly property could be transferred by way of a deed and secondly under a contract of 
sale, subject to the intentions of the parties.54 The provisions for the passing of property are found in 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979. As per s17 of the Act, property passes when intended to pass. Under 
sections 16 and 17, the goods must either be specific or ascertained for property to pass.55 
Accordingly, s17 of the Act allows parties to delay the passing of title for as long as they wish.56 In the 
event of non-payment before delivery, section 39 of the Act stipulates that an unpaid seller is entitled 
to retain possession of the goods by way of a lien on the goods, right to re-sell or a right of stopping 
the goods in transit. To protect an unpaid seller against the risk of non-payment after delivery, a seller 
must negotiate for protection from the onset.  
 
One method of ensuring protection is by virtue of section 19 of the Act, which provides that a seller 
may reserve the right of disposal of the goods until conditions set by the seller are fulfilled. 
Accordingly, under section 19 property to the goods does not pass to the buyer until the conditions 
stipulated by the seller have been fulfilled. The terminology ‘reserving the right of disposal of the 
 
49 G Monti “The Future of Reservation of Title Clauses in the European Community” (1997) 46 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 866-907, at 866.  
50 J Snead “Rationalising Retention of Title Clauses with Insolvency Law” (2004) UCL Jurisprudence Review, 288-
304, at 289. 
51 ibid at 290.  
52 See section 1.6 for the discussion on the legal benefits associated with retention of title clauses.  
53 See Sale of Goods Act 1893.  
54 See Cochrane v Moore (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 57 as per Fry LJ at [71-73]. 
55 Section 16 and 17 Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
56 D Fox, R Munday, B Soyer, A Tettenborn, P Turner, Sealy and Hooley’s Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, op cit fn 42 at 472. 
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goods’57 may not be the most accurate reflection of the operation of retention of title clauses but the 
intention of the provision is clear- a seller may retain title to the goods until certain conditions are met 
by the buyer.58 Accordingly, section 19 provides the embodiment of the contractual principle as 
parties are free to contract as they will, subject only to the vitiating factors including fraud and 
deceit.59  
 
The combination of both section 17 and 19 of the Sale of Goods Act, provides the legislative basis for 
retention of title clauses. A seller can reserve title in goods until certain conditions have been met, 
even though physical possession of the goods has passed to the buyer. As emphasised by Gullifer, for 
such reasons ‘sellers have developed a powerful method of proprietary protection against 
counterparty credit risk by manipulating the passing of property after delivery.’60 Retention of title 
clauses provides a seller with a proprietary interest in the goods, however this does not impact the 
buyer’s right to possession, right to sell, right to consume or right to use the goods in a manufactured 
process. It is evident that with a valid retention of title clause, a seller’s legal rights are significantly 
stronger. As per section 19 of the Act, the property in the goods will not pass to the buyer, until the 
specific conditions set by the seller have been fulfilled, offering a form of protection to the sellers by 
mitigating risks and losses. Accordingly, retention of title clauses are governed by the law of sales and 
thus, do not constitute a security interest in law, despite the clauses fulfilling the function of security. 
Under the remit of retention of title clauses, the buyer is merely agreeing that it will not acquire 
ownership to the goods until payment of the price, rather than granting rights over its own assets and 
as such does not constitute a security interest in law.61 The English legal framework can thus be 
described as taking a formal rather than functional approach to the characterisation of agreements.62  
 
In the circumstance where a buyer resells the goods, without full payment and without the permission 
of the seller, the subsequent buyer will not acquire title. However, under section 25 of the Sale of 
Goods Act, a buyer who is in possession of the goods and who has obtained consent from the seller, 
can successfully transfer title to the subsequent buyer if he bought the goods in good faith and without 
notice of the seller’s retention of title clause. For the operation of section 25, there must be delivery 
or transfer by way of sale, and as such it is not possible for a receiver nor a liquidator to obtain title by 
 
57 Section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
58 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 1.  
59 J Snead “Rationalising retention of title clauses with insolvency law”, op cit fn 50 at 290. 
60 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?” (2017) 133 Law Quarterly 
Review, 244-268, at 246. 
61 R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th Ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011, at 6. 
62 ibid.  
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virtue of section 25.63 Accordingly, under section 25 of the Act, a sub-buyer who knows nothing of the 
retention of title clauses will receive a good title. In essence, section 25 can override a retention of 
title clause and thus may provide a simple explanation as to why the type of extended retention of 
title clauses are not frequently used in England and Wales.64 As emphasised by Parris ‘the wording of 
section 25(1) appears to be wide enough to cover the situation where a buyer in possession with a 
retention of title clause in favour of the true owners, sells and delivers to a sub-purchaser.’65 From the 
onset, retention of title clauses as a legal mechanism are thus hindered by virtue of section 25 of the 
Sale of Goods Act. A buyer may also acquire good title if the retention of title clauses allows for the 
possibility of resale or does not expressly restrict it. However, to reap the benefits of the clauses, they 
must be incorporated into a contract correctly.  
 
1.4.3 Incorporating a retention of title clause into a contract 
From the perspective of the seller, enforcing retention of title clauses is important, in order to ensure 
that as events unfold, retention of title claimants can claim their contractual rights and take advantage 
of the protection afforded. When suppliers are in the position of dealing one-off contracts with large 
amounts of capital, it is custom for retention of title clauses to be written and drafted as a clause 
within the contract. Otherwise, it is commonplace for suppliers of goods and materials to incorporate 
the retention of title clause within a set terms of conditions within trading documents.66 As 
emphasised by McCormack, ‘well-drafted clauses are hardly worth the paper they are written on if 
they have not been properly incorporated into the contract between the parties.’67 Unless a retention 
of title clause is incorporated, the contract will be held unenforceable. The importance of 
incorporating clauses correctly is fundamental in the event of insolvency, as a liquidator will require 
written evidence of the retention of title clause. 
 
The easiest way for a retention of title clause to be incorporated within a contract of sale is obtaining 
written confirmation by the buyer assenting to the terms of the contract. This is fundamental as during 
the preliminary stages of insolvency, a receiver will seek evidence which confirms the incorporation 
of the title clause and whether the insolvent party accepted such terms. Written confirmation of 
 
63 J Parris, Retention of Title on the Sale of Goods, London: Granada Publishing, 1982, at 45.  
64 Contrastingly, the extended retention of clauses are found commonly in France where the provision is 
known as ‘reservation prolongée’ and in Germany where such provisions are referred to as ‘weitergeleitet 
eigentumsvorbehalt’. For an interesting discussion on why extended clauses are not commonly found in 
England and Wales see: J Parris, Retention of Title on the Sale of Goods, op cit fn 63 at 27-28. 
65 J Parris, Retention of Title on the Sale of Goods, op cit fn 63 at 45. 
66 British Exporters Association, The BExA Guide to Retention of Title Clauses in Export Contracts, 19 available at 
http://www.bexaweb.plus.com/files/rotguideaug05.pdf Accessed 19/01/17. 
67 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 63. 
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retention of title clauses has the potential to speed up the insolvency process by dismissing the 
insolvent’s claim to the goods, and ultimately allowing the specified goods to be reverted to the seller. 
However, liquidators often challenge the validity of incorporating such clauses as reverting the goods 
back to the seller will reduce the available pool of assets for the creditors. As such, in practice, it is 
essential that retention of title clauses are drafted carefully and incorporated properly into the 
contract before acceptance occurs. Even though the notion of exchanging written contracts between 
a seller and buyer may seem a simple procedure, in practice this is rarely simple. Difficulties and issues 
occur due to the nature of the market in which contracts for the supply of goods are often made on a 
fairly ad hoc basis or involve haphazard documentation in the circumstances where there are cash 
flow demands which necessitate stocks to be maintained at a certain quota etc.68  
 
However, in practice, difficulties arise in evidencing that retention of title clause have been properly 
incorporated. The case of P4 Ltd v Unite Integrated Solutions Plc69 provides an important reminder 
that all terms should be legible and included in the contract. In this case, the terms and conditions 
were printed on the reverse of the documentation and it was held that none of the supply contracts 
had incorporated the retention of title clauses, on which the claimant sought to rely. The supplier 
could not establish that the terms and conditions had been sent by fax as only the face of the quotation 
had been received, this led to the conclusion that the supplier had not incorporated the retention of 
title clause, which meant that the claim based on that retention of title clause failed.70 This serves as 
a stark warning for suppliers to ensure that their terms and conditions are communicated to the buyer.  
 
It is important that the seller’s contractual terms are clear and that they must be communicated to 
the buyer effectively. The importance of effectively communicating terms of contract and 
incorporating a retention of title clause properly can be exemplified by the case of Lightning Bolt Ltd 
v Elite Performance Cars Ltd.71 In a claim of conversion, the buyer of two luxury cars was entitled to 
be compensated for loss suffered, when the two luxury cars were seized by the seller as it was held 
that title to the cars had passed to the buyer, despite the inclusion of a retention of title clause.72 It 
was held that the terms purporting to retain title to the luxury cars had not been effectively 
communicated to or accepted by the buyer and for such reasons, the seller had no legal claim to the 
title of the cars. The Chancery Division of the High Court found the document in question (a letter) 
 
68 J Goldring, “Floating charges- the awakening” (2006) 19(5) Insolvency Intelligence, 68-71, at 69.  
69 P4 Ltd v Unite Integrated Solutions Plc [2006] EWHC 2640. 
70 ibid as per Ramsey J at [92]. 




was not apt to create a security or retention of title clause and thus, title had effectively passed to the 
buyer as the terms had not been effectively communicated nor accepted by the buyer. Accordingly, 
the terms and conditions ‘had no impact on the legal position as to title to the cars.’73 For such reasons, 
the claimant’s claim in conversion and trespass to goods was allowed as it was found that the 
defendant (seller) was not the legal owner and was not entitled to remove the two luxury cars from 
the buyers. Accordingly, including a provision for a retention of title clause on a letter as indicated 
above or on the reverse of delivery notes or purchase receipts will render such clauses ineffective.  
 
In accordance with general contract law principles, another way of incorporating a retention of title 
clause is by giving reasonably sufficient notice of the terms, or incorporation by consistent course of 
dealing. Reasonably sufficient notice of the retention of title clause extends to whether or not the 
contractual document has been signed, the onus is on the party seeking to rely on the retention of 
title clause to show that the other party was given reasonably sufficient notice of the existence of the 
clause.74 The ways in which sellers can successfully contend that their retention of title clause has been 
incorporated, has been summarised by Boreham J in John Snow & Co Ltd v DBG Woodcroft & Co Ltd.75 
In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that their terms included a retention of title clause, which entitled 
the plaintiffs to repossess timber as the clause purported to reserve property in the goods until the 
defendant company had discharged all of its indebtedness. The defendant company argued that the 
terms of sale did not contain a retention of title clause. It was found that the plaintiffs had successfully 
established that their retention of title clause had become a term of their various contracts. 
Accordingly, as per Boreham J, incorporation may be established by the following:  
‘(1) If the party sought to be bound was, at the material time, unaware of any writing or 
printing on the document relied upon, he will not be taken to have notice of the term in 
question and thus will not be bound by it,  
(2) If the party sought to be bound was aware, at the material time, that the document relied 
upon contained or referred to terms and conditions he will be taken to have notice of the 
term in question and will be bound by it. 
(3) If the party sought to be bound, knew that the document relied upon contained writing or 
printing, but was unaware that it contained terms or conditions, he will be taken to have 
notice of and thus be bound by the term in question, only if the party seeking to bind him has 
done all that was reasonably sufficient to bring the terms and conditions to his notice. 
Whether what was done was reasonably sufficient for that purpose is to be judged by all the 
 
73 ibid as per His Honour Judge Barker at [29].  




circumstances of the case, including the situations of the parties, the layout and contents of 
the documents relied upon and whether or not the term in question is unusually wide or 
unusually stringent. Some clauses may be so unusual as to require attention drawn to them 
in the most explicit manner.’76 
In this case, the existence of the retention of title clause had been brought to the attention of the 
defendant company, and thus it formed part of the contract and could be relied upon to repossess 
the timber.  
 
In the absence of written conformation at the outset governing the contractual relationship between 
supplier and buyer, it would be necessary to argue that there was a course of dealing between the 
parties. Incorporation by course of dealing would require the supplier to evidence that the retention 
of title clause was brought to the attention of the buyer and thus had been incorporated into the 
contractual agreements. However, a case which refuted the assertion that a retention of title clause 
was incorporated by course of dealing was Wavin Nederland v Excomb.77 In this case, Leggatt J 
expressed the underlying importance of considering whether the notion of relying on previous 
standard terms and conditions incorporated consistently between the parties is legitimate.78 A 
retention of title clause will not be implied into a contract in the situations where the clauses do not 
expressly mention the title retaining provision.79 In addition, a supplier will not be able to rely on 
several invoices upon which retention of title terms are included and claim that the clause has been 
incorporated by a course of dealing. As invoices are post-contractual documents, it is difficult to argue 
that the retention of title terms had been expressly incorporated into the contracts between the two 
parties.80 Although solely relying on various invoices may prove difficult for arguing that the clause 
had been incorporated by course of dealing, it is not an impossible eventuality as can be seen in Circle 
Freight International v Medeast Gulf Exports Ltd.81 In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the 
proper approach was to consider whether in all circumstances, had the seller taken reasonable steps 
to notify the buyer of its intention to trade on the terms relied upon, in which case invoices may prove 
sufficient evidence.82 However, there are instances where retention of title clauses have been 
incorporated by course of dealing including the infamous case of Romalpa. In that case the plaintiffs, 
Aluminium Industrie Vaassen (AIV) alleged that the retention of title clause was an express or implied 
 
76 John Snow and Co Ltd v D.B.G Woodcroft and Co Ltd, op cit fn 74 as per Boreham J at [58]. 
77 Wavin Nederland v Excomb [1983] N.L.J 937. 
78 ibid as per Leggatt J. 
79 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 65. 
80 J Goldring, “Floating charges- the awakening”, op cit fn 68 at 69. 
81 Circle Freight International v Medeast Gulf Exports Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427. 
82 J Goldring, “Floating charges- the awakening”, op cit fn 68 at 70. 
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term of the contract with Romalpa Ltd. Parris was of the opinion that ‘had the transactions between 
AIV and Romalpa Ltd taken place between parties coming afresh to do business with no antecedent 
transactions between them, it is most unlikely that the vital clause 13 [the provision of retention of 
title] would have been held to be a term of the contract of sale.’83   
 
Thus, a retention of title clause will only be effectively incorporated if the term has been brought to 
the attention of the party before or at the time the contract is made. As such, retention of title clauses 
will likely be rejected for non-incorporation, if the terms were imposed after the contract has been 
made.84  However, Bradgate argues that it is possible for a retention of title clause to be imposed after 
the contract has been made under the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act.85 In a contract of sale and 
unascertained goods, sellers are given the option of imposing a retention in the contract of sale or 
through appropriation, by virtue of section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. Bradgate recognises that the 
imposition of a retention of title clause through appropriation may lead to a breach of contract, 
however appropriation may nevertheless prevent the passing of title.86 Imposing a retention of title 
at the time of appropriation may be appropriate in circumstances which involve conducting a contract 
order by telephone, in which the buyer needs goods urgently.87 When the contract is made over the 
phone, any subsequent attempts to include new terms will be ineffective. As such, imposing a 
retention of title clause at the time of appropriating the goods may be the only suitable option for the 
seller. Nevertheless, this is contentious, and it may be possible to rebut imposing a retention of title 
clause after the contract has been made, by implicit reference to section 17, which states property 
passes when intended to pass. As such, imposing a retention of title clause after the contract has been 
made, may be ineffective by considering the intention of the parties and section 17.88 Relying on a 
course of dealing argument should not be relied upon due to the uncertainty of such a claim.  
 
Additionally, if a seller inserts a term within the contract of sale, which includes a retention of title 
clause and the buyer purported to accept the terms of the offer but excludes the retention of title 
clause, this is deemed a counter offer as there is no unconditional acceptance of the offer.89 In 
practice, this can also be difficult to prove, particularly in situations where the seller assumes his terms 
are agreed, but are met with new terms proposed by the buyer, which amounts to a clear rejection of 
 
83 J Parris, Retention of Title on the Sale of Goods, op cit fn 63 at 15.  
84 See Olley v Marlborough Court Ltd [1949] 1 K.B. 532. 
85 See generally, J Bradgate “The Post-Contractual Reservation of Title” (1998) Journal of Business Law, 477-
485. 
86 ibid at 478. 
87 ibid at 480. 
88 ibid at 482.  
89 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 73. 
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terms. If the seller proceeds with the contract of sale, with no further negotiations between the 
parties, then the terms contained in the counter offer will govern the contract, a stipulation otherwise 
known as ‘battle of the forms’.90 As demonstrated in Butler Machine Tool v Ex-Cell-O Corp91, in which 
Lord Denning’s emphasis of construing all communications between the parties as a whole is 
expressed: 
 ‘The terms and conditions of both parties are to be construed together. If they can be 
reconciled to give a harmonious result, all well and good. If differences are irreconcilable- so that they 
are all mutually contradictory- then the conflicting terms may have to be scrapped and replaced by a 
reasonable implication.’92 
This methodology can be seen in more recent cases such as Lidl UK Gmbh v Hertford Foods Ltd,93 which 
involved parties not reaching an agreement as to the applicability of either set of standard terms, and 
as such, the court inferred that the parties had not reached a binding agreement and accordingly the 
terms agreed were those expressly agreed or to be implied by law.94 In addition, attention can be 
drawn to the case of Transformers & Rectifiers Ltd v Needs Ltd95 which emphasises that it is the 
responsibility of the party seeking to incorporate their governing terms into the contract to give 
reasonable notice of such terms to the other party and fully inform the party that it is their intention 
to rely on such terms. Taking all the above into consideration and having outlined potential pitfalls 
with regards to incorporating retention of title terms into a contractual agreement, it is imperative 
that parties communicate their terms and conditions clearly and consistently. In the context of 
retention of title clauses, sellers of goods must be proactive from the onset in clarifying which terms 
govern their contract of sale. Parties seeking to rely on a retention of title clause should thus ensure 
that the clause in question has been effectively incorporated into the contracts of sale. To reiterate, 
such clauses should be clearly set out and must be brought to the attention of the other party. It is 
submitted by Bradgate, that a buyer will rarely be concerned with when exactly property passes to 
buyer as long as the buyer is in possession of the goods and is able to use the goods.96 Therefore, 
following this analysis a buyer will seldom contradict the inclusion of a retention of title clause if it has 
been brought to the attention of the buyer before the contract is made.  
 
 
90 See further Butler Machine Tool CO v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Limited [1977] EWCA Civ 9. 
91 ibid. 
92 ibid as per Lord Denning at [104].  
93 Lidl UK Gmbh v Herford Food Ltd & Another [2001] EWCA Civ 938. 
94 ibid as per Lord Justice Chadwick at [25].  
95 Transformers & Rectifiers Ltd v Needs Ltd [2015] EWHC 269. 
96 J Bradgate “The Post-Contractual Reservation of Title”, op cit fn 85 at 479.  
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It is evident that preparation is key for any companies intending the outcome of a retention of title 
clause to be successful. Accordingly, resources must be collated in order to properly enforce retention 
of title clauses, for example resources should include lawyers, debt collectors, haulage firms, 
alternative buyers and storage facilities etc.97 Exercising suppliers’ rights under a claim of title 
retention can be considered costly as a successful recovery of goods involves costs relating to 
transport, repacking, storage and legal fees. Therefore, it is considered good practice for companies 
to set aside contingency funds to finance an operation of this kind.  
 
1.4.4 Inherent restrictions of usefulness 
1.4.4 (a) Limitations of retention of title clauses 
Whether or not a retention of title clause will be effective is wholly dependent on the nature of the 
business, the type of goods sold by the supplier and the wording of the clause. As discussed below, 
there are several variables which may impact on the functional utility of a retention of title clause. 
There are essentially three types of goods, where retention of title clauses are of limited use: 
perishable, incorporated goods and mixed goods. Therefore, a minority group of suppliers exist who 
as a result of the goods they are selling, cannot effectively nor logically retain title and thus, are usually 
subjected to the harsh insolvency costs.98 This section analyses the restrictions of retention of title 
clauses, in which the instances whereby retention of title clauses are less applicable will be presented.  
 
1.4.4 (b) Perishable goods 
Retention of title clauses are considered of less practical benefit in respect of perishable goods. The 
term ‘perishable goods’ refers to goods which are highly vulnerable and deteriorate in a short amount 
of time. The effectiveness and utility of retention of title clauses in respect of processed goods can 
also be questioned, as discussed below. In circumstances where businesses are primarily involved with 
customers of consumables, it is evident that claims for retention of title clauses are less likely as they 
will be rendered ineffective, as the sellers will not be able to make use of such a clause as the goods 
are mostly perishable.99 ‘Goods that are consumable cannot, prima facie, be protected by such clauses 
as by their nature once they are supplied they cease to exist.’100 Arguably retention of title clauses can 
 
97 British Exporters Association, The BExA Guide to Retention of Title Clauses in Export Contracts, 19 available at 
http://www.bexaweb.plus.com/files/rotguideaug05.pdf Accessed 19/01/17. 
98 V Finch “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who pays the price?” (1999) 62 The Modern Law Review, 633-670, at 
647.  
99 J Spencer “The commercial realities of reservation of title clauses” (1989) Journal of Business Law, 220-232, 
at 228. 
100 J Tribe “The morality of Romalpa clauses in corporate insolvency: a case for reform?” (2001) 17 Insolvency 
Law and Practice, 1-19, at 3.  
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only be effective whilst the goods still exist and thus become ineffective once the goods cease to 
exist.101 
 
Examples include businesses who deal with fuel, livestock purposed for consumption or paint whereby 
retention of title clauses would be ineffective as the sellers will not be able to retrieve their goods. 
This matter was pinpointed by the Cork Committee: ‘fuel supplied to heat furnaces or fodder supplied 
for livestock, disappears on consumption and paint applied to the fabric of a factory becomes attached 
to the realty; the supplier of credit is necessarily left with an unsecured claim in the insolvency of the 
customer.’102 Arguably, the fundamental purpose of retention of title is thus not immediately logical, 
in situations where sellers have relinquished possession of the goods supplied which are perishable in 
nature. Additionally, the objective of a seller seeking to maintain certain rights in goods, can be 
increasingly more challenging in the fast-paced industry of supply contracts. Within the market of 
commodity supply contracts, goods such as petrol, coal, oils can be sold, used, consumed by several 
different buyers before reaching its final distant buyer, thus adding to argument that retention of title 
clauses are thus not immediately logical nor effective in commodity supply contracts.103 The 
implications of supply contracts including retention of title terms for bunkers fuel, will be discussed at 
length in a forthcoming chapter.104  
 
The inherent limitations of retention of title clauses and perishable goods can be demonstrated by the 
case of Chaigley Farms Ltd v Crawford Kaye & Grayshire Ltd.105 In this case, Chaigley Farms supplied 
livestock consisting of beef cattle and ewes for slaughter to an abattoir, on the basis of a retention of 
title clause. The retention of title terms specified that the livestock would remain the property of the 
supplier (Chaigley Farms) until the property was paid for in full. Receivers (Crawford Kaye & Grayshire) 
were appointed for the abattoir and the remaining livestock was slaughtered and all the meat was 
sold. Chaigley Farms called the property back to enforce the retention of title clause, which provided 
that the livestock and carcasses remained the property of Chaigley Farms until the property was sold 
on to the defendants’ customers. It was held that the words ‘livestock’ and ‘goods’ could only refer to 
live animals and thus, the terms could not be given the extended meaning of carcasses. As explained 
 
101 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans” (2019) Journal of Business Law, 1-20, at 4. 
102 K Cork, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558 known as the 
“Cork Report.”  
103 B Ellison, L Williams and S Fellows ‘Commodities contracts and the impact of the OW Bunkers case’ (2016) 
available at https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2016/06/commodities-contracts-and-the-impact-of-
the-ow-bun%20 Accessed 02/08/2018. 
104 For further discussion of this, see section 5.3. 
105 Chaigley Farms Ltd v Crawford Kaye & Grayshire Ltd (t/a Leylands) [1996] BCC 957. 
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by Garland J: ‘there is, in my view, an inescapable difference between a live animal and a dead one.’106  
Accordingly, the livestock had lost their identity when the livestock became carcasses of meat. The 
judgement explained that the retention of title clause would have been effective so long as the animals 
were alive, however when the livestock was slaughtered, the title to the property had been 
extinguished.107 This case is useful in explaining that retention of title clauses for livestock will most 
likely be ineffective as title would be lost on slaughter. The rigid English approach to perishable or 
processed goods can be contrasted with the lenient approach taken by the New Zealand courts in Re 
Weddell New Zealand Ltd108 to perishable goods. The facts of Re Weddell mirror Chaigley Farms, in 
which owners of cattle had supplied livestock to an abattoir under the provision of a retention of title 
clause, reserving title until the full purchase price had been paid. However, in the latter case the 
retention of title clause was held to be effective in reserving the seller’s ownership of livestock after 
the slaughtering and further processing.109 As such, the seller was able to assert a retention of title 
clause to carcasses and meat, following the act of slaughtering livestock. The distinguishing factor of 
the case was that Re Weddell contained a retention of title clause, which was inserted into the contract 
by the buyer to protect themselves during the act of slaughtering and processing the meat. This 
distinction serves to emphasise that the wording of a retention of title clause can significantly impact 
the intended results. Accordingly, this retention of title clause was not incorporated into the contract 
to protect the seller against the risk of non-payment, but rather by the buyer to protect themselves 
during the course of slaughtering, this may explain the vastly different outcomes of the two cases.110 
Nevertheless, the position taken from the Chaigley Farms case demonstrates that when livestock is 
slaughtered, the seller’s title to the goods will be extinguished and subsequently, title will pass from 
seller to buyer, rendering the retention of title clause to livestock redundant.111  
 
For a more recent example of how the courts deal with retention of title clauses and goods which 
perish once used or consumed, the case of PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited112 
can be helpful. In this case a contract for the supply of fuel bunkers included a retention of title clause, 
which purported to protect the supplier against the risk of non-payment, they were three main parties 
to the contract OW Bunkers, the physical suppliers and the shipowners. A more detailed analysis of 
 
106 Chaigley Farms Ltd v Crawford Kaye & Grayshire Ltd (t/a Leylands), op cit fn 105 as per Garland J at [963]. 
107 ibid at [958].  
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110 J De Lacy “Retention of title and claims against processed goods: a different approach” (1996) 13(5) 
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52-57, at 56.  
112 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited [2016] UKSC 23. 
35 
 
the case and its implications is discussed in a later chapter.113 The contract stipulated that title to the 
fuel bunkers would remain with the supplier until full payment was made. Despite the inclusion of a 
retention of title clause, the contract expressly provided that from the moment of delivery the 
shipowners were permitted to use the fuel bunkers for the purposes of propulsion. Accordingly, the 
contract permitted the shipowners to consume the fuel during the period of credit, which lead to the 
shipowner receiving and consuming the fuel before payment became due. OW Bunker became 
insolvent and the physical supplier intended to claim the price of the fuel by relying on the inclusion 
of the retention of title clauses within the contracts. It was held by the Supreme Court that the 
contracts were not ‘contracts of sale’ under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The rationale for the decision 
was that there can only be a contract of sale if title to the goods successfully passes from supplier to 
a buyer. Title could not pass under these contracts, due to the type of goods supplied being fuel 
bunkers, which may not exist at the time of full payment. The court explained that the combination 
of the retention of title clause, credit period and permission to use the bunkers for propulsion 
purposes, implied that the parties had an understanding that title would not transfer as the bunkers 
were likely to be consumed before payment was due. As there was an understanding that the bunkers 
would be consumed before the end of the credit period, the court held that the contract was not a 
contract of sale but rather a sui generis contract. On the assumed facts of the case and specifically the 
wording of the retention of title clause, the owners were liable for the price under a contract sui 
generis, rather than a contract of sale.114 The consequences of this decision meant that the retention 
of title clause could not be relied upon to recover the price of the fuel. This has implications for 
perishable goods as difficulties arise when ascertaining what constitutes a ‘contract of sale’ within the 
meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 s2(1). It is clear from the above case, that title is unlikely to 
pass in such situations. Accordingly, it is not possible to own something that ceases to exist after 
consumption. The above case clarifies that in situations involving goods that can be consumed during 
the credit period, which also include a retention of title clause provision, this will not constitute a 
‘contract of sale’ and as such the protection afforded under the Sales of Goods Act will not be 
available.  
 
Accordingly, from the above discussion, it is heavily implied that some particular goods are inherently 
unsuitable for the purposes of a retention of title clause such as fresh flowers or newspapers.115 The 
proceeding examples emphasise that retention of title clauses may not be practical to broader 
 
113 See section 5.3 for a detailed analysis on the Bunkers case.  
114 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [26-39]. 
115 British Exporters Association, The BExA Guide to Retention of Title Clauses in Export Contracts, 17 available 
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categories of goods with limited shelf life. As fresh flowers constitute perishable goods, the retention 
of title clause is unlikely to be useful as the goods may perish before payment is due. Accordingly, the 
protection purported to suppliers via the use of an effective retention of title clause will be 
inadequate, due to the commercial reality of perishable goods risking a high possibility that the goods 
would have been used or disposed of prior to the fulfilment of the conditions imposed by the contract. 
To preserve rights in reclaiming perishable goods would incur unnecessary loss to both the buyer and 
the supplier, who would each suffer some type of economic detriment. Additionally, perishable goods 
tend to have a low resale value, which forms another reason why retention of title clauses are of little 
use for suppliers of perishable goods. 
 
1.4.4 (c) Incorporated goods 
Similarly, retention of title clauses are not useful in relation to goods that have been incorporated. 
The definition of incorporated goods includes examples such as building materials and products which 
have been integrated into buildings.116 In such circumstances, the logistics and costs of the recovery 
of the goods under a retention of title clause would be unrealistic and would vastly exceed the value 
of the original goods. Therefore, retention of title clauses are of limited use when the costs of recovery 
are disproportionate to the value of the incorporated goods. Similarities can also be made where 
goods supplied have become affixed to the land, in which case the goods ceased to exist for the 
purpose of a retention of title claim once the goods have become part of the land. Affixed goods such 
as partitions and shelving systems are borderline and will ultimately depend on a case by case basis.117  
 
This line of reasoning also applies to special purpose items such as carpets, which once fitted would 
be of little use for any other purpose.118 Accordingly, bespoke goods which have been manufactured 
for a specific purpose, lessen the overall efficacy of retention of title clauses as such goods cannot be 
resold or can only incur very low costs for the impugned goods. However, it is evident that in most 
cases suppliers of goods will not be truly interested in retrieving the goods as the probability of 
depreciation through wear and tear would be high.119 Additionally, in most circumstances retrieving 
the initial goods would also mean that the seller would have to source out the goods to another buyer. 
In these situations, the seller risks incurring higher costs than the actual worth of the original goods.  
 
 
116 J Spencer “The commercial realities of reservation of title clauses”, op cit fn 99 at 221.  
117 J Goldring, “Floating charges- the awakening”, op cit fn 68 at 70. 
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Therefore, a supplier would be more interested in incorporating a retention of title clause which allows 
the recovery of the invoice price of the goods, which enables the supplier to manage his own costs 
and ultimately obtain profit.120 Accordingly, ‘[retention of title clauses] seem to prove a strong quasi-
security device for providing credit.’121 This is particularly advantageous to suppliers and sellers who 
under the protection of a valid retention of title clause would be in a stronger position to obtain the 
monetary value of the goods.  
 
1.4.4 (d) Mixed goods 
It is increasingly common for supplied goods to be used or manufactured by the buyer to create new 
mixed products resulting in the integration of the supplied goods and other goods. Whether a seller 
can retain title in circumstances where goods have been supplied and have been subsequently mixed 
with other goods is disputable. For such reasons, this area has led to an influx of case law, whereby 
countless attempts have been made to address the issue of retention of title clauses and mixed goods. 
Retention of title clauses relating to mixed goods has become a contentious legal topic and problems 
emanate from attempting to identify the precise circumstances where goods either remain or change 
from their original state. The efficacy of a retention of title clause is contingent on goods remaining in 
their original state as to allow the seller to rely on the clause and subsequently recover any goods.122   
 
However, it is apparent that the courts approach to mixed goods and retention of title clauses is 
twofold. Firstly, a seller with an appropriate retention of title clause will be able to retain title, 
provided that the original goods remain identifiable and can be removed without damage to the other 
goods comprising the mixed good.123 Whether the supplied goods have lost their identify having being 
incorporated into a finished product is a question of fact. Secondly, if the goods lose their identity 
during the manufacturing process, the seller will in fact lose title of the goods.124 For example, where 
flour has been supplied to a buyer, who bakes a cake using the supplied flour, the flour is no longer 
identifiable and thus a retention of title clause will be ineffective. Consequently, the courts attempt 
to distinguish effective retention of title clauses of mixed goods by ascertaining whether or not the 
original goods remain identifiable or not. In order for a seller to effectively enforce a retention of title 
clause on mixed goods, the seller must be able to demonstrate to the courts that the goods supplied 
have not lost their original identity whilst in the buyer’s possession. Although it may appear that the 
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law on mixed goods or aggregation retention of title clauses is relatively settled, difficulties persist 
with the conceptual notion of goods losing identity. Examples include whether the goods supplied are 
in the exact same condition but have merely been painted or amended slightly for use, does this 
constitute changing the identify of the goods? It is difficult to precisely say with any certainty and as 
such results are difficult to predict. It has been suggested that the reversibility of the process and the 
value of what has been added to the goods may be regarded as relevant factors for answering the 
difficult question of losing the goods identity125, however one thing is apparent that difficulties 
continue to perplex this problematic area of the law. The contentious matter is identifying when 
certain goods have lost their identity, which will vary on a case by case basis as discussed in Chapter 
Four.126 
 
Despite the inherent limitations on retention of title clauses and the unlikelihood of retrieving goods 
of perishable, incorporated or mixed nature. It can be argued that the supplier of such goods may not 
be truly invested or concerned with regaining the supplied goods but is instead more interested in the 
invoice price of the goods. As such, the real intention behind suppliers relying on retention of title 
clauses is not restricted to the prospect of retrieving supplied goods which may deteriorate through 
wear and time.127 Retrieving the goods under the retention of title clause would also necessitate 
suppliers finding new potential buyers for their supplied goods. Accordingly, claiming the price of the 
goods may be the most cost-effective solution as it would allow the sellers to offset their own costs 
and obtain any potential profit.128 Thus, despite the illusory limitations of retention of title clauses, it 
is apparent that the clause provides seller the opportunity to gain a stronger position of obtaining 
credit and retrieving the price of the goods.  
 
1.4.4 (e) Buyers in possession and third-party acquirers of goods 
 
As aforementioned, retention of title clauses can be defeated if the buyer sells the supplied goods to 
a third-party purchaser who buys goods in good faith and without notice of the seller’s original 
retention of title clause.129 Accordingly, the discussion will now turn to consider how far in principle 
third party acquirers of goods sold under retention of title clauses ought to take free of such interests 
as provided under section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act. Despite some judicial ambiguity as to the 
meaning of section 25, most notably in respect of ‘mercantile agent in possession of the goods,’ it is 
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now generally accepted that section 25 refers to any transaction which takes place in the ordinary 
course of business between a buyer and a third-party buyer (sub-purchaser).130 The transaction must 
be one where the person in possession of the goods has acquired goods under a contract for the sale 
of goods.131 Accordingly, if the goods are supplied as part of a contract for the provision of work and 
materials, then section 25(1) will cease to be applicable.132 The effect of section 25 seems to contradict 
the fundamental premise of a retention of title clause, which prevents title from passing until the 
seller has obtained the purchase price of the goods supplied.133 A retention of title clause will thus 
only be effective under the circumstances where the sub-buyer has acquired the goods in a fraudulent 
or dishonest manner or is made aware of the original retention of title clause provision. Furthermore, 
cases such as Four Point Garage Ltd v Carter134 have established that section 25 has a broad remit as 
buyers need not necessarily take possession of the goods for title to pass to third parties.135 In practical 
terms, this severely weakens the utility of retention of title clauses as when a  buyer sells goods to a 
sub-purchaser without paying for the original goods supplied, and the buyer later becomes insolvent, 
the recourse of claiming the full purchase price of the goods will be of little benefit for the retention 
of title claimant, rendering the seller at risk.136  
 
Due to the inherent popularity and widespread use of retention of title clauses, it is not an uncommon 
scenario for goods to be bought and supplied on terms which both contain retention of title provisions. 
In this instance, a seller supplies goods to a buyer on retention of title terms and the buyer resells the 
goods to a sub-purchaser subject to a similar stipulation, causing a conflict of ownership to exist. One 
underlying argument for why third-party acquirers of goods ought to take free of their interests, lies 
in ensuring the free flow of commerce. Section 25(1) allows the transfer of goods in the ordinary 
course of business, which effectively facilitates commerce and protects innocent third parties. 
Retention of title clauses should be construed in light of commercial reality and thus, commerce would 
 
130 See Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 Q B 560. It must be noted that this case concerned the 
Factors Act 1889, rather than the Sale of Goods Act 1978, however the wording of the former is almost 
identical to that found in the Sale of Goods provision. See further s9 of the Factors Act 1889. 
131 I Davies, Retention of Title Clauses in Sale of Goods Contracts in Europe, Oxon: Routledge, 2017 at 109. 
132 See Dawber Williamson Roofing Ltd v Humberside County Council [1979] CLY 212. 
133 N Beale and R Mitchell “Retention of title clauses and s25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979” (2009) 25(7) 
Construction Law Journal, 498-503, at 501.  
134 Four Point Garage Ltd v Carter [1985] 3 All E.R. 12. 
135 ibid, as per Simon Brown J. 
136 In such circumstances, the seller will also encounter several challenges including demonstrating the 
incorporation of terms, having to identify the goods, having to identify the third-party purchaser, rights to 
enter premises to recover the goods. Overcoming such issues merely illustrates the difficulties retention of 
title claimants face in respect of third-party rights. See section 1.4.3 and generally Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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be unduly restricted if such clauses would automatically override any sub-sales of goods.137 Indeed, 
buyers have been given implicit authority to pass title to sub-purchasers despite the inclusion of a  
retention of title clause as it has been argued that buyers’ businesses would otherwise come to an 
abrupt halt.138 Similarly, English law has historically not allowed retention of title clauses to extend to 
proceeds of sale as the effects on third parties would be unacceptable.139 Arguably, third parties 
should take free of their interests as it ensures the protection and enhancement of commerce. 
However, in Re Highway Foods140 in which all transactions contained retention of title provisions, the 
outcome favoured the original seller and sub-purchaser by essentially setting aside the buyer, to allow 
for the seller and sub-purchaser to directly deal with each other.141 The approach adopted in Re 
Highway Foods of stipulating that the buyer had an agreement to sell, had implications of limiting the 
buyer’s protection to merely a claim of conversion.142 By limiting the buyer’s recourse to only a 
conversion claim, this creates substantial risk for large cohorts of buyers as retention of title clauses 
will commonly be construed as agreements to sell, thus negating the impact of section 25(1).143  In 
addition, by setting aside the buyer from the transaction, this can lead to adverse consequences such 
as facilitating fraud, incurring higher transaction costs and causing uncertainty for situations of 
increased complexity.144 By cutting out the buyer from the agreement, this effectively unravels and 
shortens the chain of transactions, causing further uncertainty into an area of law which 
fundamentally requires clarity and coherence. The effect of Re Highway emphasises that sub-
 
137 See further, Fairfax Gerrard Holdings Ltd v Capital Bank Plc [2007] EWCA Civ 1226 in which the sub-
purchaser attempted to rely on section 25(1) of the Sale of Goods Act but failed as the buyer could not prove 
that it bought in good faith. For interesting case commentaries, see: S Thomas “The Role of Authorization in 
Title Conflicts Involving Retention of Title Clauses: Some American Lessons” (2014) 43(1) Common Law World 
Review, 1-26; K Loi “Retention of Title and Implied Authority to Pass Title to Sub-buyers” (2008) Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 427-432. 
138 K Loi “Retention of Title and Implied Authority to Pass Title to Sub-buyers” (2008) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly, 427-432 at 429. See also Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium 
Ltd, op cit fn 3; Four Point Garage Ltd v Carter [1985] 3 All E.R. 12. 
139 D Sheehan “Registration, re-characterisation of quasi-security and the nemo date rules” (2018) 7 Journal of 
Business Law, 584-605, at 590 in which Sheehan argues that ‘allowing the retention of title creditor first claim 
on debts due from customers would decimate the invoice factoring industry where those very debts are sold at 
a discount to the factor to provide cash for the debtor.’ See also section 4.4.3 for a detailed discussion on 
prolonged retention of title clauses.  
140 Re Highway Foods International Ltd (in Administration Receivership) [1995] BCC 271.  
141 In Re Highway Foods meat was sold by Harris to Highway Foods using a retention of title clause. The goods 
were then sub-sold to Kingfry subject to a retention of title clause. Highway Foods failed to pay the price under 
the first retention of title clause, which led to Harris and Kingfry agreeing to a new contract of sale once Harris 
had managed to repossess the goods under the first retention of title clause. For a full account of the factual 
circumstances of Re Highway Foods see further, A Tettenborn “Reservation of Title- Nemo dat and Double 
Sale” (1996) 55(1) The Cambridge Law Journal, 26-28.  
142 See P4 Limited v Unite Integrated Solutions [2006] EWHC 2924. 
143 S Thomas “The Role of Authorization in Title Conflicts Involving Retention of Title Clauses: Some American 
Lessons” (2014) 43(1) Common Law World Review, 1-26, at 3.  
144 ibid at 14, where Thomas argues that the original seller and sub-purchaser could deliberately fail to pay the 
middleman, thus leading to a mild form of fraud against the buyer.  
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purchasers are not always guaranteed protection in their position, as despite the seller in this case 
agreeing to sell the goods at the same price as the buyer, this clearly will not happen in all instances. 
It seems that sub-purchasers may be susceptible to sellers inflating their costs to gain a windfall. 
Similar cases such as Fairfax145 highlight the difficulty of maintaining an effective balance between 
sellers and sub-purchasers subject to retention of title provisions. In such cases, the seller will seek to 
maintain an interest in either the original goods or in the proceeds of sale. Most notably, if the seller’s 
claim to proceeds of sale fails, they will undoubtedly seek to exercise control over the original goods 
by attempting to recover from sub-purchasers. If Fairfax were to be followed in providing greater 
protection to sub-purchasers through implication of authority to sell, there is a greater risk of having 
to address this unfavourable balance146 by allowing sellers to trace their claims into proceeds of sale.147  
 
Arguably, the decisions in Re Highway Foods and Fairfax have exposed some inherent weaknesses in 
the way the English common law has dealt with matters concerning title conflicts, whereby the 
interpretation of retention of title clauses has had unexpected repercussions on the application of 
section 25(1) which essentially interferes with the flow of commerce. Evidently for situations involving 
retention of title provisions and third-party sub-purchasers, third party acquirers of goods should 
realise that by taking free of such interests, they jeopardise the position of the middleman as the buyer 
will have to bear the brunt of the risk.148 In addition, third party sub-purchaser need to be aware that 
their position does not always guarantee protection as the possibility of being swindled by sellers is 
highly probable.    
 
1.4.5 Adoption 
1.4.5 (a) Widespread Use by Large Firms 
The widespread adoption of retention of title clauses is specifically apparent in larger sized businesses 
who demonstrate a deeper understanding of the usefulness of retention of title clauses within the 
 
145 Fairfax Gerrard Holdings Ltd v Capital Bank Plc [2007] EWCA Civ 1226. 
146 See K Loi “Retention of Title and Implied Authority to Pass Title to Sub-buyers” (2008) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly, 427-432 at 431 where she argues that the pendulum has swung from protecting 
property rights to protecting bona fide purchasers who acquire property without notice. See also Bishopsgate 
Motor Finance Corp v Transport Brakes Ltd [1949] 1 KB 332 as per Lord Denning at [336-337]. 
147 D Sheehan “Registration, re-characterisation of quasi-security and the nemo date rules”, op cit fn 139 at 
599.  
148 It has been suggested that §9-320(a) of the United States Uniform Commercial Code provides a more 
coherent system for dealing with title conflicts involving retention of title provisions. Under American law, 
retention of title clauses are deemed to be security interests by virtue of §1-201(b)(35) and thus, it is the 
secured party who bears the losses as they are in a better position than the buyer/ third-party purchaser to 
take precautionary measures (i.e. insurance) to prevent such losses. A comprehensive account on Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code is beyond the scope of the thesis. See generally, G McCormack, Secured Credit 
under English and American Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
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commercial sector.149 Large corporate businesses have the capacity to dictate contractual terms, 
because of their powerful bargaining position which facilitates the inclusion of retention of title 
clauses. ‘Quasi-security devices tend to be used by the larger, better-placed companies who would 
otherwise be unsecured.’150 Most notably, retention of title clauses are incorporated within contracts 
by large companies who are dealing with small businesses of poor reputation, as the retention of title 
clauses provides the necessary protection from unforeseeable risks. It is suggested that there is a 
consistent use of retention of title clauses by manufacturers and suppliers, irrespective of the motives 
of using the clauses to deal with less trustworthy customers. 
 
1.4.5 (b) Requirement for credit insurance cover? 
Conferring the use of retention of title clauses in internal commerce practices is advised as such 
clauses ‘improve your chances of being able to avoid a bad debt write-off in the event that you are 
not paid, but also credit insurers are now much more inclined to require the use of such clause if they 
are to insure your domestic and export trade.’151 Therefore, it has become increasingly common for 
insurers to require the use of a retention of title clause as a condition of their insurance cover, meaning 
that companies seeking insurance cover for goods are also encouraged to incorporate such clauses. 
Hence, the widespread use of retention of title clauses also extends to companies wishing to gain valid 
insurance, thus indicating the inherent worth of the clauses within the insurance sector. As it has 
become more common for insurances to directly request companies to incorporate retention of title 
clauses in contractual arrangements, this may have positive implications on companies such as 
increasing the availability of finance and widening the access for cheaper financing.152 This highlights 
that those companies wishing to improve credit insurance terms are very likely to use retention of 
title clauses. With respect to companies supplying specific goods, it is inherent that retention of title 
clauses are frequently employed by companies who are supplying unique or high intrinsic value goods 
in order to alleviate any potential risks in the event of forfeiture.153 However, as the risk of non-
payment of goods is apparent to all businesses, the list of those using a valid retention of title clause 
is non-exhaustive and is not limited to companies of a certain size or reputation. 
 
 
149 See generally, S Wheeler, Reservation of Title Clauses: Impact and Implications, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991. 
150 V Finch “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who pays the price?”, op cit fn 98 at 647. 
151 British Exporters Association, The BExA Guide to Retention of Title Clauses in Export Contracts, 2 available at 
http://www.bexaweb.plus.com/files/rotguideaug05.pdf Accessed 19/01/17. 
152 ibid at 36. 
153 ibid at 9. 
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Nevertheless, the inherent restrictions of retention of title clauses as highlighted above, may 
detrimentally affect insurance and sellers of specific types of goods such as perishable goods. In those 
situations, a retention of title clause would be of no practical benefit. It is evident that perishable 
goods invite their own problems with gaining valid insurance cover as suppliers must contend with 
added complications such as issues with refrigeration or traceability of the goods.154 In the event of 
insolvency, insolvency practitioners’ primary concerns will be attempting to sell the business on, which 
may raise fundamental issues with suppliers of perishable goods. To this avail, insurers will insist on 
the inclusion of a valid retention of title clause, in situations where the goods in question have a resale 
value.  
 
The relevance of credit insurers insisting on the incorporation of a retention of title clause within terms 
of sale can be evidenced by the recent administration of House of Fraser in August 2018, which has 
resulted with an estimated £484 million worth of debt owed to House of Fraser’s suppliers.155 The 
collapse of House of Fraser led to a ‘Pre-pack’ acquisition of various House of Fraser entities by the 
Sports Direct Group. However, on account of the acquisition being an insolvent asset sale, all liabilities 
are subsequently left behind resulting in the Sports Direct Group not acquiring nor agreeing to pay 
any liabilities prior to the date of acquisition. House of Fraser suppliers with valid retention of title 
clauses, which enable the supplier to retain title to stock/goods until they have been paid, are given 
leverage over Sports Direct by requesting payment under the provision of the clause, before the stock 
can be sold.156 Accordingly, the suppliers with valid retention of title clause will receive a better and 
quicker recovery compared to the position of an unsecured creditor. The plight of the unsecured 
creditor is discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
1.4.5 (c) Smaller businesses and potential drawbacks 
Interestingly, a survey aimed at small to medium-sized businesses supplying materials157 purported a 
relatively high proportion of not including a retention of clauses (41%).158 Amongst the smaller-sized 
businesses it was reported that 14% had never considered the possibility of incorporating a retention 
 




156 S Clarke and M Trottier “House of Fraser administration: Do suppliers have legal rights over debts?” (2018), 
Available at https://www.cips.org/en-GB/supply-management/opinion/2018/august/house-of-fraser-
administration-do-suppliers-have-legal-rights-over-debts/ Accessed 27/11/18. 
157 Small to medium sized business refers to businesses employing up to 5,000 employees. UK Government, 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Mid-Sized Businesses, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/mid-sized-businesses Accessed 08/04/2018. 
158 J Spencer “The commercial realities of reservation of title clauses”, op cit fn 99 at 221.  
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of title clause.159 Reasons for smaller businesses disregarding the retention of title clause include 
ignorance of the legal concept, discouraged by the cost implications of obtaining legal advice, or their 
weak bargaining position against larger trading partners, which stifles their capacity to include a 
retention of title clause.160 One noticeable drawback of retention of title clauses, which discourages 
the use of these clauses in smaller sized businesses concerns the costs involved. There is a lack of 
registration requirement for retention of title clauses however, the initial negotiating costs of 
incorporating a retention of title clause may be considered too excessive for smaller businesses.161 
Accordingly, even though the initial cost of incorporating a retention of title clause is relatively low, 
the enforcement and feasibility costs may ultimately discourage small businesses. This will be most 
evident in situations where a seller is supplying small stock to a buyer. In these circumstances, 
retention of title clauses may not be worthwhile: ‘where a trade creditor advances a small stock of 
timber to a building firm for later payment, the sums involved may not justify the costs of drawing up 
a security agreement.’162 Similar reasons can be applied to companies who are under tight deadlines 
to supply a large number of goods; in these situations drafting and incorporating a standard contract 
with a retention of title clauses may not be suitable to certain companies.  
 
Additionally, the act of incorporating a retention of title clause within any contractual agreement may 
impact the potential trading relationships between small businesses and partners, as it is implied that 
the trading partner cannot be trusted and requires the small businesses to safeguard itself. It could be 
stipulated that such actions ‘would not create a good impression of a company’s credit worthiness 
and financial situation.’163 The lack of trust within trading relationships and the undermining of the 
retention of title clause may lead to detrimental financial consequences to small companies such as 
loss of potential business.164 Amongst smaller businesses, this issue of lacking trust may prove difficult 
in the process of incorporating a clause effectively within their contracts of sale. Under the current 
economic climate, smaller businesses may be influenced by powerful trading partners. Buyers may 
force small scale suppliers to agree to new terms such as granting longer payment periods under the 
threat of ceasing to continue business with them. In these circumstances, a seller desperate for 
 
159 ibid. 
160 ibid.  
161 V Finch “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who pays the price?”, op cit fn 98 at 638.  
162 ibid. 
163 S Wheeler, Reservation of Title Clauses: Impact and Implications, op cit fn 149 at 39.  
164 Undermining the use of retention of title clauses can lead to commercially negative consequences for small-
medium sized sellers who rely on such clauses as a source of finance. See further L Gullifer “The interpretation 
of retention of title clauses: some difficulties” (2014) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 564-
580, at 579.  
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business may have to assent to the new terms. Those weaker parties may accede to such commercial 
negotiation as the seller may not be able to afford losing such trading business.   
 
One of the most overriding factors that deters small businesses from incorporating valid retention of 
title clauses is in fact a lack of knowledge of the clauses. Smaller businesses are either unfamiliar or 
demonstrate poor levels of understanding of the legal concept.165 This is particularly important as 
small-sized businesses would have the most to benefit from incorporating a retention of title clauses. 
‘It might also be argued that small trade creditors who do not think that taking security is justified in 
relation to a transaction will be able to avoid the consequences that befall an unsecured creditor in 
an insolvency by resorting to quasi-security measures such as using retention of title clauses in their 
supply contracts.’166 In this risk-laden context, it is clear that the added security granted by retention 
of title clauses would heavily assist smaller companies.  In the event of a smaller-sized business having 
low credit rating, incorporating a retention of title clause would be considered ideal. Reasons 
demonstrating this point include that using the clause would enable the small business to enter into 
a contractual arrangement with minimum amount of risk167 and subsequently being granted higher 
security if the contract ceases prior to performance.168  
 
1.5 Alternative forms of protection 
It is evident that retention of title clauses are not the only device which serves the function of security, 
which secures payment of a debt or obligation. Other standard forms of security include mortgages, 
charges and floating charges, pledges, leases of personal property and use of guarantee.169 For 
example, where a company is supplying goods to another company, a director may issue a guarantee 
for the goods. Alternatively, the supplier of goods on credit could impose stricter credit control. These 
alternative forms of protection differ from one another, ‘a charge differs altogether from a mortgage. 
By a charge the title is not transferred, but the person creating the charge merely says that out of a 
particular fund he will discharge a particular debt.’170 Additionally, a mortgage or charge does not rely 
on a creditor possessing the subject of the security, similar to the position of retention of title 
 
165 J Spencer “The commercial realities of reservation of title clauses”, op cit fn 99 at 222. 
166 V Finch “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who pays the price?”, op cit fn 98 at 646.  
167 ibid at 637.  
168 The author is aware that ‘cease’ does not exist as a legal concept. This may include situations of frustration 
or repudiation.  
169 For a more comprehensive discussion on charges see sections 4.1 and 7.3. 
170 Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 Q.B. D. 347, 350. 
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clauses.171 A retention of title clause is distinct from a charge or mortgage as the benefit of retention 
of title clauses is not conferred from the debtor’s own property, a vital distinction which was raised in 
Clough Mill v Martin.172  Accordingly, there are a variety of devices which serve the function of security.    
 
However, these alternative forms of security interest may not be suitable to all parties. Accordingly, 
there are various ways in which parties can protect themselves against credit risks, however given the 
competitive nature of the commercial environment, one of the main motivations for parties is the 
relevant cost implications and for businesses to remain competitive. Factors to consider include not 
using methods which accrue expensive legal costs or overly complicated formalities. Alternative forms 
of security interest may not be suitable to parties as they do not reflect such economic factors. 
Accordingly, it may be impossible to continue in business and deny trade credit and effectively deduce 
the creditworthiness of byers.173 As emphasised by Gullifer, ‘they want a method which enables 
business to be conducted in a normal and straightforward fashion while the buyer counterparty is 
solvent, but which enables the seller to have effective proprietary protection if the buyer becomes 
insolvent.’174 Convenience and cost efficiency are some of the most common drivers for seeking 
protection by means of retention of title clauses. As such, the cost of incorporating a provision 
retaining title in the conditions of sale may therefore be a productive and prudent course of action.  
 
1.6 Legal benefits of retention of title clauses 
In modern commercial transactions, retention of title clauses are considered to be of vital importance 
and have been labelled a ‘powerful coercive tool’.175 If recognised by the courts, retention of title 
clauses give suppliers considerable benefits, to the detriment of other parties who will be 
disadvantaged to the same degree. A summary of the main advantages of incorporating a retention 
of title clause in contractual agreements will be provided below. This discussion is necessary as it will 
lay the foundation for the later analysis of whether retention of title clauses as a legal mechanism are 
hindered from achieving their functional objectives. 
 
 
171 S Cowan, A Clarke and G Goldberg “Will English Romalpa Clauses Become Registrable Securities?” (1995) 
54(1) The Cambridge Law Journal, 43-51, at 45. 
172 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45. 
173 A Hicks “Reservation of Title: A Pious Hope” (1985) 27(1) Malaya Law Review, 63-112, at 92.  
174 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 245. 




The issue of insolvency is ever-present in the commercial world, with the constant threat of company 
insolvency (whereby companies enter liquidation after failing to pay debts) and individual insolvency 
(individuals entering formal procedures after failing to pay debts) looms on a daily basis. The size of 
the insolvency problem can be evidenced by annual figures which remain consistently high.176 It is 
evident that the problem of insolvent trading partners remains ‘static’177 and can have a substantial 
effect on a wide range of actors including employees, financial institutions etc. This can be depicted 
by the insolvency of the well-known retailer BHS in 2016, and the highly publicised administrations of 
companies such as House of Fraser, Debenhams, Thomas Cook over recent years. The first half of 2020 
saw a total of 3,883 companies entering into insolvency during these initial months.178 The main 
explanations offered include a contraction of domestic manufacturing activity, low oil prices, overall 
uncertainty following the EU referendum and the emergence of, and response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. During difficult economic times, measures such as incorporating retention of title clauses 
are vital to protect businesses and strengthen the legal protection offered to suppliers. Therefore, the 
rise in insolvency figures amounts to one of the many reasons which justifies the need for effective 
retention of title clauses. For such reasons, retention of title clauses should be considered timely and 
an appropriate measure to rely upon during these circumstances. The intertwining connection of 
insolvency and retention of title clauses will be briefly mentioned here, however a comprehensive 
account of the nature of insolvency proceedings and implications on the functionality of retention of 
title clause will be discussed fully in Chapter Six.179  
 
The persistent rise of insolvent trading partners may be a contributable factor as to why retention of 
title clauses are in widespread use by those involved in the commercial sector selling and supplying 
goods. During the last couple of decades, they have formed a common feature of standard forms of 
contracts, within the business sector.180 As estimated by Wheeler; ‘there is no way of determining how 
many potential reservation of title claimants there are annually. In the same way there are no accurate 
figures available for how many unsecured creditors receive nothing from an insolvency situation, or 
 
176 For a comprehensive record of UK insolvency statistics see: The Insolvency Service Official Statistics, 
available at www.gov.uk/government/collections/insolvency-service-official-statistics  Accessed 10/07/20. 
177 S Albon, Insolvency Chief Executive commenting on corporate statistics for 2016. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/2016-corporate-and-personal-insolvency-statistics Accessed 
30/01/17. 
178 Statistics available at The Insolvency Service, Companies Insolvency Statistics, Q1 January to March 2020, 
(2020):  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/882091/
Commentary_-_Company_Insolvency_Statistics_Q1_2020.pdf  Accessed 10/07/20. 
179 See section 6.1.3 for a consideration of retention of title clauses in the context of insolvency proceedings.  
180 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 1. 
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indeed how many millions of pounds of debt are accumulated by insolvent companies each year.’181 
However, survey figures provide a good estimation and reflect the inherent popularity of retention of 
title clauses as far back as over 20 years ago, whereby one survey stipulated that 92% of companies 
incorporated a retention of title clause in their contractual agreements.182 Furthermore, Monti 
reported that ‘in the context of one administrative receivership, there have been 400 retention of title 
claims.’183 It is clear that retention of title clauses are of upmost importance to sellers as a means of 
minimising the serious impacts of a buyer’s insolvency. Accordingly, retention of title clauses offers 
sellers immunity when a buyer reaches a state of insolvency; ‘retention of title holders are immune 
from [insolvency] compulsory proceedings as they never surrender title to the supplied goods, and so 
may repossess their products at any time until the purchase price is paid.’184 On account of the 
protection granted by the clauses, it is purported that the number of sellers who incorporate a 
retention of title clause within their contractual agreement is consistently high. One explanation for 
the proliferation of the clause is the priority afforded to unsecured credits over other creditors.185 
Therefore, as long as the insolvency problem remains, retention of title clauses will be considered 
relevant within the commercial industry.  
 
Retention of title clauses provide suppliers the opportunity to strengthen the bargaining power in 
their favour. This is particularly apparent in the event of insolvency proceedings: ‘the [retention of 
title clauses] gives the debtor the power to claim the asset by meeting the invoice price, which actually 
gives him the stronger position in bankruptcy…If the asset is more valuable to his creditors in the 
debtor’s hands, he may pay the price and obtain the surplus benefit.’186 Without the protection of an 
incorporated retention of title clause, suppliers would be left to depend on the conventional methods 
of security which offer severely limited safeguarding measures.187 The conventional methods of 
security such as requesting payment on delivery are considered inflexible methods for suppliers whose 
bargaining power is severely undermined by such measures. Additionally, such measures are deemed 
unrealistic within the trade market as the options would leave suppliers in a very weak and vulnerable 
position and open to commercial dangers. The risks of the commerce market, whereby suppliers could 
be manipulated by trading partners or incur higher transaction costs would be detrimental to the 
success of companies supplying goods. This would be particularly problematic to all businesses 
 
181 S Wheeler, Reservation of Title Clauses: Impact and Implications, op cit fn 149 at 4.  
182 ibid at 6. 
183 Lipe Ltd v Leyland Daf Ltd [1993] BCC 385 as discussed in G Monti “The Future of Reservation of Title 
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involved in supplying goods, who would overtly be at higher risks but for retention of title clauses. As 
such, the incorporation of a retention of title clause offers suppliers a flexible alternative as it allows 
parties to have an anticipatory and defensive mechanism to initiate in the event of a buyer’s 
insolvency.  
 
1.6.2 Lack of registration requirement  
One of the most important advantages of retention of title clauses lies in the fact that there is no need 
to formally register the clauses. As the clauses do not require any form of registration, the clauses can 
be a quick and informal mechanism which affords the supplier protection in the event of a buyer’s 
inability to pay or insolvency. The lack of registration requirement is beneficial for two principal 
reasons: flexibility and invisibility. Firstly, it is evident that incorporating a retention of title clause 
within a contractual agreement is highly flexible compared to conventional security charges, which 
require formal registration. The validity of a retention of title clause can be gained by a simple addition 
to a standard trading contract, which further reduces any transactional complexity.188 The flexibility 
and ease in which retention of title clauses can be used is thus highly appealing for any potential 
retention of title beneficiaries.   
 
Secondly, the practicality and commercial utility of retention of title clauses can be attested by the 
fact that the contractual arrangements between seller and buyer are invisible to third parties. As such, 
investigating a company’s file at Companies House would not expose the existence of a retention 
clause.189 In addition, as a matter of routine, goods supplied under an effective retention of title clause 
arrangement are treated as purchasers on corporate accounts, ‘goods which are not the property of 
the company concerned thus commonly appear as assets in the balance sheet and it is rare for 
auditors’ notes on accounts to mention retentions of title.’190 Legitimate interests are served by the 
invisibility aspect such as protecting confidential business of parties and accordingly upholding their 
market advantage. Businesses can maintain confidentiality of commercial transactions and therefore 
can be assured that trade secrets will not be made available to competitors. Invisibility of retention of 
title clauses can be considered advantageous as parties incorporating a retention of title clause as a 
term of their contractual arrangements are offered higher levels of protection against third parties, as 
an external outside would not be able to ascertain the existence of the retention of title clause. 
Accordingly, ‘because they will not appear on registers and are always ignored in sets of accounts, 
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[retention of title clauses] remain invisible until they become important.’191 Invisibility to third parties 
can be exemplified by the case of Leyland DAF Ltd v Automotive Products plc192 in which 400 retention 
of title clauses were made against the receivers of Leyland DAF. In this particular case, it demonstrated 
that it is increasingly difficult for an external third party to ascertain any information on a retention of 
title clauses of a specific company. As such ‘what is certain is that an outsider trying to assess the 
possible effects of a retention of title clauses on a particular company is unlikely to get very far.’193 
 
1.6.3 Credit Rating 
Efficiency in the commercial sector forms another legal benefit associated with retention of title 
clauses. Firstly, the safeguarding nature of the retention of title clauses means that commercial 
activity is not hindered by issues such as buyers’ inability to pay for goods. Consequently: ‘commerce 
would be hampered without the use of an instrument guaranteeing payment; thus [retention of title 
clauses] generate allocative efficiency’.194 It has been suggested by Snead that inserting a retention of 
title clause within their contractual agreements, strengthens the seller’s position in obtaining credit.195  
 
Secondly, it is also suggested that they improve the efficiency of credit as both parties to the contract 
(debtors and creditors) achieve their intended aim at a lower cost because of the clauses.196 It is 
suggested that security measures do encourage efficiency which can benefit all types of creditors.197  
 
Finally, it is also implied that security measures such as retention of title clauses also lead to efficient 
monitoring because ‘the notion that monitoring by a secured creditor will encourage managerial 
prudence and will bring spill-over benefits to the advantages of creditors as a whole.’198 This in turn 
may aid suppliers who are competing in a competitive market as not only do such clauses reduce 
monitoring costs, they also eradicate the need to add a compensation allowance to the price of the 
goods, as the clause will reduce the risk of loss incurred by insolvency.   
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(1993) 42 Kansas Law Review, 13-73, at 14. 
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1.6.4 A self-help mechanism in commercial disputes  
Legal doctrines are considered vital within the commercial environment as a means of ensuring capital 
development.199 One of the most common precautionary methods used by businessmen is retention 
of title clauses. Within the commercial field, the vast majority of civil disputes are resolved through 
out of court settlements. As such, very few civil cases are adjudicated in formal court proceedings, 
rather the process of negotiation between parties is overwhelmingly evident.200 The reasons behind 
such a limited number of litigated civil claims is partly due to the competitively-driven commercial 
environment which encourages negotiations amongst businessmen.201 Additionally, it is apparent that 
informal negotiation is regarded as a cost effective method of settlement, compared to the expensive 
alternative. Cost effective measures such as negotiation are deemed crucial within the commercial 
sector as they offer the prospect of efficient resolutions to commercial disputes, notably saving time 
and expenditure, which are indispensable components to the avid businessman. Additionally, these 
measures avoid any unwanted publicity concerns which may arise from formal litigation.   
 
Negotiation of contracts between parties is deemed to be a more flexible method as it reflects the 
business practice: ‘businessmen recognize that trading relationships form a mutually beneficial 
network and are reluctant to disrupt this network by litigating their disputes.’202 Contentious litigation 
is thus used as a measure of last resort by businessmen, who prefer to action non-legal sanctions to 
resolve commercial disputes as a way to preserve fruitful business relationships. As a means of 
continuing business relationships and contributing to capital profits in the commercial market, 
businessmen take security precautions which can potentially limit future losses and shortcomings. 
Consequently, ‘there is often a degree of rational planning at the outset of trading relationships with 
careful provisions for as many future contingencies as can be foreseen.’203 One of the most prevalent 
contingencies in the business environment is the insolvency of a trading partner. If a buyer cannot 
complete the contractual agreement, remedial costs can be significant for the seller and could result 
in costly contract penalties. As such, businessmen incorporate legal sanctions into their contractual 
agreements in order to safeguard their assets and reduce monetary loss. Accordingly, ‘in an economic 
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In a business environment, one of the most prevalent risks for a supplier is the possibility of a trading 
partner failing or refusing to pay for the goods supplied. Accordingly, retention of title clauses are 
used by companies as a business mechanism to compensate the harsh commercial realities; ‘retention 
of title clauses gives the legal backing to [businessmen’s] desire for justice.’205 Using retention of title 
clauses appropriately can reap a wide range of commercial advantages. To action recovery of goods, 
allows companies to gain a good commercial reputation as it demonstrates strength. Commercial 
strength and reputation are deemed valuable as such qualities hold the potential to broaden business 
opportunities and contribute to the progress and development of the company. Minimising loss 
through the incorporation of retention of title clauses is a pragmatic mechanism which offers leverage 
and a form of life support for companies to remain competitive within the commercial field. Goods 
can be seized and reverted back to the seller, whereby the goods can be easily resold to alternative 
buyers, thus increasing ‘the opportunity for a continuing commercial relationship.’206 As a legal 
mechanism retention of title clauses can facilitate economic development and sustainable growth.207 





As the preliminary background information on retention of title clauses has since been outlined, it is 
now necessary to continue the exploration of the legal benefits of the clauses in more detail. The 
discussion will proceed with arguably one of the most important functions of a retention of title clause: 
affording sellers with super-priority status in the event of insolvency. A detailed discussion on how 
these clauses operate under the current insolvency framework is thus necessary to provide the 
impetus to highlight how these clauses are obstructed from achieving their functional objectives by 
legal uncertainty. As will be explored, these issues are exacerbated significantly by the minefield of 
issues stacked against retention of title clauses operating as conceptually intended. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CIRCUMVENTION OF PARI PASSU BY RETENTION OF 
TITLE CLAUSES  
2. Introduction  
This chapter explores the circumvention of the pari passu principle by retention of title clauses. The 
main hypothesis of this research is to shed light on how retention of title clauses as a commercial 
mechanism are hindered from their functional objectives. As will be explored in the forthcoming 
chapters, there is a general reluctance and uncertainty demonstrated by the courts to enforce 
retention of title clauses and as such their principal objective in offering protection to sellers in the 
event of economic hardship is significantly impeded. Rather than making a sweeping pronouncement 
that certain types of retention of title clauses are unenforceable, the courts have responded to the 
clauses in a reactive, piecemeal, and disjointed manner which further obstructs parties from 
implementing and relying on such contractual provisions. It can be argued that the courts’ hostility 
towards the more complicated retention of title provisions is a subtle way of counter-balancing the 
legal benefits bestowed on claimants relying on such clauses in the event of a buyer’s insolvency and 
balancing the rights of third parties affected by retention of title clauses.208 These clauses conceptual 
nature is founded by contractual freedom which allows parties to agree on the allocation of property 
rights and when title to the goods will transfer to the buyer, however, such allocation has 
consequential implications on third parties.209 Arguably, retention of title clauses have the greatest 
impact on third parties during the insolvency proceedings. One of the main legal benefits associated 
with retention of title clauses is the priority which is afforded to sellers in the event of insolvency. The 
priority status afforded to retention of title claimants serves as a significant advantage and may 
suggest a reason for the clauses’ proliferation and popularity as a contractual agreement.210 To this 
end, the general reluctance observed by the courts towards more complicated retention of title 
clauses may inadvertently provide a means of upholding an appropriate balance to the super-priority 
status afforded to claimants relying on title retaining provisions, a priority which allows claimants to 
bypass some of the core principles and features of the current insolvency framework. If the retention 
of title clause is effective in operation, this undoubtedly provides sellers a level of immunity from 
 
208 For supporting literature on the contention that the courts are adopting a balancing exercise towards 
retention of title clause to counter-balance the super-priority status afforded to sellers with the rights of third 
parties, most notably creditors, see L Gullifer “Retention of title clauses: a question of balance” in A Burrows 
and E Peel (eds), Contract Terms, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, at 286-313. 
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insolvency proceedings as they do not relinquish title to the goods and as such, are able to repossess 
their supplied goods in the event of a buyer’s insolvency ahead of third parties. The priority granted 
to sellers under a retention of title clause during insolvency proceedings is thus detrimental to third 
parties who have an economic interest and competing claims to the goods of the insolvent buyer. 
Undoubtedly, the third parties are adversely affected by quasi-security devices or other security 
devices which reduce the assets available to them upon the insolvency of a buyer. These third parties 
can be classified as secured or unsecured creditors and are subjected to insolvency principles which 
dictate the distribution of available assets during insolvency proceedings, whereas retention of title 
holders are able to bypass the pari passu principle to the benefit of realising and repossessing their 
supplied goods and assets.   
 
Accordingly, this chapter will focus on the pari passu principle under the current insolvency framework 
and will evidence how the principle is circumvented by retention of title clauses. The discussion will 
also provide examples of some of the hardships caused during the insolvency proceedings, which 
emphasises why retention of title clauses are such a useful anticipatory and defensive mechanism to 
initiate in the event of a buyer’s insolvency. This discussion follows on from the proceeding discussion 
in the introduction outlining the various legal benefits associated with retention of title clauses and 
continues the exploration of one of the principal reasons for the use of the clauses: higher priority in 
insolvency proceedings. Arguably, the super-priority status afforded to retention of title claimants, 
which accords the supplier with preferential treatment in the event of a buyer’s insolvency is one of 
the most important aspects of the clauses in respect of their functional objectives. As such, this 
chapter will explore the pari passu principle and why English law permits the recognition of security 
interests and quasi-security devices to the detriment of the insolvency principle which ultimately 
disadvantages the remaining creditors involved in the insolvency proceedings. By doing so, the 
discussion will turn to analysing the justifications for the recognition of security interests and quasi-
security devices and whether such mechanisms serve wider economic and political interests.  
 
2.1 Pari Passu Principle  
2.1.1 Definition 
Pari passu is a basic principle of insolvency law which refers to an equal distribution of available assets 
amongst creditors according to their rights and interests in the company.211 The principle is recognised 
by Section 107 of the Insolvency Act 1986. ‘The pari passu principle, is one manifestation of formal 
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equality in insolvency law.’212 Pari passu is regarded as one of the most fundamental principles of 
insolvency law213, which ensures that proportion of assets are distributed in accordance with the size 
of the creditors claim.214 The principle’s fundamental importance was recognised by the Cork 
Committee.215 Pari passu’s longevity has also been acknowledged, ‘the pari passu rule has provided 
the basic distributional matrix in corporate insolvency law for nearly 150 years.’216 However, its origins 
can be dated further as Lord Mansfield emphasised the importance of the principle in the case of 
Worsley v Demattos217 in 1758, where his Lordship implied that distributing insolvent assets equally 
amongst creditors was one of the main objectives of bankruptcy law.218 
 
The principle is applicable to all insolvency proceedings which involve a distribution of insolvent assets 
amongst creditors and thus can be applied to the bankruptcy of individuals and the liquidation of 
companies.219 The principle is thought to be all-pervasive, based on the notion that all losses following 
a liquidation, should be borne by unsecured creditors on an equal basis.220 Unsecured creditors are 
thus paid pro rata to the extent of their pre-insolvency claims or share rateably the assets available 
for residual distribution in the event of an insolvency.221 Creditors such as secured creditors or 
preferential creditors who hold similar claims are to be paid back the same proportion of their 
debts222, thus ensuring a degree of fairness in insolvency proceedings. As per Lord Romilly, insolvency 
law ‘takes [creditors] exactly as it finds them.’223 The pari passu principle is only applicable to the 
remaining unencumbered assets of an insolvent company, which are available for distribution at the 
company’s insolvency proceedings.224   
 
The rationale for the principle is that it prevents unfairness in insolvency proceedings. Prior to the 
principle, the swiftest creditor would unfairly benefit from insolvency proceedings on a first come first 
served basis. As emphasised by Goode, ‘in the absence of an insolvency proceeding, is that the race 
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goes to the swiftest.’225 Without an orderly list of distribution, those with the greatest resources, 
power or influence would unfairly benefit to the detriment of other unsecured creditors.226 The pari 
passu principle eliminates the incentive of creditors to enforce their rights with alacrity to the extent 
of reducing the value of the distribution estate as a whole.227 It was thought that the previous first 
come first serve basis added uncertainty to the insolvency proceedings as it decreased the utility of 
risk averse creditors.228 Hence, ‘the individualistic pre-insolvency debt-collection regime is a mad race 
to the asset pool. Since that race is undesirable, the collective insolvency system steps in to stop it.’229 
In reality, the consequence of the alacrity of the more powerful creditors and a limited amount of 
insolvent estate to begin with, results in a rapid disappearance of the insolvent estate. Consequently, 
one of the implications of this non-hierarchal method is that creditors who are late or lack the 
necessary power or resources would be left with a very limited pool of assets or detrimentally worse, 
no assets to enforce their claim on. Thus, the first come first serve approach would ultimately result 
in an unbalanced distribution of assets amongst creditors, which can have negative economic 
implications in the insolvency market as a whole. Where there is a cumulative pattern of insolvency 
proceedings resulting in an unbalanced distribution of assets, this is deemed problematic as only 
certain commercial actors would benefit, most likely the powerful creditors, thus creating an unfair 
playing field. Where there is a surge in unbalanced distribution of insolvent assets to powerful 
creditors, this can hinder economic growth of the insolvency market.  
 
Through the application of the pari passu principle, groups of claimants most notably unsecured 
creditors, are forced to queue for their allocation of residual assets in insolvency proceedings. A 
degree of fairness is ensured by the principle as it provides for equality of treatment amongst 
unsecured creditors.230 The principle has been praised by Calnan, who states: ‘reliance on the principle 
that equality is equity is a sensible, pragmatic solution, which has history on its side.’231 Accordingly, 
the intention behind the principle is to provide a means of ensuring a fair and balanced approach to 
the distribution of insolvent assets, where parties are treated equally and paid pro rata to the extent 
of their insolvency claim.  
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A collective regime which ensures an orderly list of distribution through the principle of pari passu, is 
also thought to keep legal costs and delays at a minimum.232 As the principle establishes equal 
distribution amongst creditors according to their individual claims and rights, this avoids the courts 
deliberating difficult choices if assets were allocated alternatively on the basis of needs or inability to 
sustain losses etc.233 Indeed, ‘the collectively of dealings with unsecured creditors as a class is 
enhanced by the pari passu principle which is efficient in so far as it avoids the costs of dealing with 
claims on their individual merits.’234 The unfavourable status of unsecured pari passu creditors is 
illustrated in detail by the case of British Eagle.235 The points argued by the courts are not specifically 
relevant to the distribution allocation as per the pari passu principle but will provide a detailed 
background to the protection afforded by insolvency law. The case concerned two airline operators, 
British Eagle International Airlines and Compagnie Nationale Air France. Both companies were 
members of a clearing house scheme. The objective of the clearing house scheme was in situations 
when members performed services for one another, they would be provided machinery in order to 
settle any debts and credits. British Eagle Airlines entered into liquidation and the liquidator claimed 
£7,925 from Air France, which amounted to the difference in value of services performed by British 
Eagle to Air France before entering the liquidation process. Air France claimed that the provisions 
contained within the clearing house arrangement, sought to treat Air France as analogous to the 
position of secured creditor, without the creation and subsequent registration of a charge on the 
impugned book debts. Thus, Air France purported to opt out of section 302 of the Companies Act 
1948, which contained provisions relating to the pari passu principle. Section 302 stated the following: 
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act as to preferential payments, the property of the company 
shall, on its winding up, be applied in satisfaction of its liabilities pari passu, and, subject to 
such application, shall unless the articles otherwise provide, be distributed among the 
members according to the rights and interests in the company.’236 
The matter to be discussed was in the event of a member of the clearing house becoming insolvent, 
whether or not the clearing house arrangement still applied to the creditors relating to credits and 
debts which have not yet been cleared, or whether the insolvent’s property should be distributed in 
line with general liquidations rule, in which brings all other creditors on the same footing as per the 
principle of pari passu.   
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The House of Lords held that Air France could not contract out of the provisions contained within 
section 302 of the Act, due to public policy reasons and as result the insolvent assets of British Eagle 
were to be distributed as per the ordinary liquidation rules of pari passu. The clearing house 
arrangement could not prevail over the ordinary list of distribution priority of insolvency proceedings. 
Therefore, the clearing house creditors did not amount to the same position as secured creditors 
without the requirement of creation and registration on charges. Accordingly, as per Lord Morris, ‘the 
property of the company fell to be applied in satisfaction of its liabilities pari passu.’237 Consequently, 
the sum owed was thus made receivable to the benefit of all other creditors. 
If the clearing house scheme was to be approved, it would have placed Air France in a better position 
than all of the other body of creditors. Lord Cross emphasised that approving the clearing house 
arrangement would be particularly unfair and anomalous to the remaining body of unsecured 
creditors.238 Therefore, contracting out of the principle of pari passu as contained in section 302 of the 
Companies Act 1948 would be contrary to public policy.  
 
2.1.2 Bypassing the principle through retention of title  
Since the principle’s importance within insolvency law has been so widely recognised as a method of 
ensuring fairness to creditors through an orderly list of distribution, any non-conformity should raise 
concerns.239 Through the incorporation of a retention of title clauses or through the incorporation of 
other proprietary rights, a holder of the security interest can bypass the pari passu principle and be 
accorded with preferential treatment.240 Accordingly, ‘security avoids the effects of pari passu 
distribution by creating rights that have priority over the claims of unsecured creditors.’241 Retention 
of title clauses largely undermine the principle as it allows a holder of a retention of title clause, to 
cover the insolvent goods and any products and proceeds of the insolvent assets.242 This is permissible 
by law as the principle is restricted to ordinary creditors, any pre-insolvency rights such as proprietary 
interests must be respected by law, meaning that any proprietary claimants are thus distinguished 
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from the principle.243 As a consequence, the pari passu principle is not applicable to the rights of 
secured creditors, retention of title holders or creditors holding assets on trusts.244 As summarised by 
Goode: 
‘Fixed security interests and other real rights held by third parties do not need to feature in 
the ordering of priorities because to the extent that assets held by the company are subject 
to these they do not constitute the property of the company at all and therefore do not 
compete in the priority stakes.’245  
These deviations are recognised by law as such assets do not belong to the company and thus cannot 
fall under the distribution list.246 Accordingly, the scope of pari passu is restricted in relation to 
ordinary creditors and the estate made available to such creditors by law.247 Holders of security 
interests are able to assert their claims against the insolvent assets first, followed by the residual pool 
of assets being distributed amongst other types of creditors abiding to the pari passu principle. The 
more extensive these particular rights are, the amount of residual goods available for distribution to 
unsecured creditors will be significantly reduced.248 As such, retention of title claimants will be able to 
assert their claim to the goods and be given priority ahead of the other creditors who are subjected 
to the insolvency principle.  
 
As outlined above, retention of title claimants are afforded super-priority status whereby their 
interests are preferred and prioritised ahead of other interested parties such as the unsecured 
creditors and all-monies floating charge holders. As such, consideration must now be given to 
explaining the justification for allowing retention of title claimants to benefit from having super-
priority status. In other words, why does the law permit one particularly creditor, in this instance the 
retention of title claimant, to be preferred over all other creditors? The rationale is based on the 
notion that a person who supplies goods to the buyer’s company under a retention of title clause, in 
exchange for a debt has essentially added to the company’s assets. From the perspective of the buyer, 
the exchange of goods for a debt is considered more useful than an invoice price, as the goods 
effectively bring in external value for the business without demanding more value in return.249 This 
can be contrasted with conventional forms of security such as the position of floating charge holders 
or unsecured creditors who are inhibited by an inflexibility that prevents the supplied goods from 
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being dealt with in the course of trade.250 As such, traditional forms of security lack sufficient 
bargaining power as these forms of security restrict a buyer or debtor from capitalising on the assets 
and maximising the inherent value of the goods.  Economic reasons251 have thus been advanced which 
justify the super-priority status for retention of title claimants as the supplier has ultimately increased 
the company’s pool of assets. Following on from this point, it would be grossly unfair if other creditors 
were to be allowed to benefit and obtain an unjustified windfall at the expense of the supplier who 
advanced the buyer’s total assets and funds. On the point of unfairness, it has also been suggested 
that the super-priority status is used as device for precluding the first creditor from obtaining an 
exclusive monopoly over the assets of the company.252 Jackson and Kronman describe this type of 
circumstances as a ‘situational monopoly’ whereby the first creditor on the scene would receive a 
competitive advantage to the detriment of the buyer who would not be able to raise any future credit 
without the first creditor exploiting their monopolised power.253 The monopoly of assets would 
remove the availability of other creditors and would result in an unfair distribution of bargaining 
power. Accordingly, the super-priority status afforded to retention of title claimants blunts the 
situational monopoly that would otherwise arise in such circumstances by bringing in additional value 
to an otherwise closed pool of creditors. As such, retention of title claimants are allowed to circumvent 
the insolvency framework as their goods have effectively increased the value of the assets of the 
buyer, thus affording the buyer’s company with an efficient and profitable investment.254 
 
In addition, affording retention of title claimants with super-priority status also provides a means of 
precluding the claimant from obtaining credit elsewhere, which prevents postponed creditors from 
having to contract on a riskier basis255 or from having to settle with a lower ranking security.256 In turn, 
it can be argued that the super-priority status safeguards the security interests of these later creditors 
by alleviating the possibility of having to settle with no security at all. Furthermore, if the goods 
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supplied by the retention of title claimant helped the buyer’s business financially by earning profit, 
this would once again strengthen the position of any existing creditors by potentially maximising their 
security interest.257 Viewed holistically, the super-priority status appears to strike a balance between 
safeguarding the position of existing creditors and prioritising the position of retention of title 
claimants for financing and increasing the pool of assets of the buyer.258 Evidently, the super-priority 
status afforded to retention of title claimants creates a competitive advantage for those seeking to 
rely on the clauses and a variety of justifications have been put forward for rationalising why retention 
of title claimants have been granted with super-priority status.  
 
Gaining proprietary status ensures that the assets are prevented from entering the pool of residual 
estate, thus gaining priority in insolvency proceedings. This preferential treatment results in the holder 
of the security interests maximising their possibility of recovery in the event of insolvency.259 As 
mentioned previously, in the event of encountering a company’s insolvency or where a company 
cannot meet its financial fixed obligation, the security interest holder has priority over the company’s 
other creditors. Accordingly, retention of title clauses functional objective of granting the supplier 
priority and subsequent immunity from the insolvency principle, reinforces the notion that retention 
of title clauses provide an economic lifeline to sellers in the face of economic hardship of the buyer. 
On the other hand, the recognition of security interests and quasi-security devices leads to 
consequences which may be regarded as unfair to third parties who are directly competing for the 
assets of the insolvency buyer.  
 
The effects of being denied proprietary rights in insolvency are illustrated, for example by the case of 
Re Andrabell.260 The matter at issue was whether credit to a particular account of an insolvent trust, 
amounted to an implied trust in favour of a creditor.261 If the court held that an implied trust was 
present and subsequently a proprietary interest was established, then the money would be paid 
directly to the creditor in question.262 However, if an implied trust was not found, then the creditor 
would have to rank according to the pari passu principle amongst all other unsecured creditors of the 
company. As such, the importance of establishing a proprietary interest is paramount as it would 
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determine whether or not the creditor would be paid in priority or whether the creditor would receive 
very little in the insolvency proceedings. In Re Andrabell, Airborne had supplied travel bags to the 
retailer Andrabell on the basis of a retention of title clause, which stipulated that ownership of the 
bags should not pass until the full purchase price was paid. Andrabell subsequently sold the bags and 
paid the proceeds into its bank account. Andrabell went into liquidation owing Airborne the sum of 
£28,810, which included the sale of the bags supplied and mixing the proceeds in its bank account, 
which amounted to a total of £8,103 in credit. The question to be determined was whether a 
proprietary interest was established over the money standing to the credit of the bank account. It was 
decided by Gibson J that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an implied trust over the proceeds 
of sale and thus, Airbone had to rank according to pari passu amongst the remaining unsecured 
creditors. In this case, the court held that an implied trust was not found, which resulted in the creditor 
having to rank according to the insolvency principle and the money could not be paid directly to the 
creditor. Instead, the creditor would be subjected to the pari passu insolvency distribution of claims. 
The plight of being ranked as an unsecured creditor, severely weakened the chances of Airbone 
realising any assets from the remaining pool of available assets in the insolvency proceedings.  
 
2.1.3 Breaching public policy? 
It should be noted that the law does not readily allow contracting out of collective arrangements that 
allow preferential treatment amongst certain creditors, which ultimately denies or disadvantages 
other creditors to the same degree.263 As per Vinelott J in Re Maxwell264, it is clear that courts do not 
allow creditors to arrange with the debtors any measures which benefit the individual creditor during 
the insolvency proceedings, which directly hinder or denies the prospects of the other creditors.265 Re 
Maxwell dealt with an agreement which issued certain bonds by company Maxwell Finance Jersey 
Lmd (MFJ) in 1989. The bonds were held by parties and the bonds were guaranteed by another 
company Maxwell Communications Corp (MCC). It was provided that MCC’s liability to the 
bondholders would be subordinated. Subsequently, MFJ became insolvent and MCC were put in 
administration. An order was applied by the administrator which would exclude the parties who held 
the bonds from participation of an arrangement, which stipulated that once secured and preferential 
creditors had been paid, the remainder would be distributed according to the principle of pari passu 
amongst all the other unsecured creditors. Approving the order intending to exclude the bond holders 
from participating in the arrangement, meant that the bondholders would only benefit once all other 
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unsecured creditors were paid in full. Evidently, if such an order was approved, the parties holding the 
bonds would most likely receive nothing in the insolvency proceeding. The bondholders argued that 
the agreement should be held void for breaching the pari passu principle, which was rejected by 
Vinelott J. It was held that the subordination agreement was valid since neither the insolvency set off 
rule nor the pari passu principle made the contract invalid. There was no reason why a creditor cannot 
agree to subordinate his claim to other creditors, during the event of insolvency. The pari passu 
principle prevents a creditor from arranging to obtain an advantage in the event of a company’s 
insolvency. However, it was implied that subordination did not undermine the principle of pari passu 
and as such the agreement was held valid. The case established that parties can make arrangements 
to contract out of the pari passu principle, providing that the arrangement does not involve divesting 
the estate from other creditors.  
 
It was also established by the House of Lords in British Eagle266 that the act of denying or 
disadvantaging other creditors would be contrary to public policy. In the British Eagle case, Air France 
was not able to contract out of the pari passu principle to gain for their own individual and direct 
benefit from the liquidation of the British Eagle airline. Such a process would breach the pari passu 
principle as it would remove a sum of British Eagle’s estate, which otherwise would be available to 
other general creditors of the British Eagle’s airline.267 As stated by Finch, ‘effect would not be given 
to a contractual agreement that attempted to avoid collectivity by purporting to allow certain 
creditors to opt out of pari passu distribution of the residual estate to their advantage.’268 The public 
policy referred to by Lord Cross in the British Eagle case, seems to stem from the earlier case of Ex p. 
Mackay269, which held that no creditor may obtain a position of preference without the creation of a 
valid security interest. As stated by Mellish LJ in the Mackay case; ‘a person cannot make it part of his 
contract that, in the event of bankruptcy, he is then to get some additional advantage which prevents 
the property  being distributed under the bankruptcy laws.’270 It is evident that the underlying public 
policy issue arising from British Eagle refers to the prohibition of one preferred creditor seizing an 
insolvent party’s estate or property without having a security interest vested in that specific property. 
Air France could not contract out of the pari passu principle as this would be deemed to infer an 
additional advantage to Air France, which would prevent any further distribution according to the 
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relevant priorities. However, as discussed below, this does not apply to pre-arranged contracts with 
proprietary interests such as retention of title clause which are recognised by law.  
 
2.1.4 Are security interests too extensive? 
Having established various different justifications for why the law permits the taking of security and 
allows the bypassing of the pari passu principle, it is now important to consider whether such rights 
are deemed too extensive. This is important for the underlying discussion as to whether the courts’ 
alleged reluctance to enforce more complicated retention of title clauses is justified on the basis that 
the courts’ reluctance is to counterbalance the super-priority status afforded to retention of title 
claimants and other security interests.   
  
One argument is that the current law gives secured creditors and proprietary claimants far too much 
freedom. Goode emphasises that ‘English law gives secured creditors a degree of freedom of contract, 
and an immunity from obligation, which significantly exceeds what is to be found in almost every other 
major jurisdiction, whether common law or civil law.’271 It is submitted that one of the intentions of 
insolvency law is to maximise the value of the insolvent estate; by preferring particular groups of 
creditors over another, however the recognition of security interests and quasi-security interests 
undermines this objective. This contention is supported by Cantlie who argues that, ‘singling our 
certain creditors for preferential treatment in bankruptcy clearly undermines [the] objective of 
controlling self-interest and optimizing the aggregate value of creditor’s claim.’272 Within the context 
of retention of title clauses, regardless of any precautionary methods which attempt to safeguard 
creditors, a valid retention of title clause can completely undermine a creditor’s protection, leaving 
unsecured creditors at risk of being seriously vulnerable by reducing the pool of assets available for 
them to claim.  
 
One of the central problems in the insolvency market, is deficiencies in assets to satisfy all claims. It is 
evident that there is an influx of creditors and holders of security interest competing for a share of a 
limited pool of insolvent assets. It is clear, that there is simply not enough to satisfy claims in their 
entirety.273 Thus, these deficiencies will have an immediate and direct consequences upon the 
creditors involved, most notably the risk of non-payment. It is argued that the inadequacy of the pari 
passu principle, means that certain groups of secured creditors and holders of proprietary interests 
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are unduly advantaged to the detriment of unsecured creditors. Accordingly, ‘at the remedial level 
too much dominance has been allowed property claimants in general and secured creditors in 
particular.’274 The unsecured creditors bear the worst implications of allowing security and the 
bypassing of the pari passu principle. As such, the contention mostly lies in the fact that the losses are 
endured significantly by the unsecured creditors. It has been argued that there is a stark difference in 
judicial preference between, on the one hand the secured creditors and proprietary claimants and on 
the other hand the unsecured creditor’s position.275 This is supported by Henton who argues that 
‘after the onset of insolvency, affected parties [unsecured creditors] play a zero sum game.’276 Thus, 
unsecured creditors will most likely suffer the grave implications of non-payment. It is submitted that 
unsecured creditors are frustrated/disappointed with how they are treated by the insolvency 
system.277 Nevertheless, unsecured creditors are not the only victims, as deficiencies in the insolvency 
process can be experienced by all groups. Even creditors who protected their interests may only 
recover a small proportion of their investment. Accordingly, a retention of title clause or other security 
devices can completely undermine the protection afforded to creditors.  
 
However, it has been acknowledged that ranking different claims in insolvency law is exceedingly 
challenging. It is difficult to rank creditors in accordance with how worthy they are to receive payment 
from a debtor. As emphasised by Calnan, ‘it is always possible for a particular interest group to put 
forward reasons why its particular creditor should have priority over another creditor. But it is much 
more difficult objectively to evaluate such claims.’278 Due to the fact that not all creditors claim can be 
satisfied in full by insolvent assets, the law has to decide which creditors are to be paid in full and to 
what extend others are paid, if at all.279 
 
Due to the nature of the insolvency world, it is inevitable that there will be winners and losers. Indeed, 
‘on insolvency there will be losers and, by and large, these losers will be innocent parties caught up in 
the insolvent defendant’s predicament.’280 As such, insolvency law has to decide which particular 
groups of claimants have to bear the losses, and which parties should be afforded greater protection 
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in these giving circumstances. In this respect, from the perspective of the unsecured creditors, the 
justification that the secured creditors and proprietary claimants do in fact offer sufficient advantages 
to warrant priority, remains disputable. Thus, ‘one might well consider claims to priority allocations of 
insolvency value to be a great scandal unless they can be normatively justified, by offering sufficient 
countervailing benefits to the remaining potential participants in the debtor’s insolvency.’281 No 
matter the situation, it is evident that one party to the insolvency proceedings will be preferred to the 
detriment of another seemingly innocent party. To this end, retention of title holders are given 
preferential status which allows them to jump ahead of the queue of competing claims in the event 
of a buyer’s insolvency. A claimant who enters into a contract with a valid retention of title clause has 
significant bargaining power compared to all the other creditors in a less favourable position, thus 
meaning that such creditors will have no awareness on whether they will be able to draw out any of 
the assets in the event of an insolvency. Both secured and unsecured creditors will not be able to 
predict the value of the assets they might be able to collect from an insolvent party, thus adding to 
the uncertainty of their precarious position. The hierarchal order enshrined by the pari passu principle 
is thus undermined by the recognition of security and quasi-security devices.  
 
2.2 Justifications for the unfairness 
It is evident that bypassing the pari passu principle through the recognition of security interests or 
interests which perform the function of security such as the retention of title clauses, appears to 
disrupt principles of fairness. The pari passu principle affords equality of treatment amongst creditors 
on the basis of their rights and interests in the company, however, this is disregarded by the 
recognition of security interests. McCormack writes, ‘recognition of security interests appears to clash 
with a basic fairness principle.’282 An inherent tension exists between the insolvency principle of pari 
passu and the freedom of contract which enables parties to freely bargain for priority.283 Evidently, in 
situations where holders of security interests bypass the pro rata apportion of remaining assets, this 
results in the remaining creditors essentially losing their equal footing in sharing the insolvency assets. 
Essentially, unsecured creditors who are without the protection of a security interest, can fail to 
benefit from their pre-insolvency entitlements, which from the perspective of the disadvantaged 
creditor can be considered extremely unfair. As noted by Finch, ‘the law embracing these [security] 
devices gives rise to issues inter alia of efficiency and fairness.’284 It is argued that granting priority to 
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security interest holders, disproportionately shifts the risk to unsecured creditors.285 In reality, a 
typical example of an unsecured creditor would be a small trade creditor, who lacks the adequate 
information, expertise or resources to evaluate risks to strengthen their bargaining power in the 
insolvency proceedings. One of the main implications of allowing certain groups to bypass insolvency 
rules of priority, is that in essence a creditor does not obtain the result they originally anticipated, 
which raises issues or fairness and efficiency.286 Therefore, the following discussion will provide 
reasons of why the law permits the taking of security and more specifically, the bypassing the pari 
passu principle.  
 
2.2.1 An insolvency principle with limited scope 
One reason for the unfairness is the non-extensive nature of the pari passu principle: ‘the pari passu 
principle is not as extensive, pervasive and all-embracing in practice as it appears to be in theory.’287 
The pari passu principle is supposed to be all pervasive, with the main objective of preventing unfair 
agreements which go against the default preferred order of priority amongst creditors.288 It is also 
thought that forming an order for allocation of assets upon insolvency, through the principle, satisfies 
the requirement of fairness. The pari passu principle provides an orderly list of creditors according to 
their interests and rights, in the absence of the principle, insolvency proceedings would be on a first 
come first served basis, regardless of fairness to those with pre-arranged entitlements. However, with 
the recognition of security interests, the allocation of priority under the principle is severely 
overlooked as insolvency law has created deviations289 to the principle, which are in favour of 
proprietary rights such as holders of retention of title clauses or preferential creditors. As iterated by 
Bridge, ‘when secured creditors are able to eviscerate an insolvent’s estate prior to its vesting in the 
liquidator, one has to ask just how fundamental is the pari passu principle.’290 It has been suggested 
that the principle is defined by its numerous deviations that enable the bypassing of the principle, 
which is recognised by law. Thus, ‘to allow the use of such [security] devices is not merely to reduce 
the role of pari passu, it introduces principles to override pari passu.’291 Therefore, it is strongly argued 
 
285 V Finch “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?”, op cit fn 98 at 633. 
286 S Cantlie “Preferred Priority in Bankruptcy” in J Ziegel, op cit fn 272 at 420.  
287 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, op cit fn 256 at 11.  
288 R Mokal “Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth”, op cit fn 212 at 582.  
289 The author acknowledges that there are a number of exceptions to the pari passu principle such as 
liquidation expenses, preferential debts, set-off, subordination, deferred claims etc. However, as 
aforementioned a comprehensive account of all these exceptions is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a 
detailed account see further: V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, op cit fn 190, see 
Chapter 14.  
290 M Bridge “The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions” (1992) 12(3) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 333-361, at 340.  
291 V Finch “Is Pari Passu Passe?”, op cit fn 243 at 9. 
68 
 
that the pari passu principle does not fulfil its attributed function of preventing the disruption of the 
default order or priority.292 The principle does not impose specific requirements to be fulfilled, it 
merely provides a description of what insolvency law does, and as such, it is argued that this ‘reduces 
the principle to triviality.’293 For such reasons, the principle has been critiqued for being fundamentally 
hollow as under its remit, creditors from the same corresponding class must be treated equally and 
the law recognises that there are several different classes of creditors.294 It is claimed that the principle 
has a limited effect in allocating distribution as various types of secured claims fall beyond the ambit 
and the application of the principle.295 Thus, arguably the array of deviations which allow the bypassing 
of the principle, results in uncertainty, confusion and substantive unfairness.296 It is evident that the 
principle is not quite as important as it is made out to be and potentially fails to fulfil its ascribed 
function.297  
 
It is argued that the principle of pari passu does not represent the facts of a real corporate 
insolvency.298 The accessibility and ease of creating proprietary interests, has resulted in the common 
practice of secured creditors seizing the assets of an insolvent debtor to the detriment of ordinary 
unsecured creditors. A typical case showing this is Business Computers v Anglo-African Leasing.299 The 
case deals with rights of set off, however the case’s background facts, provides a good illustration of 
how an insolvent’s assets are normally distributed in accordance with the different levels of priority. 
The plaintiff company Business Computers, manufactured computers and financed its operations by 
obtaining loans from banks which were secured by debentures. The bank insisted that the loans were 
to be secured by debentures, which subsequently created a floating charge over the assets of Business 
Computers. Subsequently, Business Computers entered into insolvency, with their assets amounting 
to £1 million. When Business Computers entered into insolvency, £700,000 was taken by debenture 
holders and subsequently preferential creditors including the Crown and the rating authorities took 
£300,000. The trade and unsecured creditors were owed £3 million but got nothing as the insolvent 
estate was bled dry to satisfy the claims of preferential creditors and those holding proprietary 
interests, specifically floating charge holders in this case. The defendants, Anglo-African Leasing Ltd 
had a claim against Business Computers which exceeded £30,000, whilst the defendants owed 
Business Computers a sum of £10,587.50. The receiver of Business Computers sought payment of the 
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debt with interest and Anglo-African Leasing Ltd sought to set-off their claim against the debt. 
Templeman J’s dissatisfaction with this ‘depressingly typical300’ event of secured creditors sweeping 
off the assets of an insolvent debtor301, was evident in the following passage:  
‘the question whether in this day and age it is necessary or desirable to permit the Crown and 
the holders of future floating charges the totality of the priorities which can be exercised 
under the existing law is not the subject of debate in this court, though I am included to think 
that it is at least debateable elsewhere.’302 
 
It is clear that there is a connection with the hollow reality of the pari passu principle and the criticism 
relating to the ease in which proprietary rights can be created. In particular, the principle is criticised 
for its hollow ambit as it simply requires the assets of an insolvent debtor to be distributed in line with 
pari passu. The principle does not specify assets belonging to others nor assets which have a 
proprietary interest. For such reasons, the principle is rarely applied in practice on account of the 
proliferation of proprietary interests.303 
 
2.2.2 Rare application in practice  
In recent times, the pari passu principle has also been criticised for its ineffectiveness in practice, as 
in reality it is suggested that company’s assets are distributed in a different manner to the pari passu 
principle.304 Mokal concludes that the principle, ‘does not constitute an accurate description of how 
the assets of insolvent companies are in fact distributed.’305 In fact, even the Cork Report 
acknowledged that a rateable distribution amongst creditors in accordance with the principle is very 
rarely achieved.306 In addition, empirical evidence has been collated which suggests that in practice, 
insolvent assets are hardly distributed as per the pari passu principle.307 On account of the widely 
divergent priorities given to those with security interests or similar, it is claimed that the vast majority 
of unsecured creditors are in fact left with very little or nothing when it comes the allocation of assets 
in insolvency proceedings. This is supported by empirical evidence which highlights that ‘it is estimated 
that there are zero returns to them [unsecured creditors] in 88% of [most insolvency cases].’308 It is 
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apparent that an overwhelming majority of insolvency proceedings, leave very little or nothing to be 
distributed to unsecured creditors.309 Unsecured creditors, the only group of claimants who are 
heavily subjected to the principle are not even paid pari passu in practice, on account of the small 
payable dividends available following the distribution to priority creditors. In the vast majority of 
circumstances, there is simply not enough residual assets to pay unsecured creditors’ claims in full.  
Indeed, ‘unsecured creditors will usually bear the burden of the insolvency of a company as it is they 
who depend on the fullest extent of the application of the pari passu principle.’310 This is supported 
by Wood: ‘experience has shown that the dividends payable to this group [unsecured creditors], after 
payment of super-priority and priority creditors, is either nil or some small percentage- often no more 
than 20 per cent and usually much less.’311 The common type of unsecured creditors who face such 
uncertainty include unsecured bank creditors, bondholders and trade creditors who are paid to carry 
out work or sell goods.312 Other unsecured creditors include tort claimants or employee pension funds. 
Unsecured creditors are thus either individuals or small sized traders, groups which are particular 
vulnerable and commonly lack the resources or influence to alleviate the risk of receiving a small 
dividend following the distribution of an insolvent estate. The trade creditor is in a weaker position 
than most other unsecured creditors who have fixed claims in tort or tax, thus meaning that they are 
more likely to be induced into additional risk: ‘it is the trade creditor who places reliance on corporate 
financial reports who may suffer an increased financial loss as a result.’313 All this evidence suggests 
that the pari passu principle fails to have successful application of its attributed function in the real 
world. It is evident that distribution in accordance with the principle is ‘non-existent’314 on account of 
insolvency law favouring those with security interests or similar status of preferred creditor. It is 
strongly argued that the principle is less effective in practice as the claim the principle ‘governs mostly 
and – necessarily- constitute something approaching a distributive null set; they are held by those who 
will not receive anything…if they do received something, it would not be much.’315 Therefore, the 
above reasons illustrate the weak nature of the principle in theory and in practice.  
 
The discussion will now turn to the practical implications of the pari passu principle for creditors. In 
line with the earlier discussion, the first rationale concerns the recognition of security rights. The 
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principle is confined to the assets of a company and accordingly, the law must respect and enforce 
any pre-arranged entitlements such as the recognition of security rights, before distributing the pool 
of remaining assets amongst unsecured creditors. The principle is non-applicable and does not affect 
the following groups; secured creditors including those with fixed charges and/or floating charges over 
assets, holders of retention of title clauses (most notably suppliers of goods), or any party with 
proprietary rights to the assets including those who hold the assets on trust.316 Accordingly, it is 
evident that a significant group of claimants either are or can be exempt from the application of the 
pari passu principle.317 In effect, this significantly reduces the amount of assets available for unsecured 
creditors and thus, offers one explanation of why the pari passu principle is less effective in practice.  
 
Goode argues that the assets may be subject to equities for example undue influence or right to avoid 
a transaction for misrepresentation.318 He further suggests that the principle is less effective in 
practice due to the limited amount of residual assets available to be distributed to unsecured 
creditors. Following the hierarchal distribution process whereby all proprietary rights holders and 
secured creditors are given their share in the insolvent estate, the remaining residual pool will be very 
limited to the detriment of any unpaid unsecured creditors. Thus, ‘the effect is largely to frustrate a 
primary objective of the insolvency process and to deprive the general body of creditors any significant 
interest in the winding up process.’319 Consequently, the above contentions provides a good indication 
of why the pari passu principle appears to be less effective in practice. It is evident that the principle 
of pari passu is non-extensive as it is subjected to a hierarchy which allows the principle to be set aside 
or overridden by security interests.  
 
2.2.3 The freedom of contract argument 
Another justification for the law allowing the bypassing of the pari passu principle concerns the 
freedom of contract argument. Accordingly, ‘judicial recognition of security devices usually proceeds 
on the basis that such recognition is but a manifestation of freedom of contract.’320 It is argued that 
bypassing the pari passu by means of incorporating a retention of title clause, is much the same as 
giving priority to secured creditors, therefore cannot lead to unsecured creditors being treated 
unfairly.321 Thus, this argument infers that there can be no unfairness towards unsecured creditors as 
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security has been freely negotiated and contracted for.322 Retention of title clauses in this instance 
freely bargained for their right of preference for the super-priority status. Consequently, the freedom 
of contract argument cites that the retention of title claimants have freely negotiated and bargained 
for proprietary rights over the insolvent property, whereas the unsecured creditor had the freedom 
to contract for higher priority, but chose not to.323 Unsecured creditors are freely entitled to negotiate 
for a position of superior priority, therefore the risk is on the unsecured creditors for not contracting 
a better position. The freedom of contract notion was emphasised by Lord Macnaghten in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co324, ‘every creditor is entitled to get and to hold the best security the law allows him to 
take.’325 Therefore, according to the freedom of contract argument, a creditor has every right to 
bargain for security which can advance his status of priority to the detriment of other creditors.326 As 
such, the freedom of contract argument provides justification for permitting creditors to benefit in 
the event of an insolvency as the freedom to contract argument dictates that the parties are merely 
respecting their proprietary and contractual entitlements.327  
 
Additionally, there can be no unfairness as before the winding up process, a creditor is free to pursue 
any enforcement measures which are available to him.328 As such, as emphasised by Goode, ‘if another 
creditor chose to lend money or supply goods unsecured, that is his affair; he has no right to complain 
of being subordinated.’329 It is fairly assumed that creditors will be aware of the potential risks and can 
thus insist on measures to aid their position. Creditors can employ measures such as demanding a 
premium or collateral to protect their unsecured claims or can raise their interest raised to reflect the 
level of risk involved.330 Within this very competitive market, creditors are entitled to strengthen their 
position and subsequently bargain for their right of preference and by not doing so, creditors face the 
risk of the pool of assets already been drained of all its contents. Evidently, any advance bargaining 
will subsequently dictate the priorities in insolvency and will increase the chances of creditors getting 
paid.331 Therefore, it can be argued that there is no unfairness to unsecured creditors as they are 
free332 to contract any rates or terms deemed appropriate to themselves. Therefore, it can be 
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suggested that the different levels of priority during the insolvency proceedings is based on first come, 
first served basis in relation to bargaining for their contractual rights of preference.  
 
Another variant of the freedom of contract argument focuses specifically on secured credit and 
property rights. It is argued that the notion of taking security is indistinguishable in its economic effects 
compared to other financial transactions such as repayment of debts.333 Accordingly, ‘the creditor is 
providing value and in return is taking security and to deny the creditor that security to its full extent 
would be to deprive the creditor of something for which it has paid.’334 This is particular analogous to 
those taking out security devices, especially the position of retention of title claimants. In order to 
incorporate a valid retention of title clause within a contract, it is most likely that such holders have 
to pay a financial sum, albeit in solicitor fees to draft contracts etc. Thus, it is suggested that in order 
to have gained a higher priority status in the insolvency proceedings and ultimately bypass the 
ordinary rules of pari passu, such holders have paid for their priority to a certain extent.    
 
Unsecured creditors appear to have consented to their inferior status by lending on an unsecured 
basis in the first place.335 Consequently, unsecured creditors’ implicit consent336 provides another 
justification why the law permits the taking of security, regardless of perceived unfairness on behalf 
of the unsecured creditors. In such a competitive environment with emphasis on bargain and the 
concept of fair exchange, the burden is on the unsecured creditor to negotiate better terms. 
Consequently, it can be further argued that a ‘creditor who failed to arrange security took the risk of 
being trumped on corporate insolvency by a secured creditor.’337 Unsecured creditors can take 
proactive measures to eliminate the risks they face, such as altering their loan rates.338 There is also 
the argument that unsecured creditors are aware of the potential risks they face and as such the 
burden should be borne by them. This is emphasised by Milman, ‘with the widespread dissatisfaction 
felt by unsecured creditors with the existing legal structure, which frequently offered them only a 
dividend of a few pence in the pound…It is hardly surprising that any opportunity to subvert the 
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existing priority rules would be seized upon with relish.’339 If certain groups of unsecured creditors are 
offered the opportunity to improve their priority status, they should do so.  
  
One potential drawback to the freedom of contract argument is to consider the fact that many 
unsecured creditors will not be in position to take out security such as tort victims or involuntary 
creditors. In certain circumstances, creditors have no choice in becoming creditors, making their 
decision completely involuntary and unable to arrange sufficient security measures. Accordingly, they 
are unable to take account of security arrangements as most commonly they did not choose to 
become creditors in the first place.340 As such there is a particular group of creditors who are unable 
to adjust their rates on loans or by taking security. This is particularly relevant to creditors whose 
claims to the insolvent estate are comparatively small. In these circumstances, when a claim is 
moderately small, it may not practical for such creditors to adjust the terms. ‘Those whose claims 
against the debtor’s estate are comparatively small as to make it uneconomic to adjust the terms of 
the extension of credit to reflect the fact that others are taking security.’341 Most creditors with a 
relatively small claim often lack the resources or influence to be able to adjust their interest rates 
accordingly to protect themselves against the increased threat and risk of secured debt, which may or 
not happen. Such creditors are unable to take precautionary methods to safeguard themselves against 
potential threats as creditors could incur wasteful financial expenditure. Indeed, these ‘non-
consensual creditors have, by definition, had no opportunity to bargain with the debtor for protection 
against the consequences of risk.’342 
 
2.2.4 Efficiency of preferential treatment 
The priority of secured creditors or holders of retention of title holders, is perceived to be mutually 
advantageous with strong efficiency considerations.343 Ensuring and facilitating efficiency344 and 
lowering market costs in the insolvency business is of paramount importance. It is argued that ‘the 
collective insolvency regime endeavours to deploy the residual pool of assets in a value maximising 
manner.’345 Consequently, those with a higher priority and claim of insolvent assets, will ultimately 
offset costs to alternative capital structures of the market, thus facilitating efficiency on a reciprocal 
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cycle.346 Thus, a mutually advantageous situation occurs where the balance of offsets of costs are 
achieved, which ultimately benefit the insolvency market as a whole and increases efficiency for 
secured credit.347 It is perceived to be most efficient as offsets of gains are then distributed further 
along to other transactions.348 Additionally, within the context of retention of title clauses, the clauses 
allow for the continued use of the assets in the meantime. Thus, by allowing the company to use the 
assets, the company can produce goods and generate income.349 Therefore, the efficiency justification 
argues that in these circumstances, allowing the bypassing of the distribution rules, maximises the 
aggregate returns to all involved in the insolvency proceedings.350 It is implied by Cantlie that from an 
efficiency perspective, that society is burdened by the consequences of resources allocation and 
subsequently: ‘the creditor’s failure to extract compensation or protection means that the debtor will 
not internalise the costs of non-payment to that creditor.’351 Hence, those afforded with a higher 
status of priority facilitate levels of efficiency on an economic basis. It is necessary to ensure that the 
law of security does not adversely affect or unfairly prejudice other creditors. Thus, creditors cannot 
take out ‘a penny more than he put in.’352 A sufficient degree of fairness and efficiency is guaranteed 
by insolvency law as to ensure that no creditor overextends or manipulates his other security rights, 
to the detriment of other innocent involved groups.  
 
The higher status of priority means, that in a vast majority of insolvency proceedings only the secured, 
post-liquidation and preferential creditors receive anything from the assets of an insolvent party. ‘The 
interests regarded as more worthy of attention (and therefore arguably more important) by the rule-
makers are given precedence with respect to particular types of assets, in certain situations, to a 
specified extent.’353 Groups of claimants who are afforded higher priority status, either by the parties 
to commercial transactions or directly by Parliament itself, are regarded as important and accordingly, 
their claims ‘should be met to a significant degree in most insolvencies.’354 
 
Unsecured creditors are often left with nothing or very little in the distribution process. For this 
reason, there is simply no point in wasting resources such as time and money in trying to allocate how 
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unsecured creditors should be ranked. As such, one contention is that it makes commercial sense for 
unsecured claims to be governed by the pari passu principle, as the alternative proposition of having 
to determine their rankings in terms of fairness and efficiency, would incur significant costs in relation 
to time, effort and resources and thus would far exceed any benefits.355 In this regard, it is implied 
that legal costs, uncertainties and delays are kept at a minimum as the principle does not differentiate 
unsecured creditors’ claims, which consequently avoids the courts deliberating difficult procedural 
decisions which would be of great expenditure of time, resources and money.356  Indeed, ‘in the end 
one suspects that the pari passu rule has been adopted by courts as a convenient fall-back position 
that avoids the necessity of making difficult choices where the legislature has failed to take the 
initiative.’357 Therefore, it is argued that those holding higher priority through the recognition of 
security interest or quasi-security interests are justified on the basis that their rights and interests are 
perceived to be mutually beneficial, albeit in terms of efficiency or fairness.  
 
2.2.5 Stimulates economic activity  
The law permits secured creditors such as those afforded proprietary rights over insolvent debts given 
that secured credit facilitates economic growth.358 As such there may be consequentialist arguments 
for allowing the taking of security to the detriment of undermining the pari passu principle.359 As a 
direct implication of the wide availability of security, loans are encouraged by lenders which facilitates 
economic activity.360 In this regard, the economic bargaining power of certain creditors (notably 
banks) inevitably strengthens from the recognition of security interests.361 Recognising security rights 
serves as an impetus for the facilitation of economic growth and development by lowering the overall 
cost of credit. Secured credit often benefits the borrower and the lender as secured loans tend to 
bring in lower interest payment compared to the unsecured loan.362 Thus, creditors and secured 
transactions enable parties to access credit at a low cost, which financially contributes to the economic 
market and enables creditors to diversity risk.363 Accordingly, it is argued that secured credit promotes 
the extension of credit, of which the economy crucially depends upon.364 Therefore, the overall 
accessibility of credit is increased which facilitates the process of raising finances. This can be 
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exemplified in practice by banks who exert their status as secured creditors to bypass the pari passu 
principle. Failing to recognise the priority of secured creditors such as banks would have a disastrous 
impact on the economy in general as it would become exceedingly difficult for businesses to raise 
capital and purchase property, without the assistance of banks.  
 
Accordingly, it has been implied that secured credit and the notion of security is responsible for the 
phenomenal growth of the distribution economy.365 In the insolvency market, whether a creditor 
deems a credit transaction as profitable is determined on the basis of risks. Thus, taking out security 
can ameliorate the potential risks and losses a creditor can face as they can increase their interest 
rates to outweigh any potential losses.366 This is emphasised by Milman, ‘the willingness of English law 
to permit companies the freedom to grant security in return for loan finance may also be justified on 
economic grounds in that such security lessened the risk for the borrower and thereby reduced the 
cost of credit.’367 As such, permitting certain groups of claimants to secure priority over their fellow 
creditors is justified as a cost-saving mechanism which facilitates the growth of capitalism in the long 
run.368  Therefore, the law permits the taking of security and subsequently allows for the pari passu 
principle to be overlooked as credit serves as an incentive for developing economic activity.  
 
2.2.6 Long established devices   
Security devices have been a notable feature of the insolvency world for a long period of time. Their 
legal longevity suggests their efficiency in this environment. McCormack argues, ‘security devices are 
widespread and pervasive not only in the modern industrialised world but also in ancient societies, 
and one might ask the rhetorical question why does secured credit persist for so long if it 
insufficient?’369 Secured measures such as retention of title clauses are long established within the 
legal community which serves as a testament to why the law permits taking of security and more 
specifically, the bypassing the pari passu principle. It can be argued that bypassing the pari passu 
principle through measures such as security devices, serves to benefit the more powerful companies. 
It is the larger and more powerful companies who are in a better bargaining position to incorporate 
legal devices such as retention of title clauses. As a result of larger company’s accessibility to more 
resources, business connections, financially stable income, they are in a far better position compared 
to smaller sized companies to be able to incorporate devices, which can bypass the principle of pari 
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passu. A rapid increase of sizable firms relying on secured credit has been noted by academics such as 
McCormack, who states that firms heavily rely on secured credit as their principal method of financing 
and developing growth opportunities.370 
 
As evidenced above, security devices have been prevalent for a long time and have been deemed 
efficient within the insolvency environment as such devices facilitate economic and market growth 
etc. As such, they are regarded as all pervasive as it allows the more powerful companies to not be 
subjected to the equality rule of pari passu. It can be suggested that this area of insolvency law, tends 
to favour the more powerful companies as they benefit economic interests as whole. Therefore, this 
offers an alternative explanation of why the law permits the taking of security and allows the pari 
passu principle to be bypassed and more specifically allows the principle to be undermined. It can be 
further implied, that these security devices which protect the more powerful companies, are 
essentially designed to promote fairness and efficiency on a wider scale in insolvency proceedings and 
commercial transactions.  
 
2.2.7 An economic and political motive? 
It appears that the law allows security interests and quasi-security interests to override the principle 
of pari passu for political and economic reasons. Certain powerful parties, for example banks are 
afforded higher priority status in the insolvency distribution allocation. It is questionable whether this 
is fair. However, there may be economic rationales for such a stipulation. It can be argued that if banks 
were to have lower priority status, this may lead to economic implications such as making banks more 
reluctant to lend due to the increased risk or imposing higher interest rates to lend on such a risky 
basis.371 Additionally, lowering their priority may lead to secured creditors enforcing more stringent 
terms in order to lend. All of these implications can have adverse effects on the economy and would 
burden all other groups involved in the insolvency process as potentially business could be hindered. 
It is thought that removing banks secured status would result in banks taking alternative defensive 
measures, which can detrimentally impact smaller businesses.372 Any of the above implications would 
have direct negative connotations on small to medium sized business, as banks can take advantage of 
companies in financial distress. The variety of security devices available to banks ensures that they 
remain in a powerful position and are able to exert such power over companies during both formal 
insolvency procedures and informal rescue contexts.373 If banks were stripped of their higher priority 
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status in insolvency proceedings, they could enforce precautionary mechanisms such as higher 
interest’s rates, adversely impacting a company during its most vulnerable time. Implications of 
reducing the priority status afforded to creditors was raised by McCormack; ‘[it would] cause a 
diminution in the supply and quality of credit offered.’374 
 
Accordingly, it can be argued that certain groups of creditors such as secured creditors and retention 
of title clause claimants are afforded a preferred position in insolvency proceedings as a method of 
minimising the inevitable social and economic costs of an insolvency.375 For example, when a company 
enters liquidation, a wide range of businesses may be owed substantial sums. This can cause 
exceptionally negative economic implications as illustrated by Keay: ‘a liquidation, particularly of large 
companies, can precipitate financial problems for many of the company’s trading partners, can lead 
to a chain of failed enterprises; this is so-called ripple effect.’376 As such, prioritising certain groups of 
creditors ensures that these parties have a greater chance of being protected against the collapse of 
an insolvent debtor. The impact of liquidation is thus spread across a wide range of groups of creditors, 
thus facilitating the possibility of creditors being able to continue trading.377  
 
A potential solution to this proliferation of priority was suggested by Calnan; he argued that the 
practical solution was to make it harder to create security in the first place.378 However, he also raised 
the issue that restricting the availability of security for credit would have disastrous consequences as 
it would just make it increasingly difficult to obtain credit. Thus, allowing secured creditors to bypass 
insolvency priority rules, enables such creditors to a have a degree of economic flexibility. As such, 
banks and other secured creditors such as retention of title holders are often afforded stronger and 
more effective security or property rights.   
 
It is evident that banks play a pivotal role during the insolvency of a company, however it is clear that 
their role is far broader and extends to economic and political motivations. Thus, in attempting to 
provide a solution to the question of why does the law allow the bypassing of the pari passu principle, 
the answer may be intrinsically connected to economic and political motives, which extend beyond 
the scope of law. As previously mentioned, banks are powerful players within the insolvency market 
as they can prevent companies from entering insolvency in the first place. Banks can issue loans to 
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inject financial income into a company in times of facing financial distress. Additionally, banks can 
encourage or force companies to undergo dramatic changes to prevent the insolvency of a company, 
such as urging reconstructive suggestions of downsizing or even suggesting the replacement of 
managers.379 As such, it is evident that banks have an influence on actions of company, which can lead 
to a company’s unfortunate demise or miraculous recovery. Having such an involved role, means that 
banks can impact on the economy in many ways. Highlighting their importance within the insolvency 
world, serves to suggest why certain powerful players such as secured creditors or holders of security 
interests/ quasi-security interests are allowed to bypass insolvency rules of equality. As such, ‘the 
existence of priorities is predicted on the belief of the legislature that certain persons warrant some 
form of protection, and should be insulated from the insolvent’s financial failure.’380 Their all-invasive 
roles have a massive impact on economic implications and also their political prowess in terms of 
power and influence over companies in the market. Therefore, secured creditors have political 
repercussions on account of the financial interests, which are inherently at stake. 
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
Accordingly, there are a variety of reasons which explain and justify why retention of title clauses and 
similar security devices are afforded super-priority status in the event of insolvency to the detriment 
of the pari passu principle and subsequently, any third parties who share an economic interest in the 
assets of the insolvent buyer. Evidently, retention of title clauses and wider security interests play an 
intrinsic role within the commercial market to warrant the circumvention of the insolvency framework 
and the pari passu principle.  
 
However, as will be argued in the forthcoming chapters, the super-priority status afforded to retention 
of title clauses comes at a stark price as the clauses functional objectives are significantly hindered by 
the legal minefield in which these clauses operate, exacerbated by the courts’ dogmatic and 
inconsistent approach to dealing with these clauses. Despite the policy justifications for affording 
retention of title holders with super-priority status, there are inherent uncertainties and difficulties 
imposed on retention of title clauses in the context of an insolvent company. There are many 
instances, where the clauses do not offer the expected level of protection to seller’s relying on the 
clauses and as such the fundamental objective of providing an economic lifeline in the event of a 
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buyer’s insolvency is jeopardised. Even within the context of insolvency proceedings, the statutory 
moratorium impedes the effectiveness of retention of title clauses as a functional mechanism and 
exposes claimants to unnecessary setbacks which hinder claimants from repossessing their supplied 
goods, as will be evidenced in a forthcoming chapter.381 Regardless of the super-priority status 
afforded to retention of title clause claimants, the functional objectives of such clauses are hindered 
by a broad range of factors, exasperated by significant legal uncertainty and the courts’ general 
reluctance to enforce retention of title claims. Evidently, all that glistens is not gold in the context of 
retention of title clauses, and the subsequent chapter illustrates the issues of terminological 
uncertainty. Difficulties with terminology and definitions poses significant and conceptual problems 
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CHAPTER 3: TERMINOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY OF TITLE  
3. Introduction  
It is widely recognised that a retention of title clause carries out a double function, one function 
relating to security and the other to sale.382 Despite the apparent duality, both functions rely on the 
fundamental objective of the clause, which is to retain legal ownership or title of the goods. The 
common commercial practice of retaining legal ownership of the goods supplied, is instrumental in 
affording suppliers of goods sufficient protection in the event of a contractual buyer’s insolvency. The 
popularity and proliferation of retention of title clauses in commercial contracts of sale arguably, 
reflects an omission of the current law in failing to adequately protect creditors. The incorporation of 
a right of ownership by means of a retention of title clause attempts to fill the void where legislation 
fails to implement sufficient protection for creditors. By means of incorporating a retention of title 
clause in the contract of sale, an otherwise unpaid seller can reserve ownership in the goods and be 
afforded priority in the insolvency proceedings. Without this level of protection bestowed by the title 
retaining provision, the unpaid seller would be denied preference in priority in the insolvency 
proceedings and would only be able to satisfy an insolvency claim, after secured creditors have 
satisfied their claim in full.  
 
Conceptually, for retention of title clauses to effectively operate and provide the necessary protection 
to the seller, the seller must retain title of the goods, thus retaining legal ownership. Of equal 
importance, the buyer must be conferred sufficient rights to be able to use the goods, before the full 
purchase price has been paid, in order for a retention of title clause to be contractually and 
‘commercially workable.’383 Accordingly, under the scope of a retention of title clause, both the seller 
and buyer fundamentally rely on the concepts of ‘title’ and ‘ownership’. Therefore, the concept of 
legal ownership is of prominent importance when dealing with retention of title clauses. Additionally, 
title as a concept is considered fundamental to ensure a detailed understanding of the proprietary 
nature of the relevant Sale of Goods legislation.384 Evidently, one must understand the concepts of 
title and ownership, to understand how retention of title clauses function in practice.  
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It can be claimed that the effectiveness of a retention of title clause is severely hindered by the 
relevant legislation failing to define key concepts pertinent to this area of law and that the current 
legislation fails to reflect the modern environment in which these clauses operate. Accordingly, this 
chapter will explore some of the common problems associated with the lack of definitions contained 
within the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and how this creates significant legal uncertainty and confusion. 
The discussion will also highlight notable problems in relation to the concepts of title and ownership 
and the subsequent implications for retention of title clauses. As such, the purpose of the following 
discussion is to illustrate the difficulties with terminological and definitional accuracy. This is important 
to discuss within this thesis in order to illustrate some of the fundamental weaknesses of this area of 
law, which hinders the functional objectives of the clauses from the onset. It is argued that the 
terminological uncertainty originating from the Sale of Goods Act, significantly contributes to the 
inception of the minefield of legal issues associated with retention of title clauses.  
 
3.1 Title  
As the focus of this thesis is retention of title clauses and title is implicit in understanding the legal 
doctrine, it is thus imperative to ascertain what is meant by title. Accordingly, the following discussion 
will provide a general overview of what exactly is meant by title and consequently attempts to 
navigate through the nuances in application and meaning of title. Title is a relative concept which 
bears different interpretations and meanings. The definition of title is an elusive concept as the 
meaning of title varies within the context it is used.385 In accordance with this, ‘title may be 
enforceable against X but not necessarily against Y. The reason for this is that title is generally a relative 
concept and must be measured relative to other facts, which may lead to a different conclusion in 
law.’386 It is evident that over the years various proponents have advanced different accounts of what 
is meant by title.387 It is suggested that the fundamentally different accounts of the meaning of title is 
caused by the various ways that title is used in law, which further contributes to the mass confusion.388 
It is instructive now to discuss the meaning of title. In order to provide a holistic approach to what is 
meant by title, it is possible to categorise the understanding of title in three ways. The concept of title 
can be equated with popular conception of ownership, legal ownership or legal right.389  
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Firstly, the concept of title can be understood with reference to the popular conception of ownership, 
which bears wider legal connotations. In this instance, if a person has ownership then it equates to 
them having title to the subject-matter of his ownership.390 Equating title to ownership is regarded as 
a much more general approach and encompasses definitions found in different areas of law. For 
example, title holds a specific meaning for land registration under the remit of the Land Registration 
Act 2002, in which title is conferred upon a proprietor through different levels of guarantee such as 
having an absolute, qualified or possessory title.391 To this extent, title is understood by the common 
popular notion of ownership. Arguably, this conception of ownership is concurrent with the view that 
ownership is and ought to be exclusive. Hence, ‘exclusion is one very import tool for enabling owners 
to exercise their authority effectively.’392  
 
Secondly, title is understood by common legal understanding. To this extent, the concept of title can 
also be used synonymously for legal ownership and possession such as the right to physically use the 
property, the right to obtain income from the property and the right to manage it.393 This is 
emphasised by Lawson and Rudden who state: ‘title is a shorthand term used to denote the facts 
which, if proved, will enable a plaintiff to recover possession or a defendant to retain possession of a 
thing.’394 According to this viewpoint, the law regards a person who has possession of a certain good 
as its owner, thus indicating that the person has a title to the ownership of the certain good in 
question.395 To this end, ownership and possession are interlinked.  
 
Thirdly, title can refer to a legal right. In this context, title is identified as a claim to a bundle of rights 
which are associated with ownership of a specific thing.396 Accordingly, ‘the classical analysis of title 
demonstrates that title is the set of facts upon which a claim to some legal right, liberty or power, or 
legal interest is based.’397 Interpreting this view of the doctrine of title, multiple ownerships can exist 
in reference to the same chattel. This account of title enables multiple persons to have rights, powers 
or interests, which constitute or partly constitute, ownership.398 In this instance, title can refer to a 
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claim arising out of a proprietary interest. It is important to note that title does not refer to the actual 
content of the claimant’s proprietary interest meaning his practical enjoyment conferred by the 
interest, merely it relates to the claimant’s strength of claim.399 The claimant’s strength of claim to the 
practical enjoyment is relative to other potential claimants holding similar interests in the same asset. 
Accordingly, a fundamental notion of title is ascertaining whether an individual’s claim to the asset is 
stronger or weaker than other claims made by potential claimants. Thus, courts must determine which 
of the contesting claimants has the better possessory title rather than ascertaining who is the true 
owner.400 Title is also understood in a technical manner by reference to a specific statute and 
ascertaining what implicit meaning does the statute refer to. The relevant statutory provisions for 
retention of title clauses are found in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which fail to define the concept of 
title or ownership. This illustrates the difficulty in inferring a particular meaning of title without the 
assistance of an explicit definition provided by the relevant statute.  
 
3.2 Elusive nature of ownership  
The same criticisms can be applied to the concept of ownership as one of the most fundamental 
difficulties with this area of law, is that the concept of ownership is deemed elusive. The elusive nature 
of ownership is heightened further on account of the failure of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 to define 
the term ‘ownership’. Similarly, a definition of ownership cannot be found in Blackstone, which fails 
to mention ownership as a juridical concept.401 The only definition found in the Sale of Goods Act 
relates to property under section 61 which states that property is defined as the general property in 
the goods and not relating to special property. However, this definition does not provide us with the 
necessary guidance to define title or ownership with absolute certainty. On account of the Sale of 
Goods Act failing to provide definitions for title or ownership, it is thought that ‘general property’ and 
‘ownership’ are used synonymously. This is supported by Davies who notes that ‘it may be that general 
property’ and ownership are treated as coterminous.’402  
 
Accordingly, it is now imperative to consider the reasons why the Sale of Goods Act does not use the 
concept of ownership directly. It is suggested by Lowe that the Sale of Goods Act does not use the 
concept of ownership on the basis of historical reasoning.403 On account of the relative nature of 
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English law and the fact that ownership is such an elusive concept, such a combination would employ 
much uncertainty to this area of law.404 Panesar argues that the concept of ownership is plagued by 
conceptual problems and as such it is difficult to refine ownership into one singular notion.405 Indeed, 
the concept of ownership is usually tied with the concept of possession, which again may explain why 
the Sale of Goods Act does not define nor clarify the concept of ownership. Despite the intention of 
the Act seeking to avoid uncertainty, arguably the lack of definitions generate their own set of 
inconsistencies and confusion. 
 
However, it is evident that much uncertainty has been brought on by the lack of comprehensive 
definitions and that the definitions employed by the Act give rise to some serious definitional 
problems as will be discussed below.406 Davies emphasises the common confusion associated with the 
terminology employed by stating; ‘the close connection between the idea of ownership and the idea 
of things owned- demonstrated by the use of the word ‘property’ to designate both- has caused 
confusion.’407 According to Davies, a functionalist and simplistic account of ownership should not be 
endorsed as such approaches may not be widely recognised in the context of sale of goods, with the 
exception of lawyers.408 Therefore, it can be argued that including a definition of ownership within the 
Sale of Goods Act would be advantageous as it would open the scope of understanding to a wider 
audience, extending beyond the remit of lawyers exclusively. Arguably, under the present regime, the 
concept of ownership is difficult to comprehend due to the wide connotations associated with it.  
 
3.3 Terminology employed by the Sale of Goods Act   
3.3.1 Use of ordinary words  
The perplexity of retention of title clauses is exacerbated by the failure of the Sale of Good Act to 
define the concepts of title and ownership. Terms associated with retention of title clauses, notably, 
‘ownership’, ‘title’ and ‘property’ are used interchangeably which often causes significant confusion. 
As will be illustrated, the employment of the terms in such close proximity invites notable problems. 
It is evident by the forthcoming examples that these different terms are used inconsistently, which 
further contributes to the existing legal uncertainty. This issue is exacerbated by the choice of 
terminology used by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (hereafter Sale of Goods Act). The Sale of Goods Act 
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has the apparent advantage of using ordinary words to convey and formulate the legal rules.409 
However, using ordinary words to formulate legal rights can be regarded as a weakness of the sale of 
goods legislation as ‘in this way the strength of the legislation can sometimes be its principal weakness 
because the ordinary words may carry a special legal meaning.’410 Within the context of the Sale of 
Goods Act, a particular term could infer a number of different meanings, all of which could have 
slightly different legal connotations or legal significances. This particular problem of inferring different 
legal meanings is exemplified by the use of the term ‘property’ in the Sales of Goods Act 1979, which 
will be highlighted further below. It is now instructive to provide an overview of the relevant sections 
of the Sale of Goods Act to facilitate understanding. 
 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 is divided into two groups of sections. Sections 16-20 deals with the 
‘transfer of property as between seller and buyer’, whereas sections 21-26 are grouped under 
‘transfer of title.’411 Section 61 defines property as the general property in the goods, which does not 
merely relate to a special property.412 It must be noted that neither ‘general property’ nor ‘special 
property’ is defined by the Act, which means that meaning must be inferred from the common law. 
This definition has been criticised for being overtly weak and lacking specificity, as such the current 
definition fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of what is meant by property.413 
Accordingly, ‘the definition of general property in the Goods Act like so many statutory definitions is 
very basic and a fuller and satisfactory definition has proved elusive.’414 However, as noted by 
McCormack, the language adopted by the relevant legislation differs from common practice.415 It is 
stated that property in the goods usually refers to the rights of ownership, which denotes a wider 
audience of participants, whereas title to the goods, is generally adopted as to refer to the legal rights 
that pass between seller and buyer.416 So from the onset, there is a variance between common 
understanding of terminology and the terminology asserted by the Sale of Goods Act. On account of 
the apparent failings of section 61 to define property, one must infer meaning from the context of the 
Act itself or by the use of common law.417 It has been implied that general property is synonymously 
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associated with ownership, whereas special property refers to a lesser interest.418 It has also been 
suggested that general property can be identified as an ownership interest and connected with the 
concept of an absolute interest.419 Hence, it can be argued that the definition of property requires 
further clarification as it is obvious that the current definition of property under the Act ‘informs us 
only of the extent to which the seller must relinquish his interests in the goods to the buyer.’420 
 
3.3.2 Inferring meaning from the common law  
The common law does not provide a definite nor a comprehensive account of the concepts of 
ownership and property.421 Accordingly, ‘since the physical, legal and moral conditions of excludability 
may vary according to time and circumstance, it becomes clear that the notion of property in a 
resource is not absolute, but relative.’422 It is argued that the common law approach to the analysis of 
proprietary rights is far less structured than in civil law jurisdictions.423 The common law approach to 
the term property has been branded feudal in nature, which intermixes different legal categories such 
as property, contract, tort, equity and real and personal remedies.424 The common law approach to 
the concepts of ownership and property is deemed an increasing problem in practice. This is supported 
by Katz who argues that ‘the common law lacks a legal concept of ownership and deals instead in 
rights to possession of varying strength.’425 Arguably, this is an increasing problem within the 
commercial sector as transactions are often expressed in terms which are conditional or split 
ownership and security interests.426 In reality, the legal implications and consequences of such 
stipulations are left unexplored until a legal dispute arises and forces the court to provide a suitable 
solution. Often, the solution provided by the courts is a piecemeal approach, which leads to 
inconsistent and inadequate decisions. Thus, it is suggested that the common law approach produces 
an incoherent body of law, which fails to achieve consistent outcomes. This piecemeal approach to 
legal doctrines, can be found in the context of retention of title clauses, as this area frequently 
generates changing body of case law, where particular clauses are liable to be rendered ineffective by 
the decisions of the court, making it impossible to achieve a sense of coherency.427  
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At common law, there is a great impetus for legal property rights in a chattel to be divided into the 
context of ownership and possession.428 However, it important to note that ‘possession, whether in 
the popular or in the legal sense, does not necessarily concur with title.’429 In the context of the Sale 
of Goods Act, it is important to note that the general property in the goods is separate from possession 
of goods. Even if the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, this does not confer the buyer 
with possession nor the right to possession against the seller.430 Additionally, the property in the goods 
can pass before possession. As such, it is not possible to adopt the common law approach to 
ownership which corresponds to possession. Accordingly, as summarised by Canavan et al: ‘the Act 
itself precludes the adoption of this view because it lays down the clear rule that the buyer’s right to 
possession depends either on payment of the price or on the granting of credit, not on the passing of 
the property.’431 The mere fact that property has passed successfully to the buyer does not equate to 
conferring the buyer title the goods against the whole world not the right to possession as against the 
seller.432 Therefore, the fragmented approach taken by the courts and the unsuitability of ownership 
corresponding to possession under common law, does little to infer meaning of ownership and 
property in the context of the Sale of Goods Act.  
 
3.3.3 Inferring meaning from the Act itself  
Despite the limited definition of property as provided by section 61, generally, there is little difficulty 
in understanding the term ‘property’ as it can be inferred from the Sale of Goods Act to mean the 
entirety of the rights of the sale goods, held by the seller and transferred to the buyer.433 The 
distinction between ‘title’ and ‘property’ within the context of the sale of goods activity has been 
advocated by Battersby and Preston.434 Indeed, Battersby states ‘the use of [the property] concept in 
the Sale of Goods Act shows that it means the totality of the rights over the sale goods enjoyed by the 
seller and which by the sale will be transferred to the buyer.’435 It is argued that the terminology 
employed by the Sale of Goods Act was consciously chosen for mere linguistic purposes by Chalmers 
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who originally drafted the 1893 Act.436 Hence, it is possible to infer meaning of property from what is 
provided by the Act itself. To exemplify this point, Battersby considers retention of title clauses and 
their purpose of retaining title until a specific requirement has been fulfilled, most commonly the full 
payment of purchase price.437 Following the exact terminology of the Sale of Goods Act and inferring 
its meaning, Battersby argues that ‘such clauses would be called reservation of property 
clauses…however, that is obviously a mere linguistic point, nothing of substance turns on it…providing 
that the meaning could be discerned from appropriate definitions or from the context.’438 Accordingly, 
the Sale of Goods Act provides wide discretion in inferring meaning beyond the literal interpretation 
of the terminology employed within the Act. This can be evidenced by the use of title within the 
context of the Sale of Goods Act to mean the various circumstances in which a buyer may become the 
owner of the goods.439 
 
In order to ensure a comprehensive and mutual understanding of property in the context of the Sale 
of Goods Act, it has been suggested by Battersby that the analogous ‘transfer of property’ should be 
elaborated further to reduce confusion.440 As we have seen, property is used within the Act to refer 
to the nature of the seller’s ownership of the goods and the term is also used in reference to the exact 
time when ownership is transferred from seller to buyer under a contract of sale.441 As such, the term 
is used to indicate the transfer of property between seller and buyer. Accordingly, Battersby and 
Preston suggest that the phrase transfer of property should be expanded to infer a comprehensive 
explanation of what it entails, specifically ‘the transfer of such-and-such a title to such-and-such an 
interest.’442 The distinction between title and property has been deemed fundamental by McClure et 
al, on the basis that the English system is one of competing titles.443  It is thus argued that, expanding 
the concept of property would rectify the current failings of section 61 which asserts a limited meaning 
to property.444 Perhaps adopting this expanded approach to the transfer of property would 
simultaneously convey the appropriate meaning and arguably, provide clear conceptual structure to 
this area of law, and subsequently, clarifying some of the conceptual uncertainty surrounding 
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retention of title clauses. However, in attempting to provide a solution to the criticism of the section 
61 definitions, Davies cautions the approach of providing a rigid application of property as such 
strictness would in his view restrict negotiability or transferability of goods.445 It is clear that the 
definitional issues surrounding the transfer of property are highly technical and complicated and 
indeed contribute to this area of law being presented as a legal minefield of uncertainty.    
 
3.3.4 Difficulties relating to the transfer of property  
The terminology employed by the Act in reference to property has been criticised for being overly 
curious as ‘the Act talks of a transfer of property as between seller and buyer, and contrasts this with 
transfer of title.’446 The concept of transfer of property poses serious questions in attempting to 
identify which individuals have ownership rights and specifically ownership rights over what exactly.447  
It has been noted that property rights possess a distinguishing feature in which such rights binds 
immediate parties and all third parties to a certain transaction. Thus, property is given an anomalous 
meaning as property rights can affect third parties.448 Following this assumption, proponents such as 
Atiyah question the existence of transferring and retaining title between a seller and buyer and the 
terminology of the relevant legislation.449 It is argued that such an action should lead to two 
alternatives, which are summarised as follows: transfer of property should relate to a mere transfer 
of duties amongst seller to buyer, or a transfer of property should not be exclusive to simply a buyer 
and seller as such ramifications hold the potential to affect wider participants.450 Therefore, under this 
line of reasoning, Atiyah suggested that ‘title’ and ‘property’ have different meanings. Accordingly, 
‘under the Act, the passing of possession of the goods is said to affect only the relations of the parties 
between themselves, whereas the passing of title in the goods binds third parties.’451 In summation, 
this raises the question of how can there only be a transfer of property between a seller and buyer? 
Either there is merely a transfer of rights as between the seller to the buyer, or there is a transfer or 
property which can impact the whole world.452 
 
Thus, those proponents set against the transfer of property between seller and buyer are doing so on 
the basis that transfer of property should not be exclusive to the category of buyer and seller. 
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Therefore, the interpretation of the Act raises doubts on whether the transfer of title is exclusive to 
the category of mere buyer and seller or extends to the wider world.453 This is supported by Davies 
who suggests that the terminology title and property in the Sale of Goods Act have two completely 
different meanings: ‘under the Act, the passing of property is said to affect solely the relations of 
parties inter se whereas only the title passage provisions bind third parties since the latter assumes 
delivery or retention of de facto possession.’454 It is clear, that this particular area of law is still riddled 
with confusion.  
 
Despite the fact that it is generally accepted that there is little difficulty in understanding the concept 
of property as a singular concept, providing further clarification would be beneficial in ensuring 
consistency and clarity of meaning. By failing to define such key concepts, the application of the Act is 
heavily context dependent which can lead to a number of practical problems as discussed below. The 
most notable problem is that at present, clarification can only be provided on a piecemeal basis 
through the process of disputes reaching the courts. As there is no overarching guidance, it is 
increasingly difficult to interpret such concepts holistically, which leads to matters of inconsistencies. 
In the context of retention of title clauses, any clarification of the law is contingent on particular 
disputes reaching the courts and as such, any development of the law is stifled by this reactive and 
fragmented approach.  
 
3.4 Consequences of failing to define key terms  
There are clear ramifications of failing to define fundamental concepts within the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. The absence of any statutory definition of the terms: ownership and title, in the Sale of Goods 
Act equates to the concept being understood ‘only against the background of the general law of 
property in the goods.’455 Thus, the omission of providing concise and comprehensive definitions, is 
regarded as severely problematic as it opens this area of law to slight variances and inconsistencies. 
Llewellyn emphasises that failing to define these key terms leads to further uncertainty on a case by 
case basis, as it results in the following pragmatic issues:   
‘Title, worked out commonly in a situation where its application fitted the issue well enough, 
is either (1) applied blindly to situations in which a different implication is concerned, with regrettable 
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consequence, or (2) is sleight-of-handed into inconsistent use in the new situation, to achieve a 
consequence deemed desirable.’456 
As such, it can be argued that courts are hindered from providing certainty and consistent reasoning 
for retention of title cases due to the lack of definitions within the relevant legislation. The lack of 
definitions exacerbates the ambiguity surrounding the terms, consequently necessitating the need to 
pose further questions to ascertain the content of the terms.457 Arguably, this can weaken the utility 
of the terms from the onset and leads to nuances in application. Evidently, retention of title clauses 
are subjected to the piecemeal approach adopted by the courts, which invariably leads to an unwieldly 
mass of case law to clarify the exact position of the law in relation to title.   
 
One possible solution to defining title is put forward by McCormack who writes, that title to the goods 
should be held synonymously with the rights that pass between seller and buyer.458 To this extent, the 
concept of title should not be overcomplicated as passing of property only comes into effect when the 
seller enters insolvency and ‘the buyer whom property has passed will have a good title against the 
liquidator.’459 Accordingly, it is put forward that including relevant definitions within the Act will bring 
much needed coherence to this area of law and dispel some of the existing difficulties with retention 
of title clauses.460  
3.5 Relevance to retention of title clauses 
The concept of property holds significant importance in the context of the Sale of Goods Act. The 
omnipotence of the concept of property is exemplified by the need to locate property in the goods 
for a variety of different reasons. Such reasons are summarised by the following statement: ‘the 
location of property in the goods is also important for other purposes such as the passage of risk from 
seller to buyer, the availability to the seller of the action for price and the ability of a buyer to recover 
the price from the seller on the ground that there has been a total failure of consideration.’461 
However, the notion of property is considered fundamental for the purposes of retention of title 
clauses, whereby the location of property in the goods is imperative in the event of one party entering 
insolvency proceedings.  
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3.5.1 Meaning of ownership by reference to case law  
Ownership is equally as important for the context of retention of title clauses. The meaning of 
ownership was raised in the case of Clough Mill Ltd v Martin.462 Clough Mill were in the business of 
selling yarn, it contracted to supply yarn to a company named Heatherdale Fabrics Ltd, a manufacturer 
of fabric. The contracts of sale included a retention of title clause which stipulated: 
‘The ownership of the material shall remain with the seller, which reserves the right to dispose 
of the material until payment in full for all the material has been received by it in accordance with the 
terms of the contract or until such time as the buyer sells the material to its customers by way of bona 
fide sale at full market sale.’463 
In summation, the retention of title clause stated that ownership of the yarn should remain with the 
seller Clough Mill, who reserved the right to dispose of the yarn until payment was received in full. In 
construing the retention of title clause in the contract of sale, the first point to consider was what was 
being reserved by the seller. In this instance, the ownership of the material supplied under the 
particular contract was being reserved, specifically the supply of yarn. The meaning of ownership was 
raised by Robert Goff LJ who stated that ‘prima facie, in a commercial document such as this, 
ownership means, quite simply, the property in the goods.’464 Therefore, the condition of the contract 
of sale purported that Clough Mill would remain owner, but could only exercise his power of owner 
to the terms, albeit express and implied of the contract. However, Oliver LJ took a different approach 
to the meaning of ownership. He clarified that the condition of the retention of title clause stating ‘the 
property…shall be and remain’ should not bear a literal interpretation. He continues: 
 ‘They necessarily import the creation by the buyer of a proprietary interest in the plaintiff and 
thus, since the proprietary interest is by way of security, a charge. Therefore, it is argued if property 
here means, as in effect it must equitable property resulting from a charge, the words ownership of 
the material in the first sentence of the claim must have a corresponding meaning of equitable 
ownership.’465   
Accordingly, the Clough Mill case provides two possible interpretations of what is meant by 
ownership. One citing that the meaning of ownership equates to the property in the goods, whilst the 
other states that it must refer to an equitable ownership. The implications of an equitable ownership 
will be discussed subsequently.   
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3.5.2 Equitable ownership 
In order to provide clarification, equitable ownership will now be discussed. Equitable ownership 
confers a financial interest in the property. The most common circumstance where an equitable 
ownership may arise is from a trust.466 In such a circumstance, it possible for the trustee to hold the 
legal ownership for the benefit of another and thus, the equitable ownership is subsequently vested 
in the beneficiary.467 In the context of the Sale of Goods Act, Goode implies that until the legal 
ownership (property in the goods) has passed to the buyer pursuant to the terms of the contract of 
sale, a mere personal contractual right exists to call for the transfer to be made.468 He continues: ‘so 
whereas an agreement for a mortgage usually constitutes an equitable mortgage and an agreement 
for the sale of land makes the vendor a trustee for the purchase, an agreement for sale of goods does 
not of itself vest equitable ownership to the buyer, or indeed, confer any real right on him at all.’469 
 
In light of equitable ownership and retention of title clauses, the case of Re Bond Worth470 is 
particularly informative and merits discussion. Re Bond Worth contained different set of contractual 
terms within the contract of sale of fibre, which purported that the equitable and beneficial ownership 
would remain with the seller until the payment of the full purchase price was made. Accordingly, the 
retention of title clauses purported to transfer the legal ownership to the buyer, whilst the seller 
retained equitable and beneficial ownership of the goods, which was fibre for the manufacturing of 
carpets. Therefore, this meant that the retention of title clause in question, purported to govern the 
equitable and beneficial ownership rather than the legal ownership, asserting that the legal ownership 
passed on delivery. In reference to ascertaining the meaning of equitable and beneficial ownership, 
Slade J made the following statement:  
 ‘The court is not entitled to discard the plain ordinary meaning of the phrase equitable and 
beneficial ownership unless there can be found in the relevant contracts other langue and stipulations 
which necessarily deprive it of its ordinary meaning. The court, however, is entitled and indeed bound 
to look at the substance of the transactions as appearing from the wording of the whole of the 
retention of title clause.’471 
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468 R Goode, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency in Sales Transactions, op cit fn 466 at 6.  
469 ibid. 
470 Re Bond Worth [1980] Ch. 228. 
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As such Slade J clarified that a retention of title clause could not retain equitable ownership, rather a 
legal owner can only retain legal title to the goods.472 Slade J asserted that a legal and beneficial owner 
of an asset cannot retain title and take a form of grant by means of an equitable assignment, trust or 
charge.473 The judge viewed this particular clause to mean that the legal title to the goods would pass 
to the buyer, and consequently, the seller would only retain an equitable title, pursuant to the 
contracted clause.474 The decision of Re Bond Worth has been supported by Goode who states that 
there is no scope of equity to operate in such situations where the legal and beneficial ownership are 
combined: ‘the legal and beneficial ownership does not have a legal title combined with an equitable 
title. He is simply the full owner.’475 On interpreting the true construction of the clause, although the 
clause referred to the equitable and beneficial ownership, the buyers granted a floating equitable 
charge as a means of security for the sellers for the full purchase price of the fibre and not a trust for 
the benefit of the sellers. As such, the case further established that a retention of equitable interest 
would indicate a charge, which would only have legal effect if it had been registered as a charge. 
Accordingly, ‘any contract which, by way of security for the payment of debt, confers an interest in 
property defeasible or destructible upon payment of such debt…must necessarily be regarded as 
creating a mortgage or charge, as the case may be.’476 It is evident that the court adopted a functional 
approach when reaching this conclusion.477 
 
The ambiguity surrounding legal ownership and retention of title clauses can pose serious and 
controversial issues, such as conferring extensive rights to the buyer to the point of disregarding the 
seller as a legal owner. This would result in an unjust balance of rights, where the seller’s rights would 
be disproportionately small and ultimately, would leave the seller exceedingly vulnerable. In such a 
situation, the retention of title clause would be of no practical benefit to the seller, as in the event of 
a buyer’s insolvency, the disparate rights in favour of the buyer would thwart the goods returning to 
the seller.478  It is clear that in relation to retention of title clauses, the buyer acquires either the legal 
title to the goods or acquires nothing beyond a mere contractual right. Accordingly, this reflects the 
universality of the contract of sale and the notion of not wanting to overcomplicate the contract by 
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equitable ownership.479 In addition, it also reflects that under a contract of sale, title passes by 
agreement, and with the exception of where title is reserved to secure payment, a seller usually 
intends to reserve a right to the disposal of the goods elsewhere, as per section 19 of the Sale of Goods 
Act.480  
 
3.6 Finding the appropriate balance within the Act 
3.6.1 Certainty v Flexibility  
When it comes to the Sale of Goods Act, a delicate balance is needed to ensure sufficient certainty in 
understanding is met with the need to ensure a level of flexibility. As emphasised by Lord Brandon in 
the case of Leigh & Sullivan v Alikamon Shipping Co481: ‘yet certainty of the law is of the upmost 
importance, especially by no means only, in commercial matters.’482 Certainty of meaning within the 
Sale of Goods Act is considered to be of paramount importance, in order to ensure that the relevant 
parties are fully informed when entering a contract for the sale of goods. However, in the context of 
the Sale of Goods Act, certainty of meaning is in constant conflict with the apparent need for the Act 
to be flexible. Omitting specific definitions such as title and ownership, serves the Act a degree of 
flexibility in which it can arguably adjust to the changing market.483 However, as exemplified in the 
arguments above, omitting these crucial definitions is leading to adverse consequences. The 
fundamental need for clarity and certainty in this area of law is particularly acute: ‘commercial buyers 
and sellers need a high level of certainty so that they can plan intelligently, taking into account possible 
risks, profits and losses, and so achieve their goals and fulfil their expectations.’484 The objective of 
striking an appropriate balance between certainty and flexibility within the Sale of Goods Act has not 
been realised and thus preferring a more flexible approach where definitions are not supplied, 
arguably creates further legal uncertainty and inconsistency in application.  
3.6.2 Practical difficulties of definitions 
Giving the broad nature of the notion of ownership, developing a suitable definition which 
encompasses the concept fully is extremely difficult. In attempting to provide a comprehensive 
definition which covers all aspects pertinent to ownership, arguably such a definition would be 
deemed too wide and would subsequently invite notable problems.  
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Omitting definitions within the Sale of Goods Act is a tactical manoeuvre which affords the Act 
sufficient flexibility. By not confining the terms such as ownership and title to a singular meaning, such 
terms can be used on a wider scale. Accordingly, ‘for on many occasions it is no doubt possible to say 
that some person or other has a title and leave it all at that; and thus significant conceptual and legal 
disagreements are allowed to remain in the background.’485 Leaving the concept of title and ownership 
vague, enables the Act to continually change its content to the exigencies of legal practice. As such, 
ascertaining the exact meaning of title has been branded an ‘unnecessary abstraction.’486 It can be 
argued that the elusive nature of the concepts deems title and ownership to be unsusceptible to a 
satisfactory definition in the context of the sale of goods.  
 
Although at first glance, title and ownership are perceived to be relatively simple concepts, the reality 
of the situation is far from straightforward. This is supported by Hargreaves who cites:  
 ‘Simple and coherent as they are, are simple and coherent only because they are based upon 
strict regard for the traditional terminology of the law; or, conversely, that the confusion which exists 
in the text-books on the subject is due not to any confusion in the authorities but to a laxity of 
language…If this laxity of language can produce confusion in one branch of law, it will produce 
confusion in other branches…’487 
This emphasises that laxity of language can cause terminological uncertainty. This has grave 
implications on wider areas of law as title and ownership transgress beyond the boundaries of the sale 
of goods context. Accordingly, constructing definitions that are sufficiently flexible yet restricted 
enough to not warrant uncertainty, seems increasingly difficult.   
3.7 Unsuitability of title for modern purposes  
When ascertaining whether or not title has passed with regards to retention of title clauses, notable 
problems occur. It is argued that the concept of title is indivisible which further complicates matters 
when attempting to segregate ownership between seller and buyer. In relation to sales contract, title 
can be construed as an elusive concept, much like ownership. Accordingly, passing title has been 
described by Llewellyn as ‘locating a mythical or…mystical essence known as title, which is hung over 
the buyer’s head or the seller’s like a halo.’488 This position can be contrasted with property matters 
such as a title to lands, in which title serves a meaningful purpose because of the concrete chain of 
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documents, which definitively state where title to a disputed land lies.489 Therefore, it is clear that 
evidence of title assumes significant importance in any transaction involving land.490 Arguably, the 
main question to pose is: how does one prove what title he has received and therefore, transfer the 
title on?491 In practical terms, the answer to this question will depend entirely on the nature of the 
property transferred. This can be exemplified by transferring land, ships or company shares, where 
documentary title is expected to ensure the validity of the transferor’s title.492  
 
As such, it is argued that the certainty of proprietary interests such as retention of title clauses, is 
hindered by the fact that there is an absence of a system which registers such quasi-security 
interests.493 The notion of transferring title in a contract of sale leads to adverse consequence of letting 
‘the chain of title evidence run into curious confusion with unseen, intangible intention.’494 The 
difficulty arises from the fact that most cases involving retention of title clauses are transient in nature, 
meaning that the chain of title is so short as to not warrant sufficient and concise evidence of title.495 
Accordingly, title has been described as ‘a purely juridical notion, occupying a conceptual space.’496 
The proprietary approach taken by the Sale of Goods Act, in which passing of property is treated as a 
mere effect of a contract rather than a conveyancing process, further adds to the overall confusion 
and uncertainty of this area of law. The proprietary focused approach has an adverse consequence on 
third parties in insolvency proceedings, most notably a buyer’s creditor, as an effective retention of 
title clause means that a buyer can prima facie use the goods to satisfy claims of insolvency. The issue 
of relativity of title will not be solved imminently, and of course the easiest solution to this problem 
would arguably be to suggest a system of registration.497 It would be easy to suggest that ownership 
should be registered, similarly to land registration which provides concrete evidence of ownership. 
However, this is simply not practical nor feasible.498 The concept of registering a plethora of all 
ownerships is completely impractical and utterly unreasonable in the commercial sector. In addition, 
as we have established that the concept of ownership, title and property is so elusive, the scale of 
registering all concurrent interests, duties and rights is simply unfathomable. Providing suitable 
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definitions in the context of the Sale of Goods Act may be considered an appropriate starting point to 
providing the much-needed solution to the above issues.499   
 
Another fundamental problem relating to retention of title clauses, is that it is clear that the current 
law cannot govern nor adequately manage the modern commercial environment, where these types 
of clauses are particularly prolific. It is implied that the law of retention of title clauses is plagued by 
uncertainty because of a fundamental conflict in basic principles. It is put forward that ‘title’ as a 
concept is static in nature, which can be contrasted with the highly dynamic environment of 
transactions of sales.500 It is thus suggested that the premise of establishing title is an arbitrary process, 
which is dependent on the contiguity of time.501 Retention of title clauses and the concept of 
transferring ownership only ensures certainty in relatively simple cases in which title and ownership 
are passed seemingly in one transaction, as exemplified by cash purchases. Simple retention of title 
clauses of this particular nature, do not often encounter legal or practical difficulties as such an action 
seemingly fits the legal framework, which reflects the established expectations of the buyer and seller 
relationship.502 This is supported by Llewellyn who writes that transferring ownership: ‘fits only in that 
rare case in which our economy resembles that of three hundred years ago: where the whole 
transaction can be accomplished in one stroke, shifting possession along with title, no strings left 
behind.’503 This can be directly contrasted with a typical modern contract of sale, which is encumbered 
by sales on credit and further complicated by lengthy extended periods of time in which matters are 
suspended temporarily, whereby title is not held by either party. It is evident that modern day 
transactions involve a complicated series of events, it is rarely one simple transaction from start to 
finish. Furthermore, ‘the title-concept is not adapted by courts to the real field of Sales disputes; it is 
also to blunt to fit particular issues as they arise…the cut of its many facets is an old-fashioned one 
which fits a few of the modern situations for which it is called upon as a touchstone.’504 Additionally, 
this matter is complicated further as under retention of title clauses, parties are able to use goods to 
continue their business activities, without possessing title to the goods, thus meaning that a party can 
have full usage of the goods without ownership. As such the modern day contract of sale between 
buyers and sellers is not a straightforward transaction, rather the transaction proceeds at a fast 
moving pace which involves a series of multiple dealings. For such reasons, title as a static concept 
does not appropriately fit such modern circumstances.  
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3.8 Conclusion  
As evidenced from the above arguments, terminological uncertainty is apparent in this area of law, 
specifically in the context of the Sale of Goods Act. Much of the confusion is caused by the linguistic 
choice of words employed by the Act and the subsequent lack of definitions. As epitomised by Lin: 
‘the Sale of Goods Act uses the terminologies of property, owner and title, and remarkably there still 
is a diversity of views about what they mean.’505 In the one instance, where the Act does provide a 
definition of property by virtue of section 61, this does little to overcome the terminological 
uncertainty as the definition is deemed to be inadequate. The plethora of views on the meaning of 
property, owner and title has hindered the application of such terms in practice.  
 
Within the context of the Sale of Goods Act, the problem is heightened further as one cannot rely on 
the common law to facilitate understanding of the three concepts: title, ownership and property. As 
established earlier, the common law seeks to protect possession, with the implication of title equating 
to a right to possession.506 The common law has no concept of a title to ownership nor does it perceive 
ownership as an interest of personal property, which means it has little significance in facilitating the 
meaning of property, title or ownership in the context of sales of goods. Under the remit of the sale 
of goods, ownership and possession are segregated in order to reflect the commercial market, 
specifically the separation accommodates the provision of unsecured credit.507 In a commercial 
context, if the passing of ownership entailed the same as the passing of title, then a seller must have 
title or face the implications of breaching contract. Accordingly, ‘separating title and ownership makes 
commercial sense if a buyer is responding to risks of loss and deterioration, where they are 
exacerbated by the need for long distance or delayed carriage or some other reasons.’508 It would 
appear that few academics would dissent from the notion that although the terms title, property and 
ownership are ubiquitous, neither term is as straightforward as it seems.  
 
The underlying point is that the lack of definitions provided by the Sale of Goods Act obscures the 
clarity of the basic conceptual meaning of title and ownership. Arguably, expressing ideas pertinent 
to these terms are met with great difficulty and the interrelation between the concept of title, 
ownership and property serves to fuel further confusion.509 The various ways in which these specific 
terms are connected in close proximity makes it extremely difficult to obtain a coherent approach. 
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The same reasoning can be applied to the almost impossible task of forming consistent terminology 
which reflects the meaning of these terms in the context of sale of goods. Although it has been 
suggested that definitions within the legislation would provide some much-needed clarity, there are 
inherent difficulties for constructing such definitions to achieve the desired effect. It is evident that 
this area of law is struggling to bring analytical clarity and certainty to the fundamental concepts of 
title and ownership, which has subsequent detrimental implications for the application of law to 
retention of title clauses. How can retention of title clauses achieve their functional objectives, if the 
basic understanding of title, ownership and property are at legal crossroads? The uncertainty and 
nuances in application around these concepts subsequently leads to an accumulation of cases and 
disputes reaching the courts for judicial clarification as illustrated by cases such as Clough Mill and Re 
Bond Worth. Evidently, one of the main implications of this issues is that retention of title clauses are 
hindered by the incoherent and piecemeal approach adopted by the courts to tackle issues brought 
on by the lack of legislative definitions or guidance. What has emerged during the course of this 
discussion is that from the onset, retention of title clauses are stifled by terminological and definitional 
uncertainty.  
 
The following chapter continues to identify areas of inconsistency and evidences the difficulties of 
adopting a piecemeal approach to retention of title cases in the context of company charge 
registration. The discussion will also reinforce the implications of not having overarching principles 
providing clarification to this area of law. Under the present regime, legal uncertainty will continue to 
beset this area of law until clarification is provided by the courts, which either resolves the issue at 
hand or contributes to the minefield of issues currently associated with retention of title clauses. The 
next chapter will also illustrate the general reluctance of the courts to uphold certain types of 
retention of title clauses, which further adds to the argument that retention of title clauses are being 












CHAPTER 4: REGISTRABLE CHARGES AND RETENTION OF TITLE 
CLAUSES   
4. Introduction  
One of the main difficulties in respect of retention of title clauses is whether such clauses constitute a 
registrable charge. The utility of a retention of title clause as a means of offering a form of protection 
to the seller, will be jeopardised and thwarted if the clause is inferred as asserting continuing property 
rights in the goods and thus, constitutes creating a charge. It will no longer be possible for a seller to 
maintain title to the goods if the clause is inferred as creating a registrable charge. Despite the 
conceptual availability of different types of retention of title clauses, in practice the courts are less 
likely to enforce such clauses and instead will interpret such clauses as creating a registrable charge. 
There have been many instances whereby retention of title clauses have been construed as 
constituting a charge which are subsequently held void for lack of registration as per s859A of the 
Companies Act 2006 as evidenced below.510 As such, there are ever-increasing situations where 
retention of title clause will not be effective and fail to provide the expected level of protection on 
account of being construed as constituting a registrable charge. Retention of title claimants must 
attempt to thread a path through the ever-complicated minefield of situations where retention of title 
clauses will be held ineffective. The interaction between retention of title clauses and the provisions 
relating to company charge registration is thus crucial in determining whether the retention of title 
clause will be held to be effective as merely preventing title from passing to the buyer rather than 
asserting more extensive rights in the goods. The depiction of this area of law as a minefield is 
particular apt in the context of company charges as being held void for lack of registration is 
synonymous to the mine exploding and thus bringing an end to the utility of the retention of title 
clause in the present commercial situation. The protection offered by a retention of title clause will 
fall short once it has been construed as constituting a charge on the goods as it will more than likely 
be held void for non-registration. Clearly, once a clause has been inferred to create a charge, this poses 
significant practical problems for the seller who will no longer be able to retain title to the goods 
supplied nor rely on the retention of title during the insolvency process. Evidently, this causes 
significant uncertainty for retention of title clauses as a functional mechanism as their objectives are 
considerably impeded once the provision has been construed as creating a charge.  
 
 
510 Section 859A of the Companies Act 2006. 
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The principal focus of this section is to explore the interaction between retention of title clauses and 
registrable charges. Retention of title clauses are not identified as registrable charges per se, however 
certain types of retention of title clauses such as prolonged clauses can constitute a charge in specific 
situations as will be evidenced further below. Generally, retention of title clauses are not security 
interests and accordingly, they do not require registration on the basis that the are not asserting the 
seller with continuing property rights in the goods supplied. Contrastingly, a security interest usually 
demanded by banks or other commercial lenders would most certainly require registration. 
Accordingly, retention of title clauses are merely a contractual agreement of sale which prevents the 
transfer of title until the purchase price of the goods has been met. As such, it is important to identify 
whether the clause involved is a genuine and valid retention of title or whether what has been drafted 
in the contract purports to involve the creation of a new security interest, most notably a charge which 
will require registering in order to evade being held void.   
 
Whether a clause constitutes a registrable charge will depend on the precise wording of the contract 
involved and the commercial situation of the dispute.511 Whether a contractual agreement creates a 
security interest such as a registrable charge, will usually be apparent from taking a cursory reading of 
the agreements terms.512 But there are some types of agreements where it is not easy to characterise 
the interest in the strictest sense, as it may appear to fulfil a security function but nevertheless, is not 
a security agreement. As such, it is evident that a fine distinction exists between a provision which 
effectively retains title and clauses being struck out by the courts on the basis that the interest infers 
a registrable charge. Accordingly, ‘with other types of retention of title clauses the application of the 
company charge registration regime is somewhat less certain.’513 Therefore, complications arise in 
determining whether in certain circumstances a retention of title clause can constitute as a registrable 
charge. It can be argued that controversy has centred on the applicability of registrable charges in the 
context of retention of title clauses.514 In certain instances, different types of retention of title clauses 
constitute a registrable charge, thus, the close affiliation with registrable charges often causes legal 
uncertainty in courts.515 Thus, the purpose of this section is to identify that once again, retention of 
title clauses as a legal mechanism are hindered by legal uncertainty brought about by the courts. The 
aim of this chapter is to explore the interplay between retention of title clauses and company charges 
and as such the former part of this section will explore the regime and purpose behind charges and 
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company charge registration and the latter half will focus on situations involving retention of title 
clauses exclusively. At present, an effective retention of title clause does not require any form of 
registration, however a detailed exploration of the rationale behind registration is necessitated as 
such factors will bear significance when providing suggestions on reform for this area of law as laid 
out in a subsequent chapter.516  
4.1 Definition of a charge  
A charge constitutes an equitable proprietary security interest and is formed when parties agree that 
certain property will be appropriated in order to discharge a particular debt or obligation.517 The 
agreement is contracted without a transfer of title. The proprietary interest enables the charged 
property to be appropriated and sold, subsequently using the proceeds of sale to finance the 
repayment of outstanding debts or obligation.518 Therefore, a charge is a form of security against 
which a company is able to acquire finance from potential lenders. In the event of an insolvency, the 
holder of the secured property will have an advantageous position in the insolvency proceedings and 
as such a secured creditor is more likely to be fully repaid in comparison with the position of unsecured 
creditors. Accordingly, a seller is not subjected to an unsecured claim in the insolvency proceedings. 
A charge is particularly advantageous for business lenders as it can minimise risks of non-payment, 
facilitates the access of credit and allows the use of the charged goods. For such reasons, a creditor 
holding a fixed or floating charge as security, allows the holder to have a certain degree of influence 
or control over events.519 The priority afforded to the charger will act as a deterrent to unsecured 
creditors from precipitating enforcement actions which may directly affect the company’s assets in 
insolvency.520 Additionally, in the event of an insolvency, a holder of a fixed and floating charge can 
exercise a degree of influence and control by appointing an out of court administrator. Ensuring that 
a holder of a charge can exercise considerable influence during the insolvency proceedings, remains 
one of the key attributes for using such a charge.521 There are two types of charges: fixed or floating 
charges. A fixed charge is attached to a particular asset in which a debtor has limited ability to dispose 
of its assets. Whereas a floating charge is a much more flexible method which allows a debtor to 
dispose of its assets in the ordinary course of its business.  A fixed charge takes priority over the 
floating charge in the event of a company’s insolvency. Thus, the priority of the floating charge is 
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subordinated. The distinction between the two types of charges was historically laid out by Lord 
Macnaghten in the case of Illingworth v Houldsworth522: 
 ‘A specific [fixed] charge, I think, is one that without more fastens on ascertained and definite 
property or property capable of being ascertained and defined; a floating charge, on the other hand, 
is ambulatory and shifting in its nature, hovering over and to speak floating with the property which 
it is intended to affect until some event occurs or some act is done which causes it to settle and fasten 
on the subject matter of the charge within its reach and grasp.’523 
A floating charge can extend to both present and future goods and allows the charge holder to dispose 
the title of the subject matter of the charge until the ‘crystallising event’. The crystallising event allows 
a charge holder to intervene upon the occurrence of an event such as failure to pay or if a company 
enters liquidation and subsequently the floating charge will transfer to a fixed charge over the 
goods.524  
 
It will not have escaped the notice of the perceptive reader that many of the above factors are 
synonymous to the benefits associated with incorporating a retention of title clause within a 
contractual agreement. The similarities between the two commercial mechanisms may provide one 
explanation as to why there is such an interconnection between retention of title clauses and company 
charges. It comes as no surprise that the close affiliation between retention of title clauses and 
registrable charges causes significant uncertainty for the courts. Clearly, both mechanisms share 
similar rationales for usage and thus, at times it is difficult to ascertain the delicate distinction between 
the contractual provision merely preventing the transfer of title and a charge which is asserting 
continued property rights in the goods. Despite the similarities in usage there are inherent differences 
between retention of title clauses and company charges, most notably the omission of transfer of 
property and the requirement of registration.  
 
The first notable difference between a retention of title clause and a company charge is that charges 
lack the element of transferring property instead under a charge, security is asserted for payment of 
debt. For an explanation of the nature of a charge, we can turn to Atkin LJ in the case of National 
Provincial and Union Bank of England v Charnley525 in which he states:  
‘It is not necessary to give a formal definition of a charge, but I think there can be no doubt 
that where in a transaction for value both parties evince an intention that property, existing or future, 
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shall be made available as security for the payment of a debt, and that the creditor shall have a present 
right to have it made available, there is a charge…’526  
In order to distinguish a registrable charge from a retention of title clause, it is important to note that 
a charge is not dependent on the delivery of possession nor the transfer of ownership. Rather a charge 
merely represents an agreement527 between a creditor and a debtor which stipulates that a particular 
asset is used for the satisfaction of a debt, whereby a creditor can discharge the indebtedness before 
unsecured creditors can claim the assets in insolvency.528 A holder of a charge is entitled to a higher 
position of priority than unsecured creditors in the process of insolvency. Therefore, charges can be 
distinguished from retention of title clauses as charges do not involve the transfer of property to the 
creditor. A charge is described as simply an encumbrance over property, which is subsequently lifted 
when the advance is repaid.529 Accordingly, ‘the charge does not transfer ownership to the creditor; 
it is merely an encumbrance, a weight hanging on the asset which travels into the hands of third 
parties.’530 Contrastingly, retention of title clauses are held to be no more than a stipulation as to when 
property is to pass from seller to buyer, despite the fact that the device fulfils the same security 
function.531 
 
The most notable distinction between a retention of title clause and a company charge is the 
requirement of registration. Part 25 of the Companies Act 2006 contains provisions in respect of 
registering charges, with s859A stipulating that any charge must be registered532, subject to 
exceptions.533 As such the main difference between a retention of title clause and a charge is that 
charges require registration, which provides a degree of transparency to lenders, commercial actors 
and unsecured creditors as the registration system is open to the public, whereas retention of title 
clauses are not security interests and hence do not require any form of registration. A system which 
registers charges is considered necessary in order for the financial system to operate efficiently and 
allows business to access credit in order to develop and grow the businesses. Failing to register a 
charge has the consequence of rendering it void against the creditor as governed by section 859H of 
the Companies Act 2006. It is the responsibility of the company to send the appropriate documents 
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529 H Beale et al, The law of security and title based financing, 2nd Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, at 
10.  
530 L Gullifer (eds), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security, op cit fn 519 at 36. 
531 R Goode and E Kendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law, op cit fn 512 at 22.05. 
532 P Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law, op cit fn 517 at 1138.  
533 See section 859A(1) and (6) of the Companies Act 2006. 
108 
 
for registration. As stipulated by Davies, ‘there is thus a very powerful practical sanction for non-
registration.’534 Registration is considered to be of paramount importance as failure to register a 
security interest will result in the security interest being held void. Failing to register has detrimental 
implications such as not being able to rely on the security interest during the insolvency process of a 
company. Charges that ought to be registered but failed to do so, are held to be void as against the 
liquidator, administrator and any creditor.535 As noted by Gough, ‘every relevant charge created by a 
company is, so far as any security on the company’s property or undertaking is conferred by the 
charge, void against the liquidator or administrator or any other creditor of the company unless 
registered with the registrar of companies within 21 days of creation.’536 Following the amendments 
to the Companies Act 2006, failure to register is no longer considered a criminal offence, however the 
security interest will be held void. By not registering a charge, the consequences will result in the 
holder of the charge being disadvantaged rather than the company, as that holder will essentially lose 
their position of security in the event of the company’s insolvency. As such the main implication of 
non-registration, is thus that the holder of the charge will ultimately lose their priority in an 
insolvency.537 Another implication of failing to register is found in s859A of the Companies Act which 
states that the underling debt will be accelerated as a direct result of failing to register.538 When a 
charge is void for failure to register the money secured, the charge becomes immediately payable. As 
such there is an economic incentive to register a charge correctly. Failure to register could lead to 
serious negative consequences in the event of insolvency such as causing cross-defaults in other 
debts.539    
 
4.2 Rationales for registration  
 
Having outlined the nature of charges and the fundamental differences between company charges 
and retention of title clauses, the focus of this discussion will now turn to explaining the rationale of 
registration. The following section outlines notable advantages and issues pertinent to the 
requirement of registration. The principle of retention of title clauses not requiring registration has 
already been emphasised throughout the course of the chapter, and as such it may appear peculiar 
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that the subsequent section will focus on registration in depth. However, this discussion is intentional 
and will serve a greater purpose for the final chapter of the thesis, where suggestions on how to 
address the legal minefield of retention of title clauses will be put forward. The following will be taken 
into consideration when seeking to suggest solutions to address the current issues which impact 
considerably on the functionality of retention of title clauses. As retention of title clauses and company 
charges are so closely affiliated with regards to general usage, it is worth examining the viability of the 
registration system imposed on company charges.   
 
4.2.1 Transparency  
One of the most evident purposes for requiring the registration of a charge, is that it is a method of 
providing relevant information to potential lenders.540 Transparency can be grouped into three 
separate categories: transparency for lenders and commercial actors, transparency for unsecured 
creditors and a more general transparency in the market itself. Registration of a charge can reveal the 
financial status of a particular company and as such can provide potential lenders accurate and up to 
date information regarding the company’s secured lending practices. Displaying a company’s financial 
information also has the benefit of informing other important involved parties such as creditors, 
insolvency practitioners, shareholders and investors.541 To this extent, it is possible for involved parties 
to ascertain the creditworthiness of a company through searching for the registration of charges. This 
is important as the creditworthiness of a company may directly impact on those about to deal with or 
become creditors of the company, as the existence of a company charge can alter the distribution of 
priority.542 To this degree, displaying the existence of the company’s charges or mortgages would be 
most beneficial to credit reference agencies, financial analysts or prospective investors.543 This is 
considered to be particular advantageous for the company itself, as it can provide assurance to 
involved parties that the assets offered as security are unencumbered.544 Therefore, the objective of 
registration is to supply information pertinent to the creditworthiness of a company, by searching the 
monetary value of indebtedness and whether or not certain property of the company has been 
encumbered or charged.545  
 
 
540 P Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law, op cit fn 497 at 1137.  
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544 See generally, A L Diamond, A Review of Security Interests in Property, (also known as the Diamond Report), 
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545 W Gough, Company Charges, op cit fn 536 at 448.  
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The rationale behind the concept of registration, whereby registration provided relevant information 
to parties was emphasised in the case of Re Jackson and Bassford Ltd.546 Buckley J stated that the 
objective of registration is: ‘that those who are minded to deal with limited companies shall be able 
by searching a certain register, to find whether the company has encumbered its property or not.’547 
Lord Parker in Dublin City Distillery Ltd v Doherty suggested a step further by implying that a register 
would give notice to all those involved in the company of important matters which affect the credit of 
a company.548 Any involved party can assess the creditworthiness of the company by examining the 
register of charges in order to ascertain whether or not any assets of the company are liable to be 
used to satisfy debts in claims in priority.549 As such, the courts have long recognised that the purpose 
of registration is to provide the necessary information about prior charges granted by the company 
over certain assets. Thus, registration ensures that any charges or mortgages over companies are 
openly publicised. In this manner, in the winding up process, creditors are aware whether assets of 
the company are held by charge or mortgaged. Therefore, one of the rationales for registration is that 
it publicly creates awareness of the existence of a charge and supports transparency.  
 
A transparent system of registration is vitally important to ensure an efficient insolvency market. The 
registration system’s transparency and efficiency has a direct impact on companies and businesses in 
general. The charges register is efficient in a way that is saves time and money for companies as the 
registration system facilitates the access of information. The World Bank Report of 2011 highlighted 
the important implications of a transparent system facilitating access to information as it can help 
alleviate financial constraints.550 Ensuring transparency would also increase the confidence amongst 
lenders. It is evident that the transparency of the register can be exemplified by the fact that 
registrations can be effected online. This simplifies the overall process of finding a registered charge 
and for registering a charge as well.551 
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4.2.2 Protecting the vulnerable  
The registration of charges is also intended to protect any unsecured creditors of the company.552 A 
typical example of when an unsecured creditor is in need of protection is illustrated by Gough, ‘a 
company might obtain credit on the strength of property in its possession and other assets, which 
prospective creditors might consider to be available to satisfy their debts in the belief that such 
property or assets were unencumbered.’553 The need to require registration to protect unsecured 
creditors can be illustrated by the case of Re Yolland554, in which companies were allowed to issue 
debentures and subsequently create a charge over all their present and future assets, with no means 
of ascertaining whether such debentures were in fact issued. Accordingly, the court held that: ‘for the 
protection of the general creditors of the company, or of the persons desiring trade with the company, 
it was thought fit to require that there should be a register.’555 Company registration can thus benefit 
a wide group of involved parties but most notably unsecured creditors.  
 
The charges registration is advantageous to unsecured creditors as the register renders an 
unregistered charge void against the liquidator or any other creditor. As such, it can be argued that 
unsecured creditors directly benefit in circumstances where a charge is held void for lack of 
registration because the register essentially removes the priority of the security interest.556 In the 
majority of cases, it is the corporate debtor who take security over personal property, as such the 
vulnerable refers to any party who will be directly impacted by the taking of security, most notably 
unsecured creditors.557 Furthermore, it is evident that registration of charges offers unsecured 
creditors or third parties a degree of protection, from charges that would otherwise remain 
completely unknown to them.558  
 
4.2.3 Combatting fraud 
It is widely received that registration of company charges is considered fundamental as a method of 
combatting fraud. One of the most fundamental dangers of apparent ownership is that creditors can 
be misled in circumstances where a debtor has possession of property, but said property is subjected 
to a security in favour of a third party.559 Thus, registration can facilitate the role of a receiver or 
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liquidator in trying to ascertain the validity of an apparent charge or mortgage. In this way, registration 
can identify the alleged validity of a charge or mortgage and can subsequently, reduce the risk of fraud. 
Registration of charges would also make it more difficult for companies to conceal the use of secured 
credit. As highlighted by Gough, without the registration of charges or mortgages, ‘there could be a 
false appearance of creditworthiness caused by undisclosed security over property in the continued 
use and possession of the debtor.’560 In addition, registration is a useful mechanism for safeguarding 
against fraud, particularly in the event where it is claimed that the security interest has come into 
effect far earlier than the real case.561 
 
Registration of company charges reduces the known problem of a company proprietor taking 
advantage of their company assets by conferring a charge on the assets, and thus ensuring a higher 
claim in priority, to the detriment of general creditors who would be aware of the existence of the 
charge.562 This problem was manifest in the case of Salomon v Salomon563; where a company 
proprietor had secured a debenture with a floating charge to secure his capital investment. This 
situation was particularly alarming as the floating charge covered the entirety of the company’s 
undertaking whilst the company was also able to continue trading in the ordinary course of business, 
just as if the security did not exist.564 Such a stipulation meant that the floating charge ensured that 
Salomon ranked higher in priority than all of the other unsecured creditors.  
 
Another way in which the registration system combats fraud is by reducing defective registration. 
Under the relevant legislation, the company or charge holder is responsible for the completeness and 
accuracy of the registration of a charge.565 Where the particulars of a charge are not accurately 
registered, the charge will be held void as the company or charge holder have subsequently failed to 
disclose the charge accurately for the purpose of registration.566 The consequences of failing to deliver 
charges to the registrar are contained in section 859H of Part 25 Company’s charges of the Companies 
Act 2006.567 As such, the onus is on the company and charge holder for the accuracy of the registration 
of the charge and the reason of not wanting the charge to be held void provides an appropriate 
motivation for conformity.   
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4.2.4 A way of determining priorities? 
Registration of charges is deemed useful for determining priority amongst secured creditors. If a 
company is wound up, charges take priority based on the date of creation, whereby those charges 
created first have priority. Therefore, registration is considered to be important as a method of 
determining priority based simply on the date of the registration of the charges. This is also supported 
by Graham who suggests that one of the principal aims of the system of registration is the 
determination of the priorities of security in which a company creates over its property.568 The system 
of registration for charges and mortgages appears to be consistent with the general rule that earlier 
claims of charges should prevail over later claims, thus ensuring a degree of fairness amongst charge 
holders.569 Registration is therefore considered to be of vital importance to ensure that secured 
creditors by way of a charge, rank ahead of other creditors.570 
 
However, registration of charges does not determine priority amongst competing security interests, 
which are subjected to the usual pari passu allocation (as discussed in the previous chapter). 
Accordingly, ‘registration is not a reference point for determining priorities.’571 The priority of 
competing security interests such as charges is governed by a combination of provisions of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and common law rules.572  
 
4.3 Notable problems relating to registration 
4.3.1 The 21 day invisibility period 
A charge could be created 21 days before the charge would be delivered to the Registrar. During this 
period, the register does not reveal the existence of charge, and therefore to any person searching 
the register the charge would be invisible. Therefore, during the dates between the creation of the 
charge and the date in which the particulars of charge appear on the register, there would be no sign 
of the charge on the register.573 One of the issues arising from the 21 day invisibility period, is that ‘a 
lender taking a charge from a company could find that its charge ranked behind a charge which was 
created before but registered after the creation of the second charge but within the 21 day period 
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allowed for registration.’574 Accordingly, this could lead to a lender being misled during this 21 day 
period to the existence of charge, as the register would not visibly display the charge until after the 
21 day period. Additionally, one of the main criticisms arising from the registration system and its 21 
day period, is that the register can subsequently be at least 21 days out of date.575  
 
4.3.2 Information tension  
A difficult balance lies in ensuring that the register of charges provides the appropriate amount of 
information to public inspection. On one hand, it is argued that the present system does not provide 
sufficient information regarding registrable interests. On the other hand, it is argued that the 
particulars of charges can disclose commercially sensitive information, which is subject to public 
scrutiny. Thus, the following paragraph will consider both of these juxtapositions separately and 
consider their respected problems.    
   
One of the most notable problems relating to the registration of charges is that the register fails to 
provide a comprehensive account of the existence of a charge. As emphasised by Finch, ‘the 
requirement that such charges be registered does little to assuage the feelings of grievance generated 
by such charges since the register gives very inadequate information to the trade creditor.’576 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the list of registrable charges does not provide adequate 
information to those searching the registration system.577 One of the most fundamental purposes of 
the register of charges was to publicly disclose the existence of charges created by companies as 
comprehensively as possible in order for relevant parties to ascertain whether a particular asset has 
been encumbered or not. However, this has been criticised by De Lacy for being superficial and not 
reflecting the true realities of the register.578 With regards to the application of the register, its remit 
has been deemed selective. The particulars of charges include information pertinent to the date of 
creation, the persons entitled to the charge, the amount secured by the charge and short particulars 
of the charge.579 However, in practice, it is very difficult to ascertain how much a floating charge 
secures. As such, the registration requirement does very little to aid creditors in acquiring the 
necessary information pertaining to security, since the register gives inadequate information to 
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creditors.580 For example, the amount outstanding on a floating charge securing bank overdrafts, 
would fluctuate daily and thus would be impossible to accurately state how much the floating charge 
is securing.581 In addition, a company’s balance sheet would not assist creditors in gathering the 
required information as usually the balance sheets are either months out of date or unlikely to disclose 
contingent secured by the floating charges.582 
 
Furthermore, the charge register does not take into account any background knowledge which may 
be able to inform parties inspecting the register. Due to the fact that the register is open to public 
inspection, it is argued that the information provided should be construed with all relevant 
background information to ensure that the register is providing a conclusive record of any registrable 
interests. Arguably, this should include any admissible background information that the parties should 
have reasonably known. This should not include any information which would prejudicially affect 
parties, for example background information should not include a company’s articles of association. 
This problem was manifest in the case of Cherry Tree Investments Ltd v Landmain Ltd.583A lender was 
unable to rely on a facility agreement clause which purported to extend a statutory power of sale, 
which was not included in the charge. One of the prominent issues of the case was that the charge 
was registered at the Land Registry and thus, open to public disclosure. The parties mistakenly omitted 
the clause which extended the power of sale, and the Court of Appeal refused to amend the legal 
charge, registered on the Land Registry. The Court of Appeal held that the Land Registry should contain 
all conclusive information, which a third party could expect to rely upon in contemplating dealing with 
the property. In this case, rather than relying on interpretation the claimant should have sought a 
rectification of the charge. As such, the lender was unable to include background information via the 
facility agreement to help inform a person inspecting the register.  
 
The question of whether the charge register should include background information in order to 
provide a much more conclusive report remains contentious. Lord Hoffmann in his judgement in 
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd584 addressed both sides of the argument for and against the 
use of extrinsic material to interpret a charge. In certain circumstances he argued that it can be unfair 
for third parties to rely and refer to extrinsic background information to aid in the interpretation of a 
charge. However, the extent of the unfairness is heavily context dependent. Lord Hoffmann held: 
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‘The law has sometimes to compromise between protecting the interests of the contracting 
parties and those of third parties. But an extension of the admissible background will, at any 
rate in theory, increase the risk that a third party will find that the contract does not mean 
what he thought. How often this is likely to be a practical problem is hard to say.’585  
Arguably, increasing the awareness of a third party can be perceived as a positive implication as it 
would increase party autonomy. Anyone inspecting the register would be more informed as the 
register would arguably hold a much more conclusive record of information pertinent to registrable 
interests.    
 
To ensure a comprehensive and detailed account of the registration process, the opposite problem of 
the register disclosing commercially sensitive information will now be discussed. The system of 
registration is electronic and thus all the relevant charge documents are posted online. The possibility 
of redaction is severely limited with redaction only available in situations involving personal data, 
account identifiers and signatures.586 Thus, redacting sensitive information from the register is 
considered limited and difficult. Therefore, this increases the risk of documents purporting to include 
charges and similar features, openly accessible to the public. As exemplified by Gregson: ‘even if 
sensitive commercial information is instead set out in documents, not filed, parties are exposed to 
inspection risk if such related transaction documents contain provisions which would enable a third 
party to identify the subject matter of the charge (s859P).’587 Accordingly, if the particulars of the 
charge are not included within the instrument that created the charge, but in fact are contained in a 
different document, a company must comply with the legislation in keeping said document available 
for inspection.588 Thus, there is a high risk of exposing sensitive information. It can be argued that the 
availability of information relating to company assets on the register poses a high risk of revealing 
sensitive information pertinent to the company, rather than simply indicating whether an asset is 
encumbered or not. This is a common problem as the security documents may contain confidential 
information, which will be most likely found in the underlying facility documentation.589  
 
It is evident from the above arguments that any system of registration will always suffer a tension 
pertinent to information. On one hand, the register of charges will be deemed problematic for not 
providing sufficient information to render the register useful. Whereas, the other argument is that the 
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current particular of charges discloses too much commercially sensitive material. There is no simple 
solution to this tension and in practical terms this equates to situations in which sensitive information 
will be released to anyone inspecting the register and other situations where the register will not 
provide adequate information to the existence of a charge. To this end, it is exceedingly difficult to 
meet the expectations of ensuring a conclusive and comprehensive system of registration for public 
inspection and not disclosing sensitive company material. A balancing act in which the holders of a 
charges are happy with the content of the register and that third parties inspecting the public register, 
will unlikely be resolved.  
 
4.4 Boundaries with retention of title clauses  
As aforementioned, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not a retention of title clause will constitute 
a registrable charge as it will depend on a range of variables such as the particular wording of the 
agreement and the commercial context in which the dispute arises. In certain instances, there is a thin 
dividing line in which retention of title clauses have been held to be in substance a charge and not in 
fact a proprietary interest of the seller. Furthermore, in situations where a retention of title clause has 
been inferred as a charge, then it is more than likely that the clause will be held void for lack of 
registration. The main implications of the clause being held void include the holder of a retention of 
title clause, losing their position of priority in the insolvency process and clearly, the clause will fall 
short of the protection it is expected to offer as will be evidenced by reference to different authorities.  
 
An example of a retention of title clause constituting a charge is illustrated by the case of Re Bond 
Worth Ltd590. In this case, Monsanto had supplied a type of artificial fibre to Bond Worth for use in the 
manufacturing of carpets. The contract of sale provided to reserve in full the equitable and beneficial 
ownership of the goods, until the price had been paid, or until a resale, in which case the beneficial 
ownership extended to cover the goods supplied, any converted products which used the goods in 
question and any subsequent proceeds of sale.591 The wording of the contract of sale was as follows: 
‘Equitable and beneficial ownership shall remain with us until full payment has been 
received…or until prior resale, in which case our beneficial entitlement shall attach to the proceeds of 
resale or to the claim for such proceeds. Should the goods become constituents of or be converted 
into other products while subject to our equitable and beneficial ownership we shall have the 
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equitable and beneficial ownership in such other products as if they were simply and solely the 
goods.’592 
Accordingly, Monsanto sought to claim that under the remit of its retention of title clause, it would 
remain the beneficial owner of all the residual fibre which had not been sold by Bond Worth and 
where the fibre had been converted into carpets. Monsanto also claimed that they had a proprietary 
claim over the resulting money and debts.593  
 
It was held by Slade J that the provisions of the retention of title clause were consistent only with the 
creation of a floating charge and dismissed the notion of a trust. The retention of title clause had 
created equitable charges in four categories of assets: the raw fabric, the proceeds of sale of the fabric, 
any new product in which the fabric became a constituent and finally any proceeds of sale to the new 
manufactured products.594 The provisions of the agreement went far beyond merely retaining title to 
the goods supplied and embodied something additional than a mere sale.595 It was also held that the 
charge was registrable and hence was held void for lack of registration under section 95 of the 
Companies Act 1948 as it was decided that a floating charge had in substance been created. In the 
course of his judgement, Slade J stipulated: 
 ‘In my judgment, any contract which, by way of security for the payment of a debt, confers an 
interest in property defeasible or destructible upon payment of such debt, or appropriates such 
property for the discharge of the debt, must necessarily be regarded as creating a mortgage or charge, 
as the case may be. The existence of the equity redemption is quite inconsistent with the existence of 
a bare trustee-beneficiary relationship.’596 
Notwithstanding the apparent significance of this judgement which alludes to the likelihood of 
provisions of such a sort to be held as creating a charge, by way of security. It can be argued that the 
judgement does little by way of clarifying or differentiating between legal title and ‘equitable and 
beneficial ownership.’ As such, the main point to be inferred from this quotation is that it is not 
expedient to rely on terms which explicitly claim equitable and beneficial ownership.597 Slade J does 
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Despite the terms of the contract purporting to retain equitable and beneficial ownership in the goods 
for Monsanto, Slade J concluded that the proper manner of construing the retention of title clause 
was by considering that the clause took effect in two steps: the first step included regarding the clause 
as effecting a sale for the entire property passing to Bond Worth, followed by ‘a security, eo instanti, 
given back by Bond Worth to the vendor, Monsanto.’598 Accordingly, Bond Worth had thereby created 
charges over all the categories of assets comprised in the retention of title clause and as such the seller 
was regarded as the creator of the relevant charge.599 The consequences of non-registration in this 
particular case were financially disastrous as the supplier, ultimately lost his position of priority in the 
insolvency proceedings and was subordinated to the same position as an unsecured creditor, with 
little prospect of recovering anything. Furthermore, this case established that a charge will be created 
in favour of the seller in circumstances where there is an attempt to retain equitable and beneficial 
ownership of the goods. As per the above judgement, this would constitute creating a charge securing 
a debt, due to the reason that equitable ownership confers that the goods are held similarly to a trust, 
until payment is fulfilled.600 Thus, this case is particularly enlightening with regards to the specific 
words of the contractual agreement, and any retention of title terms purporting to claim equitable 
ownership is likely to be construed as creating a charge over the goods in question. Clearly, parties 
seeking to rely on retention of title clauses must thus tread carefully around this minefield of issues 
relating to the wording of the contractual clause. Evidently, claiming equitable and beneficial 
ownership of the goods will render the utility of the retention clause futile as evidenced by Re Bond 
Worth, the supplier’s position in insolvency proceedings will be subordinated if the charge is held void 
for lack of registration. The functionality of retention of title clauses are thus significantly hindered in 
the situation where the wording of the contractual agreement infers the creation of a registrable 
charge. Retention of title claimants and their respective draftspersons must draft their agreement 
cautiously to ensure that their clause is validly effective in retaining title and construed as a true 
proprietorial claim.  
 
The two step approach adopted by Slade J whereby the contract was construed as first, a sale of the 
entire property to the buyer, and then secondly as a security, given back by the buyer to the seller, 
was subsequently followed in the case of Stroud v John Laing.601 The issue of this case was whether 
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upon a true construction of a contract for the supply of glazing, did the plaintiffs retain title to the 
goods supplied and thus have sufficient interest in the goods to succeed against the defendants in a 
claim of conversion.602 Once again, the retention of title clause in the contractual agreement stipulated 
that the equitable and beneficial ownership in all the goods supplied or procured would remain with 
the seller until payment had been received in respect of all sums owed.603 The provision also referred 
to the beneficial ownership attaching to any proceeds of resale or to claims for such proceeds. In this 
case it was held that the legal title passed to the buyer and this created a charge rather than a simple 
trust, and thus the seller was held as the creator of the floating charge. In the case of Stroud v John 
Laing, HHJ Newey followed the same approach taken in Bond Worth in holding that the seller’s interest 
in the goods amounted only to a floating charge, which was held void for lack of registration as per 
s395 of the Companies Act 1985, the relevant legislation at the time. It was held that retaining 
equitable and beneficial ownership created a charge granted by the buyer to the seller. Accordingly, 
from relying on both authorities using a phrase which purports to retain equitable and beneficial 
ownership, will be construed by the courts as creating a registrable charge and thus, the terms which 
attempt to retain title will most likely fail.  
 
Having outlined the significance of Re Bond Worth – arguably, one of the most important authorities 
on this prevalent issue of the circumstances where retention of title clauses are not interpreted as 
merely a contractual agreement specifying when ownership will be transferred, but in fact are inferred 
as creating a registrable charge. Consequently, the focus of this discussion will now turn to exploring 
each type of retention of title clause to identify the precise circumstances whereby the court have 
opted to construe the contractual agreement as one which constitutes a registrable charge. This 
discussion is important for the overarching hypothesis which argues that retention of title clauses as 
a functional mechanism are hindered from achieving their primary objective. In this context, the 
discussion will cast doubt on the effectiveness and utility of aggregation and prolonged clauses when 
they are inferred as creating a charge, by way of security.   
 
Depending on the type of retention of title clause, in some instances it will be relatively 
straightforward to deduce that the wording of the clause merely alludes to a proprietary claim, rather 
than asserting rights by way of security. In the simplest of cases, casting a cursory glance over the 
wording of the clause will be sufficient to ascertain whether the clause simply specifies how title to 
the goods will transfer, a function which is rendered valid by virtue of the provisions of the Sale of 
 




Goods Act. However, there are some circumstances as discussed below which blur the boundaries and 
makes it increasingly more difficult to accurately predict the outcome of the categorisation of the 
clauses as either a proprietorial claim or a security interest. The difficulty of categorisation can be 
evidenced by an abundance of cases on this issue, dealing with a vast array of different circumstances.  
Furthermore, the influx of cases in this area of law makes it especially challenging to achieve a degree 
of consistency, with different judges employing various rationales for why they interpreted the clause 
as creating a charge. As such, the following section will consider a wide range of authorities in an 
attempt to draw possible conclusions of when precisely a retention of title clause will be inferred by 
the court as creating a registrable charge. In doing so, the discussion will highlight the associated 
challenges for those seeking to rely on retention of title clause for supplied goods and whether the 
overall objective and functionality of specific types of clauses are rendered futile. As outlined below, 
the risk of the title retention terms being construed as a charge is evidently one of the biggest 
hindrances on retention of title clause as a functional mechanism as clearly the primary purpose of 
retaining title is significantly impeded. The level of protection usually prescribed by the clauses to 
sellers is brought to an abrupt end once the clauses have been conferred as a registrable charge, held 
void for lack of registration. As epitomised by the implications of Re Bond Worth, the consequences 
of the court inferring a registrable charge is financially disastrous for sellers and as such, this issue 
poses one of the most significant risks for sellers relying on retention of title terms.  
 
The associated drawbacks of retention of title clauses are manifestly exposed in this area of the legal 
minefield. Parties intending to rely on retention of title clauses in present day need to pave their way 
through the many pitfalls as identified by the influx of cases, specifically issues relating to prolonged 
and aggregation retention of title clauses. Arguably, this complicated dividing line between retention 
of title and registrable charges provides the most apt embodiment for the description of this area of 
law as a legal minefield, and subsequently, verifies the accuracy of the depiction of this area as 
‘presently a maze if not a minefield’604 by Justice Staughton. Thus, the following discussion serves the 
fundamental purpose of strengthening the main hypothesis of this thesis, which argues that  the 
functionality of retention of title clause is significantly hindered by a wide range of variables, in this 
context retention of title clauses are impacted by the specific wording of the clauses being inferred as 
constituting the creation of a registrable charge. As the wording and contextual background of the 
individual cases is of upmost importance for the categorisation of a registrable charge, greater 
emphasis will be given to the factual background of individual cases to ensure a comprehensive 
 
604 Hendy Lennox Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12 as per Justice Staughton at [491]. 
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account of the issues raised. The discussion will start by exploring the simple retention of title clause 
and whether this type of agreement amounts to a registrable charge.  
 
4.4.1 Simple retention of title clauses 
One of the most important factors to consider with simple retention of title clauses, is the fact that 
the title always remains with the seller. The title to the goods will not pass to the buyer and thus the 
seller will retain ownership of the goods, until the full purchase price has been paid for by the buyer. 
This is stipulated by section 19(1) of the Sales of Goods Act 1979, which allows sellers to impose certain 
conditions for the passing of title. The courts have been consistent in holding that simple retention of 
title clauses do not constitute charges so far as the retention of title remain confined to the original 
goods supplied by the seller.605 Retention of title terms preventing title from passing to the buyer do 
not make the agreement a security agreement as the buyer is not giving security rights over goods 
owed by the buyer, but is merely agreeing conditions with the seller as to when the property in the 
goods is to pass to the buyer.606 Therefore, despite the function of security, no charge is created by 
the buyer which requires registration. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Clough Mill v 
Martin.607  
 
In the Clough Mill v Martin case, the seller agreed to supply yarn to a fabric manufacturing company 
on credit terms. The contract of sale provided that the seller would retain the title of the yarn supplied 
until the full purchase price had been paid. The exact wording of condition 12 which included the 
retention of title provision was as follows: 
‘However, the ownership of the material shall remain with the seller, which reserves the right 
to dispose of the material until payment in full for all the material has been received by it in accordance 
with the terms of this contract or until such time as the buyer sells the material to its customers by 
way of bona fide sale at full market sale...’608 
The terms of agreement also stated that if any of the material was incorporated or used as material 
for other goods before payment had been met, the seller’s rights extended to those other goods. The 
manufacturing company went into receivership, resulting in the seller claiming to be entitled to 
repossess the yarn it had supplied, while the receiver argued that the clause enabled the property to 
pass to the buyer, subject to a charge. The key issue in determining whether or not a registrable charge 
 
605 H Beale et al, The law of security and title based financing, op cit fn 529 at 11.  
606 R Goode and E Kendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law, op cit fn 512 at 22.33.  
607 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45. 
608 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 at [113]. 
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has been created, was not the purpose of the clause establishing security but whether the title did or 
did not in fact pass to the buyer.609 If the title of the goods did pass to the buyer, who subsequently 
confers the seller’s rights over the goods, then such rights would constitute a charge.610 However, if 
the title of the goods remained with the seller and did not pass to the buyer, then the seller was simply 
seeking to repossess his goods and subsequently, no registrable charge would be created. The 
conclusion drawn from the first instance court held that a charge had been created by the company 
which was invalid for failure to register the charge. The yarn passed to the company on delivery and a 
charge was created as a means of securing payment of the purchase price.611  
 
However, this was overturned by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal took a very literal and 
detailed approach to the construction of the contractual agreement in providing that the condition 
merely stipulated that the seller would retain his ownership in the material supplied and thus would 
simply remain owner of the goods until the buyer had settled the outstanding purchase price of the 
goods.612Accordingly, Robert Goff LJ held: ‘under the first sentence of the condition, the buyer does 
not in fact confer a charge on his goods in favour of the seller; on the contrary, the seller retains his 
title in his goods, for the purpose of providing himself with security.’613 Accordingly, the court saw no 
reason why the first sentence of the condition which merely allowed the seller to retain the legal 
property in the material, should be construed as giving rise to a charge in favour of the buyer on the 
unused materials. The simple retention of title clause in this case was upheld, which enabled the seller 
to repossess the unused yarn supplied to the manufacturer, yarn which had not been paid for.  
 
The court rejected the argument that the simple retention of title should be construed as a charge to 
provide payment. It was confirmed by the court, that a registrable charge would not be created in 
circumstances where both parties intended that ownership would be retained by the seller until the 
full payment of the purchase price. The supplier of the yarn could not be expected to register a charge 
over its own goods when the buyer never obtained the title of the goods. As such, following the 
decision of Clough Mill, it is generally accepted that simple retention of title clauses are not to be 
construed as registrable charges.614 In the situations where the agreement involves merely retaining 
title to the goods, this will not be inferred as the seller conferring a charge on its own property. Simple 
retention of title clauses are merely a manifestation of the contractual freedom given to sellers and 
 
609 A Hicks “Retention of title- latest developments” (1992) Journal of Business Law, 1-13, at 1.  
610 ibid at 2.  
611 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 110.  
612 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 as per Robert Goff LJ at [118]. 
613 ibid as per Robert Goff LJ at [121]. 
614 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 73.  
124 
 
buyers by virtue of the Sale of Goods provisions.615 The simple retention of title clause merely allows 
the seller to retain ownership of the goods pending the fulfilment of a specified condition and thus, 
no question of charge by the buyer can arise.  
 
Effective retention of title clauses have been held in other decided cases and have thus, avoided the 
judicial categorisation of constituting a registrable charge. In the case of Hendy Lennox616, the 
retention of title clause provided that the title of the goods would remain the ownership of the seller 
until the purchase price had been paid in full and that the sellers would have the right to repossess 
the goods (diesel engines) in the event of default failure to pay. Subsequently, Staughton J confirmed 
that the property would pass when it was intended to pass as pertinent to section 16 and 17 of the 
Sales of Goods Act. Staughton J contended that the wording of the contractual provision should be 
given its full literal effect and stated, ‘I do not see why the plain words of the contract should not mean 
what they say.’617 Accordingly, the sellers retained full rights of ownership of the goods supplied and 
the contractual provision merely regulated how title to the goods would transfer to the buyer. It was 
affirmed that the buyers did not confer property rights in the goods to the sellers, as the sellers 
retained the proprietary rights.618 As such, the retention of title clause did not constitute a charge, 
which subsequently would require registration.  
 
The simple retention of title clause does not constitute a charge on the goods of a buyer because the 
rights are not granted over the buyer’s own property for the underlying reason that the goods do not 
become the property of the buyer until such goods have been paid for.619 Accordingly, the simple 
retention of title clause has sufficient authority affirming its validity as merely transferring title rather 
than creating a registrable charge. 
 
4.4.2 Current account clause 
Current account clauses attempt to retain the seller’s ownership of the goods supplied, until all the 
buyer’s debts or obligations to the seller, have been discharged. The difficulty with current account 
clauses is that retaining the title of the goods until an overdue debt has been paid is purported to go 
beyond the remit of the clause incorporated into the sales contract. As stipulated by McCormack, 
‘withholding title until a long overdue debt has been paid is creating something over and above what 
 
615 G McCormack, “Reservation of title in England and New Zealand” (1992) 12 Legal Studies, 195-209, at 196. 
616 Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12.  
617 ibid as per Staughton J at [492]. 
618 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 75.  
619 D French, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law, 36th Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, at 311.  
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was in existence when the clause was first incorporated into the sales contract…thus it is more difficult 
to disguise as something other than the creation of a security interest.’620 Retaining title to goods 
supplied until all pre-existing indebtedness between a seller and buyer has been discharged does 
suspiciously seem like a security right and thus may explain why such clauses have proved to be quite 
controversial.621  
 
A current account clause was upheld in the case of John Snow v DBG Woodcroft622, in which a 
conditions of sale provided that the title of the goods would only transfer to the purchaser once the 
purchaser had met all the indebtedness to the seller.623 The conditions of sale provided: ‘the property 
in the goods agreed to be sold will only pass to the purchaser when the purchaser has met all the 
indebtedness to the seller.’624 The contextual background of this case suggested that ‘all the 
indebtedness’ was limited to the single contract in question and as such the clause in question only 
dealt with one retention of title clause.625 Despite this, the learned judge treated the clause as a 
current account retention of title clause. The conclusion drawn from this case was that a current 
account retention of title clause did not create a charge requiring registration under the Companies 
Act.  
 
Despite uncertainty surrounding whether a retention of title clause creates a registrable charge, it is 
suggested that the decision of Clough Mill gives support to the view that a current account clause does 
not constitute a registrable charge.626 The judges were of the opinion that retaining title to the seller 
was inconsistent with the creation of a registrable charge by the buyer.627 Relying on the observations 
made by Slade J in Re Bond Worth, the judges of the Court of Appeal in Clough Mill construed the 
important question as how has the seller’s position been secured, and Oliver LJ concluded with the 
following remark ‘if in fact [the seller] has retained the legal title to the goods, then by definition the 
buyer cannot have charged them in his favour.’628 As such, this indicates support for the validity of a 
current account retention of title clause.  
 
 
620 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 114.  
621 G McCormack, “Reservation of title in England and New Zealand”, op cit fn 615 at 199.  
622 John Snow & Co Ltd v D.B.G. Woodcroft & Co Ltd, op cit fn 74. 
623 ibid as per Boreham J at [62]. 
624 ibid. 
625 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 105.  
626 G McCormack “All-liabilities reservation of title clauses and company charges”, op cit fn 514 at 3. 
627 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 115.  
628 Re Bond Worth Ltd, op cit fn 450 as per Oliver LJ at [123]. 
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In the Scottish case of Armour v Thyssen629, the House of Lords held that a current account clause did 
not create a charge on the basis that the parties were entitled to agree on any conditions chosen for 
the transfer of property as stipulated by section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. The claim in Armour v 
Thyssen was to recover the good supplied. Accordingly, parties are afforded contractual freedom to 
agree to any terms they see fit for the passing of property. The notion of legal ownership is flexible 
enough to enable buyers and sellers to agree on which rights and terms meet their commercial 
objectives and intentions.630 In this instance case the terms of the contract allowed the seller to 
maintain title until all debts owed to the seller had been paid for, by virtue of a legitimate retention 
of title, rather than conferring rights by the buyer of his own property. In summation, the fact that the 
seller’s interest in the goods is defeated upon payment of the debt, does not automatically render 
that interest as a registrable charge.631 Accordingly the current account retention of title clause has 
thus received judicial approval.632  
 
4.4.3 Prolonged retention of title clauses 
The difficulty arises since prolonged clauses attempt to claim the beneficial interest in not only the 
original goods but also to the proceeds of sale. As such, under a prolonged retention of title clause, 
ownership is retained until the buyer has paid the full purchase price to the seller, if goods are 
subjected to a sub-purchase, then the seller can acquire the ownership to the proceeds of sale or be 
afforded the right to sue the sub-buyer for such proceeds of sale. Equitable trading rights by operation 
of law are not registrable as the rights are not conferred or created by the buyer.633 In situations where 
the charge has not been created by the buyer, then it is not registrable under the Companies Act. As 
per the judgement in Re Diplock634, it is possible for equity to declare a charge on a mixed fund 
comprising of traceable funds and other funds in a bank account. The following was stipulated by Lord 
Greene; ‘the result of a declaration of charge is to disentangle trust money and enable it to be 
withdrawn in the shape of money from the complex in which it has become involved. This can only be 
done by sale under the charge.’635 The tendency of the courts dealing with retention of title clauses 
purporting to claim proceeds of sale, is that the vast majority of cases the claim has been disallowed 
 
629 Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339. 
630 S Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions, op cit fn 11 at 20. 
631 ibid. 
632 See further, W Davies “Romalpa thirty years on- still an enigma?” op cit fn 43 at 23 for his commentary on 
the decision in Armour receiving ‘high judicial approval.’ 
633 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 120. 
634 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465. 
635 ibid as per Lord Greene at [547]. 
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on the grounds that such a stipulation creates a charge which is held void for failing to complete the 
registration process.636 
 
The most famous case which conferred the seller the right to proceeds of sale was Romalpa, in which 
the Court of Appeal held that the terms of agreement established a fiduciary relationship between the 
seller and buyer, which allowed the seller to have an equitable right to the proceeds of sale. The issue 
before the court in Romalpa centred on the construction of the contract rather than the 
characterisation of the agreement and as such, it was conceded that the buyer was in fact a bailee of 
the goods. Two main arguments led to the Court of Appeal to favour the seller’s position and thus 
allowed the seller to have an equitable right to the proceeds of sale; firstly the court was strongly 
influenced by the buyer holding the goods as a bailee for the seller and secondly, the court heavily 
focused on the implied term which allowed the buyer to sub-sell the goods.637 The Court of Appeal 
adopted a literal interpretation to the contractual clause and thus focused on the account of the seller 
which resulted in granting the seller the right to the proceeds of sale. However, the decision reached 
in Romalpa has been criticised extensively638, and has been described by Longmore LJ ‘as a case more 
distinguished than followed in subsequent authority.’639 A more detailed account of the Romalpa case 
and its implications for retention of title clauses and the minefield of issues left in its wake can be 
found in Chapter Five.640 Lower courts have consistently bypassed the decision on the basis that 
Romalpa omitted crucial points of argument such as the intention of the parties and the 
characterisation of the charge, which arguably should have been at the forefront of the discussion but 
unfortunately had not been given sufficient consideration. Despite subsequent judicial reluctance to 
Romalpa as evidenced by the following cases, the decision in Romalpa has neither been reversed nor 
overruled and as such confers the seller the right to the proceeds of sale on the basis of the Court of 
Appeal adopting a strict literal interpretation of the contractual agreement. In Romalpa, the Court of 
Appeal held that the seller retained title until payment and that the construction of the contract 
indicated that the buyer was accountable to the seller for any proceeds of sale, and that such proceeds 




636 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 84.  
637 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3 at [680]. 
638 See R Goode and E Kendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law, op cit fn 512 at 22.34.  
639 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1232 as per Longmore LJ at 
[26]. 
640 See section 5.1.1. 
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The following cases buck the trend set by Romalpa in holding that the right to the proceeds of sale 
must have been assumed by the parties to be construed as a security interest, thus inferring a creation 
of a charge and in the absence of registration was held to be void against the liquidator and 
creditors.641 In the case of Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd642, Mummery J held that the 
seller’s interest in the proceeds of sale was determinable on the payments of debts, which therefore 
created a charge. This reasoning concurs with the statement of Slade J in Re Bond Worth Ltd, ‘any 
contract which, by way of security for the payment of debt, confers an interest in property defeasible 
or destructible on payment of such debt, or appropriates such property for the discharge of the debt, 
must necessarily be regarded as creating a mortgage or charge.’643 A charge is created if the security 
conferred an interest in the goods that were defeasible upon payment of the debt.  
 
Contracts of sales which include a prolonged retention of title clause, whereby the terms incorporated 
are extensive and overly elaborate, are the most prone to fail. The reasons behind this generalisation 
include that complicated and extensive rights purport to extend the seller’s property rights further 
and as such are more likely to be construed as creating a registrable charge rather than merely 
preventing the transfer of property. This can be illustrated by Tatung Ltd v Galex644, which involved 
two separate and complicated conditions of sale for supplying televisions and video equipment to the 
defendants. The first condition of sale stipulated that any proceeds of sale would indefinitely belong 
to the suppliers. The second condition of sale specified that the defendants had to keep the proceeds 
resulting from any resales, in a separate account explicitly for the benefit of the suppliers. In this case, 
the contractual agreement conferred the rights to the proceeds of sale to the suppliers until the 
purchase price and all sums owed had been paid by the buyer and as the supplier’s interest was 
defeasible upon payment, it was held by Phillips J that in this case, a charge had been created over 
the proceeds of sale. Furthermore, it was held that the contract had created rights by way of security 
rather than an absolute interest.645 The retention of title clause provided that the buyer in this case 
was to deal with the goods as an agent for the supplier as a means of security for payment of debts. 
Thus, his Lordship decided that the supplier’s rights for proceeds resulting from resales, arose out of 
a security arrangement created by the buyer and therefore constituted a registrable charge created 
by the buyer on its book debts.646     
 
641 R Goode and E Kendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law, op cit fn 512 at 22.34.  
642 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 484. 
643 Re Bond Worth Ltd, op cit fn 450 as per Mummery J at [248]. 
644 Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd [1989] 5 BCC 325. 
645 D Fox, R, Munday, B Soyer, A Tettenborn, P Turner, Sealy and Hooley’s Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, op cit fn 42 at 482.  




Where a seller is attempting to enforce a prolonged clause and claim proceeds of sale of the goods 
which are mixed with insolvency money, then in order to be successful, the seller must either establish 
a fiduciary relationship with the insolvency party or establish that the proceeds of sale are subject to 
a registered charge on book debts. If a fiduciary relationship is established then a charge will not be 
created.647 However, if a seller cannot establish a fiduciary relationship, then it is possible for the 
clause claiming the proceeds of sale, to create a registrable charge which will be subsequently be held 
void for non-registration as per section 859H of the Companies Act.  
 
Another relevant case which dealt with the situation of purporting to claim proceeds of sale is 
Pfeiffer648. In this particular case Pfeiffer supplied wine on retention of title terms to a retailer, who 
subsequently sold or leased the goods to customers on credit terms. The supplier sought to reserve 
title to the goods and a proprietary interest in the monies deriving from the proceeds of the sub-sales 
and leases. The predominant issue of this case was determining the extent of the interest that Pfeiffer 
had in the proceeds of the sub-sales and leases. Phillips J stated that where a buyer is allowed to sell 
the goods supplied to a third party in the usual course of business, it is usually suggested that the 
buyer sub-sold on his own account as a principal, rather than a fiduciary obliged to account for all the 
proceeds of sale.649 Due to the fact that the supplier’s claim was contingent on the amount of proceeds 
needed to satisfy the outstanding price, the court held that the contract in question amounted to an 
equitable assignment of the proceeds of sale which conferred a registrable charge. The interests 
purported by the contractual agreement was held to be inconsistent with the fiduciary relationship in 
which a proprietary claim of interest would be based and as such was held to create a registrable 
charge. As summarised by Gough it was held to be a registrable charge as ‘the substance and effect of 
the assignment provision constituted an agreement by the buyer to assign to the seller future debts 
owed by sub-purchasers to the buyer up to the level of outstanding indebtedness to the seller.’650 
Thus, the clause constituted an equitable charge on book debts created by the buyer, which was 
subsequently held void for non-registration. No fiduciary relationship could be established and 
accordingly the suppliers could not succeed.651   
 
 
647 See Re Andrabell Limited, op cit fn 260. 
648 Pfeiffer Weinkellerei- Weineinkauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Limited [1988] 1 W.L.R 150. 
649 W Gough, Company Charges, op cit fn 536 at 492.  
650 ibid at 495. 
651 The supplier’s second ground also failed which purported that the proceeds of sale had been assigned to a 
factoring house which was held to have priority. However, the scope of the second ground is beyond the remit 
of this thesis and as such will not be discussed further.  
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In relation to book debts, the case of Re Weldtech652 can be of further assistance. Weldtech had been 
supplied welding equipment by a German company, using a retention of title clause which purported 
to extend to the original goods and any proceeds of sub-sale. Before the fulfilment of payment, 
Weldtech entered into financial difficult and went into liquidation. The German company sought to 
recover the welding equipment and a claim for £11,000 representing proceeds of sale, which had been 
paid into a separate account.653 In respect of the retention of title clause extending to the proceeds of 
sale, it was held to amount to a charge on the book debts of Weldtech. Hoffman J held:  
‘It appears to me plain, on the wording of the clause and, in particular, the sentence ‘This transfer 
takes place only for securing our claims against the purchaser’- that the assignment was, indeed, 
intended to be by way of charge…it follows that the reservation of title clause is void against the 
liquidator.’654 Accordingly, the proceeds were used to meet the claims of Weldtech, who held a 
registered charge over their book debts and therefore, the German company were not entitled to 
claim for the proceeds of sale.655 Thus, it was held that standard terms of sale involving book debts 
constituted creating a charge, which was subsequently held void due to non-registration. In the case 
of an individual seeking to claim a clause assigned to book debts, it is suggested that a claim to the 
proceeds of the sale would likely to be held void against a trustee, unless it is registered as a bill of 
sale. The Weldtech case is considered to be important in respect of prolonged retention of title 
clauses, as it confirms that claims purporting to extend to proceeds of sale, will amount to a registrable 
charge on book debts, pursuant to the Companies Act.656 Thus, as emphasised by Bridge, ‘any rights 
conferred by the contract over book debts due from the sub-buyer will be judicially characterised as 
the product of a charge over those debts.’657 From analysing the case law, it is clear that retention of 
title clauses attempting to extend to claims involving proceeds of sale will be held void as unregistered 
charges.658  
 
Another difficult issue with retention of title claims is where the contractual agreement was 
documented in such a way as to conceal the true nature of the transaction as can be seen in the case 
of Re Curtain Dream plc.659 In this case Curtain Dream a fabric company had sold its entire stock of 
 
652 Weldtech Equipment Limited [1991] BCC 16. 
653 J De Lacy “Reservation of Title and Charges on Company Book Debts: The Death of Romalpa?” (1991) 54 The 
Modern Law Review, 736-738, at 736.  
654 Weldtech Equipment Limited, op cit fn 652 as per Hoffman J at [17G-H]. 
655 J de Lacy “Reservation of Title and Charges on Company Book Debts: The Death of Romalpa?”, op cit fn 63 
at 737.  
656 ibid. 
657 M Bridge et al “Formalism, Functionalism and Understanding the Law of Secured Transactions” (1999) 44 
McGill Law Journal, 567-664, at 639.  
658 A Hicks “Retention of title- latest developments”, op cit fn 609 at 6.  
659 Re Curtain Dream plc [1990] BCLC 925. 
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trade fabric to Churchill Merchanting Ltd for cash under a financial arrangement which entitled Curtain 
Dream to repurchase the stock after a 90 day credit period on retention of title terms. The 
arrangement stipulated that the stock would remain the property of Churchill Merchanting Ltd until 
payment was received and the stock would be kept separate from other goods to ensure that the 
goods would be easily identifiable. Curtain Dream used the proceeds of sale to pay Churchill 
Merchanting Ltd the original purchase price as well as accrued interest. The stock of fabric remained 
at Curtain Dream’s warehouse for the entire time and as such there was no physical movement of the 
stock. The nature of the transaction between Curtain Dream and Churchill Merchanting Ltd was 
analysed as one global transaction. The issue before the court was whether the one global transaction 
created a mortgage or a charge as security for a loan made by Churchill Merchanting Ltd or whether 
the transaction was one of sale with a retention of title clause included for the resale of the goods. 
With regard to the agreement masking its true transaction, Knox J relied on the judgement of Lord 
Hanworth MR in Re George Inglefield Ltd:660 
‘It is old law, and plain law, that in transactions of this sort the Court must consider whether 
or not the documents really mask the true transaction. If they do merely mask the transaction, the 
Court must have regard to the true position, in substance and in fact, and for this purpose tear away 
the mask or cloak that has been put upon the real transaction.’661 
The court in Re Curtain Dream plc held that the true analysis of the relationship of the parties was that 
of borrower and lender and as such the retention of title clause constituted a charge on the fabric. 
Once Curtain Dream had transferred the stock of fabric to Churchill Merchanting Ltd there was an 
obligation on Churchill to retransfer the stock back to Curtain Dream, and for such reasons this 
arrangement created a charge in favour of Churchill the buyer. The nature of the whole transaction 
meant that the retention by Churchill of title was not of its own fabric.662 As the charge had not been 
registered it was held to be void against the administrative receivers of Curtain Dream. Accordingly, 
in the instance where retention of title terms are documented in such a way as to conceal the true 
nature of the contractual agreement, the courts will unveil the conceptual mask and will construe such 
terms as creating a security interest. The agreement will most likely constitute a charge which will be 
held void for lack of registration. Evidently, the retention of title clause will be unenforceable in such 
a situation and parties will not be able to hide behind what appears to be a contract for sale on 
retention of terms. As evidenced by Re Curtain Dreams plc, the court will construe the transaction as 
it was truly intended, a security interest over the supplied goods.  
 
 
660 Re George Inglefield Ltd [1932] All ER Rep 244. 
661 ibid as per Lord Hanworth MR at [251]. 
662 D French, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law, op cit fn 619 at 316.  
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As exemplified from the cases above (with the exception of the Romalpa case), it is rare for retention 
of title cases to succeed in which the seller is claiming an interest in the proceeds of sale. However, an 
interesting comparison can be made between the English courts approach and the Australian case of 
Associated Alloys Pty663 in which the Australian High Court upheld the effectiveness of a proceeds 
subclause and deemed that the contractual provision in question did not involve the creation of a 
charge. In this case the clause stipulated that the buyer was entitled to use the goods in a 
manufacturing process and that the buyer should hold part of the proceeds in trust for the seller in 
proportions which reflected the value of the parties inputs.664 In addition, another case of interest is 
the New Zealand case of Len Vidgen665, where the seller’s claims to the proceeds of sub-sales of goods 
supplied was once again successful. The clause in the Len Vidgen case reserved full legal title in the 
goods supplied (ski apparel and equipment) and included a provision that the seller would be entitled 
to the proceeds of sale arising from any sub-sales and constituents of other goods. Barker J scrutinised 
English cases which dealt with retention of title terms claiming proceeds of sale, by comparing and 
contrasting the wording of the relevant clauses and the circumstances of each individual case.666 
Barker J distinguished the case of Bond Worth on the basis that the supplier failed to retain the full 
legal title to the original goods supplied. In addition, the learned judge found similarities with Romalpa 
as the claims to proceeds were in respect to goods which remained in an unaltered condition from 
the time of supply. This rationale was enough for the learned judge to thus distinguish subsequent 
cases such as Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products667 and Hendy Lennox as those claims to 
proceeds were in respect of goods which had been subsequently altered in some form. Finally, the 
learned judge in the New Zealand case relied heavily on Robert Goff LJ’s remarks in Clough Mill which 
emphasised the need for each retention of title clause to be construed on the basis of its own 
contextual facts which led Barker J to include that on the balance and consideration of the authorities 
that there was an obligation to account for the proceeds of sale on the basis of an automatic fiduciary 
relationship.668 Both cases are of interest as they juxtapose the decisions reached in the English cases 
which purport that claiming proceeds of sale is likely to infer the creation of a charge as can be seen 
in Re Weldtech, Compaq Computer, E Pfeiffer and Tatung. Indeed, it is evident from the two cases 
discussed above that Australia and New Zealand view retention of title clauses more favourably669, 
 
663 Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v CAN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd [2000] 202 CLR 558 (AUS). 
664 D Fox, R Munday, B Soyer, A Tettenborn, P Turner, Sealy and Hooley’s Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, op cit fn 42 at 482.  
665 Len Vidgen Ski & Leisure Ltd v Timaru Marine Supplies (1982) Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 349 (NZ). 
666 P Watts, “Reservation of Title Clauses in England and New Zealand” (1986) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
456-464, at 457.   
667 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products, op cit fn 48.  
668 P Watts, “Reservation of Title Clauses in England and New Zealand”, op cit fn 666 at 459.  
669 G McCormack, “Reservation of title in England and New Zealand”, op cit fn 615 at 195.  
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which may suggest that the English approach to proceeds of sale clause is too rigid and is thus 
hindering the functionality of retention of title clauses.  
 
As such, the above analysis demonstrates the difficulties faced by the courts in determining whether 
the retention of title terms confers the creation of a registrable charge. The nature of determining 
whether the contract in question amounts to inferring a registrable charge largely depends on several 
variables, most notably the particular wording of the clause which is deemed of paramount 
importance. The rationale may differ on a case by case basis and as such ‘it is not easy to state 
determinative principles on whether a tracing [prolonged] clause constitutes a registrable charge…the 
authorities speak with forked tongues as it were.’670 The judgements of the courts pertinent to 
prolonged clauses are never conclusively straightforward which adds to the complexities and 
uncertainties surrounding this area of law. In each of the cases discussed above, the court established 
that the transactions were in substance a charge and not a valid retention of title clause but with 
varied rationales as to why the courts have reached such a conclusion. As such, from analysing the 
above cases, it can be presumed that purporting to extend a retention of title clause to proceeds of 
sale will constitute a registrable charge, but deducing a consistent thread through the minefield of 
different rationales for why this is the case is notoriously difficult.   
 
4.4.4 Aggregation retention of title clauses 
The next section of this chapter will explore the situation where retention of title terms seek to cover 
products which have been made from the original goods supplied by the seller as well as material 
belonging to the buyer or alternatively material belonging to a third party. Here the difficulty lies in 
ascertaining whether the product is intended to belong to the seller exclusively, in which case the 
interest in the new product is vested to the seller under the retention of title clause, without any grant 
by the buyer, or whether the seller’s interest should be construed as a registrable security interest.671 
This particular area of law is riddled with confusion and is summarised aptly by Oliver LJ in Clough Mill 
v Martin:  
‘English law has developed no very sophisticated system for determining title in cases where 
indistinguishable goods are mixed or become combined in a newly manufactured article and, to adopt 
the words of Lord Moulton in Sanderman & Sons v Tyzack & Branfoot Steamship Co672, ‘the whole 
matter is far from being within the domain of settled law.’’673 
 
670 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 90.  
671 R Goode and E Kendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law, op cit fn 512 at 22.35.  
672 Sanderman & Sons v Tyzack & Branfoot Steamship Co. [1913] A.C. 680 as per Lord Moulton at [695]. 
673 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 as per Oliver LJ at [124]. 
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As will be discussed in most circumstances the seller’s interest for aggregation retention of title clause 
are limited to a security interest as otherwise the seller would invariably gain a windfall.674 In effect, 
in the most common circumstances, when the seller is purporting to claim new products, the seller is 
not in fact claiming for the right to his original supplied goods but is claiming for something additional, 
which is suspiciously similar to a registrable charge. Construing the retention of title terms as creating 
a registrable security interest may be the most appropriate characterisation for these types of 
situations as will be evidenced by the discussion of various authorities below. The first situation to be 
discussed concerns where the goods supplied remain separated and identifiable from the new 
product. In this regard, the original goods supplied have not been destroyed or mixed in the creation 
of a new product.  
  
4.4.4 (a) Goods which are still separate and identifiable  
In situations, where the seller’s goods have been assorted with other goods, to the extent where the 
goods remain identifiable or can be separated from other goods, the separate owners become tenants 
in common of the mass to the extent of their own contribution. Accordingly, no registrable charge 
comes into existence.675 In a manufacturing process, if the finished product incorporated no other 
material other than the goods supplied in the first instance, there is no reason why the seller’s 
retention of title should fail. If the goods supplied are incorporated with other materials, in a manner 
which allows the original goods to be separated from the finished incorporated product, then the title 
of the goods will still remain with the seller. As such, no registrable charge will be created in the above 
circumstance. This principle can be dated as far back as the early 20th century in the case of In re 
Oatway676 where Joyce J stipulated that ‘it is a principle settled as far back as the time of the Year 
Books that, whatever the alteration of form any property may undergo, the true owner is entitled to 
seize it in its new shape if he can prove the identity of the original material.’677 
 
This situation was also briefly alluded to by the Court of Appeal in Clough Mill v Martin, however this 
issue was not the circumstances of the instant appeal. Despite this, Donaldson MR made the following 
remarks:  
 
674 See cases such as Re Peachdart Ltd, op cit fn 124; Specialist Plant Services Ltd v Braithwaite Ltd [1987] BCLC 
1 (CA). 
675 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 122.  
676 In re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356. 
677 ibid as per Joyce J at [359]. 
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‘If the incorporation of the yarn in, or its use of material for, other goods leaves the yarn in a separate 
and identifiable state, I see no reason why the plaintiff should not retain property in it and thereby 
avoid the application of section 95.’678 
As such, in the event that the goods remain separate and identifiable as per the contractual 
agreement, the seller will still be able to maintain title to the goods supplied and as such, avoid the 
creation of the charge and the requirement of registration. This rationale was also supported by 
Robert Goff LJ in the same case who stated that with regard to unused materials, the retention of title 
merely allows the seller to retain the legal property in the material, and the buyer does not, by way of 
security, confer on the seller an interest in the property defeasible upon the payment of the debt 
secured.679 This notion was also accepted by Bridge LJ in Borden (UK) Ltd, in which he stated that if 
identical goods had been mixed but during the process of manufacture had not lost their physical 
identity, the rights of the bailee or seller of the goods would be preserved.680 In this context, the court 
alluded to a relationship of bailment whereby the buyer gains possession but not title to the goods.  
 
The case of Hendy Lennox provides an example of where the seller’s proprietary claim to retake diesel 
engines under a retention of title clause was successful.681 The sellers had supplied diesel engines to 
the buyers under a retention of title clause purporting to retain title until the full purchase price of 
the goods had been paid. The prospect of the supplied diesel engines being incorporated into 
generating sets, and subsequently sold to sub-buyers was discussed between the parties. It was 
specified that the process of incorporation would not alter nor damage the engine in any way, and it 
would be possible to identify the diesel engines by looking at the serial number of the goods. The 
buyers went into receivership and the seller was claiming a proprietary claim for proceedings in the 
group of engines. Staughton J gave detailed consideration to the terms of the agreement in light of its 
full literal effect, emphasising the importance of construing the wording of the clause meticulously in 
the context of retention of title clause to infer meaning.682 In Hendy Lennox, the court found in favour 
of the sellers because the diesel engines had not been incorporated fully into the generating set. 
Consequently, as the diesel engines could be separated from the final product, the engines were 
capable of operating under the retention of title agreement. Accordingly, Staughton J provided the 
following statement:  ‘the proprietary rights of the sellers in the engines were not affected when the 
engines were wholly or partially incorporated into generator sets…they remained engines, albeit 
 
678 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 as per Sir John Donaldson MR at [125]. 
679 ibid as per Robert Goff LJ at [119]. 
680 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products, op cit fn 48 as per Bridge LJ.  
681 This case is one of accession, where the retention of title clause is combined with another provision which 
prevents the goods from being attached to other goods without the overriding consent of the seller.  
682 Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12 as per Staughton J at [491]. 
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connected to other things.’683 To this end, the title retention provision was capable of operating as 
intending as the engines had not been incorporated into the final generating set and thus the 
retention of title claim was effective.  
 
Another case which evidences that it is possible to retain title in the circumstances where goods 
supplied remain identifiable is Re CKE Engineering Ltd.684 In this case, ingots of zinc were supplied on 
retention of title terms. The retention of title clause provided that property in the goods remained 
with the seller until the goods were paid for in full and in the event of the zinc having been mixed or 
melted in a galvanising tank, ownership of the converted goods would also remain with the seller.  
Both the buyer and seller were aware of the fact that the ingots of zinc would be immediately added 
into a tank of molten zinc, a tank which was composed of material supplied by a different seller. The 
court held that it was intended for the seller to have title to a proportion of the contents of the molten 
zinc. There had been no practical difficulty in identifying the supplied original zinc as the goods had 
remained sufficiently identifiable to permit recovery without any damage.685 The addition of the other 
materials into the tank had only amounted to a very small percentage (1.5%) which meant that the 
molten material remained substantially zinc.686 In addition, as the contents of the tank was largely 
zinc, the zinc was physically reducible into ingots again, which meant that the goods supplied had 
retained their original identity per se and thus were sufficiently identifiable to be recovered. 
Accordingly, the court concluded, ‘having regard to the actual words of clause 16 (which demonstrate 
that CKE was to retain title notwithstanding delivery) and settling those words in the context of the 
remainder of the clause and the factual context, an objective observer would regard the parties as 
having agree that CKE could retain title to a part of the bulk molten zinc proportionate to its physical 
contribution to the whole. I therefore hold that when CGL entered administration CKE had a ‘retention 
of title’ claim to 217/265ths of the zinc in the tank.’687 In doing so, this gave validity to the retention 
of title clause as merely transferring title rather than being construed as a registrable charge. Although 
the issue of registration was not raised during this case, the case is still useful in explaining what tends 
to happen when dealing with goods which remain identifiable. Evidently, the position of a claimant 
purporting to rely on terms for goods which remain separate and identifiable is relatively strong as 
they will be able to retrieve the goods and thus rely on the incorporated retention of title clause.  
 
 
683 Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12 as per Staughton J at [494]. 
684 Re CKE Engineering Ltd [2007] BCC 975. 
685 ibid at [976]. 
686 ibid. 
687 ibid at [976] as per His Honour Judge Norris QC at [26-27]. 
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4.4.4 (b) Goods which are no longer identifiable  
One of the most difficult instances involving retention of title clause is where goods belonging to two 
or more parties are mixed in some form and as such it is incredibly difficult to ascertain the rightful 
owner of the goods.688 Attempts have been made to assert the right approach with a degree of 
precision but nevertheless ‘conclusions must be stated with diffidence.’689 In practice, distinguishing 
the seller’s goods from goods supplied by others is notoriously difficult, exasperated in the instance 
where the goods have been used in a manufacturing process and have subsequently lost their identity. 
If goods on retention of title terms lose their identity, it will be exceptionally difficult for a seller to 
retain title.690 Most of the cases discussed below involve the issue of mixing, where the goods have 
been essentially mixed or combined with other goods to the effect of creating a new product. 
Determining who gains the interest in a newly manufactured product can be problematic, if it is 
deemed to be the seller than they will have an absolute interest over the new products, otherwise the 
buyer will acquire title to confer a security interest on the seller. It has been suggested that title 
retention provision can confer the absolute interest to a new manufactured product upon the seller 
by way of contractual agreement691, however in practice and as will be demonstrated below, the 
courts are more inclined to interfere with parties contractual intention and construe the arrangement 
as the buyer acquiring title sufficient to confer a security interest on the seller as a chargee.  
 
Despite these cases being concerned with the issue of the mixing, the courts frame the problem as an 
issue pertaining to loss of identity. This can be demonstrated by the case of Borden (UK) Ltd, where 
resin was supplied on retention of title terms to be used in the manufacturing of chipboard. The Court 
of Appeal found that the resin had lost its identity once the resin had been incorporated in the 
manufacturing process and thus, title to the resin was thereby lost.692 It has been proposed by Webb 
that the reasoning would have been entirely different had the resin been stored with other identical 
resin supplied by others, in which case the law of mixing would be applicable and consequently the 
seller’s would have owned the goods in common.693 In essence, the approach taken by the court is to 
frame the problem of goods sold subject to aggregation clauses as one of loss of identity.  
 
 
688 See further, D Turing, “Retention of Title: How to get Value from a Bad Penny”, op cit fn 478. See also, A 
Hicks, “When Goods Sold become New Species’ (1993) Journal of Business Law, 485-490. 
689 G McCormack, “Reservation of title in England and New Zealand”, op cit fn 615 at 203.  
690 D French, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law, op cit fn 619 at 315.  
691 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 at [124].  
692 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products, op cit fn 48 as per Bridge LJ at [968], Templeman LJ at [973] and 
Buckley LJ at [974]. 
693 D Webb, “Title and transformation: who owns manufactured goods?” (2000) Journal of Business Law, 513-
540, at 520.  
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Whether the goods subsequently lose their identity is a question of fact, which notably invites further 
difficulties of trying to ensure that decisions promote a degree of consistency in this ever-complicated 
minefield of goods on aggregated retention of title clause terms. The vast diversity of situations and 
the need for careful consideration when seeking to answer whether the goods have lost their identity, 
is encapsulated by the illuminating judgement of Bryson J in the Australian case of Associated Alloys 
Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Engineering694: 
 ‘The question whether the goods which have been used in some manufacturing process still 
exist in the goods produced by that process, or have gone out of existence on being incorporated in 
the derived product is, in my opinion, a question of fact and degree not susceptible of much 
exposition. When wheat is ground into flour it is reasonably open to debate whether the wheat 
continues to exit; when flour is baked into bread there could be little doubt that the flour does not. 
Many examples might be encountered or imagined and each must be addressed separately. Where 
goods of a homogenous character are mixed co-ownership might be a correct conclusion…whether 
goods are reducible to the original materials is not simply a matter of physics. Other perspectives have 
to be considered, including the economic perspective. The scraps of leather produced by cutting up a 
manufactured shoe could not in reality be regarded as the original leather from which the shoe was 
manufactured. The stell which would be produced by cutting up the pressure vessel and flattening 
and the cylindrical parts would not be the steel which Associated Alloys delivered under the sale; it 
would be scrap metal.’695 
As emphasised by Bryson J, in most circumstances, it will be relatively straightforward to decipher 
whether or not goods have lost their identify merely by applying a question of fact. However, further 
difficulties are apparent when deducing whether the contractual agreements purporting to claim the 
aggregation retention of title clause, constitute a registrable charge or not. Where seller’s goods are 
manufactured to the point where the goods are no longer identifiable or cannot be physically 
separated from the goods, the question to be posed is whether this will constitute a charge.   
 
This issue was raised in the case of Re Peachdart Ltd696 which involved supplied leather which was 
subsequently manufactured into handbags. In this case, the contract of sale purported to retain the 
property in the leather until payment was received in full, and that the seller should retain the right 
to resell the leather in the event, where payment was overdue. It was held, that a clause purporting 
to claim goods manufactured to the point of becoming unidentifiable, is to give rise to a registered 
charge over the manufactured goods. The court concluded that it must be presumed that once the 
 
694 Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Engineering and Fabrications Pty Ltd [1996] 20 ACSR 205. 
695 ibid as per Bryson J at [209]. 
696 Re Peachdart Ltd, op cit fn 124. 
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goods had been appropriated that the parties had intended for a charge to be created over the leather 
handbags and the partly completed handbags as the seller would cease to have the exclusive title to 
the leather. The charge would be registrable as a charge on goods or as a floating charge.697 Thus, in 
this instance, the charge had not been registered and was therefore held void under the relevant 
legislation of the time. No further commentary or analysis as to why the court found in favour of 
construing the clause as a registrable charge was provided by Vinelott J. As emphasised by McCormack 
‘where the aggregation clause purports to vest title in the seller to products formed partly of materials 
belonging to third parties, it amounts to a charge over the products.’698 This follows the reasoning of 
similar authorities where title to the goods is lost by the manufacturing process including Bond Worth 
where fibre was used for the manufacturing of carpets, and Borden (UK) Ltd  where resin was used for 
the manufacturing of chipboard.  
 
Further difficulties arise where the goods supplied have not fundamentally changed their identity but 
have been merely improved to the point of substantial transformation. As exemplified by Webb, ‘a log 
which is turned into a fine table is still a piece of wood, and a statute made of a block of marble is still 
a piece of stone.’699 To this end, the technical change will be more apparent for some types of goods 
than others, for example it will be abundantly clear that grapes turned into wine produces an entirely 
new product and thus, it is easier to argue that the grapes cease to exist as fruit.700 As such, the 
distinction between retaining title in goods which have improved but have subsequently managed to 
retain their original identity and goods which have created a new product from the goods supplied, is 
a fine distinction. Evidently, the law in this area is lacking a clear principle regulating the 
transformation of goods supplied under an aggregation retention of title clause. The principle in 
question could clarify when goods have subsequently undergone a transformation by considering 
numerous relevant factors such as the reversibility of the goods, the economic viability of the goods 
in deliberating whether such goods have increased in value to constitute the original goods losing their 
identity etc.701 However, without a clear over-arching principle, it is exceptionally difficult for this area 
of law to develop on a consistent basis. The current piecemeal approach does not offer any degree of 
certainty to those seeking to rely on aggregation retention of title clause or for courts to adjudicate 
such legal disputes. This fine distinction was recognised in the case of Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box 
 
697 G McCormack, Reservation of Title, op cit fn 33 at 126.  
698 ibid at 127.  
699 D Webb, “Title and transformation: who owns manufactured goods?”, op cit fn 693 at 524.  
700 ibid. 
701 See D Webb, “Title and transformation: who owns manufactured goods?” op cit fn 693 at 525 where Webb 
contemplates that the test should consider the economic implications rather than the physical nature of the 
transformation of the goods.  
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Ltd702 in which His Honour Hart noted, ‘I see no reason why the plaintiff should not retain property in 
the board so far as it remained identifiable notwithstanding its having had value added to it by the 
plaintiff’s labour and materials, if that is what the contract on its true construction provides.’703 The 
true construction of the provision in Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box Ltd, led HHJ Hart to conclude that 
the seller’s interest in the new product was created simply by way of security for the satisfaction of 
the buyer’s obligation to pay the price of the original good supplied, which created a charge which 
ought to have been registered.704 However, although the fine distinction was alluded to, the judgment 
of His Honour did not clarify the position as when the goods remain identifiable.  
 
In the circumstances where a new product is manifested from a range of different goods and the title 
of the new product belongs to the buyer/ manufacturer, the title is transferred to the seller as a means 
of security for the discharge of a debt, which will most likely be regarded as creating a charge over the 
goods in question.705 Consequently, the charge will be held void for non-registration. As the title in the 
manufactured goods vests in the buyer, this arrangement acts as security on the goods.706 This 
arrangement can be exemplified by Specialist Plant Services v Braithwaite,707 in which a company 
repaired machines and had supplied materials for the process of repair. The repairing company 
specified a term which purported that the company would retain ownership of machinery which 
incorporated any materials that they supplied, as security for the debt. The wording of the term clearly 
indicated that the material used in the repairs would be held security for costs of the repair. During 
this time, the defendant company who was a customer, went into receivership and had failed to pay 
the company for the supply of materials. Specialist Plant Services had attempted to claim a proprietary 
interest in the impugned machinery and acquired an injunction, which preventing any receivers from 
selling the machinery. The court discharged the injunction as the contract created a charge, equivalent 
to an unregistered bill of sale which was subsequently held void for non-registration under the 
Companies Act. In the event where a contract contains a provision that the supplier is given ownership 




702 Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box Ltd [1993] BCLC 623. 
703 ibid as per Michael Hart QC at [952]. 
704 ibid at [953]. 
705 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 93.  
706 D Webb, “Title and transformation: who owns manufactured goods?”, op cit fn 693 at 531.  
707 Specialist Plant Services Ltd v Braithwaite Ltd [1987] BCLC 1 (CA). 
708 D Fox, R Munday, B Soyer, A Tettenborn, P Turner, Sealy and Hooley’s Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, op cit fn 42 at 481.  
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It is difficult to determine whether a charge has been created in circumstances, where a seller through 
express stipulation has conferred rights in the product which has been manufacturing partly using 
goods that he has supplied. This issue was raised in Clough Mill in which Robert Goff J elaborated 
further; ‘where A’s materials is lawfully used by B to create new goods, whether or not B incorporated 
other material of his own, property in the new goods will generally rest in B…it is difficult to see why, 
if the parties agree that the property in the goods shall vest in A, that agreement should not be given 
effect to.’709 Thus, the learned judges’ initial thoughts on the topic was that the court could not 
envisage any problems in attempting to adhere to the original agreement in such a circumstance. 
Accordingly ‘he failed to see any reason in principle why the original legal title in a newly manufactured 
article composed of materials belonging to A and B should not lie where A and had agreed that it 
should lie.’710 However, Goff J later retracted his initial thoughts and provided logical reasoning which 
effectuated his reasoning behind his withdrawal of opinion. The main rationale referred to the 
intention of the parties, it is implied that a buyer would not intend for a seller to gain windfall of the 
purported higher value of the new product.711 Goff LJ arguing that the parties could not have intended 
for the parties to have the effect of allowing a seller to gain a windfall of the full value of the new 
product is significant, as clearly his Lordship is introducing concepts which are applicable to security 
arrangements, despite claiming that the substantive nature of the arrangement did not amount to a 
charge.712 This provides an apt example of the close affiliation with registrable charges and retention 
of title clauses which causes legal uncertainty for courts. Additionally, it also suggests the court’s 
tendency to interfere with the alleged contractual freedom afforded to parties under the provisions 
of the Sale of Goods Act, in holding that the parties could not have intended for the words to have 
meant that the seller would invariably gain a windfall.  
 
In the same case, Donaldson MR also acknowledged the difficulty of the situation of determining who 
owned the goods of the new product made from incorporated material from other goods: 
 ‘Fortunately, we do not have to decide whether the fourth sentence of condition 12 creates a 
charge to which s95 of the Act of 1948 would apply. I say ‘fortunately’, because this seems to me to 
be a difficult question…I should have thought that the buyer was clearly purporting to create a charge 
on the ‘other goods’ which would never have been the plaintiffs goods….if the incorporation of the 
yarn created a situation in which it ceased to be identifiable and a new product was created consisting 
of the yarn and the other material, it would be necessary to determine who owned that product. If, 
 
709 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 as per Robert Goff LJ at [119]. 
710 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 96.  
711 ibid.  
712 D Webb, “Title and transformation: who owns manufactured goods?”, op cit fn 693 at 538.  
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and to the extent that, the answer was the buyer, it seems to me that the fourth sentence would 
create a charge.’713  
As such, relying on the Court of Appeal’s rationale, it is suggested that the buyer should be the rightful 
owner of any new manufactured product and the proper construction of the contractual agreement 
would result in the seller creating a charge over the supplied goods.  
 
On a similar note, in Clough Mill the wording of the contractual agreement (condition 12) was of 
particular significance as it stipulated that the seller would retain property in all the material until the 
price of that material had been paid in full. The Court of Appeal recognised the implications of the 
word ‘until’ which meant that if three-quarters of the material had been paid for, the seller would still 
be able to retain ownership and have the right to resell the material thus leading to a windfall for the 
seller as the sum would likely exceed the amount owed by the buyer. Accordingly, Donaldson MR had 
the following to say:  
‘I am inclined to think that the word ‘until’ in the phrase ‘reserves the right to dispose of the material 
until payment in full for all the material has been received’ connotes not only a temporal, but also a 
quantitative limitation. In other words, the plaintiff can go on selling hank by hank until they have 
been paid in full, but if thereafter they continue to sell, they are accountable to the buyer for having 
sold goods which, upon full payment having been achieved, becomes the buyer’s goods.’714 
Accordingly, a seller may continue to sell the goods up until the point that payment has been met, if 
the seller were to continue to sell, this would likely infer a creation of charge which would be rendered 
void for lack of registration.  
 
Up until this point, the various authorities have been concerned with provisions specifying what will 
happen if the supplied goods are incorporated or manufactured into a new product. However, a 
further question needs to be posed concerning what happens where the contractual agreement 
contains no term specifying what is to happens to the goods supplied if such goods subsequently lose 
their identity? Can the original retention of title clause prevail on the new manufactured product or 
will this constitute creating a charge over the goods? The case of Ian Chisholm Textiles Ltd v Griffiths715 
can be of assistance. This case concerned a seller supplying cloth under a retention of title clause to 
manufactures of garments. The sellers contended that the retention of title clause applied to the final 
product- garments, despite no provision stipulating as such in the agreement. In this instance the court 
held that the supplier’s title to the goods created a charge over the garments, a charge held void for 
 
713 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 as per Sir John Donaldson MR at [125]. 
714 ibid at [126]. 
715 Ian Chisholm Textiles Ltd v Griffiths & Others [1994] B.C.C 96. 
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lack of registration. The nature of ownership in the goods changed from beneficial ownership to the 
interest of a chargee once the goods had changed its identity.716 Accordingly, if the contract is silent 
as to the ownership of the products, then the courts are unlikely to infer that the parties intended for 
the seller to remain the owner of the new product. It is worth noting that in this instance case, the 
cloth had been combined with buttons, threads and zips, and this was sufficient to indicate that the 
identity of the cloth had changed by a ‘significant extent’.717 The conclusion to be drawn from this case 
is that despite the appearance of reversibility and the relative ease of removing buttons, threads and 
zips from a piece of cloth, the court will most likely not entertain this prospect and will subsequently 
view the goods as having lost its identity through the manufacturing process. Accordingly, when 
considering the functionality of a retention of title clause in retaining title to goods supplied, any 
significant change to the goods including the incorporation of buttons, threads and zips will change 
the identity of the goods. Clearly, the courts have not laid down a coherent principle as to when goods 
will lose their identity to a significant degree as to render the goods transformed, and thus triggering 
the creation of registrable charge. We can only estimate when goods have subsequently lost their 
identity in the process of manufacturing or wait until the dispute reaches the courts for them to apply 
a question of fact and reach a palpable conclusion. The passive approach taken to this area of law does 
not instil any degree of clarity or coherence for those seeking to rely on the clauses in similar 
circumstances. There is no guidance to follow specifying when goods in a manufactured process are 
so transformed that they cease to exist as the originally goods supplied and consequently endure a 
significant transformation resulting in the formation of a new product. Furthermore, the lack of clarity 
and lack of overarching principles outlining how much change is needed before the goods change and 
lose their identity, serves to support the argument that retention of title clauses are significantly 
impeded as a functional commercial mechanism.   
 
Accordingly, once goods supplied have been incorporated with other goods to produce a new product, 
there are a variety of possible consequences for retention of title clauses. It may be that the retention 
of title clause no longer applies or that the agreement is only applicable to goods which remain 
separate and identifiable and if the goods can be retrieved without cause of damage. However, the 
most common eventuality is that once goods have been mixed, manufactured or processed which 
results in the creation of a new product, it is exceptionally difficult for a seller to retain title. Thus, title 
to the newly created product will prima facie vest in the buyer who has created the new product, and 
not the seller.718 The seller’s interest would only be vested by way of charge, which would 
 
716 ibid at [104]. 
717 ibid.  
718 D Webb, “Title and transformation: who owns manufactured goods?”, op cit fn 693 at 513.  
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subsequently be void for lack of registration under s395 of the Companies Act. In this instance, the 
title of the supplied goods transfers to a charge on the manufactured product, in which case title has 
subsequently passed to the buyer and the retention of title clause ceases to be an effective in its 
objective of retaining title to the original goods supplied for the seller.  
 
The courts have consistently applied the same rules by which title to the goods will be lost where the 
goods identity has changed in the manufacturing process and title to the new created products will 
vest in the creator of the product, which will normally be the buyer. However, the cases discussed do 
not apply a clear or consistent approach to what amounts to a transformation to render the identity 
of the goods lost and thus, triggering the creation of a charge. It is contended that despite the author 
believing that the cases have been decided correctly, the cases have been decided without any 
reference to a clear governing principle and this is the true fallacy. Once again, the law in this area has 
developed at a gradual and piecemeal basis with no overarching consistent approach, which promotes 
obscurity in this already complicated area of law. It is apparent that the interest of the seller to goods 
on aggregation terms will more than likely be conferred as a registrable charge.  
 
In addition, the principal reasoning adopted by the courts is to argue that title to the goods must have 
passed to the buyer as such a result denies the seller an unwarranted and unintended windfall gain. 
As evidenced above, the courts heavily rely on the contention that parties would not have intended 
for the seller to gain a windfall. However, there is a perceived weakness with the windfall argument 
as the retention of title clause expressly prevents this from happening. Worthington argues that if the 
contract remains in operation when the seller’s rights are exercised, then there can be no windfall 
gain as title to the goods passes once the price has is paid or alternatively, ‘if the contract is repudiated, 
the windfall gain to the seller may be no more than is appropriate or intended in the commercial 
context.’719 Accordingly, relying on the perceived windfall argument is thus flawed. Despite the 
apparent weaknesses in the courts’ rationales, it is evident that there is a general pronouncement that 
retention of title clauses of this kind are generally unenforceable and the interest of the seller is likely 




719 S Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions, op cit fn 11 at 32.  
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4.5 Conclusion  
It is evident that the current law is based on an accumulation of case law and there has been a spate 
of decisions concerning the different types of retention of title clauses. As demonstrated above, 
whether the construction of the agreement is inferred as a registrable charge or as a retention of title 
clause depends on a wide range of variables. A common pattern from all the cases is that one of the 
most important factors in determining the categorisation of the agreement is the precise wording of 
what the parties have agreed to with regards to the passing of title. The construction of the contract 
is thus at the forefront of the court’s analysis and consideration. The precise wording of the 
contractual clause can either facilitate the seller in attempting to retain title or can prove detrimental 
in inferring a security interest, most notably a registrable charge. As both legal mechanisms perform 
similar security functions, at times it is difficult to predict with absolute certainty whether the wording 
of the clause will be inferred as provision retaining title or a registrable charge.  
 
Although some comparisons can be drawn from the courts approach to different retention of title 
cases, most notably the need to consider any relevant surrounding circumstances to ensure that the 
court can accurately ascertain the rights of the parties, with great emphasis on the practical effect of 
any conclusions drawn from the nature of those rights,720 it is still challenging to categorise the 
contractual agreements as retaining title rather than inferring a registrable charge. As mentioned 
previously, one of the main factors for the courts to consider is essentially the construction of a 
contract and as such, judicial decisions on clauses relating to different contexts may thus be of limited 
assistance when dealing with a particular case before the courts. The difficulty lies in the fact that 
despite the vast hoard of authorities on this complicated area of law, it is evident that previous cases 
deal with very different clauses which have arisen in materially different circumstances. As epitomised 
by the judgment of Robert Goff LJ: 
‘different cases have raised different questions for decisions; and that the decision in any 
particular case may have depending on how the matter was presented to the court, and in particular 
may have depending on a material concession by counsel. So, this is a field in which we have to be 
particularly careful in reading each decision in the light of the facts and issues before the courts in 
question.’721  
Accordingly, it is increasingly difficult to confidently assert that the contractual provision will avoid the 
implications of creating a registrable charge as such a decision will most definitely depend on a case 
by case basis with much emphasis on the particular wording of the contractual agreement. This 
 
720 See further the illuminating judgement of Robert Goff LJ in Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 at [116]. 
721 ibid as per Robert Goff LJ at [114]. 
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incoherent approach to cases has the detrimental impact of complicating the legal issues 
unnecessarily and would thus, benefit from general overarching principles or guidelines outlining at 
what point do goods lose their identity in the context of an aggregation retention of title clause.  
 
As we have seen, different rationales are provided by the courts for materially different circumstances 
which makes it difficult for this area of law to be coherent and uniformed in laying down precisely 
when do retention of title clauses constitute registrable charges. Due to the different rationales 
employed by the courts in justifying the categorisation as a security interest, it makes it almost entirely 
impossible to produce and adopt one consistent approach for this area of law. It is self-evident that 
the body of law in this area is not internally consistent. As such, predicting the circumstances with any 
degree of certainty as to whether the retention of title will be effective in merely transferring title is 
notoriously difficult. On account of the inherent complexities and influx of case law, trying to enforce 
stable reasoning within cases is bound to be extremely difficult.722  
 
Despite the courts in Clough Mill and Hendy Lennox implying that the wording of the retention of title 
clause should be given its full literal effect. It goes without saying that it is almost impossible to draft 
prolonged and aggregation clauses in a manner which the courts will enforce. As evidenced above, 
the courts have strained to prevent the clauses from operating as intended, preferring to interfere 
with parties contractual intentions and repeatedly construing such clauses as creating a registrable 
charge, which ultimately suggests an innate suspicion of the clauses.723 The consistent approach of 
striking down such clauses as conferring a security interest over the goods supplied causes significant 
practical problems for those parties seeking to rely on such clauses, as they will almost certainly be 
destined to fail. As supported by Webb, ‘rather than making a sweeping pronouncement that such 
clauses are unenforceable, the courts have, in common law fashion, responded in an ad hoc way by 
obstructing the attempts of the parties to implement such contractual provisions.’724 The piecemeal 
and fragmented approach taken by the courts to this area of law, merely serves the court’s ability to 
obstruct the enforceability of such clauses and intrude on the contractual intentions of the parties 
relying on title retaining provisions. Possible reasons behind the judicial reluctance to prolonged and 
aggregation clauses may include that the courts are preventing retention of title claimants from 
benefitting in yet another way which allows them to gain priority over unsecured creditors’ and 
 
722 A Knight “Reforming the English law of secured transactions in personal property” (2010) 4 Law and 
Financial Markets Review, 553-567, at 533.  
723 D Webb, “Title and transformation: who owns manufactured goods?”, op cit fn 693 at 538.  
724 ibid at 539. 
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secured lenders claims.725 If the courts were to regularly enforce prolonged and aggregation retention 
of title clauses, then this combined with the super-priority status afforded to retention of title 
claimants would mean that in the event of an insolvent buyer, the seller would be granted priority 
ahead of other creditors’ and would potentially benefit from obtaining a windfall at the expense of 
those creditors’ who have an economic interest in the goods supplied.726 To this end, it is suggested 
that the courts are attempting to strike an appropriate balance to the priority afforded to retention 
of title claimants with regard to the original goods supplied, which subsequently benefits the position 
of receivable financiers.  
 
The lack of consistency adopted by the courts as seen in the different approaches taken to claims of 
proceeds of sale under Romalpa and subsequent authorities727 and the fundamental weakness of not 
having an overriding governing principle clarifying when goods have lost their identity to a significant 
degree, significantly impacts on the functionality and commercial worth of retention of title clauses. 
This area of law is still inherently problematic as no coherent guidance exists to resolve the most 
significant issues as to when the interest in the goods will vest in the seller, amounting to the creation 
of a registrable charge. This raises the fundamental question of the overall effectiveness of retention 
of title clauses as clearly the expected objective of the clauses is hindered significantly once the goods 
have lost their physical identity or the agreement is inferred as creating a registrable charge. Which 
begs the question, do aggregation retention of title clause serve a meaningful purpose, if the 
protection offered is only available in such limited circumstances? Should aggregation and prolonged 
clauses continue as a commercial mechanism if under most circumstances, they will be construed as 
creating a registrable charge? It cannot be refuted that the courts have placed impossibly high 
requirements for claimants to succeed in claims of aggregation and prolonged retention of title 
clauses. The courts almost always interfere with the contractual autonomy of the parties whereby 
parties are prevented from implementing their contractual intentions of retaining title to goods 
supplied. Accordingly, the current judicial trend almost guarantees that such clauses are doomed to 
fail.728 
 
It is argued that this line of argument, supports the underlying hypothesis of this research that 
retention of title clauses as a commercial mechanism are significantly hindered by the present law and 
 
725 See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the courts’ alleged balancing exercise regarding retention of title clauses.  
726 L Gullifer, “Retention of title clauses: a question of balance”, op cit fn 209 at 287.  
727Pfeiffer Weinkellerei- Weineinkauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Limited, op cit fn 648; Tatung (UK) Ltd v 
Galex Telesure Ltd, op cit fn 644; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd, op cit fn 642.  
728 A Hicks “Reservation of Title: A Pious Hope”, op cit fn 173 at 80.  
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the court’s inconsistent approach to goods losing identity which prompts a creation of a charge over 
the goods supplied. Despite the fact that retention of title clauses are in widespread use, in practice 
the legal mechanism offers less protection than originally expected as clearly there is an abundance 
of authorities whereby the clauses are struck down as registrable charges and subsequently held void 
for lack of registration. Consequently, once the clause has been struck down for constituting a 
registrable charge, the claimant will be reduced to the ranks of the unsecured creditor – an incredibly 
precarious position. The growing emergence of the clauses not offering the expected level of 
protection has thus come to light, and the following chapter will explore this issue further, considering 
the situations where retention of title clauses contracts are construed as contracts of agency or sui 
generis contracts and the corollary implications of further uncertainty in relation to the functionality 

























CHAPTER 5: UNCERTAINTY OF RETENTION OF TITLE JURISPRUDENCE 
5. Introduction  
In recent times, the breadth of litigation surrounding retention of title clauses cases has led to great 
uncertainty. On account of retention of title clauses being a contractual provision, the development 
of law in this area has been understandably piecemeal in nature. Given the increase in popularity of 
such clauses729, the courts have had to interpret the ever-developing nature of retention of title 
clauses which seek to provide the unpaid seller with a security interest over the goods sold. Over the 
years, such clauses have become more extensive and ambitious in trying to provide greater security 
for the unpaid seller in the event of a buyer’s insolvency. A large number of sellers incorporate 
retention of title clauses as part of their standard contractual terms in tandem with equally 
complicated provisions such as; instructions on how to store the goods in a separate place allowing 
the goods to remain readily identifiable, provisions allowing the buyers to use the goods in the 
ordinary course of business, provisions which allow the buyer to resell the goods in the capacity as the 
seller’s agents and provisions which entitle the seller to proceeds of sale and so forth.730 Therefore, 
the court must exercise a degree of caution when examining retention of title cases, as each decision 
is reached by virtue of its particular wording of the contract and considered in light of the commercial 
context in which the dispute has arisen.731 
 
Despite the need to construe the wording of each retention of title clause on an individual basis, it can 
be claimed that the courts have followed a reasonably consistent interpretation of the wording of 
retention of title clauses, with emphasis on commercial sense.732 To clarify this further, it appeared 
that retention of title cases were dealt with in a similar manner, to the extent of allowing some form 
of commercial certainty and predictability.733 Predictability in this regard related to both predictability 
in terms of judicial outcomes and the stability of the legal and commercial framework.734 Cases which 
consider the interpretation of retention of title clauses have been consistently used as a means of 
providing guidance for both courts, practitioners and contracting parties alike, ensuring a form of 
 
729 It is exceedingly common for sellers to include retention of title clauses within their contracts of sales of 
goods in tandem with further complicated provisions. See J Davey and C Kelly “Romalpa and Contractual 
Innovation”, op cit fn 5 at 384 for interesting theories on the proliferation of retention of title clauses.  
730 M Clarke, R Hooley, R Munday, L Sealy, A Tettenborn and P Turner, Commercial Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials, 5th Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, at 497.  
731 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin, op cit fn 45 as per Robert Goff LJ. 
732 See L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 564. 
733 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 1.  
734 J Yap “Predictability, certainty, and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods” (2017) Common Law 
World Review 46(4), 269-286, at 269.  
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market certainty. Evidently, decisions were reached which facilitated the commercial needs and 
expectations of the market in conjunction with producing fair results which contributed to economic 
outcomes.735 To this end, a degree of consistency was upheld within the market, whereby courts 
would interpret the wording of a retention of title clause in way which allowed for commercial 
certainty. For example, courts have been willing to uphold simple retention of title clauses with the 
rationale that such provisions merely postpone the passing of property under the contract.736 Whereas 
the courts have repeatedly refused more extensive retention of title clauses, particularly those 
provisions which seek to allow sellers to uphold an interest in the proceeds of sale.737 As discussed in 
an earlier chapter, the courts regularly characterise such provisions as being a registrable charge.738 
The requirement of registration is stipulated in s859A of the Companies Act 2006.  
 
Undeterred by the court’s approach to more complicated retention of title provisions, sellers still to 
this day attempt to include more extensive retention of title provisions which seek to widen their 
interest, in the hope that the courts will one-day uphold the wording of the ‘perfect’ clause, which will 
grant sellers an interest which will not result in a registrable charge; a non-registrable interest per se. 
This sought-after objective was achieved by the sellers in Caterpillar (NI) Ltd (formally known as) FG 
Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co Ltd739 (henceforth Wilson v Holt) but unknowingly such 
decision reaped some unintended consequences. Upholding a non-registrable interest in the proceeds 
of a sub-sale came at the price of preventing the seller from doing what it had intended to do, which 
was to bring an action for the price of the goods. Consequently, such a decision also detrimentally 
impairs the commercial utility of retention of title clauses by preventing sellers from being able to 
bring an action for the price of the goods in similar circumstances. Once again, the analogy of this area 
of law as a legal minefield holds acute significance in this context as difficult cases have exposed pitfalls 
and uncommercial implications of relying on retention of title clause as a mechanism which offers a 
lifeline in times of economic hardship. Therefore, this chapter will seek to argue that diverging from 
the reasonably consistent pattern of interpretation has come at a difficult compromise for sellers 
purporting to rely on retention of title clauses. Following a number of complicated retention of title 
cases, old and newer cases, it is apparent that such legal outcomes and reasonings have led to 
consequences that are commercially flawed and do not result in viable solutions.  
 
735 R Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998, at 8-31.  
736 See Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG, op cit fn 629.  
737 See Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd, op cit fn 644; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] 
BCLC 602. 
738 The registration requirement is found in s859A of the Companies Act 2006 . 
739 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1232; [2014] 1 W.L.R 2365 




The decisions of the three cases discussed below, appear fragmented from the commercial reality in 
which these clauses operate. The emphasis on commercial certainty has been compromised by 
decisions which have achieved far-reaching and uncommercial implications.740 This approach to case 
law, complicates matters for future retention of title cases as any interpretation of such contracts will 
be subjected to a series of individual and isolated decisions, which may detrimentally impact the 
court’s ability to provide flexibility or ingenuity with commercial decision-making. As emphasised by 
Gullifer, ‘rather than an overarching view being taken of the balance that should be reached between 
creditors…the development of the law is at the mercy of the ingenuity of those drafting contracts (who 
seek to get the best of all worlds) and the vagaries of which cases come before the courts and in what 
circumstances.’741 As will be discussed, further uncertainty emanates from an influx of controversial 
legal reasoning in recent case law. It is evident that the uncertainty of this area of law has detrimental 
ramifications on the functional use of retention of title clauses in commercial transactions. This 
chapter will critically analyse three examples of difficult retention of title cases which in the author’s 
opinion have inherently increased the overall ambiguity of this area of law. As will be demonstrated, 
these three cases have caused unprecedented disruption to the effectiveness and utility of retention 
of title clauses.  
 
The first case to be analysed will be the infamous Romalpa case, and how this decision started a 
pattern for future uncertainty for retention of title clause cases. The second case to be analysed will 
be Wilson v Holt, in which its legal and commercial implications will be evaluated. The third and final 
case to be explored is PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited742 (henceforth Bunkers) 
in which its profound impact on sales law and the consequent implications on the functionality of 
retention of title clauses will be critically analysed. Areas of legal uncertainty, inconsistency and 
unpredictability will thus be highlighted to illustrate the difficulties encountered when seeking to rely 
on retention of title clauses, following the decisions of these three controversial cases. As such, this 
chapter will support the underlying hypothesis that retention of title clauses are impeded from 
achieving their functional objective of providing an economic lifeline for suppliers in times of economic 
recession. Accordingly, this chapter will argue that the functional use of retention of title clauses has 
been significantly limited by the current legal position following the decisions in both Wilson v Holt 
and Bunkers. 
 
740 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 1. 
741 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 250. 
742 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112.  
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5.1 A reasonable and commercial pattern? 
 
Before delving into the discussion on the cases which are in the author’s submission commercially 
flawed, it is imperative to lay out a brief groundwork for the pattern of consistency of retention of title 
cases. It is hoped that by briefly alluding to the cases which conform with commercial sense, that it 
will be easier to illustrate how the following three cases refute and hinder the commercial 
functionality of retention of title clauses.  
 
As highlighted above over the last few decades, retention of title clause cases have followed a 
relatively sensible pattern of interpretation.743 The pattern can be summarised briefly as follows:  
simple retention of title clauses are deemed valid without registration if the clauses purport only to 
reserve title of the actual goods supplied, until either full payment of the goods has been met or until 
the buyer has paid all outstanding debts to the seller.744 In relation to situations where the original 
goods have been made into manufactured products, the retention of title clause is unlikely to be 
effective unless the contract of sale expressly specified that the seller is to have an interest in the 
manufactured goods.745 In such circumstances where the goods have been manufactured or altered 
in some form, the contracts have been characterised as contracts for the sale/ supply of goods. It is 
common for the courts to infer a charge, despite the seller’s attempt to draft the contract of sale with 
a clause purporting to reserve property in the goods.746 However, where the seller purports to reserve 
title in either the money or in any proceeds of sale arising from the original goods, in practice such 
clauses have been inferred as creating a charge.747 For example, from previous cases such as Re Bond 
Worth we understand that any interest granted to sellers will most likely be categorised as a 
registrable charge. The court is also unlikely to confer a seller an interest to account, in situations 
where the clause does not mention any proceeds of sale nor manufactured goods.748 Once again, such 
 
743 The argument put forward here is that prior to the decisions of both Wilson v Holt and Bunkers, the law 
pertaining to retention of title clauses appeared to have settled. For supporting viewpoint see W Davies 
“Romalpa thirty years on- still an enigma?” (2006) 4(2) Hertfordshire Law Journal, 2-23, who stated: ‘The law 
of ROT does now appear to be settled. Suppliers can be advised that proceeds and manufactured goods clauses 
will fail. Subject to its incorporation in the contract however, a simple clause will usually be effective. Perhaps 
more surprisingly the all monies clauses has also received high judicial approval. Although the route by which 
this point has been reached defies any meticulous analysis, this modern certainty is to be welcomed.’ 
744 See Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG, op cit fn 629.  
745 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products, op cit fn 48. 
746 M Bridge, Personal Property Law, 4th Ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, at 288.  
747 E Pfeiffer Weinkellerie-Weineinkauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd, op cit fn 648.  
748 Hendy Lennox (Industrial Englines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12.  
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an interest will be categorised as a registrable charge with the result of being rendered void for lack 
of registration.749  
 
One of the general conclusions to be drawn from the above summary is that the interest of the seller 
and whether a charge has been created is at the foremost issues for the courts to consider. This is 
fundamental in ascertaining the intention of the parties and subsequently whether to uphold a 
retention of title clause. The courts must contemplate the intention of the parties when deliberating 
whether a registrable charge had been created. The significance of this is encapsulated by Hudson, 
who states ‘the crucial thing in most retention of title cases is the proper interpretation of the rights 
and obligations of the parties inter se and the appropriate characterisation of their resulting 
relationship.’750 One of the issues is whether or not the contractual provision amounts to a legitimate 
retention of title or does it create a security interest characterised by a charge? Whilst it is certainly 
possible for a seller to register each individual charge, there are a few implications which hinder the 
practical realities of complying with the registration process.751 Most notably, the level of protection 
afforded by the availability of a security charge is illusory, although it is supposed to offer the seller 
some form of protection, the compliance with the registration process has some fundamental 
difficulties.752 It is submitted that under the present registration regime, it is highly impractical for 
retention of title sellers to register each individual charge as firstly this would be uneconomic if the 
goods supplied are of small commercial value; the cost of registration would far outweigh the 
commercial worth of the goods. Secondly, as retention of title clauses are widely used it is highly 
probable that several repeated contracts are used, which would once again be impractical and too 
costly for a seller to register such charges. Therefore, this raises the fundamental question of why is it 
important for the law to ascertain whether the interest confers a registrable charge which will most 
likely be held void for lack of registration? In the instance whereby a registrable charge will be held 
void for lack of registration, this will be held void against any potential liquidators, administrators, and 
other creditors. In this respect, such measures can be seen as a providing a counterweight to the 
priority afforded to retention of title claimants in the event of insolvency753 and can be considered a 
 
749 See Re Peachdart Ltd, op cit fn 124; Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box Ltd, op cit fn 702.  
750 G McMeel, “On the redundancy of the concept of bailment” in A Hudson, New Perspectives on Property 
Law: Obligations and Restitutions, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2013, at 276. 
751 See in particular Chapter 4 and section 7.3.1 respectively.  
752 J De Lacy, “Romalpa revalued?” (1993) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 375-382, at 375. For an 
interesting observation, see the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Queensland in Puma Australian Ltd v 
Sportsman’s Australia Ltd Unreported, December 7, 1990, Moynihan J (No. 346 of 1990) where the court 
favoured upholding the proprietary interest of the seller despite the disposal of goods by the buyer. This 
approach was chosen over construing the clause as a registrable security charge.  
753 As discussed previously in Chapter 2 and see in particular section 4.5.  
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satisfactory resolution for long-term receivable financiers.754 As such, striking down cases for lack of 
registering a characterised charge is fundamentally important for interpreting retention of title clause 
cases as it upholds a degree of legal certainty and aligns with the commercial expectations of the 
parties and conforms with the decisions of previous retention of title cases.755  
 
5.1.1 Romalpa and its repercussions  
 
The first and most famous instance which led to an unsatisfactory interpretation of retention of title 
clause was the decision reached by the Court of Appeal in Aluminium Industrie Vaasen v Romalpa 
Aluminium Ltd756 (henceforth Romalpa). The Court of Appeal’s reasoning has been subjected to 
considerable criticism757 and it is not the purpose of this section to highlight or repeat every notable 
criticism of the case. But rather the aim of this section is to illustrate a few fundamental issues with 
the reasoning and the approach taken in Romalpa, a rationale which has subsequently been relied 
upon directly or indirectly by courts in their pursuit of dealing with complicated retention of title 
clauses cases. It can be argued that although later cases have not concurrently followed the decision 
reached in Romalpa758, the courts have clearly been influenced by elements raised in the reasoning. 
As discussed below, adhering to such an approach can be inherently problematic and has led to 
detrimental and uneconomic implications.  
 
A brief overview of the facts will be provided before examining some of the pivotal criticisms of the 
Court of Appeal’s reasoning and its implications for subsequent cases. Aluminium Industrie Vaaseen 
BV (the seller) sold aluminium to Romalpa (the buyer). The contract of sale contained an elaborate 
retention of title clause which stipulated that property in the goods would not pass until all payments 
due to the seller were met as stipulated by clause 13:  
‘the ownership of the material to be delivered by AIV will only be transferred to the purchaser 
when he has met all that is owing to AIV, no matter on what grounds.’759  
 
754 L Gullifer “Retention of title clauses: a question of balance”, op cit fn 209 at 288. 
755 As discussed in Chapter 4. Despite the author believing that these historic cases have been decided 
correctly, the author criticises the courts lack of clear governing principle and corollary piecemeal approach to 
the types of retention of title clauses in question. The omission of a consistent approach to such cases has 
caused historic uncertainty and has ultimately resulted in a proliferation of cases reaching the courts to decide 
whether such cases are in fact true retention of title clauses or an interest most likely to be conferred as a 
registrable charge.  
756 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3. 
757 See further, A Hicks, “Romalpa is Dead” (1992) 13(11) Company Lawyer 217-218, at 217.  
758 See Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd, op cit fn 644; Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box Ltd, op cit fn 702; 
Pfeiffer GmbH v Arbusthnot Factors Ltd [1998] 1 W.L.R 150. 
759 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3, at [679]. 
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The clause continued by specifying that until the date of payment, the buyer acting as a fiduciary 
owner for the seller should store the aluminium supplied separately, so as to clearly identify that such 
property was the property of the seller. The contract of sale also provided that if the buyer should 
make objects from the aluminium supplied, that once again the seller would be given ownership of 
the new objects as surety of payment. Additionally, the contract also stipulated that the seller would 
be entitled to sell such objects and hand over all claims arising from the sale to the seller if still unpaid.  
 
It is clear that the retention of title clause was extensive and notably, exceptionally onerous on the 
buyer. From the above provisions, the buyer would not be entitled to use any proceeds in its business 
for any other reason than paying back the seller. Subsequently, the buyer went into liquidation, owing 
the seller more than £122,000. The seller was entitled to reclaim the goods themselves but 
commenced proceedings against the proceeds of sale of the goods which the seller was claiming it 
was entitled to. The seller claimed they were entitled to a charge on the money which amounted to 
roughly £35,000, which was held in a separate bank account by the receiver and to subsequently trace 
the proceeds of the sub-sale of the property in that particular account.  
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the elaborate retention of title clause and held that the seller was entitled 
to trace and recover the proceeds of the sub-sales. Two main arguments led to the Court of Appeal to 
favour the sellers’ position; firstly the court was strongly influenced by the buyer holding the goods as 
a bailee for the seller and secondly, the court focused on the implied term which allowed the buyer 
to sub-sell the goods.760 Put simply, by taking a literal interpretation to the contractual clause, the 
court focused on the account of the seller, which resulted in the seller having a right to the proceeds 
of sale.  
 
Despite the negative repercussions and criticisms, it is evident that certain principles and justifications 
cultivated in Romalpa have clearly transcended into later cases, again with unintentional 
consequences for this area of law. Foremost, the outcome of Romalpa has evidently shaped the 
intentions of draftsmen and sellers purporting to rely on retention of title clauses. As noted by Low 
and Loi, ‘ROT clauses burst into the collective consciousness of English businessmen following the 
Court of Appeal decision in Romalpa in 1976.’761 Therefore, it is not just the judiciary who have been 
influenced in some capacity by this notorious case. A repeated pattern has emerged whereby sellers, 
 
760 ibid, at [680]. 
761 K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English 
Law of Sales”, op cit fn 4 at 233. 
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suppliers and draftsmen all seek to mimic the alleged success of what was achieved in Romalpa.762 
Accordingly, with sellers attempting to fall within the limited ambit of the decision in Romalpa, difficult 
cases have emerged which has brought further uncertainty and complications to the law relating to 
retention of title clauses. Controversial decisions have been reached which detrimentally hinder the 
commercial utility of retention of title clauses and the root of the problem can be sourced from the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Romalpa; which provided the first time for a retention of 
title clause to be upheld.763 
 
Although subsequent cases have dealt with Romalpa through vehemently distinguishing the case764, 
there has been calls for the decision to be conclusively overruled to prevent any further misconstrued 
interpretations of retention of title clauses cases.765 This section will contend that the reasoning of the 
case was unsatisfactory and should be once and for all revoked as to prevent any further unclarity for 
future retention of title cases. From the case examples provided below, the courts have inadvertently 
been influenced by some of the inadequate reasonings adopted in Romalpa, which has subsequently 
led to additional complications on the commercial utility and functionality of the clauses.   
 
5.1.2 Literal interpretation of the contractual provision  
 
It is submitted that one of the main criticisms of the Court of Appeal’s decision was taking an overly 
literal approach to contractual interpretation. Although it is recognised that of course a court should 
construe the wording of each retention of title clause, clauses should not be interpreted in isolation 
and should not be prioritised over taking a holistic approach to case in hand; the court must dedicate 
sufficient time in deliberating all relevant aspects of the case. In this instance, the court primarily 
focused on the precise wording of the contractual provisions of clause 13, to the detriment of 
disregarding the need to characterise the interest of the seller. In this regard, great focus was given to 
whose account the sale was for, seller or buyer. Interpreting the case from the account of the seller 
would entitle the seller to a right to the proceeds, or alternatively interpreting the clause from the 
account of the buyer would lead to the conclusion that the seller was an unsecured creditor. The Court 
of Appeal took the unusual approach of favouring the position of the seller on the caveat that it would 
be contrary to the interpretation of the clause for the seller to be construed as an unsecured creditor. 
 
762 M Kerr “Modern Trends in Commercial Law and Practice” (1978) 41(1) Modern Law Review, 1-24, at 9. 
763 I Davies, Effective Retention of Title, op cit fn 6 at 11. 
764 See further Re Bond Worth, op cit fn 450 at [264]; Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd, op cit fn 
48 at [38], Re Andrabell Ltd, op cit fn 260 at [415]. 




The court’s direction of omitting the characterisation of the interest of the seller, was deemed a 
peculiar direction to take, considering the buyers appeared to be insolvent by the fact that a receiver 
and manager had been appointed by the buyer’s bank.766 Although it is acknowledged that this was 
fleetingly alluded to by Mocatta J at first instance, the characterisation of the interest of the seller was 
dismissed on the ground that a claim to trace the proceeds of sale would not be registrable. It is 
evident that the court was heavily influenced by the argument that it would be in direct contradiction 
of the purpose of a retention of title clause for a charge to be created. As affirmed by Goff LJ ‘the 
difficulty so imported is not enough to drive one to imply a term defeating the whole object of clause 
13.’767 Thus, the clause was construed as one for the account of the seller, rather than the account of 
the buyer as to not be in direct contradiction of the objective of the retention of title clause agreed by 
both parties.   
 
Such a reasoning was heavily questioned by Phillips J in the subsequent case of Tatung.768 Phillips J 
respectfully questioned the reasoning adopted by Mocatta J in holding that no registrable charge was 
created. He distinguished the approach taken in Romalpa which was heavily influenced by the 
argument that it would be in direct contradiction of the purpose of a retention of title clause for a 
charge to be created. Phillips J opined that inferring a charge was not contradicting the underlying 
objective of a retention of title clause as ‘while that object makes it desirable for the seller to acquire 
an interest in the proceeds of sale or other disposal of goods supplied by way of security, it does not 
require that the seller be free of the obligation to register that interest…’769 It is contended that in the 
situations where a seller is purporting to claim the proceeds of sale arising out of supplied goods, the 
correct interpretation is to infer that a registrable charge has been created. 
 
Arguably, the characterisation of the charge should have been at the forefront of the discussion in the 
Romalpa case. As emphasised by Goodhart ‘in [Romalpa] the question which has been at the heart of 
most subsequent litigation about reservation of title clauses- namely, whether the clause constitutes 
a charge on the goods which will be void if not registered under (Part III of the Companies Act 1948- 
was never raised.)’770 As aforementioned, the relevant registration requirement is now found in s859 
of the Companies Act 2006. It is evident that insufficient attention was given to this important aspect 
 
766 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 574. 
767 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3, as per Goff LJ at [692]. 
768 Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd, op cit fn 644 as per Phillips J at [337]. 
769 ibid.  
770 W Goodhart “Clough Mill Ltd v Martin- A Comeback for Romalpa?”, op cit fn 593 at 96.  
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in the Romalpa case and ironically, had the Court of Appeal focused on the characterisation of the 
interest of the seller, it is highly probably that the interest would be deemed a registrable charge, 
which would be subsequently void against the liquidator and creditors. Thus, conforming to the usual 
pattern of interpreting retention of title clause in a conceptual and formalistic manner with emphasis 
on commercial certainty.771 
 
This misconceived prioritisation of contractual interpretation whilst subsequently not paying sufficient 
attention to the categorisation of the seller’s interest was also observed in Wilson v Holt.772 Clearly, 
the approach taken in Romalpa set a dangerous example as will be discussed below, which has led to 
subsequent cases following the same misguided direction, leading to further inconsistency with the 
interpretation of retention of title clauses.   
 
5.1.3. Disregarding the intention of the parties  
 
Another criticism of the Romalpa reasoning, stemmed from the court’s reluctance to consider the 
intentions of the parties. The purpose of the elaborate clause was to provide the sellers as far as 
possible, a form of security in the event of a buyer’s insolvency and to mitigate the risk of the buyer’s 
non-payment. This fact is not disputed and was recognised by Roskill LJ who conceded, ‘it is 
obvious…that the business purpose of the whole of this clause, read in its context in the general 
conditions, was to secure the plaintiffs, so far as possible, against the risks of non-payment…’773 As 
aforementioned, the court was strongly influenced by the opinion that inferring a charge must be 
contrary to the underlying objective of the retention of title clause as stipulated in clause 13. As such 
the Court of Appeal was of the view that it was not the parties’ intention for a charge to be created as 
this would allegedly defeat the purpose of incorporating such a clause in the first place.774 The 
following section will provide an alternative argument for why this interpretation is inherently 
incorrect.  
 
It can be argued that the intention of the parties was to create a charge over the proceeds of sale. The 
objective of the clause was to provide security to the sellers against the possibility of non-payment or 
insolvency of the buyers. Accordingly, the duty to account for the proceeds and holding the proceeds 
 
771 R Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium, op cit fn 735 at 8-31. 
772 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Patten LJ at [68]. 
773 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3, as per Roskill LJ at [688]. 
774 The Court of Appeal relied upon the flawed logic of tracing claims under the operation of the law under Re 
Hallett’s Estate (1883) 13 Ch D 696, however this has argument has been extensively criticised and will not be 
discussed further. See further, J De Lacy, “Proceed with care” (1989) 10 Company Lawyer, 188-191. 
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for the sellers as fiduciary owners was limited in the following ways. Firstly, to specific time periods 
when all outstanding debts to the seller had not been paid as illustrated by ‘so long as any 
indebtedness whatever remained outstanding from the defendants to the plaintiffs.’775 The duty to 
account and to retain those proceeds exclusively for the seller’s account required the buyer to 
continue this course of action until the entirety of outstanding debts were discharged. Secondly, the 
duty to account was limited to the amount due to the seller.776 As such, under this construction the 
buyer was entitled to the surplus and once payment of the secured debt was discharged, the seller’s 
interest in the proceeds would cease. These elements are indicative of creating a registrable charge. 
As the created charge was not registered, this would have resulted in the charge being void against 
the bank holder and had the buyer gone into liquidation, the charge would have been void against the 
liquidator.  
 
Subsequent retention of title cases have dealt with implying a right to extend title to proceeds of sales 
by vehemently distinguishing Romalpa, with McCormack going so far as saying that the reasoning has 
‘almost distinguished to death.’777 This provides sufficient evidence that the conclusion reached in 
Romalpa was completely unsatisfactory. In the event of a retention of title clause explicitly granting 
the right to claim proceeds arising out of sub-sale to the seller, such clause should be categorised as a 
registrable charge which will be subsequently struck down as void for lack of registration as per s859A 
of the Companies Act. The basis behind this rationale is that the courts assume as a matter of business 
common sense that the contracting parties did in fact intend that the sub-sale is made for the buyer’s 
account, at which point the seller’s interest in the proceeds of sale would cease once the payment of 
debt owed to the seller had been satisfied. As emphasised by De Lacy, it is highly logical to contend 
that if the buyer is sub-selling the goods of the seller than the buyer should be accountable for any 
proceeds received.778 Furthermore, under this line of argument, it was not intended for the buyer to 
sub-sell in the capacity of the seller’s fiduciary agent and as such any profits or proceeds generated 
from the sub-sale should belong to the buyer, rather than providing a windfall to the seller.779 Under 
normal business circumstances, it cannot be reasonably assumed that the parties to a contract agree 
to provide a windfall to the seller, such logic defies commercial sense on part of the buyer.  
 
 
775 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3, as per Roskill LJ at [689]. 
776 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 574. 
777 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, op cit fn 256 at 182.  
778 J De Lacy, “Romalpa revalued?” (1993) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, op cit fn 752 at 380.  
779 See Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd, op cit fn 642 as per Mummery J. 
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Additionally, it cannot be said that the parties intended for the buyer to hold the goods as bailee for 
the seller. In this case, the Court of Appeal conceded that the buyers were bailees for the aluminium 
foil as laid out by Roskill LJ: 
‘It seems to me clear…that to give effect to what I regard as the obvious purpose of clause 13 
one must imply into the first part of the clause not only the power to sell but also the 
obligation to account in accordance with the normal fiduciary relationship of principal and 
agent, bailor and bailee.’780 
The principles laid out by Roskill LJ meant that because the buyer held the goods of the seller as a 
bailee, this resulted in the buyer selling the goods as a fiduciary for the seller. Once again taking  a 
literal approach to the clause, the court was willing to imply the obligation expressly contemplated in 
clause 13 which bestowed an obligation on the buyer to account under the normal fiduciary 
relationship of principal and agent, bailor and bailee. It was this point, which entitled the sellers to 
trace and subsequently recover the proceeds of the sub-sale. To this end, rather than the buyer being 
treated as trading for his own account, it was interpreted as the buyer acting as an agent and a bailee 
for the goods supplied, with the obligation to account to the seller any proceeds gained when dealing 
with the seller’s goods.781 In other words, the buyer held the goods as a fiduciary and as a consequence 
was accountable for any proceeds he received.782 There has been plenty of authority and academic 
commentary which refutes this approach.783 Interestingly, such an approach was questioned by 
Staughton J in the case of Hendy Lennox784 where he argued that if all agents and bailees were 
fiduciaries, there was no need to consider whether there was an implied term as to their obligations 
to sell on the seller’s account, as they were bound to account as a fiduciary regardless. As epitomised 
by Low and Loi, ‘a fortiori, without an explicit provision giving the supplier the right to those proceeds, 
a supplier who retains title merely in the original goods will not ipso facto despite Romalpa, be entitled 
to assert that the purchaser was selling as fiduciary or agent and will not be able to trace into and 
claims sub-sale proceeds.’785 It is highly unlikely that it was the intention of the parties for the buyer 
to act as a fiduciary agent for the seller.  
 
Clearly, if a relationship of bailment existed between the parties, the question of whether the goods 
were sold as fiduciary should be ascertained by the construction of the contract. Furthermore, in each 
 
780 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3, as per Roskill LJ at [688]. 
781 D French, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law, op cit fn 619 at 316.  
782 J De Lacy, ‘Proceed with care’ (1989) 10 Company Lawyer, 188-191, at 191. 
783 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at [612]; Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v 
Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12 at [498]; Re Andrabell Ltd, op cit fn 260 at [414]. 
784 Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12 as per Staughton J at [498]. 
785 K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English 
Law of Sales”, op cit fn 4 at 236. 
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individual case, the relationship must be examined to see whether or not the nature of the relationship 
is fiduciary.786 Again, it is contended that the above construction is unlikely to reflect what the parties 
intended, particularly because in Romalpa there was no obligation to keep the proceeds of sale 
separate. If there was a fiduciary relationship between the seller and the buyer, then there would also 
be an obligation to pay all the proceeds of sale into a separate bank account. Such a course of action 
would notably impede business efficacy and impact negatively on terms of credit. Usually, the buyer 
would need the money from the proceeds of sale for their own business, and as such paying money 
into a separate bank account would unlikely reflect the intention of the parties or the commercial 
reality of business. In practice, in Romalpa the buyer was entitled to benefit and use the proceeds of 
sale under the buyer’s own discretion during the period of credit. This much was accepted by Goff LJ 
who noted that buyers are not restrained from using the proceeds for their own benefit during the 
credit period and indicated the difficulties of identifying the nature of the parties relationship: 
‘No doubt in practice, so long as all went well the plaintiffs would allow the defendants to use 
the proceeds of sale in their own business, as I understand they did; but things ceased to go well, and 
now one has to determine the strict rights of the parties…’787 
As the clause in the present case did not provide for the obligation to keep the proceeds from the sub-
sale in an segregated bank account, Baskind et al were doubtful that the relationship involved a 
bailment and even questioned whether a fiduciary relationship existed on the facts of the case.788 In 
line with this reasoning, if the buyers did hold the foil in a fiduciary capacity, this would also have 
meant that the buyers should have kept the foil completely separate from their own goods. Lastly, 
this argument would also extend to the above submission of frustrating commercial sense with a buyer 
allowing a seller to profit from a windfall. As discussed above, based on a fiduciary relationship, the 
seller would have been entitled to all the proceeds of sale, a sum which might exceed what was 
originally owed. Again, it cannot be reasonably expected that a buyer would agree to such prospects 
and would likely be contrary to what the buyer had originally intended. Such an outcome also leads 
to uneconomic implications and contradicts usual commercial practice.   
 
It has been suggested that one of the instrumental factors which impacted the outcome of the case, 
was that the buyers conceded that they owed fiduciary obligations to the sellers.789 This in conjunction 
with the buyers holding the manufactured goods as bailees, and the sellers being subsequent fiduciary 
owners of such goods, was also key to understanding the decision reached by the Court of Appeal.  
 
786 See Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd, op cit fn 12 as per Staughton J at [498]. 
787 Aluminium Industrie Vaasen B.V v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd, op cit fn 3, as per Goff LJ at [692]. 




Although the claim for proceeds of sale did succeed in Romalpa, such claims are highly unlikely to 
succeed in the future as the interest of the seller has been routinely categorised as creating a charge 
over the proceeds of sale. Claims are unlikely to succeed for a number of different reasons including, 
firstly; it is doubtful whether a fiduciary relationship or bailment would rise under similar 
circumstances as we saw with the case of Romalpa. Secondly, it is evident that the retention of title 
clause imposed by the seller on the buyer was incredibly onerous and at times, such concessions 
defied business logic. Therefore, it is very unlikely that under normal business circumstances that a 
buyer would agree or intend that any proceeds of sale would be kept solely for the seller, rather than 
use such proceeds to generate income for the buyer’s own business. Additionally, as observed by 
Baskind et al the decided case poses the question of ‘is it really likely that either of the parties would 
have intended that the seller should receive a sum greater than he was actually owed?’790 A suggestion 
which once again flouts commercial sense. 
 
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, there has been a definite trend of judicial reluctance towards the 
Romalpa decision, which also provides conclusive evidence for refuting the proposition that the seller 
may be entitled to proceeds of sale. Despite the efforts of draftsmen incorporating terms relating to 
agency, bailment and fiduciary within their contractual provisions to replicate the success of Romalpa, 
the courts in cases such as Re Andrabell791, Tatung and Re Weldtech Equpment792 have been unwilling 
to establish the obligations as being consistent with that of a fiduciary relationship.  
 
However, in spite of the apparent hostility towards Romalpa, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal 
has set a misguided precedent for how to construe complicated retention of title cases. Some 
elements such as disregarding the intention of the parties, implying an agency/principal bailee/bailor 
relationship and allowing implications which reap uncommercial consequences have seeped into 
more recent cases dealing with difficult retention of title clauses.  
 
5.2 Wilson v Holt (Caterpillar) 
 
The second case to be examined is Wilson v Holt, whereby the Court of Appeal interpreted a retention 
of title clause in a sale of goods contract as one that creates an agency relationship between the buyer 
and the seller. The Court of Appeal relied heavily on an agency construction, in which case the buyer 
 
790 E Baskind, G Osborne and L Roach, Commercial Law, op cit fn 441 at 262.  
791 Re Andrabell Ltd, op cit fn 260. 
792 Re Weldtech Equipment Ltd, op cit fn 652.  
163 
 
was acting as an agent for the seller when sub-selling the goods. Similarly, to what was observed in 
Romalpa, abiding by an agency construction and disregarding the intention of the parties, has once 
again led to uncertainty in the application of law and produces uncommercial implications, all of which 
will be examined in the course of this section. Firstly, a summary of the facts of the case will be 
provided before shedding light on some of the most notable criticisms arising from the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning and decision in Wilson v Holt.  
 
Wilson v Holt concerned the interpretation of an agreement within a contract of sale to sell generators 
sets and spare parts. The seller had an agreement to sell generators and various spare parts to the 
buyer, who subsequently sub-sold the generators and parts to its Nigerian subsidiary. The agreement 
included a retention of title clause, credit payment terms and a clause which specified the following: 
‘buyer shall not apply any set-off to the price of seller’s products without prior written 
agreement by the seller and…title shall not pass to buyer until seller has received payment in 
full…prior to title passing buyer shall be entitled to resell…and shall account to the seller for 
the proceeds.’793  
Following a series of missed invoices of overdue payments whereby the buyer had failed to pay, the 
seller purported to use the incorporated retention of title clause and exercise his rights under the 
agreement. The buyer replied stating that the generators and parts had been sold to its Nigerian 
subsidiary. Therefore, the seller brought proceedings against the buyer for the outstanding price of 
the goods under the agreement. At first instance, the buyer made a series of arguments however, only 
two of these arguments were raised to the Court of Appeal. Firstly, the buyer contended that the no 
set-off clause did not apply to transactional set offs. The judges at first instance and the Court of 
Appeal gave short shrift to this argument and thus, this matter will not be discussed any further. 
Secondly, an action on the price under section 49(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 was inapplicable 
because the retention of title clause prevented section 49 from being operative. The argument of 
whether property had passed from seller to buyer was contingent on the wording and interpretation 
of the retention of title clause, which stated:  
‘Title and risk of loss: …Notwithstanding delivery and the passing of risk in the products, title 
shall not pass until seller has received payment in full for the products and all other goods or 
services agreed to be sold by seller to buyer for which payment is then due. Until such time 
as title passes, buyer shall hold the products as seller’s fiduciary agent and shall keep them 
separate from buyer’s other goods. Prior to title passing buyer shall be entitled to resell or use 
 
793 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739.   
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the products in the ordinary course of business and shall account to the seller for proceeds of 
sale…’794 
The terms and conditions of the contract contained another clause which seemed to contradict the 
above as it specifically stated that the relationship of the parties would not be deemed to create an 
agency relationship between the parties. The clause provided ‘nothing herein contained shall be 
deemed to create an agency or fiduciary relationship between the parties hereto.’795 As such, the 
contract of sale between the seller and buyer contained two contradictory clauses.  
 
The buyer argued that the seller had no claim under section 49(1) of the Act as the retention of title 
clause prevented the property from passing to the buyer, as required by section 49. From construing 
the terms of the above agreement, the buyer argued that the goods had never passed from seller to 
buyer, rather the effect of the terms meant that the property had passed straight to the sub-buyer 
(the Nigerian subsidiary) as the buyer sub-sold the goods as the seller’s fiduciary agent.  Accordingly, 
an action for price could only be brought under section 49 if the goods had passed to the buyer, for 
which the buyer argued had not happened in this case due to the buyer acting as an agent for the 
seller when they re-sold to the sub-buyer.    
 
In response to the arguments concerning section 49, the seller proposed that the property had passed 
to the buyer because the buyer had authorised the sub-sale to its Nigerian subsidiary on its own 
behalf.796 As such, according to the seller, the property first passed to the buyer and then subsequently 
to the sub-buyer. Accordingly, the seller argued that both contracts were contracts of sale and thus, 
the seller had a claim under section 49. In addition, the seller also argued that it is possible to bring an 
action for the price, despite not meeting the criteria set out in section 49.  
 
Interestingly, it is worth noting that the courts displayed a reluctance to rely on previous authorities 
when seeking to interpret the wording of the retention of title clause. The first instance judge declined 
to consider the numerous authorities on retention of title clauses for two apparent reasons. Firstly, 
the authorities in question all consider specific clauses which are framed in different terms and 
secondly, the courts are naturally concerned with interpreting the case before them and thus, did not 
want to ‘get bogged down’797 into the comparisons of other construed clauses found in different cases. 
These sentiments were shared by Patten LJ who thought that many of the retention of title cases 
 
794 ibid as per Longmore LJ at [20]. 
795 ibid. 
796 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 254. 
797 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Longmore LJ at [25]. 
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would be of limited assistance as the previous interpretation of cases all turn on specific wording of 
the contracts.798 This is of interest, when considering the outcome that was decided significantly 
departs from previous precedent and has resulted in much uncertainty, as outlined below.  
 
Popplewell J, at first instance, and Longmore LJ of the Court of Appeal, interpreted the clause as not 
creating an agency relationship on the basis of commercial reality. They argued that the clause was 
not meant to substitute an entitlement to the goods nor the proceeds of sale via bringing an action 
for the price, but rather provide security to the seller.799 The aforementioned judges also relied on the 
fact that the buyer sub-selling the goods as the seller’s agent, did not reflect the intention of the 
parties as this would mean that the seller would have had a direct relationship with the sub-buyer.  
 
However, the majority of the Court of Appeal decided to follow the agency argument, interpreting the 
retention of title clause in a sale of goods contract as one that creates an agency relationship between 
the buyer and the seller. In this instance, the buyer sub-sold the goods as the seller’s fiduciary agent.  
Patten LJ took a literal approach to the interpretation of the terms of the retention of title clause. By 
construing the literal wording of the agreement, in particular the obligation to account for the entire 
proceeds of sale, Patten LJ found that this was entirely consistent with the buyer being a fiduciary 
agent throughout the process of sub-sale.800 In accordance with this viewpoint, Floyd LJ held that the 
seller retains property in the goods until paid. However, the buyer had expressly been granted the 
right to sell the goods before payment and thus, this meant before title passes. As such, Floyd LJ 
natural reading of the agreement contends that the property never passes to the buyer: ‘immediately 
before and at the moment of the sub-sale the goods remain the property of FG Wilson [seller]’.801 
Prior to title passing, during the period where the buyer is entitled to sell the goods in the ordinary 
course of business, the goods are held by the buyer as the seller’s fiduciary agent. Accordingly, Patten 
and Floyd LJ held that the buyer did sell as an agent and that the clause alluding to the ‘relationship 
of the parties’ did not alter the reached conclusion.  
 
By interpreting a retention of title clause in a sale of goods contract as one creating an agency 
relationship, the seller could not bring an action for the price due to the fact that the property in the 
goods never passed to the buyer. Despite the seller acquiring an interest in the proceeds of a sub-sale- 
a feat only accomplished once before in Romalpa, it was for this reason that the sellers were not able 
 
798 ibid as per Patten LJ at [65]. 
799 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 567.  
800 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Patten LJ at [68]. 
801 ibid as per Floyd LJ at [74]. 
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to bring an action for price. Such an outcome raises some fundamental issues with regards to the 
utility of retention of title clauses and the exclusive nature of section 49.802 The following discussion 
will outline some of the practical consequences arising from construing a retention of title clause as 
being analogous to creating an agency relationship and not being able to bring an action for price. 
Once again, such an argument supports the main hypothesis that retention of title clauses are 
hindered from achieving their functional objectives as such an outcome limits the effectiveness of 
retention of title clauses in similar situations.  
 
5.2.1 Uncommercial consequences   
The construction of the agency argument has been strongly criticised by proponents such as Gullifer, 
who argues that such a decision leads to uncommercial implications.803 Previously, the courts have 
been reluctant to imply terms which give rise to a duty to account, resulting in claims asserting to 
having an interest in the proceeds of sale being repeatedly rejected by the courts and the interest 
being characterised as a registrable charge.804   
 
Despite the decision of Wilson v Holt achieving the much sought-after objective of a seller succeeding 
in being given a non-registrable interest, the crux of the issue lies with the seller unable to sue for the 
price. As outlined by Gullifer, this decision leads to uncommercial consequences as it ‘raises the more 
fundamental point that uncertainty over the status of such clauses can only cause market instability 
and raise costs, either for sellers of the goods or, more likely, for buyers who wish to raise finance 
against their receivables.’805 Accordingly, the inability to bring an action for the price under s49 means 
that sellers will have to raise costs from the onset in order to compensate for the reduced protection 
afforded by the retention of title clause in not being able to claim for the price of the goods. Clearly, 
this once again sheds light on the situations where retention of title clauses are not able to offer the 
expected level of protection to sellers, a situation which is becoming more and more common for the 
clauses and has been repeatedly highlighted throughout this thesis.  
 
Evidently, the agency construction has an impact on the amount to be paid by the buyer to the seller 
as it would vary considerably depending on whether it was paid before or after the sub-sale.806 Under 
 
802 The author acknowledges that the exclusive nature of section 49 was overruled in PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC 
v O W Bunker Malta Ltd [2016] UKSC 23; [2016] AC 1034 and this is discussed further below at section 5.3.2. 
803 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 251. 
804 See Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd op cit fn 644 at [333] and Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Ltd 
[1993] BCLC 602, at [615]. 
805 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 565.  
806 ibid at 568.  
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regular circumstances, if the goods were paid before the sub-sale, both parties would agree that the 
buyer would pay the seller a fixed amount reflecting the full price of the goods. As such, in this regard 
the seller’s losses are mitigated as the fixed amount would guarantee that the seller would receive 
the full price of the goods. However, regarding the situation post sub-sale, sellers will undoubtedly 
have to raise the costs to counterbalance the risk of the amount to be paid varying or dropping in 
price. Sellers would have to raise the costs to protect themselves against the possibility of the goods 
being sold at a loss in the sub-sale which would lead to adverse consequences such as the sellers not 
receiving the full price of the goods and incurring a subsequent loss. Although it is appreciated that 
there is a possibility that the goods may be sold at a profit in the sub-sale and thus guaranteeing the 
seller some form of windfall, it is submitted that no seller would run the risk of such a variable amount. 
There is also well-established authority which purports that where a fixed price amount remains 
payable after a sub-sale, such a recourse would be inconsistent with an agency construction.807 
Accordingly, sellers would want to take precautions to ensure that the full price is received by raising 
the amount to be paid by the buyer to the seller. Therefore, the inability to claim for the price of the 
goods has the potential to expose the seller to more risks, and as such the seller would want to 
compensate adequately to offset such risks. Arguably, such an approach would have detrimental 
consequences for small and medium sized businesses in terms of financial ramifications of raising 
costs.808 Evidently, the need for sellers to take additional precautions to supplement the inclusion of 
a retention of title clause within the contractual agreement, serves to support the main contention 
that the present legal position is hindering the clauses from achieving their functional objectives. The 
incorporation of a retention of title clause on its own, under the present regime is insufficient to grant 
the sellers the necessary scope of protection needed in such commercial situations. Clearly, there is 
much uncertainty and unpredictability in the legal position of retention of title clauses being construed 
as creating an agency relationship.  
 
5.2.2 Unlikely to reflect the intentions of parties 
The following section will outline several reasons why it was highly unlikely that the parties intended 
the buyer to sell the goods as an agent of the seller. Firstly, an apparent consequence of the agency 
construction is that the contract between seller and the buyer would be predominately overridden by 
setting out the agency relationship, in which any duties and obligations pertinent to an agent 
 
807 See In re Nevill (1871) LR 6 Ch App 397. 
808 L Gullifer “Retention of title clauses: a question of balance”, op cit fn 209 at 293.  
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relationship would have to be outlined.809 Such discussions necessitate a more coherent and 
extensively contractual arrangement than the mere inclusion of a single sentence in a clause.810 As 
such, it is highly unlikely that the parties intended the clause to draw up the required details of an 
agency relationship. Another unintended consequence of the agency construction is that the contract 
of sale between seller and buyer would be categorised as an agency relationship in lieu of a contract 
of sale as it is evident that under this construction, the contract of sale is between the seller and the 
sub-buyer.811  
 
Additionally, following the agency construction, the seller would have intended to have a contractual 
relationship with the sub-buyer and consequently the seller would exercise a degree of influence over 
the contract between the seller and sub-buyer. Conversely, this was not the case in Wilson v Holt and 
as such it cannot be argued that this represented the intention of the parties. Once again, this casts 
doubts as to whether an agency relationship truly existed. It is worth noting at this stage, that 
disputing whether an agency relationship existed and the unlikelihood of reflecting the intentions of 
the parties, mirror the criticisms of Romalpa- a troubling coincidence.   
 
Furthermore, it is very difficult to argue that both parties intended that the amount to be paid by the 
buyer to the seller for the goods would be so variable. Putting aside the agency relationship for a 
moment, under normal circumstances the amount to be paid by the buyer to the seller before a sub-
sale would be a fixed and quoted price. However, adopting the agency construction means that both 
parties would have effectively intended for the price to be variable, as it would depend on whether 
the seller was paid before or after the sub-sale, as outlined above. Even more disconcerting is that the 
fact, that it would be highly unlikely for a buyer to intend the seller to be entitled to a windfall on the 
sub-sale as it effectively makes the buyer’s role in this transaction redundant. This cannot be said to 
reflect the intention of the parties on the buyer’s part and this was relied upon by Longmore LJ: ‘It 
seems to me that the retention of title clause in the present case is intended to operate by way of 
security rather than to confer a potential windfall on the seller and that must militate against the 
buyer acting as the seller’s agent resale.’812 It is unlikely that the buyer in this regard would intend to 
work for nothing and allow the seller to be entitled to profit arising out of the sub-sale.813 It cannot be 
 
809 Such obligations would include fiduciary duties such as acting in the best interest of the principal and duties 
relating to performance e.g. to sell the goods by exercising reasonable care and skill. An exploration of the 
duties imposed by an agency relationship is beyond the ambit of this thesis.  
810 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 569. 
811 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 251. 
812 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Longmore LJ at [28].  
813 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 568. 
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argued that the parties intended an agency as it is apparent that this leads to uncommercial 
consequences.  
 
Lastly, in construing the retention of title clause of the impugned case, it is highly unlikely that the 
parties intended for the buyer to act as an agent for the seller. Rather the retention of title clause 
should have been interpreted as one attempting to enforce security as emphasised by Longmore J.814 
It is much more likely that the parties intended for the seller to be entitled to the proceeds of sale as 
a means of security, to mitigate the possibility of the buyer failing to pay the full purchase price. This 
line of reasoning emulates one of the principal reasons for incorporating a retention of title clause 
within a contract of sale and aligns with commercial sense. As previously discussed in an earlier 
chapter, the reason behind sellers incorporating a clause which seeks to entitle sellers to the proceeds 
of sale is to provide them with a proprietary interest in the goods, which will ultimately afford them 
higher priority than secured creditors in the event of the buyer’s insolvency and failure to pay the full 
purchase price.815 There is a consistent pattern of retention of title clauses purporting to claim 
proceeds of sale and thus attempting to confer a potential windfall on sellers, being characterised as 
registrable charge.816 Adopting the agency approach, the sellers interest would not be characterised 
as a registrable charge. This has huge implications most notably, disrupting the previous consistent 
pattern of proceeds of sale cases, which has come to be considered as an area of law which has since 
been resolved.817 The decision in Wilson v Holt has clearly introduced implications which flout 
commercial sense and cause further uncertainty in this complicated area of law.  
 
It is for the above reasons why the agency construction has been heavily criticised. Once again, the 
agency construction as evidenced in both Romalpa and Wilson v Holt raises issues which bear 
unsatisfactory commercial outcomes.  
 
5.2.3 Section 49 Sale of Goods Act 1979 
 
The seller’s sought an action for the price under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. For this section to be 
operative, either it is necessary that the property in the goods has passed to the buyer and 
subsequently the buyer neglects or refuses to pay for the goods as per s49(1). Alternatively, as per 
 
814 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Longmore LJ at [28]. 
815 For further discussion on this, see Chapter 2.  
816 See further Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd, op cit fn 644 at [333], Pfeiffer Weinkellerie-Weineinkauf 
GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd, op cit fn 648 at [160-161]. 
817 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 572.  
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s49(2) the price is payable on a day certain irrespective of delivery, and the buyer wrongfully neglects 
or refuses to pay such price. To rely on section 49, one of the above must be satisfied. In Wilson v Holt, 
the sellers did not rely on s49(2) and so the only recourse for an action for the price was to satisfy that 
property had passed from seller to buyer or to try to sue for the price in circumstances beyond the 
scope of s49. The Court of Appeal took a stringent approach to s49, by construing that the section 
outlined the only possible circumstances in which an action for price could be brought. Fortunately, 
this exclusive approach to s49 has been overruled in the Bunkers818 case but nevertheless warrants 
discussion to highlight the court’s judicial disfavour towards retention of title clauses.  
 
Consequently, the ruling in Wilson v Holt meant that no claim for the price of the goods could be 
brought unless one of the above stipulations of s49 applied. The Court of Appeal observed that if the 
remedy to bring an action for price was readily available irrespective of when the obligation to pay 
had arisen, then s49 would largely be superfluous, hence the restrictive approach outlining the only 
specified circumstances where the remedy is available to sellers.819  
 
All judges of the Court of Appeal in Wilson v Holt held that section 49 was an exclusive (rather than 
permissive) remedy which governed the entire circumstances of when a seller can bring an action for 
the price of the goods. The exclusivity of section 49 meant that sellers who relied on terms purporting 
to retain title would only be able to bring an action for the price of the goods if the property passed 
from seller to buyer. Following the Court of Appeal’s decision that the buyer was acting merely as the 
seller’s agent in the sub-sale, in this regard property bypassed the buyer’s position completely and 
instead property passed from seller to sub-buyer. Accordingly, property in the goods never passed to 
the buyer and as such the seller could not bring an action for price under s49.820 At this point in the 
discussion, it is interesting to note Longmore LJ’s rejection of this agency construction, instead 
construing the buyer’s role as a principal rather than an agent, in which property did indeed pass from 
seller to buyer, before the sale to the sub-buyer. In this interpretation, the seller would have retained 
the ability to bring an action for the price, which would have resulted in the seller’s interest in the 
proceeds being categorised as a charge, albeit void for lack of registration. Such a decision would have 
aligned with previous precedents construing an interest in proceeds of sale as being struck down by 
the courts for lack of registration. It is this author’s submission, that this should have been the correct 
interpretation of the law, which would have circumvented most of the uncertainties and issued 
discussed. However, the Court of Appeal adopted the agency construction, which meant that although 
 
818 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 at [58]. 
819 E Baskind, G Osborne and L Roach, Commercial Law, op cit fn 441 at 257.  
820 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 575.  
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the goods were in the possession of the buyer, as the seller retained title to the goods until payment, 
this had the unintended consequence of the seller not being able to rely on the remedy of s49.821 The 
s49 remedy is only available where the property in the goods has passed from seller to buyer, which 
subsequently did not happen in this case.  
 
This decision reached by the Court of Appeal is inherently problematic for the sellers who sought to 
rely on the inclusion of the retention of title clause for security purposes of achieving the payment of 
price. As summarised by Low and Loi ‘this aspect creates instead a perverse result of inability to sue 
for the price in spite of the contractual terms agreed between the parties where the clause prevents 
title from being passed to the buyer.’822 In Wilson v Holt, the Court of Appeal held that property never 
passed to the buyer, as the buyers were acting as agents for the seller when they re-sold the goods to 
the sub-buyers. The seller of the goods was not entitled to bring an action for the price of the goods 
under s49 unless property passed specifically to the buyer. Patten LJ in his judgment opined that 
property would not pass under the retention of title clause until the payment of the price has been 
achieved, which subsequently did not happen in the decided case.823 The agency construction meant 
that property passed directly from seller to sub-buyer, hence the seller’s inability to bring an action 
for the price of the goods under s49. This leads to a very unsatisfactory conclusion for retention of 
title claimants and the clauses commercial functionality in the sale of goods market.  
 
The conclusion of the agency construction was ultimately reached despite the inclusion of a different 
clause which explicitly stated that nothing contained in the contract would create an agency 
relationship. This services as a cautious warning to those seeking to draft the all-encompassing 
retention of title clauses, such advances are counterproductive and will be construed by courts as 
futile. This once again demonstrates the judicial disfavour towards retention of title clauses, whereby 
the clauses are rendered ineffective by courts on a relatively frequent basis.  
 
An exclusive interpretation of s49 is detrimental for retention of title claimants as for one, it 
contradicts the provisions included within the contract of sale as agreed by both seller and buyer. 
Despite contracts expressly providing that an action of the price can be brought when the obligation 
for a buyer to pay the price has arisen under a retention of title clause, it is clear under this exclusive 
 
821 E Baskind, G Osborne and L Roach, Commercial Law, op cit fn 441 at 257.  
822 K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English 
Law of Sales”, op cit fn 4 at 239. 
823 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Patten LJ at [68]. 
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approach to s49 a seller will be unable to bring an action for the price.824 Under this interpretation and 
the decision of Wilson v Holt, sellers relying on a retention of title clause will be unable to sue for the 
price in the circumstances where the goods supplied are with the buyer, despite the contract 
stipulating otherwise. This severely weakens the utility of the retention of title provision if such terms 
can be disregarded by virtue of the courts exclusive approach to s49. Ultimately, this has a detrimental 
impact of rendering the retention of title clause ineffective and impractical within the commercial 
market. Longmore J recognised this unsatisfactory position but conceded by stating that such a 
conclusion ‘is just an inherent result of a retention of title clause and shows that it has dangers as well 
as benefits.825’ By limiting s49 to only two possible situations for bringing an action for the price of the 
goods, sellers who rely on retention of title clauses are subjected to adverse consequences of being 
exposed to further risks.  
 
The alleged protection provided under a retention of title clause has obviously been undermined 
significantly by the exclusivity of section 49. As repeatedly emphasised throughout this thesis, one of 
the primary purposes of a retention of title clause is that such terms may be relied upon in the event 
of a buyer’s insolvency. In the ordinary course of business, whereby both parties are solvent, the 
relationship remains as one of seller and buyer. As such, it is entirely reasonable that outside the realm 
of insolvency, that a seller relying on a retention of title clause would pursue an action for the price of 
the goods in the event of a non-paying buyer. For practical reasons, retention of title claimants may 
choose to bring an action against a buyer who has failed to pay a price, rather than going down the 
route of repossessing the goods. For example, such an action would be entirely appropriate in 
situations whereby the value of the goods has fluctuated and as a result the goods are worth 
significantly less than the original price. As retention of title clauses are used as a means of ensuring 
security, it is perplexing why a seller is being denied the right to bring an action for the price of the 
goods on account of the stringent approach upheld in Wilson v Holt. Such sentiments are shared by 
academic proponents such as Gullifer who opined that ‘it is most unsatisfactory that the seller cannot 
have the normal choice of a secured party, that is, to sue for the price or to stand on its security.’826 
This unsatisfactory conclusion left the seller without an effective remedy against the buyer, which 
negates the entire purpose of retention of title clause in seeking to afford the seller a degree of 
protection. Evidently, the functional objectives of retention of title clauses are invariably hindered by 
the unfavourable treatment of the clauses by the courts as demonstrated aptly by the court in Wilson 
v Holt.  
 
824 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 578.  
825 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Longmore LJ at [56]. 




5.2.4. An avoidable situation? 
 
Longmore LJ recognised that if a retention of title seller wished to maintain the right to bring an action 
for the price, the seller could do so by providing that payment was to be due on a day certain, 
irrespective of delivery, which would then fall under the scope of s49(2).827 In this regard, s49(2) 
applies regardless of whether delivery has been made or whether or not title has passed, thus 
providing the seller an entitlement to bring an action for the price.828 Sellers should consider the effect 
of s49(2) by ensuring that the price payable is made on a day certain, irrespective of delivery, in order 
to guarantee that the seller may maintain an action for the price and consequently, the seller will be 
afforded some form of protection against a non-paying buyer. A prudent seller could take one step 
further in this regard by expressly stipulating in the contract that the price is payable, even though 
property has not passed in order to avoid being caught out by the exclusivity of s49(2).  
 
It appears that s49(2) is effective when the actual date for payment has been expressly stipulated in 
the contract. According to Gullifer, in situations where the date is only determinable on the occurrence 
of an act or decision, then such situations are excluded from the remit of s49(2).829 If this is the correct 
interpretation, then the provision of ’30 days of the date of invoice’ stipulated in Wilson v Holt would 
once again result in the sellers being denied a claim for the price of the goods. The rationale behind 
this is the fact that the 30 days stipulation is dependent upon raising the invoice and concurrently the 
date of delivery as the invoice could only be raised once delivery has been completed.830  To overcome 
such an issue, the seller would have to expressly stipulate a day in the contract, a course of action 
which is deemed uncommercial on part of the seller and grossly unfair for the buyer’s sake, who would 
normally seek the credit period to extend from the date of delivery.831 Additionally, it is submitted 
that by getting sellers to wield their situation within the remit of s49(2), this effectively forces sellers 
into an inflexible situation and most notably, interferes with the notion of party contractual autonomy. 
As inferred by Yap ‘there could be many commercial reasons why the contracting parties might not 
want the price to be payable on a day certain, and to effectively insist on this would unduly impinge 
on the parties’ freedom to agree on terms that are the most commercially suitable for them.’832 While 
 
827 FG Wilson (Engineering) Ltd v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd, op cit fn 739 as per Longmore LJ at [44]. 
828 E Baskind, G Osborne and L Roach, Commercial Law, op cit fn 441 at 257.  
829 L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 578.  
830 ibid. 
831 See further, L Gullifer “The interpretation of retention of title clauses: some difficulties”, op cit fn 164 at 
578. 
832 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 274. 
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it is theoretically possible for sellers to attempt to bring an action within the ambit of s49(2), it is 
proposed that this is too much of an imposition on party autonomy and contractual freedom.  
 
As evidenced above, some of the main criticisms of Wilson v Holt include that the decision opposes 
commercial practice and disregards the intention of the parties, which coincidentally mirrors its 
predecessor, Romalpa. An unwelcoming predicament, which continues to cause inconsistency in the 
way retention of title clauses are interpreted. Evidently, a disconcerting decision was reached with 
Wilson v Holt, which paved the way for more uncertainty, with the decision of the Supreme Court in 
the Bunkers case, which although did overrule the exclusivity of section 49 alas, created further 
considerable problems for retention of title clauses.   
 
5.3 The Bunkers Case (The Res Cogitans) 
 
The final case which supports the underlying argument that title-retention jurisprudence has evoked 
significant commercial uncertainty is the Bunkers case. The following section will seek to outline how 
the decision of the Supreme Court in this case has far-reaching implications on legal certainty, 
predictability and uncommercial ramifications for retention of title cases. Once more, this contention 
will evidence how retention of title clauses are hindered by the minefield of issues preventing the 
clauses from achieving their functional objective.  
 
Due to the complicated nature of the facts of this case, it will be prudent to devote attention to both 
the factual circumstances of the case and the Supreme Court’s decision. The facts of this complicated 
case are as follows, the OW Bunker Ltd (OWB) contracted to supply bunkers of fuel oil to PST Energy, 
who owned a vessel named Res Cogitans (the Owners). There were three main parties to the contract 
with OWB acting as the middle party in the process of supplying bunkers fuel to vessels in a series of 
transactions. The three main parties included: the first party OWB, who supplied bunkers through 
sourcing the fuel externally from physical suppliers, the second group who were the physical suppliers 
who supplied the bunkers to the vessels and the third party, the Owners who eventually used the 
bunkers. As such the contract of supply was the last in a chain of contracts involving the fuel bunkers. 
During the series of transactions, OWB had obtained the bunkers from its parent company, OWBAS, 
which in turn obtained the bunkers from Rosneft, which obtained the bunker from an associate RMB, 
which eventually supplied the bunkers directly to the Owners. The contract for the supply of fuel 
bunkers provided for payment 60 days after delivery and incorporated a retention of title clause, 
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which stipulated that title to the fuel bunkers would remain until the bunkers had been paid for in full. 
The contract of supply also expressly provided that from the moment of delivery, the Owners would 
be entitled to use the fuel bunkers for the purpose of propulsion as the Owners would be ‘in 
possession of the Bunkers solely as Bailee.833’ This meant that the contract permitted the Owners to 
consume the fuel during the period of credit. The difficult issue arose once OWBAS became insolvent 
and subsequently ceased payments with the physical suppliers. This in turn, led the physical suppliers 
to seek payment from the Owners who used the bunkers during the credit period. Both OWB and RNB 
sought payment from the Owners. The Owners were concerned that they would have to pay for the 
same bunkers twice over, and consequently did not pay OWB.  
 
The Owners commenced arbitration proceedings against OWB seeking a declaration that they were 
not bound to pay for the bunkers or they would seek damages for breach of contract on the basis that 
OWB had not been able to pass title to them under the application of s2(1) and 49 of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979. It is worth acknowledging that RNB another supplier were not part of these arbitration 
proceedings. The argument to be considered by the arbitrators was whether the Owners were liable 
to pay OWB, having taken delivery and subsequently consumed the bunkers. The Owners relied on 
the argument that the title to the bunkers never passed to them, asserting that an action for the price 
under s49 could not be brought, relying on the exclusive approach to s49 as reached in the decision 
of Wilson v Holt. By contrast, OWB argued that the contract was not a sale of goods contract but rather 
a contract for the supply of bunkers to be consumed, which meant that payment was duly owed and 
that s49 would not be applicable.  
 
The arbitrators decided that the Owners were liable to pay, as under the contract OWB did not 
undertake to transfer title in the bunkers to the Owners. Accordingly, the Owners remained liable to 
pay. This was agreed by Males J and an appeal by the Owners was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. 
The proceedings reached the Supreme Court to consider two fundamental questions: firstly was the 
contract of sale within the meaning of s2(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, and secondly, if so, could 
OWB bring an action for the price under s49 on the basis that Wilson v Holt’s exclusive approach to 





833 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Clauses H.1 and H.2 at [6].  
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5.3.1 The decision and reasoning of the Supreme Court  
 
In line with the case’s procedural history, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that the 
contract was not a contract of sale. The rationale behind the decision was that there can only be a 
contract of sale if title to the goods successfully transfers from supplier to buyer. Title could not pass 
under these circumstances as once the bunkers were consumed, the goods ceased to exist. Lord 
Mance explained that the combination of the retention of title clause, credit period and permission to 
use the bunkers for propulsion purposes, implied that the parties had an understanding that title 
would not pass.834 It was anticipated that the bunkers were likely to be consumed in their entirety 
before the end of the credit period and as such title to the goods would not pass from the supplier. 
This reasoning coincides with the definition of a sale of goods contract as provided by s2(1) which 
states: ‘a contract by which the seller transfers of agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer 
for a money consideration, called the price.’835 In line with this, the court held that the contract was 
not a contract of sale but rather a sui generis contract. Accordingly, s49 did not affect the obligation 
to pay the price and as such, the Owners were liable for the price under a contract sui generis.836 
Furthermore, OWB could not be in breach of contract on the fact that the transfer of title was not the 
core element of the contract.  
 
5.3.2 Overruling Section 49  
 
The Supreme Court also discussed the position had the decision reached the opposite conclusion of 
finding that the contract was a sale of goods contract, which would subsequently fall within the scope 
of the Sale of Goods Act. The Supreme Court held in obiter that s49 would not restrict OWB from 
claiming an action for the price of the goods.837 In doing so, it meant that s49 was not exhaustive and 
thus did not represent the full circumstances in which a claim for the action of price could be brought. 
In reaching such a conclusion, the Supreme Court held that it would have overruled the decision in 
Wilson v Holt, which advocated for an exclusive approach to s49.838 Consequently, had the contract 
been characterised as one of sale, the Supreme Court held that the price would have been recoverable 
by virtue of an express term of the contract. In other words, s49 does not provide an exclusive list of 
situations in which an action for the price may be recoverable under a contract of sale. Despite, the 
 
834 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [26-39]. 
835 Section 2(1) Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
836 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [26-39]. 
837 ibid as per Lord Mance at [60]. 
838 ibid at [58]. 
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statement being made in obiter, it must be regarded as the current approach to s49 and the availability 
to bring an action for the price.839 
 
Overruling the exclusive scope of s49 can be seen as a welcome development and Lord Mance 
correctly recognised that the purpose behind s49 was to afford the buyer sufficient protection against 
being sued before delivery (unless risk has passed).840 His Lordship also discussed the ambit of section 
49 by stating that section 49 does not focus on the circumstance whereby delivery is made but title is 
reserved until the agreed price has been paid.841 He continued by noting that the section focused less 
on the position of a buyer being entitled to dispose of consume the goods or the risk of the goods 
being destroyed or damaged.842 As such, his Lordship argued that there is some potential leeway for 
claims for the price, thus extending beyond the circumstances covered directly by section 49.843  
 
This is a positive development as reverting s49 back to a permissive rather than an exclusive remedy, 
means that s49 remains a valuable remedy for the seller as there may now be circumstances where 
sellers can claim for the price, even if s49 is not satisfied.844 One illustrative example is provided by 
Baskind et al, they state that the price may be recoverable in the circumstances where goods 
undelivered continue to be the property of the seller but are at the buyer’s risk and are destroyed by 
fire.845 In doing so this broadens the possible circumstances and means that sellers are no longer 
restricted by the stringent application of s49. It has been noted that extending the circumstances 
beyond those provided in s49 reflects modern commercial reality, as occasions may arise where it will 
be deemed fairer if the price can be claimed at the time of delivery to the buyer, even if the title to 
the goods has not passed.846  Accordingly, this overcomes the issue of s49 excluding situations where 
arguably sellers should be able to bring an action for the price of the goods such as where the goods 
have been consumed lawfully as observed in the Bunkers case. Incidentally, this also addresses the 
earlier issue of imposing sellers to bring their situation within the ambit of s49(2), in which parties are 
forced to make the price payable on a day certain. By opening the circumstances beyond those 
included in s49, it can be argued that this will benefit the position of sellers as such a prospect allows 
for more contractual freedom compared to the incursion on their party autonomy by virtue of s49(2).  
 
839 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 9. 
840 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [49]. 
841 ibid.  
842 ibid at [50] 
843 ibid as per Lord Mance at [53] in which he states ‘But I consider that this leaves at least some room for 
claims for the price in other circumstances than those covered by section 49.’ 
844 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 273.  
845 E Baskind, G Osborne and L Roach, Commercial Law, op cit fn 441 at 259.  
846 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 274. 
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Parties will no longer have to insist on making the price payable on a day certain on terms which are 
deemed inflexible and overly burdensome on the contractual parties. Such a decision has expanded 
the scope of the availability of the remedy and consequently promotes the notion of freedom of 
contract as parties are now afforded further freedom to negotiate their own preconditions.847 
 
Despite the welcome development of overruling s49 in obiter, it is important to note that the Supreme 
Court appears to have taking a tentative approach to this area of law. First of all, Lord Mance declined 
to specify the precise circumstances in which the price may be recoverable outside the remit of s49 
by stating: 
 ‘The precise limits of such circumstances- and the significance which may in particular attach 
to the use of retention of title clauses in combination with physical delivery of the goods and the 
transfer of risk- must be left for determination on some future occasion.’848  
It can be argued that this is a missed opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the precise 
circumstances which may be recoverable outside the scope of s49. Leaving this as an open-ended 
resolution merely adds to the excessive ambiguity of this area of law. To exacerbate this further, the 
Supreme Court failed to provide any justifiable reasons for reaching this unsatisfactory and open-
ended decision – a frustrating predicament. Sellers are left with limited indication of the circumstances 
where an action for the price of the goods can be brought.849 Although it is acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court used the case of Harry & Garry v Jariwalla850 to provide some form of guidance, under 
the circumstances it is still unclear as to when an action for the price can be brought beyond the 
situations provided in s49. From the decision of the Supreme Court, it is suggested that bringing an 
action outside of the scope of s49 will only be applicable to cases such as Harry & Garry v Jariwalla, 
the situation raised in Bunkers (had the contract been characterised as one of sale) and finally, where 
risk has passed but the title has not passed.851 The Supreme Court held that it was possible for the 
price to be claimed outside the scope of s49 due to the fundamental factor of risk passing under the 
contract, despite the title to the goods not passing.852 Guidance on the precise circumstances where 
an action can be brought outside s49 has been rather limited, and merely speculative in nature.  
Additionally, the decision reached in Bunkers does not provide sufficient guidance to ascertain 
 
847 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 11. 
848 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [57]. 
849 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 275. 
850 Harry & Garry Ltd v Jariwalla [1988] WL 1608652. This case involved a buy-back contract which was 
categorised as a sui generis contract. Had the contract been characterised as one of sale, by virtue of the 
party’s agreements to vary the terms of the Sale of Goods Act, it would have been possible for the price of the 
goods to have been recovered.  
851 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 9. 
852 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [57]. 
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whether parties are able to incorporate any conditions for the seller’s right to claim the price, this 
remains unclear and has yet to be substantiated. It is unfortunate that the court with the highest 
authority declined to give further detail on the circumstances where the price can be claimed outside 
s49 as this would arguably provide some much-needed clarity for this complicated area of law. It is 
uncertain as to whether there will be another salient opportunity for the Supreme Court to provide 
clarification on this precise issue.  
 
Secondly, despite stating that Wilson v Holt’s restrictive approach would have been overruled had the 
contract been categorised as one of sale, the Supreme Court also commented that the courts should 
exercise caution when recognising claims extending beyond the instances listed in s49.853 This 
indicates a form of reluctance by the judiciary and it is anticipated that the ambit of circumstances 
that will allow parties to bring an action for the price will be much more limited in practice. A 
predicament that will not be tested until a similar case requires the courts’ consideration. It is not 
known how long we must wait for further clarification from the court to test this hypothesis 
thoroughly. Once again, the progression of this area of law is subject to the incremental and 
fragmented development of case law. The legal position of retention of title clauses is still subject to 
considerable uncertainty and unpredictability in the wake of the Bunkers litigation.   
 
Finally, it is submitted that the law in relation to s49 remains unsatisfactory, despite the alleged 
improvements outlined above. By expanding the circumstances where it is possible for a claim to be 
brought, it has the effect of undermining the significance of s49 for retention of title claimants. The 
rationale behind s49 was always to protect a buyer from paying the price of the goods before delivery. 
The Supreme Court may have reduced the availability of s49 for sales contracts incorporating a 
retention of title clause. In contracts involving a retention of title clause, it is a well-known concept 
that risk normally passes with delivery, whilst the title pass once payment is made. Accordingly, the 
scope of s49(1) may now be confined to cases which do not involve retention of title clauses or credit 
terms, in the instances where title to the goods passes before or upon delivery.854 As noted by Saidov, 
‘given a wide use of retention of title clauses [ROTC] the exceptions introduced by RC [Bunkers] would 
completely swallow up the rule in s49, to a considerable degree de factor restructuring the price action 
with reference to delivery.’855 The resulting uncertainty of this area of law is regrettable as it 
detrimentally impacts the utility of the s49 remedy, despite the remedy’s past significance for 
 
853 ibid as per Lord Mance at [53]. See also, E Baskind, G Osborne and L Roach, Commercial Law, op cit fn 441 
at 259 for a similar argument.  
854 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 11. 
855 ibid at 12.  
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contracts including retention of title clauses in volatile markets. The functionality of retention of title 
clause has clearly been hindered by the Supreme Courts’ approach to s49 in Bunkers.  
 
5.3.3 Characterisation of contracts as sui generis contracts 
 
Once again, the decision reached in Bunkers of characterising the contract as a sui generis contract 
rather than a contract of sale was reached by the courts by taking a very literal approach to the 
interpretation of the retention of title clause. Without the inclusion of the specific wording of the 
retention of title clause, the contract would have been characterised as a contract of sale. In Bunkers, 
the Supreme Court believed the contract in hand could not be characterised as one of sale because 
the contract entitled the Owners to use the bunkers, despite not acquiring title to the goods. Clearly, 
the issue lies with the transfer of title whereby the Supreme Court insisted that it was not possible for 
title in the goods to transfer in circumstances where the goods have been consumed and thus, cease 
to exist.856 Accordingly, the Supreme Court took the view that the contract could not be one of sale as 
this was inconsistent with the retention of title clause as the goods would be consumed before the 
end of the credit period. Rather the contract was categorised as a sui generis contract with two 
elements: firstly, there was an agreement which permitted the consumption of the bunkers before 
payment and without the passing of title, and secondly, an agreement to transfer title to any 
remaining bunkers once the Owners had satisfied the purchase price of all bunkers, irrespective of 
whether such bunkers had been consumed or not. Under this construction, the permission to use the 
bunkers for propulsion purposes prior to payment, was by way of licence. Following the pattern of the 
preceding cases of Wilson v Holt and Romalpa, the court in Bunkers chose to construe and interpret 
the clause in isolation, rather than taking a holistic approach to the case and thus failed to consider 
the wider implications arising out of such a decision. The intention of this section is to demonstrate 
why such an interpretation can lead to further uncertainty and uncommercial ramifications for the 
functionality of retention of title clauses.  
 
It has been noted that the decision of categorising the contract as sui generis by the Supreme Court 
has produced significant uncertainty for this area of law. Firstly, Gullifer states that characterising the 
contract as sui generis produces uncertainty as it ‘draws an unwelcome distinction, on one hand, 
between the characterisation of contracts for the supply of bunkers where no credit is provided (or 
where credit is provided but there is no ROT clause) and contracts where credit is provided and a ROT 
 
856 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [28]. 
181 
 
clause is included.’857 This decision clearly undermines the overall value of retention of title clauses 
and the characterisation as sui generis contracts may act as a deterrence for parties who will 
undeniably seek contractual security by using alternative formats such as letters of credits or 
demanding guarantees.858 Clearly, the alleged protection afforded by retention of title clauses has 
been completely undermined by the distinction as not a contract for sale. This may lead sellers to 
consider whether it is beneficial for them to include a retention of title clause within their supply 
contract, as without the clause, the contract in Bunkers would have satisfied the requirements of 
section 2(1) of the Sale of Goods Act as a contract of sale.859 Additionally, if retaining security prior to 
payment is fundamental to potential suppliers, suppliers may wish to avoid including a retention of 
title altogether, preferring other methods of securing payment such as payment by letter of credit 
which following the aftermath of Bunkers provides greater security for sellers against the risk of 
insolvency.860 The crux of the issue lies with the problematic rationale of holding that the contract 
cannot be categorised as a contract of sale, because the contract provided that the Owners could 
consume the bunkers before payment and as such, title to the goods could not pass as the goods 
ceased to exist. This contradicts with one of the fundamental functional characteristics of a retention 
of title clause. One of the principal objectives and benefits of retention of title clauses is allowing for 
the extension of credit periods to encourage greater sales, whilst simultaneously guaranteeing the 
seller a form of quasi-security to the goods supplied.861 From the perspective of the buyers, the credit 
terms would not be commercially viable if such buyers were restricted from using the goods in the 
ordinary course of business during the credit period. For such reasons, the possibility of the goods 
being used or consumed in the course of business during the credit period is always readily available. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation is thus perplexing as it seems to contradict the purpose of credit. 
As noted by Loi et al, ‘after all, what would be the point of credit if the goods so obtained could not 
be used in any fashion prior to payment?’862 It might be suggested that the ramifications of Bunkers 
will only impact on a relatively small pool of cases, most notably any contractual agreements in the 
bunkers market which contain both a retention of title and a provision for the consumption of the 
goods, however this is simply not true. The implications of Bunkers will be felt across a wide range of 
industries, as such it cannot be said that the decision will only impact cases relating to fuel bunkers. 
 
857 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 257. 
858 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 4.  
859 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [58]. 
860 B Ellison, L Williams and S Fellows “Commodities contracts and the impact of the OW Bunkers case” (2016) 
available at https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2016/06/commodities-contracts-and-the-impact-of-
the-ow-bun%20 Accessed 03/07/2020. 
861 K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English 




The decision on this scale has over-arching ramifications of affecting a wide range of industries where 
consumables are supplied on credit terms with retention of title clauses pending payment. Markets 
which include food, pharmaceuticals and chemicals are just some of the most obvious examples which 
will bear the heavy burden of the decision in Bunkers.863 Undoubtedly, this raises issues in relation to 
the utility and overall functionality of the retention of title clause where once again the protection 
afforded by such clauses is questioned and reduced considerably by the decision in Bunkers.   
 
The uncertainty deriving from the characterisation of a sui generis contract rather than a contract of 
sale undermines the protection afforded by retention of title clauses and more broadly, falls outside 
the benefit of the Sale of Goods Act. It can be argued that categorising a contract purporting to 
supplying goods as not one of sale, but of sui generis, widens the category of applicable contracts too 
broadly.864 The incorporation of retention of title clauses in contracts for the sale of raw materials and 
stock in trade is widely prevalent in the market, as is terms relating to consumable goods.865 In most 
circumstances, the intention is that raw material goods will lose their identity in the manufacturing 
process, such a course of action is likely to happen before the end of the credit period. It is also possible 
for such materials to be have been consumed, perished, destroyed by a variety of different means.866 
With regards to contracts for sale of stock in trade, the norm is that the goods will be sold before the 
end of the credit period. As such, in most transactions of sale concerning consumable or raw materials, 
the period of credit will be longer than the ability of the buyer to keep such goods in a preserved 
condition. In addition, the Bunkers decision will undoubtedly cause confusion and uncertainty in 
relation to ‘current-account’ retention of title clauses, where a buyer will not be granted ownership 
until all monies or liabilities owed to the seller have been paid.867 When considering current-account 
clauses, it is highly likely that the original goods would have dissipated in some form before the 
property in the goods intends to pass. The common thread for all the examples provided is that once 
such actions have taken place, it will no longer be possible for title in the goods to pass to the buyer. 
By applying the reasoning found in Bunkers, is it correct to assume that none of the above examples 
are now contracts of sale? If so, this would limit the scope and threshold of the Sale of Goods Act 
considerably as a significant proportion of retention of title cases would no longer fall within the ambit 
 
863 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 277. 
864 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 259. 
865 See A Tettenborn “Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a Sale Not a Sale?” (2016) 1 Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly, 24-28, at 26. 
866 See section 1.3.4 and section 4.4.4 for a comprehensive discussion on perishable/ consumable goods.  
867 See Armour v Thyssen, op cit fn 629 for a useful example of a current-account retention of title clause 
where the clause provided ‘all goods delivered by us remain our property (goods remaining in our ownership) 




of the Sale of Goods Act. In falling out of the scope of the Sale of Goods Act, such supply contracts 
would not be a contract for the sale of goods, but a sui generis contract which would include a licence 
permitting the activity (which makes it impossible for title to pass) at the time of payment.868 This has 
widespread significance for retention of title clauses as such contracts may no longer be interpreted 
as one for the sale of goods. A dilemma which would render the Sale of Goods Act considerably 
obsolete.869 This issue was identified by Saidov who states that ‘from a well-developed area of the law 
that lay at the heart of commercial law, sales law is suddenly in danger of being seriously marginalised, 
with its functions ceded to the newly created sui generis contracts, the law on which is completely 
underdeveloped.’870 Clearly, the decision reached in Bunkers has diminished the importance of the 
Sale of Goods Act and sales law in general, by substantially reducing the applicable transactions within 
its remit. Additionally, falling outside the Sale of Goods Act has detrimental implications for both 
suppliers and buyers as the statutory protection will cease to apply to such supply contracts. From the 
perspective of the buyer, they will no longer be able to rely on section 14 which denotes that the 
goods supplied are of ‘satisfactory quality’871 nor the protection afforded by section 14(3) which 
provides that the goods purchased will be ‘reasonably fit for purpose.’872 The materiality of such 
implications may not be as significant since the Supreme Court suggested that terms relating to 
description and quality could be implied into the sui generis contracts and that such terms would be 
closely analogous to a sale.873 However, such a contention evokes immediate questions relating to 
how such terms will be implied if not by the Sale of Goods Act? Furthermore, as Bunkers was decided 
by the Supreme Court, a case of the highest authority, evidently the decision will be relied upon in 
future cases dealing with the interpretation of retention of title clause and the surge of characterising 
contracts as sui generis contracts. The market stability afforded by the accumulation of previous title-
retention decisions has clearly been disturbed by the decision of the Supreme Court. The reasonable 
degree of certainty experienced by the judiciary, practitioners, and contracting parties in relation to 
the interpretation of retention of title clause has been sacrificed to greater uncertainty on an ever-
reaching scale. Furthermore, although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the sui generis contract 
would ‘contain similar implied terms as to description, quality, etc to those implied in any conventional 
sale,’874 it will take considerable time for definitive answers to emerge and as such, we are once again 
 
868 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?” op cit fn 60 at 260.  
869 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 276.  
870 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 5. 
871 Section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
872 Section 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  




left at an unsatisfactory state of law, the legal position of retention of title clauses is riddled with 
uncertainty.  
 
Moreover, if a large range of contracts will cease to be interpreted as contracts of sale, this raises a 
few practical issues with categorisation. Notably, it will be difficult to ascertain which terms are to be 
implied into contracts or to what extent will contracts be categorised as contracts for the sale or supply 
of goods. In the circumstances where contracts do not contain a retention of title clause, these should 
generally be construed as contracts of sale, even where there is a right to consume prior to payment 
on the basis that title to the goods often passes on delivery and thus before consumption.875 However, 
Bunkers has unwittingly complicated matters to the point of not being able to tell if sales on credit 
involving retention of title clauses will fall under the remit of the Sale of Goods Act or not. It is no 
longer clear whether a category will be categorised as a contract of sale or sui generis as such a 
characterisation will entirely depend on the specific facts of the case and the subject matter of the 
goods, an outcome which produces significant uncertainty and cannot ensure predictability within the 
commercial market. Additionally, the characterisation of the supply contracts as sui generis may 
necessitate parties revising contracts to ensure that the terms fall within the ambit of the Sale of 
Goods Act. This may require parties to incorporate provisions which mirror the provisions of sale or 
supply of goods to ensure that their contract will be governed by their preferred characterisation.876 
Any revision or amendment of contracts will increase transactions costs for the involved parties.  
 
The decision of holding that the contract was not one of sale, seems to defy the intention of the 
parties. From the onset, it was clear that the parties themselves constructed the contractual 
agreement as one of sale, with the inclusion of express permission to consume the bunkers in the 
propulsion, before payment. This was alluded to at first instance by Males J: 
‘I accept that the parties’ contract is drafted as a contract of sale and contains numerous terms 
appropriate to such a contract. It is therefore a reasonable starting point that this is what the parties 
intended and is indeed the true nature of the contract which they have concluded.’877 
There are numerous indications which support this submission including the fact that the contract 
itself was described as a contract of sale and the contract identified the parties as ‘seller’ and buyer’.878 
The contract also contained terms which used the language of sale and additionally the contract used 
 
875 See Wood v TUI Travel Plc [2017] EWCA Civ 11, [2018] 2 W.L.R 1051 as per Lord Justice Burnett at [25]. 
876 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 4.  
877 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC, Product Shipping and Trading S.A v O.W. Bunker Malta Limited, ING Bank N.V 
[2015] EWHC 2022 (Comm) as per Males J at [28]. 




similar terms as expected from a contract of sale.879 Accordingly, the contractual parties clearly 
contemplated that the contract for which they provided was to be construed as a contract of sale. 
Defying the intention of the parties and subsequently construing the contract as something different 
to what was reasonable expected to be the parties’ intention is a common denominator of all three 
cases discussed: Romalpa, Wilson v Holt and Bunkers. 
 
The decision in Bunkers seems to not only go against the intention of the parties but also extends to 
thwarting the bunkers industry as well. Past cases which have dealt with the supply of bunker fuel 
have commonly proceeded on the basis that the contracts in question operate as contracts of sale.880 
Contracts for the supply of bunkers use similar contractual language to that observed in Bunkers, 
which indicates a common understanding with the market that bunkers supply contracts operate as 
contracts of sale.881 Construing the contract as anything other than contracts of sale has undoubtedly 
changed the understanding and expectations within the bunkers industry. It has been observed that 
the decision in Bunkers has practical implications for the bunkers market as it is uncertain as to 
whether shipowners would agree to pay the set amount for bunkers with the caveat of only granting 
a mere licence to use the bunkers.882  
 
The last argument to be put forward with regards to the characterisation of the contract as sui generis, 
concerns the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the term allowing consumption. It is respectfully 
submitted that the reliance of the Supreme Court on the express provision allowing for the 
consumption before payment as being instrumental in the characterisation of the contract as sui 
generis and not a contract of sale is inherently incorrect. Three different arguments will be used to 
support this submission.   
 
Firstly, it has been noted that the nature of the contract and whether it falls within the remit of the 
Sale of Goods Act should be determined at the date of contract formation, rather than be construed 
by events which occur at a later date such as the consumption of goods.883 The nature of the contract 
should be determined at the date of contracting as this allows parties to have sufficient notice to 
 
879 ibid as per Males J at [27]. 
880 See The Saetta [1994] 1 WLR 1334 and The Fesco Angara [2010] EWHC 619 (QB), [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 61. 
Both cases provide support that a contract for the supply of bunkers (with a retention of title clause) is a 
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881 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 4. It is acknowledged that the intention of the 
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sale, but merely helps with the interpretation for the purpose of s2(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
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prepare for whether the terms of the Sale of Goods Act apply to their set of circumstances. If they do 
not, parties are left with adequate time to plan any necessary actions during the duration of the 
contract which may offset any unforeseen risks. From a commerce perspective, parties need to know 
at the time of contracting whether their contractual agreement will be categorised as a contract of 
sale rather than at the time that their issue is being heard at court.884 
 
Secondly, the decision in Bunkers contradicts earlier retention of title cases which have assumed that 
the contracts in question have been interpreted as contracts of sale. The Supreme Court referred to 
earlier authorities such as Borden885, Forsythe886, Angara887 and Armour v Thyssen888 but commented 
that it was merely assumed that such transactions were contracts of sale and accordingly, within the 
scope of the Sale of Goods Act.889 Accordingly there is a direct contradiction between the implicit 
assumption in earlier cases that the contracts in question were contracts of sale and the express 
decision in Bunkers that the contract could not be construed as one for the sale of goods.890 By 
characterising the Bunkers contract as sui generis, the Supreme Court was able to bypass the earlier 
retention of title authorities without adequate justification for doing so. It remains unclear as to why 
the contract in Bunkers was fundamentally different from any other retention of title cases which 
allowed for the use of the goods. Lord Mance merely stated that the above cases were not 
authoritative as firstly, it was assumed that the transactions were agreements of sale and secondly, 
that the issue under question of categorising a supply contract for bunkers with a retention of title 
clause which permitted the consumption of the bunkers before payment, had not been addressed.891 
It is respectfully submitted that this did not provide justification for bypassing the earlier authorities, 
as it is highly improbable that earlier authorities would address such specific issues. This point was 
emphasised by Bridge who argues ‘moreover, the courts took in their very comfortable stride the fact 
that previously, in numerous reservation of title cases at first instance, in the Court of Appeal and in 
the House of Lords, contacts that would now be treated as sui generis contracts were treated as sale 
of goods contracts. The issue had not arisen in those cases, so they were simply put on one side.’892 
Bypassing the existing authority without sufficient justification merely adds to the incoherent way 
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these cases have been dealt with by the courts and once again contributes to the overall uncertainty. 
Evidently, retention of title clauses have been perfunctorily treated by the courts which demonstrates 
that the clauses are hindered by both judicial disfavour and significant legal uncertainty.  
 
Thirdly, it is submitted that the decision reached in Bunkers limits the overall functionality of retention 
of title clauses and has a detrimental impact on the ability of sellers to claim for the price of the goods. 
This criticism emanates from both the approach to s49 and the interpretation of the contract as sui 
generis and not one for sale. The crux of this argument focuses on the fact that Bunkers eludes the 
possibility that title to the goods can pass either at the precise time of consumption or momentarily 
before the extinction of the goods. Accordingly, in the event of the goods being consumed or used in 
a manufacturing process which results in the extinction of the goods, normally title passes either at 
the moment of destruction or immediately before the demise of the goods.893 As the goods no longer 
exist, it is impossible to retrieve the goods and thus, the seller is left with an unsecured claim for the 
price. This has been the position for previous retention of title clauses cases.894 This interpretation 
would also be applicable for Bunkers in dealing with a chain of contracts, in which there would be an 
implied term providing that title to the goods passes when the bunkers are used. Thus, this analysis 
would allow the seller to rely on s49(1) to bring an action for the price of the goods. This interpretation 
of an implied term was rejected at first instance by Males J who argued that this would contradict the 
express provision that title to the goods would pass on payment895, this view was also observed by the 
Supreme Court.896 However, rejecting this interpretation has arguably limited the circumstances 
whereby retention of title clauses can operate when provisions are included which allow for the 
consumption of the goods. The justification for being inconsistent with the retention of title clause as 
the goods would be destroyed before the end of the credit period, arguably renders retention of title 
clauses infinitely less functional. If the bunkers have been consumed before the end of the credit 
period, title intrinsically cannot be retained, which means that the retention of title clause is made 
effectively useless and without application. Under these circumstances, the only applicable situation 
whereby the retention of title clauses will be functional is if there are remaining bunkers at the end of 
the credit period and if the price is still not paid in full. This significantly reduces the circumstances 
where retention of title clause can be operational, and the clause will only afford protection where 
there are bunkers remaining at the end of the credit period. The characterisation of the contract as 
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not one of sale in Bunkers has undoubtedly caused a significant degree of legal uncertainty and has 
once again led to uncommercial and impractical ramifications.  As epitomised by Low and Loi, ‘English 
law appears to be stuck in Wonderland until such time as another dispute involving another mock sale 
comes before the Supreme Court, after which, perhaps, it can go back to being a real sale again- 
respectable and commercial sensible.’897 Possible suggestions on how to resolve the many 
uncertainties occasioned by Bunkers, are discussed in the conclusion of the thesis.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
As discussed, it can be argued that Romalpa set the foundation for the unfortunate way in which 
retention of title clauses have been interpreted. Since the decision in Romalpa has neither been 
reversed or overruled, its repercussions continue to plague this area of law. There is a notable 
paradigm of subsequent case law undermining the effectiveness and overall functional utility of 
retention of title clauses in some way shape or form. From a judicial standpoint, this area of law will 
continue to be beset by uncertainty. Retention of title claimants and contractual draftsmen 
persistently seek to mimic the illusory perception of the ‘perfect’ retention of title clause as set out by 
Romalpa and Wilson v Holt. It is apparent that commercial parties are consistently tempting fate by 
using ineffectual but more elaborate clauses, which subsequently test judicial reasoning. The courts 
will be consistently challenged by the ingenuity of parties who will ‘[persist] in using likely ineffectual 
clauses in the face of hostility rather than adopting tried and tested clauses.’898 This norm will continue 
until Romalpa is finally laid to rest.  
 
Despite the inherent judicial reluctance to Romalpa, the courts tend to respectfully distinguish the 
case rather than explicitly oppose and criticise its reasoning. In doing so, draftsmen are under the 
illusion that the perfect retention of title clause is still within their grasp and that such an objective is 
achievable. Draftsmen continue to be flaunted with the possibility of the all-encompassing retention 
of title clause and are not put off by the judicial hostility and thus continue to push their luck, a feat 
which is rendered plausible by the court’s inconsistent approach to interpreting retention of title 
clauses. This has led to iterative failures in case law reasoning which has produced uneconomic and 
impractical outcomes. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Wilson v Holt is unsatisfactory and once again 
creates uncommercial implications and raises the possibility that contracts of sale may be interpreted 
 
897 K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English 
Law of Sales”, op cit fn 4 at 253. 
898 ibid at 238. 
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as contracts of agency, resulting in a large degree of uncertainty. Even worse is the Supreme Court’s 
characterisation of contracts of supply as sui generis contracts in Bunkers, a characterisation which 
detrimentally hinders the overall functionality of retention of title clauses and potentially renders such 
cases outside the scope of the Sale of Goods Act. The decision in Bunkers has produced great 
uncertainty and has profoundly impacted the law on sales, ultimately disrupting the prior 
understanding that transactions involving retention of title clauses and provisions permitting for the 
consumption of the goods, are in fact contracts of sale. It is evident that the efficacy of retention of 
title clauses continues to be undermined and threatened by the courts inability to deal with these 
difficult cases in a comprehensive and holistic manner. As perfectly encapsulated by Gullifer ‘hard 
cases make bad law899’- a sentiment that hits the nail on the head. Evidently, the outlook for future 
retention of title clauses is oppressively bleak and the scope of the clauses’ application has been 
reduced considerably by the cases outlined in this chapter.  
 
The legal position in relation to retention of title clauses is confusing, contradictory, and 
unsatisfactory. The unsatisfactory treatment of the clauses can also be evidenced during insolvency 
proceedings which will be discussed at length in the next chapter. The discussions of this chapter 
sought to illustrate the difficulties encountered for those parties seeking to rely on retention of title, 
difficulties which are exacerbated by weak rationalisation of legal rules and inconsistent interpretation 
of the clauses by the courts. Undoubtedly, legal uncertainty is an intrinsic factor for explaining why 
the clauses are not providing the expected level of protection. This integral theme will continue to be 









899 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 244. 
190 
 
CHAPTER 6: COMPANY IN ADMINISTRATION  
6. Introduction  
 
One of the main limitations on the effectiveness of retention of title clauses is the statutory 
moratorium during the process of administration. As a disguised form of security interest, retention 
of title claimants are met with great uncertainty and difficulty in the context of goods of an insolvent 
company.900 Thus, the statutory moratorium causes significant hindrances for those seeking to 
successfully rely on their retention of title clauses. The recurring theme of the increasing situations 
where retention of title clauses will not be effective in offering the expected level of protection, is 
once again apparent in the field of insolvency law. The functional objectives of retention of title clauses 
are significantly weakened in this context by the combined impact of insolvency law provisions and 
the need to obtain the consent of the court to proceed with title retention claims once a company has 
entered administration proceedings. The effectiveness of retention of title clauses are severely 
impeded by some of the practical repercussions of the statutory moratorium, all of which will be 
explored throughout the course of this chapter.  
 
Immediate consequences will result following a company entering administration, most notably 
initiating rescue attempts to salvage the company. Accordingly, the purpose of administration is to 
provide the opportunity for distressed companies to initiate rehabilitation proceedings, with the 
purpose of attempting to rescue the company as a going concern as specified in paragraph 3, Schedule 
B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986.901 By making an administration application or alternatively filing a 
notice of intention to appoint under Schedule B1 of the Act, this imposes a moratorium on taking steps 
against the company and consequentially the company’s property.902 Accordingly, during this period 
of administration, it is evident that certain parties are significantly impeded by the statutory 
moratorium as they are unable to take any immediate course of action. Most notably, the parties who 
are directly affected by the statutory moratorium are those parties seeking to exercise their 
proprietary or contractual rights.903 Under this remit, retention of title holders fall under the category 
 
900 D Milman “Security Interests and quasi-security claims in UK corporate insolvency law: current issues” 
(2011) Company Law Newsletter 299, 1-4, at 1.  
901 Paragraph 3, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
902 W Trower, D Allison, A Goodison and A Shaw, Corporate Administrations and Rescue Procedures, 3rd Ed, 
London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, at 31.  
903 D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue” (2004) Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer, 89-108, at 89.  
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of those negatively impacted by the statutory moratorium. The specific ways in which the moratorium 
impedes retention of title holders will thus be critically discussed in the course of this chapter.    
 
There are essentially, two types of moratorium in administration, the statutory moratorium and the 
interim moratorium, which both have similar effects and implications. Pursuant to paragraph 43, 
Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, no steps can be taken to enforce security of the company’s 
property without the consent of the administrator or permission of the court. Accordingly, any 
enforcement of security or legal proceedings against the company in administration are suspended, 
which means that goods under a hire purchase agreement, leasing or a retention of title clause 
agreement may not be immediately repossessed during the moratorium. 
 
In order to repossess goods which have been supplied with an incorporated retention of title clause, 
parties must seek leave to lift the moratorium by ascertaining the consent or permission of the 
administrator or court. Under paragraph 44 of the same schedule, this period of prohibition is also 
relevant during interim moratorium in an administration. Paragraph 44(2)(a) states that this period 
applies from when a copy of notice of intention to appoint an administrator is filed, until the 
appointment of the administrator takes effect. The interim moratorium protects a company and its 
assets between the start of the process of administration up until the start of the administration itself. 
Essentially, both the statutory and interim moratorium under Schedule B1 prevents and suspends 
creditors and third parties from taking action against an insolvent company in administration during a 
set period of time.  
 
Consequently, the following chapter will critically analyse the statutory moratorium with particularly 
focus on how the moratorium negatively impacts the effectiveness of retention of title clauses. 
Arguably, recent judicial decisions have compromised the claimant’s ability to use retention of title 
clauses effectively by exposing claimants to delays, disruptions and setbacks. Additionally, this chapter 
will illustrate how the statutory moratorium imposes significant limitations on the enforcement of 
security, proprietary and contractual rights. This discussion provides another example of how the 
current law impedes the overall effectiveness of retention of title clauses in the context of a company 




6.1 The statutory moratorium in administration  
 
6.1.1  Scope of the moratorium  
 
The purpose behind the moratorium in administration can be broadly encompassed under two 
rationales: rehabilitation and protection against creditor action. Firstly, one can argue that the 
purpose of the statutory moratorium is to provide insolvent companies with a period of time, during 
which the insolvency process attempts to rescue the business. The whole purpose of administration 
procedures is to provide companies in financial difficulty the possibility of rehabilitation. Companies 
can be reorganised with the intent of promoting the rescue/ rehabilitation of the company. During 
the moratorium period, the company or its administrators are granted time to consider the possibility 
of rehabilitation by considering the overall position of the company and subsequently, the company 
assets.  
 
Secondly, the purpose of the moratorium is to protect companies under significant financial difficulty, 
against the possibilities of facing outside pressures. Most commonly, these outside pressures will 
emanate from creditors attempting to protect themselves, against the risk that the company will fall 
into insolvency. The act of creditors reverting pressure on the insolvent company, can have 
catastrophic consequences on the possibility of the company being rescued. Under these 
circumstances, the creditors will seek to take specific actions which serve and protect their own 
interests as creditors. Accordingly, the moratorium provides the distressed company sufficient 
breathing space to formulate possible rescue/ rehabilitation arrangements, whilst simultaneously 
preventing creditors acting in their own interests at the expense of the distressed company’s rescue 
attempts. As such, companies are afforded a moratorium under the Insolvency Act 1986. Paragraphs 
42 to 44 of Schedule B1 set out the provisions for the statutory moratorium, which allows companies 
to benefit from the protection of the moratorium.904 Consequently, through the moratorium, creditors 
are prevented from gaining priority over one another or from seeking expensive legal recourse that 
will subsequently be dealt with during the course of administration.  
 
As mentioned above, the moratorium prevents creditors or third parties from taking action against 
the assets of the company. More specifically, the provisions of Schedule B1 suspends any legal 
proceedings or processes against the company. This includes: suspending creditors from commencing 
 
904 Paragraphs 42 to 44, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
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insolvency proceedings against the insolvent company, suspending the right of any secured creditor 
from enforcing their security over any of the company’s assets, suspending the right to repossess 
assets in the company’s possession and suspending a landlord’s right to forfeit any leases of the 
company’s proceedings. As emphasised by Milman, imposing a moratorium is distinctive in the 
process of administration as it allows the ‘freezing of hostile actions against the company that is 
intended to allow the administrator a vital breathing space to effect either a rescue of a more efficient 
winding up.’905 Taking direct action against the assets of the company can only be done with the 
consent of the administrator or being granted permission by the court. Retention of title clause 
holders are thus prevented from taking immediate action until consent or permission has been 
ascertained, the process and implications of this requirement will be discussed in detail further below.   
 
With regard to timeframe, the moratorium period is instigated from the moment the company enters 
administration and the administration process starts. Under paragraphs 42 – 43 of Schedule B1, the 
moratorium automatically applies from the moment the court makes the administration order or for 
an interim moratorium, the moratorium will take effect from the time the application for 
administration is issued at court.  
 
Breaching the moratorium will give rise to serious consequences such as committing contempt of 
court or give rise to a claim in damages. It is noted that in practice, it is rare for creditors to be 
sanctioned for contempt of court for breaching the statutory moratorium in administration. 
 
 
6.1.2 Schedule B1: Definitions and issues   
 
6.1.2 (a) Property and Security  
 
In order to fully discuss the implications of the statutory moratorium, emphasis will be given to certain 
definitions provided by the Insolvency Act 1986. In order to shed light on certain terms, where possible 
judicial pronouncements will be considered and any notable issues stemming from the definitions of 
the Act, which may hinder individuals who are directly impacted by the statutory moratorium will be 
discussed. Firstly, ‘security’ and ‘property’ will be considered.    
 
905 D Milman “Administration orders: the moratorium feature” (1992) 5(9) Insolvency Intelligence, 73-75, at 73.   
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As an overview, section 248(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 sets out the definition for security which 
includes any mortgage, charge, lien or other security.906 In the context of the above definition, security 
is afforded a wide definition by the Insolvency Act 1986. Additionally, in the case of Bristol Airport v 
Powdrill907, the words ‘lien or other security’ were considered by Sir Browne-Wilkinson who 
contended that ‘other security’ ought to be given its natural meaning, which was sufficiently wide 
enough to encompass the issue of the case which was a statutory right of detention as a ‘lien or other 
security’ for the purposes of section 248(b) the Insolvency Act.908  
 
Furthermore, in accordance with this ‘property’ over which the security must subsist is defined 
broadly under section 436 of the Insolvency Act, which states that ‘property’ includes: 
‘money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property wherever situated and 
also obligations and every description of interest, whether present or future or vested or contingent, 
arising out of, or incidental to, property.’909  
The Court of Appeal in Bristol Airport v Powdrill noted the difficulties arising out of the meaning of the 
term ‘property’ and emphasised the difficulty of employing a wider definition, particularly in the 
context of the latter half of the definition which includes things arising out of or incidental to 
property.910 One of the issues in Bristol Airport v Powdrill, concerned whether aircraft that were leased 
could be defined under the meaning of property under section 11(3)(c), in which it was affirmed by 
Sir Browne-Wilkinson that a lessee has an equitable right in the aircraft and thus could fall under the 
definition of an interest arising out of or incidental to the property.911   
 
However, despite the above attempts to clarify the terms, it has been submitted by Trower et al that 
the precise ambit of the words ‘security’ and ‘property’ will not be settled for some time and thus the 
prudent course of action for persons with rights against a company in administration is to seek the 
consent or permission of the administrator or court before attempting to exercise such rights.912 It is 
evident that a degree of ambiguity surrounding the terms ‘property’ and ‘security’ still persists.   
 
 
906 Section 248(B), Insolvency Act 1986. 
907 Bristol Airport v Powdrill [1990] Ch 744. 
908 ibid as per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson at [760]. 
909 Section 436, Insolvency Act 1986. 
910 Bristol Airport v Powdrill, op cit fn 907 as per Sir Nicolas Browne- Wilkinson at [759]. 
911 ibid. 
912 W Trower, D Allison, A Goodison and A Shaw, Corporate Administrations and Rescue Procedures, op cit fn 
902 at 41.  
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6.1.2 (b) Taking steps to enforce security 
 
Retention of title holders are directly impacted by the statutory moratorium under Schedule B1 of the 
Insolvency Act. Firstly, as a point of reference, Section 251 of the Insolvency Act defines a ‘retention 
of title agreement’ as follows: 
‘retention of title agreement means an agreement for the sale of goods to a company, being 
an agreement- (a) which does not constitute a charge on the goods, but (b) under which, if the seller 
is not paid and the company is wound up, the seller will have priority over all other creditors of the 
company as respect the goods or any property representing the goods.’913 
However, the crux of the issues hindering retention of title holders are found in paragraph 43(3) of 
the Schedule. Pursuant to Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act, a contract that incorporates a retention 
of title clause is defined under ‘hire purchase agreement’ for the purposes of paragraph 43(3) which 
states:  
‘No step may be taken to repossess goods in the company’s possession under a hire-purchase 
agreement except- (a) with the consent of the administrator, or (b) with the permission of the 
court.’914 
In this circumstance the definition of hire purchase agreement also extends to conditional sales 
agreements and chattel leasing agreements as per paragraph 111, Schedule B1.  
 
It has been noted that the definition prescribed to retention of title clause under section 251 is 
peculiar and almost unnecessary.915 With regard to limb (a), there seems to be a direct overlap with 
provisions covered by para 43(2) which refers to security, as limb (a) effectively excludes mortgages 
or charge agreements. Moreover, this is distinctly odd as if the agreement is a mortgage or charge 
then it cannot be a sale agreement. The peculiarities also extend to limb (b), as the definition once 
again overlaps with the definition of a conditional sale and more so, it is difficult to think of a retention 
of title clause which does not fall within the definition of a conditional sale agreement. As such, one 
may question the need for a separate definition, as retention of title clause agreements could have 
easily been included within the definition of a conditional sale agreement. It has been observed that 
limb (b) seeks to ascribe a conditional sale agreement with a legal effect, which it may not necessarily 
have, as the legal effect is dependent on the nature of the legal priority rules.916 Within the context of 
retention of title clauses, potentially there may be a party with a stronger title to the goods if the 
 
913 Section 251, Insolvency Act 1986. 
914 Paragraph 44(3), Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 




retention of title clause seeks to cover proceeds of sale, which will almost certainly be categorised as 
creating a charge, rendered void for lack of registration. Accordingly, one cannot ascribe a legal effect 
to a sale agreement as it is entirely dependent on legal priority rules. Furthermore, it is clear from the 
precise wording of paragraph 43(4), that such a provision limits the effectiveness of retention of title 
clauses. The precise implications of paragraph 43(3) for retention of title holders is discussed in detail 
further below.  
 
A further definitional issue of the Schedule can be exemplified by the lack of coherent definition to 
the word ‘step’. Indeed, ‘step’ has not been adequately defined by the Act and as such the precise 
meaning of taking steps to enforce security or repossess goods remains unclear. Uncertainty exists in 
deciphering the meaning of what constitutes ‘taking steps’ as it is unclear to whether this refers to 
preparatory acts of enforcing security. A case decided under the original provisions of the Insolvency 
Act may prove instructive in relation to helping us clarify the uncertainty of defining ‘step’. In Sabre 
International Products Ltd917 it was held by the Court that the assertion by a lien holder, of a statutory 
right retaining goods subject to the lien, did constitute the taking of steps to enforce security, and 
subsequently, consent needed to be obtained. In this case, a lien holder refused to return goods to 
the administrators, who demanded delivery of the company’s goods. The court held that the lien 
holder had to deliver the goods and that the administrators in this instance were acting as officers of 
the court and were entitled to the possession of the goods, as the lien holder had not sought an 
application to the court to enforce their security. This case is illustrative as although the administrators 
have a duty to act fairly and reasonably during the administration process, this does not extend to 
telling the lienholder what steps it should take to protect its security. Accordingly, the duty of 
administrators does not extend to informing secured creditors on what steps they should take to 
enforce their security. Retention of title holders will thus not be informed by administrators on what 
steps they should take to enforce their claim.   
 
The precise meaning of the prohibition against ‘taking steps’ in the context of enforcing a lien, was 
also raised in Bristol Airport v Powdrill. This case involved a creditor of an insolvent charter airline not 
being able to exercise a lien over property belonging to a company, without seeking the consent of 
the administrator or permission by the court. In this case, the applicant was an airport operator who 
was not entitled to exercise his lien over the property, which was an aircraft. Subsequently, detaining 
an aircraft by parking a lorry in front of the property amounted to taking steps to enforce security 
which ultimately triggered the application of section 11(3)(c) of the Insolvency Act, requiring either 
 
917 Re Sabre International Products Ltd [1991] B.C.L.C. 470; [1991] B.C.C. 694; [1991] 2 WLUK 123. 
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the administrator’s consent or leave of the court to be ascertained before exercising their right of lien. 
In this case the court provided clarification by accepting that taking a step imports an overt act or a 
positive act of reliance on his rights.918 Furthermore, within the meaning of section 11(3)(c) of the 
Insolvency Act, the exercise of a right of lien by an overt act of detention, constituted a step taken to 
enforce security.919 The Court of Appeal seemed to have accepted that in the majority of cases, it 
would be obvious whether or not a step has been taken, however it was submitted that situations 
involving a refusal to hand over possession raised further difficulties. Accordingly, the Bristol Airport v 
Powdrill case provided some clarification in supporting the view that the exercise of a right to retain 
under a lien constitutes the enforcement of the security. No such actions can be done without the 
consent of the administrator or permission of the court. However, the issue surrounding a refusal to 
hand over possession is particularly prevalent for retention of title cases and as such, it might not 
always be clear when a step has been taken in the context of a retention of title case. Do preliminary 
actions such as facilitating phone calls/ establishing communication to prepare for possession of 
goods, amount to taking steps? It is unclear how far the boundaries extend for taking preliminary steps 
in the context of retention of title cases or any other hire purchase arrangement.  Despite the court 
claiming that it would be obvious whether a step has been taken, for retention of title holders, this is 
not always clear cut and as such, uncertainty still ensues. It is evident that retention of title holders’ 
actions are ultimately restricted, even if such actions are only preparatory in nature. In order to avoid 
breaching the provisions, retention of title holders will have to cautiously seek permission from the 
administrator or court regardless.  
 
A similar issue of regarding the definition of ‘taking steps’ to enforce security and repossess goods was 
alluded to in the case of Barclays Mercantile v Sibec Developments.920 In this case Millett J regarded 
the difficult issue of whether making a demand for the return of goods amounted to a cause of action 
in conversion and consequently constituting taking steps to repossess goods in the company’s 
possession. However, Millett J declined to comment on this issue as the issue itself was not paramount 
for his decision. Trower et al, provided some commentary on this issue and were of the opinion that 
provided that the demand was not complied with, the making the demand would not constitute taking 
steps to repossess the goods: 
‘With some diffidence, however, it is submitted that, provided the owner of the goods made it clear 
that in the event the demand was not complied with, he would seek the consent of the administrator 
 
918 W Trower, D Allison, A Goodison and A Shaw, Corporate Administrations and Rescue Procedures, op cit fn 
902 at 42.  
919 Bristol Airport v Powdrill, op cit fn 907 at [749]. 
920 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd and another v Sibec Developments Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1253. 
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or the permission of the court to take proceedings to recover the goods, the making of such a demand 
would not, in itself, constitute the taking of a step to repossess the goods.’921  
 
Similarly, Judge Weeks in Re David Meek Plant922 declined to discuss an analogous issue of whether 
serving a terminating notice of a hire-purchase agreement would constitute taking a step in enforcing 
a security. In the case, Judge Weeks stated, ‘I do not propose to decide question of whether serving a 
notice is any step to enforce security and I will attempt to disregard the lacuna that might otherwise 
arise.’923 Judge Weeks choice of words ‘lacuna’ is reflective of the reluctance of the courts to clarify 
difficult and somewhat open-ended circumstances which may constitute taking steps to enforce a 
security. It is submitted that this is a missed opportunity to deal with the issues surrounding the terms 
‘taking steps’. 
 
As such, there is a recurring theme of judicial reluctance to offer clarification and ultimately tackle 
difficult scenarios which fall under the remit of taking steps. We await judicial commentary to fully 
resolve the issues discussed above. As such, the precise meaning of taking steps to enforce security or 
repossess goods has been subject to rigorous judicial pronouncement, however despite this, 
ambiguity remains.   
 
6.1.2 (c) Duration  
 
More significantly, Schedule B1 does not directly specify the duration of the interim moratorium. 
Rather, the duration of the moratorium parallels the process of administration appointment, which is 
usually around 12 months but may be extended further.924 As such, the length of the moratorium is 
dependent on whether there is a court or out-of-court appointment. Paragraph 44(1) infers that the 
interim moratorium starts from the day that the administration application has been granted until the 
administration order takes effect. For an out-of-court administration appointment, the date is set 
from the issuing of notice of intention to appoint administrators until the date of appointment. Or 
 
921 W Trower, D Allison, A Goodison and A Shaw, Corporate Administrations and Rescue Procedures, op cit fn 
902 at 43.  
922 Re David Meek Plant Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 680 at [684a]. 
923 ibid as per Judge Weeks QC at [178]. 
924 The Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A consultation on options for 
reform (2016) Available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/525523/
A_Review_of_the_Corporate_Insolvency_Framework.pdf Accessed 16/01/20. 
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conversely, if no administrators are appointed, paragraph 28(2) states it will be ten business day from 
the date on which the notice of intention to appoint is filed.   
 
A case which considered the duration of the moratorium was JCAM Commercial v Davis Haulage Ltd.925 
The court found that the interim moratorium that arose out of filing a notice on the 22nd of January 
2016, expired at the end of the 5th February 2016, following the operation of paragraphs 44(4) and 
28(2) of Schedule B1.926 The court did not provide further guidance beyond the end of the day on the 
5th of February and thus, a degree of uncertainty still exists in specifying an exact expiry of the duration 
of the moratorium. Any retention of title holder impacted by an interim moratorium, must seek the 
permission of the courts to exercise their rights during this period. Due to the very nature of 
administration proceedings, there is unlikely to be enough time to seek the co-operation of all 
creditors involved.927 As aforementioned, the purpose of administration and imposing a moratorium 
is to provide a period of breathing space on the enforcement of rights, as such the administration 
process should only be temporary928, however this can still cause issues for those seeking to enforce 
their rights. Those seeking to exercise their proprietary rights should only be prevented from doing so 
on a strictly temporary basis.929 Further problems relating to the duration of the moratorium are 
highlighted and discussed in detail below. 
 
6.1.2 (d) Potential impact of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 
 
The discussion will now briefly consider the potential impact of the new self-standing moratorium 
introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 on retention of title clauses.930 The 
purpose behind the new rescue procedure is to enhance the restructuring culture for companies in 
financial difficulty by introducing a new standalone moratorium, directed at rescuing companies as a 
going concern. Similar to the provisions contained in Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act, this new 
moratorium procedure provides breathing space for companies to formulate a rescue plan without 
incurring significant costs. The moratorium is available to a company under financial difficulty where 
it is likely that the moratorium will result in the rescue of the company.931 The self-standing 
 
925 JCAM Commercial Real Estate Property XV Ltd v Davis Haulage Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 267. 
926 ibid at [16]. 
927 A Bacon and R Cowper “The moratorium emasculated- another blow for corporate recovery?” (1997) 
10(10) Insolvency Intelligence, 73-75, at 74.  
928 P Fidler “Administration: leave to enforce security on property rights” (1991) 6(2) Journal of International 
Banking Law, 78-81, at 80.  
929 ibid. 
930 The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 came into force on the 26th of June 2020.  
931 Part A6 of the Insolvency Act 1986 as inserted by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020. 
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moratorium provides for a period of 20 business day protection against any creditor action, which may 
also be extended with the consent of the pre-moratorium creditors or the courts932, thus inevitably 
impacting on the ability of retention of title claimants to enforce their proprietary rights. Section A21 
directly impedes the position of retention of title claimants as during the period of the standalone 
moratorium, creditors are prevented from repossessing their goods and enforcing their security or 
other proprietary rights.933 Once again, this impedes the position of retention of title claimants as the 
Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 prioritises the recovery of the company rather than 
the realisation of assets. It appears that monitors have less pervasive roles than the position of 
administrators under Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 as notably the new moratorium can only 
be lifted by the courts, neither the directors nor monitors can lift the restriction on enforcement. This 
will inevitably impede retention of title clauses from realising their assets in a timely manner and will 
undoubtedly add to the overall financial costs of enforcing their rights.934  
 
It is speculated that the position of retention of title claimants in relation to this new moratorium will 
mirror the position under Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and we wait patiently to see the full 
extent of the self-standing moratorium on enforcing security and proprietary interests and how the 
existing law on the statutory moratorium and the new moratorium procedure will coincide in 
practice.935 Accordingly, the true impact of the standalone moratorium is not widely known at this 
stage as the procedure will need to be navigated in practice and clarified by the courts.936 Any 
remaining uncertainties can only be resolved by litigation. Evidently, the inherent tension between 
the recovery expectations of third parties such as retention of title claimants and the self-standing 
moratorium is likely to be rigorously tested during the following months and the full impact remains 
to be seen. For such reasons, the following discussion will focus on the implications of the moratorium 
in administration under Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, as this area of law has been subject 
to considerable judicial pronouncement.  
 
 
932 A9(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The author acknowledges that the period of moratorium is relatively 
short, 20 business days commencing on the day after the moratorium comes into force.  
933 See A21(1)(d) of the Insolvency Act 1986. A54 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides a broad definition of ‘hire 
purchase agreement’ which includes ‘a conditional sale agreement, a chattel leasing agreement and a 
retention of title agreement.   
934 It is worth noting here that the creditor seeking leave has the burden of persuading the court to grant 
leave. See further section 6.2.1.  
935 During these unprecedented times of the Covid-19 pandemic, the legal and economic landscape is 
understandably uncertain. See further, L Linklater and J Wildridge “Changing times: aspects of creditor 
enforcement in administration and in the new moratorium” (2020) 33(3) Insolvency Intelligence, 96-98 at 96.  
936 At the time of writing, the application of Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] 2 WLR 367 on the new 
moratorium procedure remains to be seen. For a detailed discussion on the application of Re Atlantic 
Computer, see section 6.2.1 in the context of how retention of title clauses are dealt with on administration.  
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6.1.3 The effect of the moratorium and implications for retention of title holders  
 
6.1.3 (a) Suspending the substantive rights of creditors  
 
A secured creditor will be prevented from enforcing its security during the moratorium unless the 
parties seek the consent of the administrator or permission of the court. Furthermore, by virtue of 
paragraph 43(3) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, once a moratorium has taken effect, a 
retention of title holder is prevented from taking steps to repossess the goods, which are still in the 
possession of the company. Accordingly, paragraph 43(3) states:  
‘no step may be taken to repossess goods in the company’s possession under a hire-purchase 
agreement except- 
(a) With the consent of the administrator 
(b) With the permission of the court’937 
It was established in Barclays Mercantile v Sibec Developments938 that the moratorium does not alter 
or extinguish creditor’s substantive rights, but instead merely suspends them. It was held by Millett J 
that imposing a moratorium on the enforcement of a creditor’s legal rights does not alter or destroy 
such rights and consequently, the immediate right to possess the goods will not be removed. This case 
concerned a hire-purchase agreement which leased motor vehicles and computer equipment to 
Barclays Mercantile. The applicants initiated the repossession of the goods without gaining the 
consent of the administrators. Justice Millet was of the opinion that: 
 ‘those paragraphs [section 11(s)(c) of the Insolvency Act] presuppose that both the legal right 
to enforce the security or repossess the goods and the cause of action remain vested in the party 
seeking leave. By giving leave the court does not alter the parties’ legal rights. It merely grants the 
person having a legal right liberty to enforce it by proceedings if necessary. The section imposes a 
moratorium on the enforcement of the creditor’s rights but does not destroy those rights.’939 
Accordingly, under the scope of Schedule B1, the provisions suspend the right of a secured creditor to 
enforce their security over the assets of the company and suspend the right of the creditor to 
repossess assets in the company’s possession.940 On further analysis, it is emphasised that the rights 
remain but are temporarily frozen and stayed until either consent from the administrator or 
 
937 Paragraph 43(3) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
938 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd and another v Sibec Developments Ltd, op cit fn 920.  
939 ibid as per Justice Millet at [1257]. 
940 The author acknowledges that Schedule B suspends other rights such as right to forfeiture, ability to 
commence insolvency proceedings against the company and the ability to commence any other form of legal 
process against the company.  
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permission of the court is sought or until the moratorium has ceased. Subsequently, the moratorium 
prevents creditors from enforcing their securities for a period of time, however this is not meant to 
prejudice the interests of the creditors. As the moratorium prohibits any steps or processes being 
commenced against the distressed company, sellers of goods will require the consent of the 
administrator or permission of the court, before taking possession of the goods.  
 
In the context of balancing entitlements, imposing a statutory moratorium has been heavily criticised 
by Milman for being ‘based upon a utilitarian premise that the interests of a few may need to suffer 
in the service needs of the many.’941 The company in financial difficulty can benefit from the protection 
afforded by the moratorium, however creditors and other third parties with claims are suspended 
from exercising their rights. The strength and utility of retention of title claims are severely weakened 
by the need to ascertain permission by an external body in order to enforce their claims. The 
restrictions imposed by the moratorium on retention of title holders, is clearly indicative of the 
situation outlined by Milman above, where the notion of collectivism is rife.   
 
In line with this reasoning and expanding on the points raised by Milman, the creditor’s rights or more 
specifically, any retention of title holders are detrimentally impacted by the statutory moratorium as 
the moratorium period can affect the commercial value of goods. Depending on the duration of the 
moratorium, this could lower the commercial value of the goods which are subject to a valid retention 
of title clause. For retention of title holders seeking to repossess goods which are in the possession of 
the other party, such actions are time critical. This is even more significant for holders of retention of 
title clauses selling goods of fluctuating value, as the value will be affected by the duration of the 
moratorium, which can fluctuate and be subject to long postponements as will be evidenced by case 
law, discussed further below. Wheeler states that under the Insolvency Act, the moratorium can last 
longer than a year as the tenure of the administrator is not subjected to a time limit.942 If a moratorium 
lasts for a substantial length of time, this bears significant risks and implications on retention of title 
holders, who would be exposed to additional deferments in waiting to seek leave from the 
administrator or court.  
 
In addition, it is evident that creditors’ substantive rights are hindered by the moratorium, which 
subsequently suspends, and essentially restricts the enforcement of security and the right of a creditor 
to repossess assets which are not in their immediate possession. During the moratorium period, goods 
 
941 D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”, op cit fn 903 at 90.  




under hire-purchase agreements (for which retention of title clause are categorised) cannot be 
repossessed until leave has been granted by the court.943 Consequently, the commercial utility of such 
rights is limited as those seeking to enforce their security must face additional administration and 
timely delays. In relevance to retention of title clauses, their popularity in the commercial market 
derives from their relatively simple incorporation and the protection which is afforded to holders in 
the event of insolvency. However, this purported protection is ultimately weakened by the statutory 
moratorium as rights are suspended until leave is granted to lift the moratorium. Notwithstanding the 
risk that the administrator or court may deny the retention of title claim during the process of 
administration and reject their application for leave. Accordingly, the protection given to retention of 
title holders, which allegedly affords them priority over all other creditors in respect of goods is 
impeded, until consent or permission has been granted by the administrator or court. Based on the 
notion of collectivism, holders of retention of title clauses need to realise the assets of the company 
in a timely fashion and thus any disruption to this process causes significant problems for retention of 
title holders.  
 
As such, this evidences one of the main limitations on the effectiveness of retention of title clauses, 
that if the buyer is a company in administration, the rights of holders of retention of title clauses and 
other creditors are suspended by the moratorium under the provisions of Schedule B1. It is evident, 
that the suspension of rights as afforded by the statutory moratorium prevents retention of title 
holders from acting in a manner which would ultimately benefit themselves.  
 
6.1.3 (b) Disposal of goods  
 
Furthermore, holders of retention of title clauses are exposed to further risks, most notably that goods 
subject to a retention of title clause can be disposed of by an administrator. Once an administrator is 
appointed, an administrator is granted considerable power, pursuant to para 70 to 72 of Schedule B1 
of the Insolvency Act, an administrator is granted the power to deal with charged property (formerly 
s15 of the Insolvency Act 1986). By virtue of paragraph 72, through an order made by the court, the 
administrator can dispose of goods in the possession of the company under a hire-purchase 
agreement. This applies to retention of title clause agreements, conditional sale agreement and 







If the holder of the security or owner of the goods under a hire-purchase agreement consents or 
alternatively if the court grants leave, then the goods may be disposed of, as if the rights of the holder 
of the security or owner under the hire purchase agreement were vested.944 Where the court is 
satisfied with the disposal, an administrator may exercise his powers to dispose of any property of the 
company which is subject to a security. The court may authorise the disposal if they are satisfied that 
one or more of the specified purposes in the administration order have been met. In deciding whether 
to dispose the goods that are subject to a hire-purchase agreement, the court must balance the 
competing interests of the owner of the goods and the general body of creditors. Additionally, in the 
process of making an application to the court for an order under paras 71 and 72, notice must be given 
by the administrator to the holder of the security, or the owner under the hire purchase agreement. 
Accordingly, in the event of the courts making an order which subsequently authorises the disposal of 
property of goods by the administrator, the parties must be notified and thus afforded the opportunity 
to participate in the hearing. 
 
This epitomises the contention that the rescue culture is based upon a utilitarian premise, whereby 
administrators are granted the power to sell goods and realise property, despite the fact that the 
goods do not belong to the company in question. The administrators have the power to sell goods on 
the basis that such actions would be for the interest of the company as this would ultimately benefit 
stakeholders and encourage the efficient realisation of assets.945 Once again, it is clear that the 
moratorium fails to strike the appropriate balance between creditors’ rights and administration rescue 
attempts. In this context, the utility of a retention of title clause is impeded during the moratorium, if 
such goods can be disposed of by an administrator on the relatively simple basis of balancing 
competing interests. This supports the underlying hypotheses that the effectiveness of a retention of 
title clause is hampered to a significant extent by various factors.  
 
The issue of disposal of goods can be exemplified by Singh Sandhu v Jet Star Retail.946 In this case, a 
manufacturer supplied clothing to a retailer under a contract which included a retention of title clause. 
The retention of title clause provided that ownership of the goods would remain with the supplier 
until such goods had been paid for in full and in the event of insolvency, the supplier could require the 
retailer not to dispose of such goods until they had been paid in full. The retailer had fallen into 
 
944 P Totty, G Moss and N Segal, Totty, Moss & Segal: Insolvency, Volume 2, FT Law and Tax, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1996 at 1-16.  
945 D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”, op cit fn 903 at 90.  
946 Bulbinder Singh Sandhu (trading as Isher Fashions UK) v Jet Star Retail Limited (in administration) [2011] 
EWCA Civ 459. 
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financial difficulty and administrators were subsequently appointed. During administration, the 
retailer continued to trade and sold stock which the retailer had not paid for. Consequently, the 
business and the supplier’s stock (which had still not been paid for in full), was sold to a third party. 
As a result, the supplier sought damages for conversion, relying on the retention of title clause to claim 
damages for the stock of clothing supplied.947 In the first instance, the judge held despite the existence 
of the retention of title clause, the retailer had implied authority to sell or dispose of the goods until 
the supplier exercised its rights to withdraw authority. Due to the fact that the seller had not taken 
steps to withdraw its authority, the retailer was entitled to dispose of the goods in both instances; the 
first during administration where the retailer continued to sell stock and secondly, where the business 
and stock were ultimately sold to the third party.  
 
The supplier appealed on the grounds that the retailer ceased having authority to sell and dispose of 
the goods once the business became insolvent and entered administration. Accordingly, the basis of 
the appeal was that any sale or disposal of the goods once entered into administration amounted to 
wrongful interference with the goods.948 The appellants relied on the reasoning that the effect of a 
retention of title clause is analogous to that of a floating charge. Subsequently arguing that in the case 
of a floating charge, the distressed company’s authority to dispose of its assets is limited to disposals 
made in the ordinary course of business and subsequently, ceased on insolvency. Lord Justice Moore-
Bick, disagreed with this rationale, instead opting that the right to dispose of the goods derived from 
the individual terms of the contract and its commercial object and as such should be decided on the 
facts of each individual case.949 With regard to the crux of the case, the Court of Appeal in agreement 
with the original court held that the supplier took no steps to withdraw his authority. Accordingly, 
Lord Justice Moore-Bick stated that: ‘[supplier] took no steps in his capacity…to withdraw its authority 
to dispose of the goods at any time before the sale of the business to Internacionale was complete, 
although he was well aware of its financial difficulties and of the appointment of the administrators.’950 
It was held that there was no wrongful interference with the goods, by disposing of the goods during 
the process of administrator or selling the business and stock to the third party. To clarify further, 
there was an implied right to deal with the goods until the point of authority was brought to an end 
and as the supplier had not acted upon his authority, the court adopted a commercial interpretation 
 
947 ibid at [2]. 
948 Bulbinder Singh Sandhu (trading as Isher Fashions UK) v Jet Star Retail Limited (in administration), op cit fn 
946 at [6]. 
949 ibid at [11]. 
950 ibid as per Lord Justice Moore-Bick at [15]. 
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of the clause in concluding that no express termination of authority had been effected.951 From a 
practical standpoint, in order for retention of title clauses to be effective in affording considerable 
protection to suppliers, suppliers must now exercise the rights that they hold under their clause. 
Suppliers must exercise their rights by withdrawing the authority for buyers/ retailers to sell and 
dispose of the goods. Following the aftermath of Jet Star Retail, parties seeking to rely on retention of 
title clauses will nonetheless have to ensure that the terms and conditions which incorporate a 
retention of title clause, contain provisions which assert that during the distressed company’s current 
or impending insolvency, the supplier requires the return of all its goods which remain in the 
possession of the buyer and a provision which allows the supplier to enter the retailer’s premises to 
recover the goods.952 
 
Another fundamental provision to include and act upon pertains to the removal of the right to sell 
goods in the ordinary course of business. Despite the position of the retailer having a right to resell 
the goods in the ordinary course of business as evidenced by the Jet Star Retail case, suppliers must 
exercise and act upon this right of removal to avoid the implications described above. Exercising the 
supplier’s removal of the right to resell the goods in the ordinary course of business is clearly 
complicated by the statutory moratorium in administration. The statutory moratorium clearly 
prevents the supplier from threatening the distressed company and administrators with a claim in 
conversion as it prohibits claimants from taking any steps against the distressed company, without the 
consent of the administrator or permission of the court. For retention of title claimants to succeed in 
a claim for conversion where buyers have wrongfully interfered with goods, they must seek the 
administrators consent or permission of the court in order to withdraw its authority at the earliest 
opportunity. It is evident that prolonging or refraining from taking immediate action of withdrawing 
authority will result in failure as demonstrated by the Jet Star Retail case. Despite the supplier having 
a well-drafted set of terms and conditions which incorporate a valid retention of title clause, this will 
not assist the supplier in the event of insolvency unless the supplier exercises its rights as early as 
possible.953  
 
Another ramification of the statutory moratorium for retention of title claimants is that the above 
scenario of needing to exercise rights to withdraw authority to sell and dispose goods, has the impact 
 
951 D Milman “Security Interests and quasi-security claims in UK corporate insolvency law: current issues”, op 
cit fn 900 at 3. 
952 S Beale and G Butcher “The winner takes it all: who loses most in retail insolvencies?” (2015) Corporate 
Rescue and Insolvency, 218-220, at 218.  
953 ibid.  
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of severely weakening the bargaining position of retention of title claimants. When claimants are 
dealing with goods of a low scrap value or low resale price supplied with a retention of title clause, 
the supplier may not wish to reclaim possession as the commercial value of such goods may not be 
viable and subsequently, not worth pursuing the immediate possession of its goods. Accordingly, 
under these circumstances the supplier’s claim for conversion would be for value of the goods rather 
than the outstanding debt and as such goods of low scrap value or low resale price may be of little 
commercial interest and worth.954 Instead, suppliers opt to use the threat of a claim of conversion to 
negotiate better deals. As emphasised by Beale, a supplier may ‘use the threat of a claim of conversion 
as a bargaining tool to negotiate a higher payment in settlement.’955 However, following the outcome 
of Jet Star Retail where it was held that there was no wrongful interference with the goods and the 
supplier was unable to seek damages for conversion. This results in the weakening of suppliers 
bargaining position if the distressed company and administrators are aware that claims for conversion 
are contingent on the supplier exercising their rights at the earliest opportunity and are likely to fail if 
no such withdrawal of authority is actioned. The unlikelihood of success of a claim for conversion 
undermines the supplier’s bargaining position to negotiate higher payments.  
 
The implications and pitfalls of suppliers using retention of title clause agreements as a means of 
negotiating can be exemplified by the case of Blue Monkey Gaming956 which included a failed claim of 
conversion by the suppliers. MDM had supplied gaming machines subject to a retention of title clause 
to Frankice Ltd, who was a member of a group of companies, named the Agora Group. The retention 
of title clauses stipulated that legal ownership of the goods would be retained by the seller until the 
final settlement had been made, however the complexities of the terms varied considerably. Following 
the administration of the Agora Group, MDM claimed to be owed almost £4 million in respect of the 
gaming machines which were supplied subject to the retention of title clause. When MDM went into 
creditors voluntary liquidation, the claim was assigned by the liquidator to Blue Monkey Gaming Ltd 
(BMG). BMG subsequently claimed damages of more than £7 million against the administrators for 
causing Frankice to use MDM’s gaming machines to make money for the administration and for failing 
to deliver machines to MDM following a demand for their return. The court held that the 
administrators had never converted nor wrongfully interfered with MDM’s machines and their claim 
was subsequently dismissed. The court determined that the alleged demand for the return of the 
goods was not a genuine demand, rather it was a tactic which allowed the goods to remain in situ with 
 
954 ibid. 
955 S Beale and G Butcher “The winner takes it all: who loses most in retail insolvencies?”, op cit fn 952 at 218.  
956 Blue Monkey Gaming Ltd v Hudson [2014] 6 WLUK 458. 
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a view to strike up a deal with a new prospective buyer.957 HHJ McCahill QC held that ‘it was mere 
posturing rather than expression of a genuine desire to recover the machines. It was not a genuine 
demand.’958 The demand for the goods was also deemed inadequate as the evidence submitted by 
MDM failed to identify the property which was subject to a retention of title clause. MDM had failed 
to identify the number, type, manufacturer’s serial number or location of the machines to which it 
was claiming ownership.959 Following the case of Blue Monkey Gaming, it is evident that suppliers will 
need to be particularly cautious in reserving their rights and to be transparent on exactly what terms 
relating to possession are permitted for companies.960 When demanding goods, retention of title 
claimants will also have to clearly identify the goods and location in as much detail as possible.  
 
To avoid the consequences of Jet Star Retail and Blue Monkey Gaming it may be advantageous for 
suppliers to withdraw the company’s rights to sell the goods as soon as it is feasible, in order to reduce 
any doubts of the supplier’s intentions and providing sufficient evidence to the court, if needed. In the 
situation where retention of title claimants take no action to negotiate for the continued use of goods, 
it likely that the courts will interpret this as the claimants having consented to such use gratis, and as 
such retention of title claimants must act accordingly. Alternatively, another riskier recourse for this 
situation may be to incorporate a clause in the contract from the onset, seeking to avoid the above 
situation altogether by stipulating that the supplier will withdraw his authority automatically after a 
set period. However, it may be argued that incorporation of this term may prove difficult, especially 
in trying to get the buyer to assent to such terms from the onset. But if the term is successfully 
incorporated, this approach would once again bypass the consequences highlighted by the two cases 
above. Although it is submitted that the former approach is much less risky than attempting to 
incorporate a further term within the contract. Beale suggests an alternative approach by 
recommending suppliers to send lorries to recover the goods at the earliest possible opportunity 
before any moratorium as [suppliers] ‘may find directors a more attractive pressure point that a 
subsequent administrator and may hope to act before any form of moratorium is in place.’961 Clearly, 
this emphasises the inherent difficulties associated with the moratorium and advises suppliers to act 
prior to the imposition of the moratorium. The suggestion of recovering goods by sending lorries at 
the earliest opportunity, epitomises the despondency of the situation once a moratorium has come 
 
957 ibid at [429]. 
958 ibid at [525]. 
959 ibid at [516]. 
960 S Beale “No respite for retail: the sector that keeps on giving” (2017) Corporate Rescue and Insolvency, 117-




into place, and thus it may be to the advantage of suppliers to do all that they can to preserve their 
position from the outset.  
 
6.1.3 (c) Causes significant disruption  
 
Taking a holistic approach, some stakeholders of the company, most notably directors or the 
associated workforce of the distressed company will benefit from the possibility of rehabilitation 
during the moratorium.962 Accordingly, the alternative argument to the one put forward throughout 
this chapter would be that incidentally the moratorium could also benefit creditors and retention of 
title holders. Considering the purpose of administration and conditions for making an administration 
order. Paragraph 11 of Schedule B1 states:  
‘The court may make an administration order in relation to a company only if satisfied— 
(a) That the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts, and 
(b) That the administration order is reasonably likely to achieve the purpose of administration.’963 
As such, the statutory moratorium affords creditors the opportunity to recover their debts through 
providing the possibility of rehabilitation or rescue of a distressed company which is reasonably likely 
to succeed in the purpose of administration. It is also appreciated that the moratorium has the 
potential to afford creditors a better opportunity to recover debts, compared to the unfavourable 
prospects of recovery in the event of insolvency.  However, in order to refute this claim, it is submitted 
that there is no guarantee that the distressed company can be salvaged by rescue procedures, 
irrespective of whether administration prospects are reasonably likely. Furthermore, the uncertainty 
of this is emphasised by the lack of empirical research conducted which affirms that the prospects are 
greatly enhanced by effective rescue models compared to the minimum amount expected to receive 
on the liquidation of a company.964 Of course, there are notable examples of successful 
administrations to recount, however this area is still lacking sufficient statistics on the apparent 
success facilitated by the statutory moratorium.965 Additionally, there is further uncertainty as to the 
criterion of a successful rescue which in fact may be less encouraging that the term suggests, with the 
 
962 D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”, op cit fn 903 at 90. 
963 Paragraph 11, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
964 See generally, D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue” op cit fn 903 at 95, 
where Milman emphasises the limited empirical research in this field and refers to his own empirical research 
which focuses on the performance of CVAs: See D Milman and F Chittenden, Corporate Rescue--CVAs and the 
Challenge of Small Companies, ACCA Research Report No.44, 1995; G Cook, N Pandit and D Milman [2000] 38 
Jo. of Small Bus. Man. 78; N Pandit, G Cook, D Milman and F Chittenden [2000] 7 Jo. of Small Bus. and Ent. Dev. 
241. 
965 See further, I Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 3rd Ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, at 515. 
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notion merely referring to the orderly realisation or sale of assets/ the company.966 Despite the limited 
empirical research on the prospects of companies being salvaged by the statutory moratorium, 
confirming that the rescue procedure does indeed enhance the prospects of companies being 
rehabilitated, the insolvency statistics produced by the government, consistently report high levels of 
administrations.967 During the first quarter of 2019, there were 451 administrations, which amounted 
to the highest number of administrations over the last five years.968 In 2020, the total number of 
administrations decreased to 404.969 These figures serve to emphasise that the high number of 
administrations can significantly impede or delay those seeking to claim their goods under retention 
of title clauses. Despite the honourable intentions of administration, in reality this could be of 
detriment to any potential creditors/ retention of title holders seeking a quick adjudication of their 
claim due to the fact that they will ultimately be subjected to further delays, disruptions and 
uncertainties.  
 
Another factor which delays retention of title holders in dealing with their claim in a timely manner is 
that they themselves bear the responsibility of identifying and providing title to the goods. The case 
of Blue Monkey Gaming also clarified that the seller of the goods bears the responsibility for 
identifying and proving title to the goods under a retention of title clause and not the administrator.970  
HHJ McCahill QC held that the administrators were not obliged to compile an inventory of assets nor 
obliged to identify machines owned by individual third parties.971 The extent of the administrators’ 
obligation is to ‘permit and supervise access to an alleged owner to enable it to identify its own goods 
and then to adjudicate on any claim arising on the basis of all the evidence supplied.’972 In practical 
terms, retention of title claimants must ensure that they compile a detailed inventory of claimed 
assets and arrange an appointment with the administrator to identify and segregate those assets. 
Retention of title holders must submit adequate evidence supporting their claim which clearly 
 
966 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, op cit fn 190 at 341.  
967 The Insolvency Service, Companies Insolvency Statistics, Q1 January to March 2019, (2019) Available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/798393/
Commentary_-_Company_Insolvency_Statistics_Q1_2019.pdf Accessed 04/08/2020. 
968 ibid. 
969 The emergence of the coronavirus pandemic may have impacted the overall insolvency statistics as 
insolvency practitioners, Companies House and the courts were not able to process insolvencies in the usual 
manner during the first lockdown period. Additionally, the overall numbers of insolvencies remained low 
during this period partly driven by the Government responses measures to the coronavirus pandemic. As such 
caution needs to be applied when interpreting these statistics. See further, The Insolvency Service, Monthly 
Insolvency Statistics, June 2020, (2020) Available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905189/
Monthly__Insolvency_Statistics_June_2020_-Updated.pdf Accessed 04/08/2020. 
970 E Baskind, G Osborne and L Roach, Commercial Law, op cit fn 441 at 256.  
971 Blue Monkey Gaming Ltd v Hudson, op cit fn 956 at [155]. 
972 ibid.  
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specifies the goods in question. It is clear from Blue Monkey Gaming that the court will not accept 
insufficient evidence such as invoices which fail to specify the goods subject to a retention of title 
claim nor prove that the clause was successfully incorporated into the contract.973  Administrators 
allow retention of title claimants, under supervision, to segregate and make their goods identifiable 
by means of stickers/markers etc. to facilitate the final determination of the claim. The burden of 
identifying goods and establishing title falls solely on the seller of the goods claiming to retain title. As 
such, the moratorium continues to suspend the enforcement of rights and provides significant 
disruption to those affected, including retention of title holders.  
6.2 Lifting the moratorium  
 
The burden of proof rests on the party seeking to lift the moratorium.974 If a retention of title holder 
seeks to bring an action against a company in administration, they must gain the consent of the 
administrator or be granted permission by the court. As such suppliers of goods are unable to rely on 
their contractual rights of recovery until they have obtained permission.975 No indication is provided 
by the Insolvency Act about how the courts or administrator will use their discretion in granting 
permission.976 
 
In practical terms, it is often quicker to ascertain consent from the administrator rather than making 
an application to the courts. As such holders of retention of title clauses and those governed by 
paragraph 44 of Schedule B1 must face additional administrative duties and burdens of 
communicating to administrators requesting consent in order to exercise their rights. Such 
correspondence requires detailed information outlining their legal basis such as identifying whether 
they have any security or proprietary interests over the assets of the company and the detriment 
caused from suspending their legal rights by virtue of the moratorium. As aforementioned, the burden 
of proof lies on the party seeking leave and as such they must make an application promptly in order 
to satisfy that there is an arguable case. Accordingly, holders of retention of title clauses are subjected 
to further pressures of having to make their application in a timely manner and gather all of the 
required evidence. Of course, the administrator may refuse to grant leave on lifting the moratorium 
and as such the holders of retention of title clauses are unable to take proposed action until they 
obtain a court order granting permission. It is evident that those party seeking the courts permission 
 
973 See further, Blue Monkey Gaming Ltd v Hudson, op cit fn 956 at [419-429]. 
974 D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”, op cit fn 903 at 99.  
975 D Milman “Administration orders: the moratorium feature”, op cit fn 905 at 75. 
976 S Wheeler “Insolvency Act 1986 and retention of title clauses”, op cit fn 942 at 277.  
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will incur cost and time ramifications. In practical terms, if the administrators refuse to provide their 
consent, then they are delayed further from exercising their rights, awaiting the permission of the 
courts. It is clear that holders of retention of title clauses are under substantial administrative burden 
in attempting to enforce security over their assets or repossess their assets which are not in their 
immediate possession.   
 
6.2.1  Guidelines for granting leave  
 
A body of case law has emerged concerning lifting the moratorium and subsequently granting leave 
to allow secured creditors to either enforce their security or to enable an owner of a hire purchase 
agreement or equivalent to repossess goods which are in the possession of the company in 
administration. Due to the ramifications involved in granting leave, such a decision must not be taken 
lightly by the court so accordingly, a court must take into account a number of considerations in the 
process of deliberating whether to grant leave. In Re Atlantic Computer977 the court was invited to 
clarify principles to be applied on applications for leave, however the court was reluctant to do this as 
they did not want to limit the courts’ discretion.978 However, the court recognised the necessity for 
some general guidance for insolvency and legal practitioners and proceeded to make some general 
observations, which are discussed in detail further below.  
 
In the general context of administration, the court is obliged to balance competing interests, 
particularly in situations which may impact the process of administration. But what is meant by the 
phrase to balance competing interest? To clarify this point, it has been consistently emphasised by 
case law that the court must balance competing interests of the secured creditor against any other 
creditors within the process of administration.979 The notion of the courts balancing competing 
interests of a secured creditor on the one hand and the other general creditors on the other, arises in 
two administration situations. Firstly, the process of balancing such competing interests arises when 
an application is made to lift the moratorium and secondly, when an administrator intends to dispose 
of goods which are subject to a hire purchase agreement, as if the rights of the owner under the 
agreement were vested in. Accordingly, the following section will thus shed light on what the courts 
 
977 Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] 2 WLR 367. 
978 P Fidler “Administration: leave to enforce security on property rights” op cit fn 928 at 80. 
979 See further, Re Meesan Investments Ltd [1988] 4 B.C.C. 788 and Bristol Airport Plc v Powdrill [1990] Ch. 744; 
[1990] B.C.L.C. 585. 
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must consider in the context of balancing competing interests. In order to grasp the meaning of 
balancing competing interests, we turn to judicial pronouncement.  
 
The Court of Appeal specified how the court or administrator should carry out this balancing exercise 
in the landmark decision of Re Atlantic Computer. In this case, several observations were made in 
relation to cases where leave is sought for parties attempting to enforce their existing security or 
proprietary rights, against a company in administration. The general observations made by the Court 
of Appeal can be summarised briefly as follows:  
If granting leave to exercise the security rights or repossessing the goods is unlikely to impede the 
‘purpose’ of administration, then in such normal circumstances, leave should be granted by the court. 
If granting leave would lead to the impediment of the purpose of administration, then this is when the 
court must carry out a balancing exercise of legitimate interests. The Court of Appeal found that a 
pragmatic approach should be taken in balancing individual and collective creditor rights. In addition, 
the guidelines laid down by the court also call for the exercise of judicial judgement, considering all of 
the circumstances of the case. The guidelines set by Nicholls LJ emphasised the need to give priority 
to proprietary interests of the secured creditor.980 It is stressed that the administration procedure 
should not benefit unsecured creditors and consequently prejudice those who have existing 
proprietary rights. Additionally, leave will normally be granted in circumstances where such a refusal 
would lead to the creditor incurring significant loss. For this purpose, loss is defined widely, 
encompassing both direct and indirect financial loss. However, if greater loss would be sustained by 
others or if such a loss would be disproportionate to the benefit of granting leave, this may be a 
deciding factor in rejecting leave to lift the moratorium. All of the above factors may prove to be 
relevant in deciding whether the court should grant or refuse leave. Additionally, the court 
emphasised that the list is not exhaustive and further factors may prove to be material for example 
considering the general conduct of the parties.981  
 
On the point of balancing interests of secured and unsecured creditors, we look to the case of UK 
Housing Alliance982 where Martin Mann QC clarified ‘the Court is required when considering whether 
or not to exercise its jurisdiction to grant permission to enforce its securities under paragraph 43 of 
Schedule B1 to balance the interests of the secured and unsecured creditors only if the relevant 
property is required for the purposes of administration.’983 
 
980 Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc, op cit fn 977 as per Nicholls LJ at [542]. 
981 ibid. 
982 UK Housing Alliance (North West)(in admin) [2013] EWHC 2553 (Ch). 




The Re Atlantic Computer guidelines were considered and applied in TPS Investment (UK) Ltd984, a case 
which considered four applications which arose from the administration of a company, TPS 
Investments (UK) Ltd. For the purposes of this discussion, the third application will be considered and 
analysed. The respondent of this case, Hutchinson had applied for permission to enforce its security 
over commercial properties under paragraph 43 of Schedule B1. In determining the application and 
conducting the exercise of balancing competing interests, His Honour Judge Stephen Davies, 
emphasised that the court should grant leave where such situations are unlikely to impede the 
purposes of administration and that great weight must be given to proprietary interests.985 Further 
clarification for giving sufficient weight to proprietary interests was provided by His Honour Judge 
Stephen Davies, who considered whether allowing Hutchinson to enforce his security would prejudice 
the interests of any unsecured creditors and secured creditors.986  
 
Accordingly, it has been stressed that on this basis ‘it is clear that proprietary enforcement rights are 
marginalised if substantial harm would be done to the administration.’987 Adopting a balance of 
interest approach means that the retention of title holders and equivalents categorised under ‘hire-
purchase agreement’ find their interests subordinated by the interests of the insolvent company or 
other creditors.988 As such, despite best intentions to provide a flexible approach of balancing 
competing interests, it is evident that a fair balance between the general bodies of creditors has not 
been achieved.  
 
The statutory moratorium is curtailing their ability to exercise their contractual rights and it is clear 
that the requirement of balancing competing interests sets a difficult threshold to meet in order to 
grant leave. On the one hand the extensive guidelines set down in Re Atlantic Computer ensures 
flexibility of approach in order to serve the ‘purpose’ of administration, however on the other hand, 
it is suggested that by trying to promote the rescue culture and overall purpose of administration, 
proprietary interests are easily subordinated in favour of salvaging the distressed company.  
 
Undertaking a careful balancing act is not the most appropriate method for deciding whether leave 
should be granted or refused as such guidelines seem to disadvantage retention of title holders and 
 
984 Re TPS Investments (UK) Ltd (in administration); Tailby (as joint administrators of TPS Investments (UK) Ltd v 
Hutchinson Telecom FZCO [2018] EWHC 360 (Ch). 
985 ibid as per His Honour Judge Stephen Davies at [76-82]. 
986 ibid at [80]. 
987 D Milman “Administration orders: the moratorium feature”, op cit fn 905 at 73.  
988 S Wheeler “Insolvency Act 1986 and retention of title clauses”, op cit fn 942 at 278.  
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other hire-purchase agreements. For example, one of the suggestions note that leave would be 
granted if significant loss would otherwise be suffered by a lessor. However, it is evident that if leave 
would not be granted then the retention of title holder will irrespectively incur losses. From a practical 
perspective, retention of title holders may not satisfy the requirement of significant loss but would 
nevertheless incur losses if leave to lift the moratorium would be refused. This again would be most 
evident for parties with retention of title clauses on goods of low sale value. The proposed guidelines 
seem to benefit the distressed company serving the purpose of administration, thus subrogating other 
competing interests including the retention of title holder.  
 
Although it is appreciated that the proposed guidelines are merely suggestive in nature and the court 
has discretion to grant or refuse leave. It appears that it is impossible to satisfy all of the parties 
involved in administration as granting leave to exercise proprietary rights is likely to impede the 
purpose of administration. Both are contradictory as granting leave to lift the moratorium may reduce 
the pool of assets available to the distressed company, making the process of rehabilitation even more 
difficult to accomplish. As such a cyclical issue is inevitably apparent where balancing the interest of 
one interested party is detrimental to the other. As evidenced above, the courts have clearly struggled 
with the difficult interface between the statutory moratorium and the recovery expectations of third 
parties such as the retention of title holder or creditors. Furthermore, the courts have had further 
difficulty balancing the language of the statute and the precedents affirming the need to be flexible 
and inclusive in their approach. There has been a general reluctance by parliament to address these 
potential conflicts within the established law and as such the courts have been left to fend and iron 
out these complicated matters, inevitably with controversial results.989 These difficult and problematic 
balancing requirements have caused significant uncertainty and a lack of clarity within the insolvency 
field, which ultimately hinders the operation of retention of title clauses in practice.  
 
6.2.2 An illustrative example: Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton 
 
A case which dealt with a supplier seeking the court’s consent to repossess goods under a retention 
of title clause is Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton.990 This case illustrates the difficulties imposed on retention 
of title holders seeking to repossess goods during the statutory moratorium in administration. In this 
case, two applications were made by Fashoff and Forall to exercise their retention of title clauses in 
respect of goods, which were sold to a company (Baron Jon Menswear Ltd) which had entered into 
 
989 D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”, op cit fn 903 at 106.  
990 Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton [2008] EWHC 537. 
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administration. Both Fashoff and Forall were seeking to gain permission from the court to enforce 
their retention of title clauses, a clause which allegedly formed part of their terms and conditions of 
the contract between the two applicants and Baron Jon Menswear Ltd. The applications were made 
under paragraph 43(3) of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act, seeking to repossess the goods under the 
hire purchase agreement, which were subsequently in the company’s possession.  
 
The factual background of this case was that Baron Jon Menswear, a clothing business had entered 
administration and an administrator (Linton) was appointed. Shortly after the appointment, the 
administrator arranged to sell the company’s assets and stock, before receiving notice of any claims 
pertaining to retention of title. The stock sold by the administrator, included stock which Baron Jon 
Menswear had purchased from different suppliers. This stock was subject to retention of title clauses 
held by both applicants.  
 
Both Fashoff and Forall’s applications were considered and dealt with individually by the court. The 
factual background of both applications will now be provided, starting with the former. The facts for 
Fashoff’s case background are as follows. From the onset, the administrator agreed that they would 
honour any claims pertaining to a valid retention of title clause, if they received evidence before a 
prescribed date. In order for Fashoff to pursue its claim for the goods which were subject to a retention 
of title clause, Fashoff had to evidence that Baron Jon had agreed to Fashoff’s terms of incorporating 
a retention of title clause and explain how they could identify the unpaid goods from those goods 
which had already been paid for. With the intention of pursuing a claim under terms retaining title, it 
was imperative that the administrator was provided with evidence that the goods were supplied 
directly from Fashoff rather than a third party. The above questions were posed to Fashoff by the 
administrator in the form a letter. Despite numerous correspondence between the administrator’s 
agent and Fashoff, Fashoff had failed to respond to the questions posed within the prescribed 
timeframe, instead the correspondence insisted for copies of the stock inventory. Further concerns 
were raised as Fashoff’s terms were subject to Italian law under Condition 17. Under Italian law, in 
order to be valid, retention of title clauses must be registered. Fashoff had failed to provide a 
substantive reply to this query either. Subsequently, Fashoff sent a letter requesting consent from the 
administrator claiming a retention of title clause on a new set of terms and conditions were governed 
by English law. This letter was requesting the permission of the administrator to enforce security over 
Baron Jon’s stock. Once again, Fashoff had failed to provide the administrator any evidence that the 
contractual terms relied upon were agreed by Baron Jon within the prescribed timeframe. The 
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prescribed date for honouring retention of title claims had since long passed.991 Accordingly, the 
decision was taken to court.  
 
Moving on to discuss Forall’s claim, the facts are as follows, a confirmation order by Forall pursuant 
to agreement stated:  
‘the factor shall acquire the title of property to assigned debts with all the relevant accessories, liens, 
pledges and collaterals in general. Therefore, the supplier shall no longer dispose of the debts assigned 
to the factor.’992  
Subsequently, Forall notified the administrator (Linton) that the goods were delivered under a 
retention of title claim and requested that any unsold goods be returned. The administrator’s agent 
responded to the correspondence, requesting evidence that Baron Jon had been made aware of the 
terms of the contract, most specifically the retention of title clause and whether the unpaid goods 
could be identified. Forall had not demonstrated a way of differentiating the unpaid goods from goods 
which had been paid for and additionally failed to provide evidence that Forall’s terms had been 
agreed by Baron Jon. For such reasons, the administrator was recommending that the claim should be 
rejected. Forall responded by disputing the rejection of the claim. Four months after Forall’s claim had 
been rejected, Forall sent further correspondence to the administrator with a signed copy of an order 
between Forall and Baron Jon. Consequently, the decision was challenged and taken to court.  
 
As such, the administrator sought to dispute the claim as Forall had failed to provide evidence that 
Baron Jon had agreed to the contractual terms at the time that the purchase agreement had been 
made and that the time frame in which any claims to retention of title clause would be honoured had 
subsequently long expired. For the former requirement, this follows the reasoning set out in Re David 
Meek Plant Ltd993, which states that the claim must be considered at the date when the application 
was made. It was also argued by the respondents that in relation to Fashoff’s claim, the retention of 
title clause had not been properly incorporated into the contract as the clauses had been printed as 
circulars and on the reverse of confirmation invoices. Additionally, in considering Forall’s claim, it was 
contended that it remained questionable as to whether the terms had been properly incorporated as 
there was no order form signed by Baron Jon agreeing to Forall’s terms. As such, this provided 
justification for the administrator rejecting consent to any claim pertaining to a retention of title.  
 
 
991 ibid at [41]. 
992 Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton, op cit fn 990 at [44]. 
993 Re David Meek Plant Ltd, op cit fn 922 at [686]. 
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The court considered the guidance set by Re Atlantic Computer in deliberating whether the court 
should grant leave to exercise proprietary rights against the company in administration. A court is 
permitted to grant leave unless such actions would likely to impede the purpose of administration.994 
The guidance highlighted the need to balance the legitimate interests of the applicant against the 
legitimate needs of any other creditors of the company. In the process of conducting this balancing 
exercise, the court also emphasised the need to give weight or ensure great importance is given to 
proprietary rights.995  
 
In considering Fashoff’s case, the court concluded that the applicants had delayed making an 
application to the court and it was contended that such actions had prejudiced the creditors of the 
company. The period of delay amounted to around seven months for Fashoff’s application. 
Accordingly, the administrator was unable to take action and make a distribution to creditors until 
such applications have been resolved. Additionally, it was held that the period of delay of seven 
months did not meet the requirement that an application should be made promptly. The court also 
argued that in relation to Fashoff’s claim, no compelling evidence was provided which supported that 
the Baron Jon had consented to incorporating a retention of title clause within their contractual terms. 
Following this reasoning, HHJ Toulmin QC dismissed the Fashoff’s application for leave. 
 
Whilst deliberating Forall’s claim, again the court emphasised and relied upon the period of delay, 
which was estimated at nearly eight months between Forall’s notification of rejection and the 
subsequent application to the court. HHJ Toulmin QC stated that ‘the delay in the context of purpose 
of the legislation was substantial and contrary to the requirement that any application should be made 
promptly.’996 For such reasons, it was held that granting leave would impede the purpose of 
administration and that Forall did not have any standing to his claim purporting to retain title. 
Consequently, both applications were refused.  
 
The above case is useful in illustrating the potential difficulties facing retention of title holders seeking 
to exercise their retention of title claims and repossess goods, during a moratorium. It is conclusive 
that parties must exercise their claims within the prescribed time frame set by the administrator. In 
this respect, the administrator will make it clear that any retention of title claims will be honoured for 
a reasonable period of time after the sale. However, if the timeframe has long since elapsed, then as 
 
994 Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton, op cit fn 990 at [94]. 
995 Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc, op cit fn 977 as per Nicholls LJ at [542]. 
996 Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton, op cit fn 990 at [110]. 
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demonstrated by both Fashoff’s and Forall’s applications, the courts will not allow parties to exercise 
their retention of title claims, which are made after the course of the administration.  
 
Additionally, as emphasised above by Fashoff’s application, parties must provide evidence to the 
administrator or the court that the contractual terms, more specifically the retention of title clause 
have been agreed by both parties. Evidence of incorporating the retention of title clause is thus crucial 
in seeking to exercise contractual rights during a moratorium in administration. This proved to be fatal 
flaw in the case of Fashoff’s application as there was no direct evidence that the contractual terms 
had been agreed by Baron Jon. Accordingly, it is imperative that parties are cooperative and most 
importantly, act in a timely manner. In addition to this, the administrator must be provided evidence 
that the goods have been supplied directly from the owner of the goods, rather than a third party, as 
well as be satisfied that the unpaid goods which are subject to a retention of title claim can be 
identified from goods which have already been paid for. In respect of the above case, the latter 
requirement was easily satisfied as each piece of clothing was branded with a unique tag and thus 
could be easily traced. However, providing an administrator with evidence of how goods subject to 
retention of title claims can be identified and thus distinguished from the remaining bulk of goods, 
may not be so easy for retention of title holders who are not in the clothing industry.  
 
Accordingly, the case of Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton illustrates how holders of retention of title clauses 
are excessively burdened in the process of seeking to exercise their contractual rights during the 
moratorium in administration. One can argue that the moratorium in administration impedes the 
overall effectiveness of retention of title clauses on account of all the burdensome requirements 
imposed on the parties seeking to exercise their claims.  
 
6.3 Potential recourse for wrongful refusal 
 
It has been repeatedly emphasised by the court that Schedule B1 and the provisions of paragraph 43 
and 44 merely impose a suspension on creditors’ rights, as discussed in detail above. Consequently, 
the moratorium directly impacts the enforcement of such rights, rather than altering or destroying 
those rights altogether. Accordingly, where the administrator has decided to refuse leave to the 
creditor or owner of goods, this judgement may be reviewed in respect of whether the decision was 
found to be wrongful in any way. The decision may be reviewed in considering the subsequent impact 
of the refusal upon the creditor. As such, in certain circumstances, it may be possible to refute the 
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refusal of leave and bring a claim for compensation on the grounds of wrongful refusal.997 Providing 
creditors the opportunity to challenge a moratorium, allows claimants to raise objections and indicate 
where their interests have been unfairly prejudiced.  
 
An example of an administrator found to have been wrongful, is exemplified in the case of Re Capitol 
Films Ltd998 (also known as Rubin v Cobalt Pictures Ltd.) In this case, the court was required to 
determine whether the decision of the administrator was appropriate in preventing a holder of a fixed 
charge from enforcing its security. The administrator was found to have behaved in an unreasonable 
manner by withholding consent to enforce security. The administrators conduct was found to be 
unreasonable and had failed to properly investigate a fixed charge claim and had failed to engage 
constructively with the secured creditors. The conduct of the administrators had been unreasonable 
to such an extent that the court responded by imposing an adverse cost order as well as an order 
which deprived the administrator of the right to recoup the costs as an expense of the administrator. 
Under paragraph 71 of Schedule B1, the administrators had to pay the costs of the application 
personally and on an indemnity basis. The conduct of the administrator was held to be unreasonable 
to such a degree that it justified the court to seek an order preventing the administrator from 
recovering any costs. As stated by Mr Richard Snowden QC ‘in my judgement, this conduct of the 
application made by the Administrators was out of the norm and was unreasonable to a sufficiently 
high level to justify an award of costs on an indemnity basis.’999 It follows that in order for the court to 
justify making an order, there needs to be a significant level of unreasonableness or inappropriate 
behaviour.  
 
As illustrated above, in rare circumstances it may be possible to refute refusal of leave and bring an 
action for compensation. However, in order for the court to justify making such a decision, the conduct 
of the administrator’s needs to be irrational and unreasonable to a high degree and the burden of 
proof is on the secured creditors to demonstrate that the administrators had disregarded the concerns 
of the secured creditors.1000 In practical terms, administrators are supposed to serve the interests of 
creditors or owners of goods and as such it may prove difficult in evidencing that the administrators 
had subverted their duty to serve the interests of creditors during the process of administration. 
Applying the judgement of Re Capitol Films Ltd, from the perspective of the secured creditor or owner 
of goods, the combination of needing to prove that the administrator’s conduct was sufficiently 
 
997 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd and another v Sibec Developments Ltd, op cit fn 920. 
998 Re Capitol Films Ltd [2010] EWHC 3223 (Ch); [2011] B.P.I.R 334. 
999 ibid as per Mr. Richard Snowden QC at [97]. 
1000 See further, Re Capitol Films Ltd, op cit fn 998 as per Mr. Richard Snowden QC at [98]. 
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irrational and unreasonable as well as demonstrating that the administrators had disregarded the 
interests of secured creditors, imposes a very high threshold. This further illustrates why the statutory 
moratorium imposes a hindrance on the effectiveness of retention of title clauses. In order to be 
successful in refuting a refusal by the administrators, retention of title holders or those seeking to 
enforce their security rights must overcome a burdensome process. It is also apparent that the secured 
creditors or owners of goods will potentially be subjected to further cost expenditures and delays from 
enforcing their security rights in waiting for the court to determine whether it was appropriate to 




The statutory moratorium provides an important prohibition of proceedings, however it is submitted 
that it also imposes significant limitations on the enforcement of security and other proprietary rights 
against the company. This issue is exacerbated further by definitional issues as there is still a degree 
of ambiguity surrounding terminology used by the Insolvency Act 1986. Retention of title clauses are 
hindered unnecessarily by virtue of the Act providing a separate definition for retention of title clauses 
and grouping such clauses under the category of hire-purchase arrangements. The definition 
prescribed by section 251 has been criticised for its lack of clarity and overlapping nature with other 
provisions of the Act.1001 To this day, it is still unknown as to why retention of title clauses are 
segregated from the category of conditional sale agreements. Especially, considering it is incredibly 
difficult to conjure an example of a retention of title clause which does not fall within the definition 
of a conditional sale agreement. Clearly, the legislation fails to understand and grapple with the nature 
of a retention of title clause and has unnecessarily complicated matters and produced significant 
definitional uncertainty. The definitional issues can be exemplified by the uncertainty surrounding the 
term ‘taking steps’ to enforce claims as despite rigorous judicial pronouncement, ambiguity still 
persists. Clearly, retention of title holders’ actions are restricted to having to obtain permission from 
the court or administrator to proceed with their claim to repossess goods supplied or risk breaching 
the provisions under paragraph 43(4). Paragraph 43(3) of Schedule B1 prevents a retention of title 
holder from taking steps to repossess goods in the possession of the company. From the outset this 
clearly weakens the functional objective of a retention of title clause in the context of a company 
entering into administration. Despite the conceptual objective of a retention of title clause in allowing 
 
1001 See generally, R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, op cit fn 61 at 433, para 11-63.  
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a seller to retrieve goods in the event of a non-paying buyer, clearly in practice, claimants are impeded 
from doing so without permission from the court/ administrator.  
 
Additionally, the statutory moratorium disrupts the notion of collectivism which retention of title 
holders are a party to and thus, any disruption causes significant issues for parties seeking to realise 
assets of company in an orderly fashion. The tendency of the courts is to resolve any difficult case by 
promoting the collective good,1002 which has inevitably impacted upon parties seeking to enforce their 
proprietary rights against the distressed company. The courts have clearly struggled with the two 
fundamental dichotomies within this field of insolvency law; the first pertaining to the interface 
between the statutory moratorium and the recovery expectations of the third parties; and the final 
dichotomy refers to the difficulty of balancing the language of the provisions of the Insolvency Act and 
the precedents outlining the need for the courts to be inclusive in their approach. The resulting 
conclusion is that the law has dealt with this minefield of difficult conflicts in a way which has caused 
significant uncertainty for those parties seeking to realise their claims including retention of title 
holders. Over twenty year ago, the state of insolvency law had been described by Finch as: 
‘A pragmatic tradition manifested itself in piecemeal development of the law; reactive solutions were 
adopted rather than coherent frameworks of principles; and legal provisions were scattered 
throughout a plurality of statutes, statutory instruments and judicial decisions.’1003 Umfreville 
advocates that such a statement accurately reflects the status of the current insolvency 
framework1004- a statement wholly supported by this author.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of clarity imposed by the courts significantly impedes the functionality of 
suppliers using retention of title clauses in practice. The moratorium temporarily freezes the rights of 
the parties, which again hinders the functional objective of a retention of title clause. Essentially, the 
statutory moratorium imposes a barrier to the enforcement of these title retention agreements.  
Parties will not be able to reclaim possession of their goods until consent or permission is obtained. 
Arguably, this weakens the commercial utility of the retention of title clause as the protection offered 
will be second-rate to parties obtaining consent from the administrator or courts. The functional use 
of retention of title claims are severely impeded by the need to ascertain permission by an external 
body to enforce their claims. In addition, following the implications of Jet Star Retail, retention of title 
clause must exercise the rights that they hold under their claims by withdrawing the authority for 
 
1002 D Milman “Administration orders: the moratorium feature”, op cit fn 905 at 75.  
1003 V Finch, “The Measures of Insolvency Law” (1997) 17(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 227-251, at 228.  
1004 C Umfreville “Pre-packed administrations and company voluntary arrangements: the case for a holistic 
approach to reform” (2019) 30(11) International Company and Commercial Law Review, 581-603, at 602.  
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buyers to sell and dispose of the goods. Thus, adding to the burden imposed on retention of title 
claimants during the administration proceedings. The rescue culture enshrined by the statutory 
moratorium tends to be more benevolent to the distressed company, whereas retention of title 
claimants and other creditors seeking to enforce their contractual rights are subjected to the court’s 
stringent approach and the timely delays stemmed from the administration process.  
 
The statutory moratorium imposes an increasingly difficult threshold for retention of title claimants 
to meet when making an order to grant leave. When demanding goods, retention of title claimants 
will have to clearly identify the goods and location in as much detail as possible to facilitate the role 
of the administrator during the proceedings. In practical terms, retention of title claimants must work 
diligently to compile detailed inventory of the claimed assets and arrange appointments to identify 
those assets. Evidently, the burden of identifying goods and establishing title falls solely on the seller 
of the goods claiming to retain title. The claim for supplied goods under a retention of title clause can 
be easily defeated by an administrator holding that there is insufficient or inadequate evidence 
proving the existence of such a clause. The role of the courts in facilitating arrangements of lifting the 
moratorium, does not often culminate in the successful recovery of goods and often exposes those 
parties to further unnecessary litigation. As emphasised by Milman, ‘the hostile nature of 
administration in the sense of its impact on outside stakeholders can also generate costly contested 
litigation.’1005 Accordingly, this substantially increases the administrative burden on those seeking to 
enforce their contractual agreements and prove existence of their retention of title claims. 
Furthermore, it cannot be disputed that the statutory moratorium introduces significant hindrances 
for those seeking to rely on their retention of title provisions, most notably by exposing those 
claimants to considerable delays and disruptions. The duration of the moratorium which can be 
extended can also impact the commercial value of goods which could lower during the moratorium 
period and can weaken the bargaining position of retention of title claimants by preventing suppliers 
from seeking damages for conversion. The above discussion has illustrated the many potential 
difficulties facing retention of title holders seeking to exercise their title retention claims and 
repossess goods, during a moratorium. 
 
It is evident for the reasons discussed in this chapter that the statutory moratorium as provided by 
Schedule B1 fails to balance the competing interests between on the one hand ensuring creditor 
protection, and on the other affording distressed companies a period of relief for the possibility of 
 
1005 D Milman “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”, op cit fn 903 at 95.  
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rescue and rehabilitation. Less affinity is shown for rights which are created by security or perform the 


































CHAPTER 7: SUGGESTED PROPOSALS FOR REFORM  
 
7. Introduction  
 
 
A primary aim of this research enquiry was to illustrate notable issues which limit the effectiveness of 
retention of title clauses. Having identified the main problems restricting retention of title clauses 
from fulfilling their main functional objectives of mitigating sellers’ risk, the research will now suggest 
potential solutions to the problems raised. Having documented the main issues hindering retention of 
title clauses throughout this thesis, the discussion will now turn to suggesting proposals for a 
reanalysis of the legal position pertaining to retention of title clauses. It is hoped that the following 
section on potential solutions can demonstrate how this research can be developed further in the 
future.  
 
As is the case with any proposals for reform, the breadth of possible directions to take is vast in scope. 
Accordingly, it is not the author’s intention to examine all possible recourses for rectifying the 
minefield of legal issues associated with the way the clauses are treated under English law. As such, 
the following discussion will examine three possible suggestions as to how the law can respond to the 
wide-ranging ramifications of the current unsatisfactory position under English law. It is felt that the 
following three proposals tackle the most significant issues pertaining to the current legal position of 
retention of title clauses and as such, warranted detailed consideration. The suggestions are an 
amalgamation of both short-term solutions and long-term reform initiatives. It is worth noting that 
the following suggestions are not the author’s original creation and thus, the upcoming discussion will 
build upon existing material/ arguments and due recognition of any proposed reform initiatives will 
be given to the appropriate author. The first suggestion proposes a revaluation of the passing of title, 
whereby title passes immediately before the goods are destroyed.1006 The second suggestion calls for 
more broader reform initiatives by amending the Sale of Goods Act 1979.1007 The final suggestion 
 
1006 This suggestion was proposed by Tettenborn in A Tettenborn “Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a 
Sale Not a Sale?” (2016) 1 Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 24-28. Similar suggestions 
advocating for the ‘nanosecond’ argument can be found in D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 
101; and the work of K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses 
Shrank the English Law of Sales”, op cit fn 4. 
1007 A version of this argument is made by Gullifer who advocates for the redrafting of the Sale of Goods Act to 
ensure a wider application by including all of the circumstances which goods are supplied to businesses in the 
modern context, including the inclusion of the new sui generis contracts, supply of services and digital content. 
See further, L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?” op cit fn 60. 
Additionally, Saidov proposes to change the Sale of Goods Act to specially reform price action and to 
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discusses the feasibility of the recharacterization of a retention of title clause as a registrable 
charge.1008  Due to the timing of this thesis, the author acknowledges the difficulties of reforming this 
area of law in an imminent manner, as evidently Parliament is presently occupied by Covid-19 and 
Brexit repercussions, however it is hoped that the law will be reformed sometime in the near future 
to address the most problematic issues identified in this thesis pertaining to retention of title clauses.  
 
7.1 Addressing Bunkers first and foremost  
 
Since the legal and commercial implications produced by the Bunkers case have been so profound and 
detrimental to the overall functionality of retention of title clauses, it is reasonable to provide 
suggestions on how to address the issues raised in this case first, before providing further 
recommendations and proposals for reform. It is by no means suggested that providing solutions to 
the Bunkers case will solve all the issues which detrimentally hinder the utility and effectiveness of 
retention of title discussed throughout the course of this thesis. However, addressing the issues of 
Bunkers directly will hopefully provide the starting impetus for rectifying the unsatisfactory way the 
courts have dealt with retention of title clause thus far.   
 
7.1.1 A revaluation of the passing of title  
 
As the decision in Bunkers has led to such uncertainty with regards to the utility of retention of title 
clauses within the commercial market, a reanalysis of the legal position must be put forward. The first 
solution supported by Tettenborn is a reanalysis of the law of property, more specifically the transfer 
of ownership.1009 One argument raised at the start of the Bunkers litigation but was unfortunately 
rejected by Males J at first instance, dealt with the transfer of title in suggesting that title to the goods 
passed for or in a nanosecond before the consumption of the bunkers.1010 It is contended that this 
 
modernise the Act. See further D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101. Calls for reforming the 
law of sale of goods have been prevalent for quite some time, see for example, M Bridge “What is to be done 
about sale of goods?” (2003) 199 Law Quarterly Review, 173-177.  
1008 The third suggestion has been widely proposed and is mentioned in the following selective sources: L 
Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60. See also, A 
McKnight “Reforming the English law of secured transactions in personal property”, op cit fn 692 at 553-567. 
See also reform consultation papers, The Law Commission, Registration of Security Interests: Company Charges 
and Property other than Land, Consultation Paper no 164 (2002) Available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/cp164_Company_Security_Interests_Consultation.pdf   
Accessed 02/09/20. 
1009 A Tettenborn “Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a Sale Not a Sale?”, op cit fn 865.   
1010 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 at [14]. 
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particular point, of whether title could pass immediately before the destruction of the goods and its 
implications for retention of title clauses, ought to have given more detailed consideration, rather 
than Males J refusing the permission to appeal on that particular ground.1011 Thus, the first contention 
is that the clause in the case implicitly implied that title to the goods would pass immediately before 
the consumption of the goods or at the exact time the bunkers were consumed. This construction of 
the clause would have changed the decision of the case significantly as clearly there would have been 
a distinct agreement to deliver both possession and title to the goods.1012 However, Males J and the 
Court of Appeal gave short shrift to this argument and rejected it hastily on the basis that this would 
contradict the express provision of the retention of title pending payment following 60 days.1013 
Accordingly, the intended purpose of this section is to highlight some of the main criticisms concerning 
the transfer of ownership and the interpretation of the courts in Bunkers, before suggesting a possible 
reanalysis of the legal position and its associated implications for retention of title clauses.  
 
At first instance, Males J relied upon the fact that no title could pass in the situation where the goods 
ceased to exist, and it was this contention that was significant in reaching his decision, which was later 
agreed by the Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, this interpretation has been subject to extensive criticism 
on the grounds that if title could not pass in non-existing goods on the above rationale, neither would 
it be plausible for one to retain title.1014 Accordingly, this debunks the contention that the express 
provision of the retention of title clause contradicts with the implied term. As such, the courts’ strict 
interpretation of the contract as retaining title to non-existent goods is less plausible than originally 
thought. As expressed by Tettenborn ‘the idea that any reasonable businessman (whose view, of 
course, is vital to the questions of in the interpretations of contracts) would read it as reserving title 
to the non-existent goods incapable of ownership by anybody is, to say the least, curious.’1015 The 
above rationale behind the categorisation of the contract as sui generis and not a contract of sale, a 
rationale relied upon by all of courts in the Bunkers litigation is subsequently less than convincing.  
 
It is submitted that the decision to categorise the contract as sui generis and not one of sale and thus, 
disapplying the scope of the Sale of Goods Act is respectfully the wrong interpretation in the context 
of the Bunkers case. As noted in a previous chapter, completely changing the nature of the contract 
 
1011 See PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 at [14] which notes different ways 
OWB suggested that it could recover the price of the bunkers under the scope of the Sale of Goods Act. All 
points raised were refused permission to appeal by Males J.  
1012 A Tettenborn “Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a Sale Not a Sale?”, op cit fn 865 at 26.  
1013 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC, Product Shipping and Trading S.A v O.W. Bunker Malta Limited, ING Bank N.V, 
op cit fn 847 as per Males J at [67]. 
1014 A Tettenborn “Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a Sale Not a Sale?”, op cit fn 865 at 26.  
1015 ibid at 27.  
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in Bunkers as sui generis has detrimental commercial and legal implications for retention of title 
clauses.1016 The court interpreted the contract between OWB and the Owners as unequivocally 
providing that no property in the goods would pass for the duration of the credit period which 
amounted to 60 days. Furthermore, the court argued that price was an indivisible consideration for 
all the bunkers involved and that the characterisation of the contract could not be dictated by the 
transfer of title in any remaining bunkers, due to the agreed express provision allowing the goods to 
be consumed.1017 On this contention, it is reasonable to assume that since there was no possibility of 
title ever passing, then this would also correspond to the argument that there could be no contract of 
sale. However, it is argued that this was not the case in Bunkers as despite the provision allowing the 
consumption of the bunkers, there was the possibility of title passing for any remaining bunkers and 
parties did intend for title to pass in any remaining unconsumed/ unpaid bunkers. Accordingly, the 
proper construction of the express provision (allowing the consumption of the bunkers for propulsion 
purposes), should be construed as not one which calls for the situation where all the bunkers must be 
consumed but rather, that there might be the possibility of the bunkers being consumed.1018 As such, 
it is respectfully submitted that the preceding courts took the wrong approach with the rigid 
construction of the clause as providing that all bunkers must be consumed, and that this was envisaged 
by the parties. In doing so, the courts were mistakenly committed to categorising the contract as sui 
generis. This is supported by Yap who states, ‘the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the term allowing 
consumption before payment as a key factor in the characterisation of the contract was arguably 
misplaced, since that term was only intended to regulate what the Owners could do with the goods 
before payment, rather than to change the whole character of the contract from sale to a sui generis 
contract.’1019 Arguably, the proper analysis should be that the parties did in fact intend that title to the 
goods would pass on a conditional basis for any goods remaining unconsumed and unpaid for.1020 
Applying this to the contextual facts of Bunkers, it is possible to state that there was the possibility 
that some if not most of the bunkers would be consumed for propulsion purposes, however on the 
same basis it was also possible to argue that some remaining bunkers would be left unconsumed and 
unpaid for. Accordingly, the clause should have been interpreted as not one which exclusively permits 
that all bunkers would be destroyed by consumption as this clearly negates the possibility that there 
 
1016 See section 5.3.3.  
1017 H Moore ‘Unconventional “Sales”’(2016) 75(3) The Cambridge Law Journal, 465-468, at 466. 
1018 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 at [12] which states that the 
arbitrators were invited to treat the assumed facts that all the bunkers were used within the credit period of 
60 days. The Supreme Court was told the actual position that at most, part of the bunkers were used, with any 
remainder being used at a later point.  
1019 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 278. 
1020 In this respect the condition would relate to the fact that the goods had not been consumed previously for 
propulsion purposes.  
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would be remaining bunkers available at the end of the 60-day credit period. As such, the claim 
supported by Males J that there was no expectation to transfer to title to all the bunkers supplied is 
refuted. Clearly, the parties had expected that title would transfer for all the bunkers supplied, 
including those consumed and those bunkers which remained unpaid and not extracted.  
 
The benefit of this interpretation lies in the fact that it would not necessitate a complete change of 
nature of the contract and would not impact the utility of the retention of title clause. To support this 
claim, had there been any remaining unpaid bunkers at the end of the 60 days credit period, the 
retention of title clause would have operated in the usual way, in which case the supplier OWB would 
have retained title. As such, it is suggested that the parties to the contract did foresee that title to the 
goods would pass on a conditional basis (of allowing the consumption of the goods) and intended for 
the contract to be one of sale. This is well within the scope of the Sale of Goods Act as the Act provides 
under s1(3) that a contract may in fact be either absolute or conditional.1021 In this interpretation, the 
transfer of risk takes place before the passing of title. The reanalysis of the law of property 
recommends that title to the goods passes immediately before such goods are destroyed, consumed, 
or even resold.1022 This proposition is entirely plausible and, in the instance where the goods have 
been consumed or destroyed, after the passing of risk but before title has passed, the price remains 
payable. The price remains payable irrespective of the fact that it is not possible to transfer title in 
goods which no longer exist.1023 Furthermore, a contract under which the risk has transferred to the 
buyer, still remains a contract of sale. To that extent, where the risk is on the buyer, many contracts 
of sale are in fact conditional contracts. This is even the case in the instances where the seller no 
longer has goods or the seller has a contract purporting title to the extant goods, to deliver to the 
buyer.1024 Thus, the conditional sale point evidently has merit and the decision and rationale of the 
court is contestable.  
 
Thus, the approach that the courts should have adopted in Bunkers was to recognise that the seller’s 
obligation to transfer title is in fact conditional on the continued existence of the goods, which does 
not exclude such contracts from being categorised as contracts for the sale of goods. It is argued that 
the categorisation of sale was not inconsistent with the express provisions and retention of title clause 
 
1021 See Section 1(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
1022 This argument has also been described as ‘scintilla temporis’ or the ‘nanosecond’ argument where title to 
the goods intends to pass the moment/ nanosecond before the destruction of the goods.  
1023 See A Tettenborn “Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a Sale Not a Sale?”, op cit fn 865 at 28, in 
which he supports his submission with the following cases: Ross T Smyth v Bailey [1940] 3 All ER 60; Manbre 
Saccharine Co Ltd v Corn Products Ltd [1919] 1 KB 198. 
1024 M Bridge “The UK Supreme Court decision in The Res Cogitans and the cardinal role of property in sales 
law”, op cit fn 892 at 353.  
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contained within the contract in Bunkers. The interpretation of passing title immediately before the 
destruction of the goods, would have led to the contract being categorised as a contract for sales as a 
matter of law. Saidov is in concurrence with this interpretation as it would be more in line with not 
only commercial sense, but also the bunkers industry which previously construed analogous bunkers 
contracts as sales contracts and would ultimately reflect the parties’ conceptualisation of their 
contract.1025 Interpreting the parties’ intention with regards to the passage of title in a way which leads 
to the categorisation of the contract as one of sale, would negate the adverse commercial and legal 
consequences listed in the previous chapter. In addition, had title/ownership passed immediately 
before the consumption of the bunkers and the contract was categorised as a sales contract, the 
interpretation would have produced the same result for the case, the result of the Owners being liable 
to pay the price. In conclusion, interpreting the passing of title immediately before the destruction of 
the goods thus has two fundamental benefits: firstly it produces exactly the same outcome of the 
case, which allows a degree of consistency with the judicial outcome and secondly, it avoids the 
negative implications arising from the contract not being categorised as one of sale. As 
aforementioned, the appeal on this interpretation was rejected by Males J at first instance, it is thus 
extremely disappointing that the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to address this issue 
directly.1026  
  
7.1.2 Implications for retention of title clauses  
 
Reinstating the categorisation of the contract as one of sale, rather than sui generis, has the added 
benefit of not making the retention of title clause obsolete in its application. By providing that the 
passing of title to the goods happens immediately before the destruction of the goods, this means 
that the retention of title clause is not restricted in its remit. Furthermore, this contention addresses 
the issue of the retention of title clause only operating under the limited circumstances of being left 
with any remaining unpaid bunkers, which have yet to be consumed. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
this interpretation does not provide the supplier with an abundance of proprietorial security, at least 
this interpretation promotes commercial sense1027 and is more likely to reflect the intention of the 
parties, a fundamental aspect for contractual interpretation. Accordingly, categorising the contract as 
one of sale would address the issue of such contracts falling outside of the remit of the Sale of Goods 
 
1025 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 6.  
1026 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [14]. 
1027 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 261. 
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Act. Accordingly, the Sale of Goods Act would no longer be undermined by such contracts falling 
outside of the scope of the Act.   
 
The proposed solution outlined above focuses mainly on contractual interpretation, however it is 
possible that the solution could also emerge from an implied term, purporting that title to the goods 
would pass either immediately before or at the time of the destruction of the goods. However, it is 
submitted that using the form of an implied term propels the argument that the sui generis contract 
are effective in terms of business efficacy as can be evidenced by case law.1028 As discussed in a 
previous chapter1029, the categorisation of the contract as sui generis has detrimental legal and 
commercial implications on the functionality of retention of title clauses. As such, the focus of the 
proposed recommendation suggesting the passage of title immediately before the destruction of 
goods, derives from contractual interpretation rather than from an implied term.  
 
Another benefit of title passing immediately before the destruction of the goods, is the fact that it not 
only applies to situations involving retention of title clauses and the possibility of the goods being 
destroyed, but it also extends to the situations where goods have been resold. As such, title can pass 
immediately before the goods are resold. This has the additional benefit of reflecting the intention of 
the parties in a wide range of situations involving goods supplied subject to a retention of title clause. 
It has been suggested by Gullifer that the interpretation of title passing a nanosecond before the 
destruction/ resale of the goods, is preferable to the agency construction adopted in the case of 
Wilson v Holt.1030 As noted in a previous chapter, the agency construction is unlikely to reflect the 
intention of the parties, and once again produces uncommercial implications. As such, this revaluation 
addresses two fundamental issues arising out of contentious jurisprudence: the agency construction 
arising out of Wilson v Holt and the categorisation of a contract of supply as sui generis in lieu of a 
sales contract deriving from the Bunkers case. In the situation whereby the parties intend for their 
relationship to be construed as an agency relationship, this should be adequately indicated in the 
contract itself by distinctly outlining the obligations and duties arising out of an agency type 
relationship.1031  
 
Rather than taking a passive approach and waiting for further judicial clarification which is essentially 
halted until another similar dispute reaches the courts, parties seeking to rely on retention of title 
 
1028 See The Moorcock (1889) 14 P.D 64 CA; Shirlaw v Southern Foundries Ltd [1939] 2 K.B. 206 CA. 
1029 Revert back to section 5.3.3.  




clause must be proactive. One proactive measure which parties can adopt is subsequently adapting 
their contractual agreements to ensure that they fall within the familiar scope of the sales law by 
including an express provision which reflects the intention of the parties. In practice, the revaluation 
of the passing of title could be achieved by incorporating an express provision in sales agreements 
stating that title passes immediately before or on the destruction of the goods. This in turn facilitates 
the interpretation of the contract for any future courts, where it will hopefully be clear that this was 
in fact intended by the parties involved and that provisions of its kind are not to be construed as an 
agency relationship nor resulting in a sui generis contract, in lieu of a contract of sale. Following the 
aftermath of Bunkers, any parties in analogous situations must ensure that their written contracts 
expressly provide that title passes on either the payment of price or immediately before consumption. 
By doing so, the contracts will fall under the familiar remit of the Sale of Goods Act and this will be 
clear from the onset. Evidently, including an express provision within any future contract is vital since 
the implication of terms was hastily rejected in Bunkers.1032 Communicating the parties’ intention 
clearly from the onset by way of an express provision, will hopefully avoid any doubt or confusion 
further down the line of proceedings. An express provision will make it abundantly clear that the 
parties do intend for title to pass immediately or on the destruction of the goods. An express provision 
of this kind would merely be a manifestation of contractual freedom given to sellers and buyers by 
virtue of the Sale of Goods provisions, most notably section 17 which stipulates that property can pass 
when intended to pass. Accordingly, in this instance the express provision will state that title passes 
immediately before or on the destruction of the goods.  
 
Thus, the first recommendation advocates for a revaluation of the passing of title, whereby title passes 
immediately (a nanosecond) before the goods are destroyed. The caveat to this recommendation is, 
of course, the rejection by Males J at first instance, which has essentially denied the Supreme Court 
the possibility of addressing this issue directly. For such reasons, alternative suggestions must be 
proposed.  
 
7.2 Reforming or redrafting the Sale of Goods Act   
 
The non-applicability of the Sale of Goods Act is a serious problem because sales on retention of title 
terms are ubiquitous in the commercial market. Even more common are the instances where goods 
are supplied with retention of title terms, which are nevertheless intended to be used quickly and well 
 
1032 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 as per Lord Mance at [28]. 
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in advance of payment.1033  As such, the decision of the Supreme Court in Bunkers has a profound 
impact on the law of sale of goods, which disrupted the common understanding of the applicability of 
contracts on retention of title terms within the scope of the Sale of Goods Act. The decision reached 
in Bunkers undermines the remit of the Sale of Goods Act by reducing the applicable transactions. A 
significant number of contracts, such as contracts on retention of title terms and contracts on credit, 
which used to be governed under the Sale of Goods Act, are potentially subsequently categorised as 
sui generis contracts. Clearly, the decision introduces uncertainty into this particular category of 
contracts- sales on credit using retention of title terms, contracts which are notoriously common and 
commercially useful.1034 As emphasised by Low and Loi ‘it is no longer clear which provisions of the 
SGA would continue to apply to sales on credit on ROT terms by way of analogy and which will not.’1035 
The theoretical basis of many of the customary retention of title clauses within the sales of goods law 
is now less than certain on account of the controversial decision reached in Bunkers. This area of law 
is clearly riddled with significant uncertainty which ultimately hinders the functionality of retention of 
title clauses. If it is unclear as to which sale of goods provisions apply to sales on credit on retention 
of title terms, sellers may be deterred from relying on retention of title terms, preferring to opt for 
alternative mechanisms which afford parties a degree of certainty instead.  
 
It can be argued that the Sale of Goods Act warrants reform to reflect the modern conditions in which 
it operates.1036 An entire redraft of the Act could be facilitated to ensure that the Act encompasses a 
much broader remit of circumstances including: proprietary rights, sales of goods, the new elusive sui 
generis contracts and all of the circumstances in which goods are supplied to businesses. By doing so, 
the scope of the Act would be considerably wider and would reflect the way goods are sold and 
supplied in the modern business context. Thus, amending the Sale of Goods Act to reflect the modern 
business context would subsequently release the Act from its 19th century confines, of which many of 
its core provisions take the default form as enacted originally back in 1893. For example, the definition 
given to ‘goods’ by section 61 which states ‘includes all personal chattels other than things in action 
and money1037’ is evidently dated and obscure. Amending provisions will thus ensure that the Act 
remains a progressive piece of legislation.  
 
 
1033 A Tettenborn “Of Bunkers and Retention of Title: When is a Sale Not a Sale?”, op cit fn 865 at 26.  
1034 K Low and K Loi “Bunkers in Wonderland: A Tale of How the Growth of Romalpa Clauses Shrank the English 
Law of Sales”, op cit fn 4 at 253. 
1035 ibid.  
1036 A similar argument is made by Bridge who advocated for an overhaul of the law of sales back in 2003. See 
M Bridge “What is to be done about sale of goods?” (2003) 199 Law Quarterly Review, 173-177, at 174.  
1037 Section 61 Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
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However, the difficulties of employing consistent terminology to cover all these different contracts is 
acknowledged and careful consideration to terminology would have to be exercised. The main 
implications of terminological uncertainty have been discussed at length in a previous chapter1038, but 
any amendments would have the notoriously difficult task of ensuring a degree of consistency and 
providing sufficient clarity within the provisions of the Act. By amending the scope of the Act, it will 
provide a convenient opportunity to dispel the archaic disparity between the terms of title, ownership, 
and property through providing adequate clarification. Providing clarification would be beneficial in 
ensuring consistency and clarity of meaning. The current implications of the Act not defining such key 
terms is that the law develops gradually and on a piecemeal basis, which leads to significant 
inconsistencies. Including further clarification within the Act will thus bring coherence to this area of 
law and limit some of the existing difficulties with retention of title clauses. Most notably, one 
suggestion would be to support Battersby and Preston’s recommendation of expanding the phrase 
transfer of property to infer a comprehensive explanation of what it entails.1039 Expanding the concept 
of property would rectify the criticisms of section 61 which currently asserts a limited meaning to 
property. Adopting this expanded approach to the concept of property would not only convey the 
appropriate meaning but would also reduce the possibility of producing variances and inconsistencies. 
The above suggestion is limited to providing clarification rather than advocating for specific definitions 
to be included within the scope of the reformed Act. This is intentionally done to ensure that the 
delicate balance between certainty and flexibility of the Act can be maintained. A balance can be 
struck between ensuring a sufficient amount of flexibility as to allow for adjustment to the ever-
developing market on the one hand, and providing parties a high level of clarity and certainty so that 
they fully understand what is required of them and thus can plan intelligently for any eventuality. 
Developing suitable and all-encompassing definitions would be highly technical and a difficult feat to 
accomplish and thus providing clarification to the Sale of Goods Act would be the most appropriate 
course of action. On a general note, this may be the opportune time to reform the law of sales, 
especially since consumer transactions have been extracted from the Act.1040 Accordingly, this may 
provide the impetus for change to move away from the state of the market of the late 19th century 
and propel the law to reflect the modern business market of the 21st century.1041  
 
 
1038 See section 3.6 for further discussion. 
1039 G Battersby and A Preston “The Concepts of Property Title and Owner used in the Sales of Goods Act 
1893”, op cit fn 384 at 270.  
1040 See Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
1041 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 263. 
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However, it is recognised that the likelihood of completely modernising the Sale of Goods Act by 
introducing major reform or revisions to the law of sale remains an unlikely prospect.1042 The feat of a 
complete overhaul of the law of sales cannot be underestimated. As epitomised by Bridge, ‘the 
chances of modernising the Sale of Goods Act are slim: arguments that the law should be reformed to 
accord with superior legal aesthetics have no traction in the UK.’1043 For a new statute to be drafted 
and enacted, this would require a substantial amount of work, which may raise the question, whether 
a complete overhaul of the law of sales is necessitated or would amendments and revisions be 
sufficient?  
 
7.2.1 Inclusion of new provisions    
 
A simple revision to the Sale of Goods Act could potentially provide the solution to the issues brought 
to the forefront in Bunkers. Bridge has suggested the inclusion of the following provision in the Sale 
of Goods Act: 
 ‘A contract for the supply of goods is not prevented from being a contract of sale for the 
purposes of this Act by reason only of a permission given by the supplier for the goods or some of 
them to be used, consumed or disposed of before the property in them passes to the receiver of the 
goods upon payment.’1044  
This would be a relatively simple revision and could be incorporated directly into section 2 of the Sale 
of Goods Act which deals with contracts of sale. Such a simple addition would bypass the detrimental 
implications of categorising supply contracts as not contract of sales. If any analogous situations to 
Bunkers arise, the parties involved would not be subjected to their contract being characterised as sui 
generis but rather the clauses would be construed as contracts of sale, a desired outcome for many of 
those seeking to rely on retention of title clauses.  
 
7.2.2 Further clarification for section 49 
 
Although it can be argued that the availability of bringing an action for the price has been settled to 
some degree by the Supreme Court in obiter, it is contended that further clarification is needed by 
amending section 49 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. To promote greater legal certainty and 
 
1042Bridge concedes that such prospects are merely a ‘pipe dream’ in M Bridge “What is to be done about sale 
of goods?”, op cit fn 1036 at 177. 
1043 M Bridge “The UK Supreme Court decision in The Res Cogitans and the cardinal role of property in sales 




predictability, which at present is arguably lacking in this area of law, further clarification is required 
outlining the precise circumstances in which an action for the price can be brought. It is evident that 
merely relying on the passive development of case law is not sufficient as despite the efforts of the 
Supreme Court to provide some situations where the price can be claimed, the state of play it is still 
far from clear.1045 In addition, despite the Supreme Court having the prime opportunity to clarify the 
excessive ambiguity of when the price can be recoverable outside section 49, such a vital decision was 
left ‘for determination on some future occasion.’1046 Clearly, sellers are lacking a comprehensive 
framework which provides all of the circumstances where sellers are allowed to claim the price. At 
present, the implication of the overtly cautious approach taken by the Supreme Court in Bunkers, 
means that sellers may still find themselves unsure if they are able or unable to claim for the price.1047 
In light of this uncertainty, many sellers wishing to rely on retention of title terms will most likely have 
to specify a day certain, the consequences of such actions has been discussed in a previous chapter.1048 
Irrespective of the possibility of reliance on section 49(2), the basis for claiming an action for the price 
of the goods remains unsatisfactory and thus warrants legislative reform in order to develop a 
systematic framework.1049 It is thus suggested that section 49 needs to be updated to provide sellers 
with some much-needed clarity and coherence. 
 
One of the proposed amendments to section 49(1) revolves around the importance of delivery. 
Accordingly, one suggestion is that section 49(1) should be revised to provide that a seller can claim 
the price once payment is due and the goods have been delivered to the buyer. This is irrespective of 
whether title to the goods has passed to the buyer or not. This is beneficial as it effectively strikes a 
fair balance between the interests of both sellers and buyers since the buyer has notably received 
possession of the goods and thus, should pay the price for the goods.1050 Additionally, the buyer’s 
position is sufficiently protected as the goods would be in the buyer’s possession before having to pay 
the payment price and concurrently, the buyer is able to deal with the goods as planned.1051 A fair 
balance is also struck when the seller essentially gives up the possession of the goods and hence, is 
not afforded a stronger position than the buyer to deal with the goods. Linking the claim for price with 
delivery is thus an appealing solution. In addition, this suggestion lends itself well with section 28 of 
the Sale of Goods Act which provides that payment and delivery are concurrent conditions: 
 
1045 See J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 
275.  
1046 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited, op cit fn 112 at [57]. 
1047 H Moore “Unconventional “Sales”’,op cit fn 1017 at 468. 
1048 See section 5.2.4 for further discussion. 
1049 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 8. 
1050 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 275.  
1051 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 9. 
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‘Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions, 
that is to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in 
exchange for the price and the buyer must be ready and willing to pay the price in exchange for 
possession of the goods.’1052   
Accordingly, this supports the argument that a claim for the price of the goods should be available 
upon delivery since section 28 connects price with delivery rather than the passing of title.1053 Of 
course, an alternative suggestion would be to consider risk, which generally passes with title1054, 
however out of the two suggestions: delivery and risk, delivery is the most viable solution. The main 
rationale behind promoting delivery as the preferred solution is that the passage of risk can be 
uncertain as it is essentially very difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when title passes. Hence, it 
can be particularly problematic to determine the passage of risk. In contrast to this, as epitomised by 
Saidov, ‘delivery is a more clearly defined event, promoting certainty, finality.’1055 Arguably, delivery 
is more determinable than risk due to the fact that delivery has the notable advantage of being a 
visible event, where it will be clear once the goods have been delivered and are in the possession of 
the buyer.1056 Thus, out of the two alternatives, delivery is the preferred solution. However, despite 
the argument that delivery is a more readily identifiable event, it is acknowledged that for such an 
amendment to be effective, it will be vitally important to clarify what precisely constitutes delivery, 
which may require statutory clarification. By providing statutory clarification on what constitutes 
delivery, one would hope that this limits the circumstances of where it is unclear as to whether 
delivery has occurred, thus providing greater clarity for both sellers and buyers alike. Including a 
robust definition of delivery1057 will promote finality to parties, in which case the statutory clarification 
will ensure that delivery is in most circumstances, an easily identifiable event. 
 
It is submitted that amending the Sale of Goods Act in a way which connects the action for price with 
delivery would enable a more coherent and systematic framework within sales law. In addition, 
amending or incorporating the above suggestions within the contract of sales definition or by 
providing further clarification to many of the definitions laid out in section 61 would also bring some 
much-needed certainty within the law of sales. The likelihood of amending and revising the Sale of 
 
1052 Section 28 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
1053 J Yap “Predictability, certainty and party autonomy in the sale and supply of goods”, op cit fn 734 at 275. 
1054 Section 20(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
1055 D Saidov “Sales law post-Res Cogitans”, op cit fn 101 at 9. 
1056 It is noted that there are examples where linking the claim for price with delivery may not be appropriate 
such as with CIF contracts, where risk passes before delivery.  
1057 It is acknowledged that the Sale of Goods Act provides in section 61 that delivery ‘means voluntary transfer 
of possession from one person to another.’ However, for this suggestion to be feasible, further clarification on 
what constitutes delivery is necessitated.   
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Goods Act imminently or over the following years remains an unlikely prospect due to the sheer 
amount of work required. For such reasons, one final alternative suggestion is considered.  
7.3 A floating charge?  
 
7.3.1 Recharacterization of the retention of title clause 
 
Another difficult issue emanating from the decision in Bunkers concerns the categorisation of the 
contract as sui generis which included a licence permitting the consumption. A sui generis contract 
with a licence permitting the activity which prevents the passage of title, is inherently problematic and 
might lead to the recharacterization of a retention of title clause as a registrable charge. In the context 
of the Bunkers case, the licence purporting to allow the consumption of goods, effectively allowed the 
seller’s reserved property rights in the goods to be destroyed.1058 Bridge argues that this may lead 
courts to question whether retention of title clauses should be recharacterized as a charge, given the 
substance of the clause and the weak proprietary rights reserved by the seller.1059 Is the 
recharacterization of retention of title clauses as registrable charges the next logical1060 step in 
progression? The answer to this question, remains to be seen. However, if this is the future for 
retention of title clauses, then a few basic points on the viability of recharacterizing the clauses as a 
company charge must be considered. The concept of retention of title clauses being recharacterized 
as a registrable charge is not a novel concept and has been initially mentioned in many proposals 
including the Diamond Report of 19891061, as well as by the Law Commission in their consultation 
paper on registration of security interests1062, however no reform of the law concerning retention of 
title has developed further beyond the consultation period.  
 
Applying a functional analysis, an agreement including a retention of title clause could be 
characterised as a floating charge. By doing so, this would not necessitate a brand-new type of 
contract as it could be a sale of goods contract combined with a security interest in the goods.1063 In 
 
1058 M Bridge “The UK Supreme Court decision in The Res Cogitans and the cardinal role of property in sales 
law”, op cit fn 892 at 359.  
1059 ibid. 
1060 Thornely advocates that retention of title clauses should ‘logically’ be recognised as a registrable security 
devices. See further, J Thornely “Romalpa clauses: the retreat continues’ (1985) 44(1) The Cambridge Law 
Journal, 33-35, at 34. 
1061 A Diamond, A Review of Security Interests in Property, 1989, HMSO, otherwise known as the ‘Diamond 
Report’. See in particular 9.3.2. 
1062 Law Commission, Consultation Paper on Registration of Security Interests, Law Com No 296 (2005), at 21. 
1063 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 264. 
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addition, the granting of security could be provided over a vast range of possible circumstances, which 
would essentially secure the different types of retention of title clause within the remit of the 
charge.1064 To this end, if the aggregation and prolonged retention of title clause were to operate from 
the onset as a registered floating charge, then this would subsequently bypass the impossibly high 
threshold imposed on the retention of title clauses and would also evade the judicial reluctance of the 
courts in enforcing such types of clauses. A floating charge over the seller’s assets could cover any raw 
materials and manufactured goods, and thus could extend to existing goods or future assets of an 
undertaking1065, which would grant the seller the protection it requires without the incumbrance of 
the retention of title clause being struck down by the courts. In essence, the parties relying on the 
new mechanism would thus avoid the procedural barriers of creating a security interest held void for 
lack of registration.  
 
By creating a floating charge over the goods in question, this would mean that the provisions of the 
Sale of Goods Act would still be applicable and henceforth would not require any redrafting or 
amendments. The main difference being that the sale of goods contract would recognise a proprietary 
right in the goods supplied, and it is this element which will provide sellers the protection in the event 
of the buyer’s insolvency. How this would operate in practice is that the contract would be a contract 
of sale whereby title to the goods would pass on delivery, but subsequently the clause would create a 
floating charge over the goods for the benefit of the seller.1066 This approach maintains the 
fundamental function of the retention of title clause which is to provide a degree of protection to the 
seller in the event of a buyer’s insolvency and inability to pay the full purchase price. In addition, 
recognising retention of title clause as a security interest would subsequently necessitate minor 
changes to the basic terminology in which case the terms seller and buyer would change to creditor 
and debtor, where the creditor has a proprietary interest in an asset of the debtor which subsequently 
secures an obligation by the debtor. As such, the change in terminology would not be too much of a 
disposition to the involved parties and the terms would provide sufficient indication of what the roles 
of each party entail.  
 
 
1064 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, op cit fn 256 at 46.  
1065 See further Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co [1870] 5 Ch App 318. 
1066 This functional analysis is adopted by Article 9 of the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) whereby the law 
relating to security interests applies to ‘a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in 
personal property or fixtures by contract’ as per Article 9-109(a)(1). See also s12(2) of the Australian Personal 




One advantage of this suggestion is that the buyer or debtor can continue to use the goods in the 
ordinary course of business in which case the debtor is not disadvantaged in anyway with the change 
in characterisation. Ordinary course of business is given a wide definition, which entitles the debtor 
to use the goods in a way analogous to an owner such as reselling, consuming, disposing or destroying 
the goods, the latter types of uses requiring the consent of the secured creditor.1067 Hence, this is in 
no way different to the function of the retention of title clause, in which case the buyer operates as if 
it were the true owner of the goods. Thus, the debtor can continue to use the goods for the purposes 
of business up until the point that the creditor enforces their security interest, which usually occurs 
on the insolvency of the debtor. In the event of insolvency, due to the nature of the proprietary 
interest granted to the secured creditor, the creditor is thus put in a more favourable position as a 
floating charge holder. Under the present law, parties who retain title have an effective proprietary 
interest in the goods supplied, an interest which does not require a recharacterization as a charge, 
and for such reasons it has super-priority over other interests and is not registrable.1068 As such, the 
super-priority status afforded to retention of title claimants is considered to be of upmost importance 
and an element worth keeping if retention of title clauses were to be characterised as a floating 
charge. The Law Commission in its consultation paper, recommended that all types of retention of 
title clause should be registrable but to counterbalance this position, suggested that the simple 
retention of title clause should continue to benefit from the super-priority status whereby such 
clauses would be given priority ahead of pre-existing securing interests.1069 Furthermore, Gullifer 
suggests that the super-priority status could be assigned to the new ‘retention of title floating charge’ 
to the extent of the interest securing an obligation to pay the price of the inventory it covers.1070 
Accordingly, the super-priority status would not be lost under the new characterisation of a retention 
of title clause as a floating charge. Any reform would have to contend with maintaining the super-
priority status afforded to retention of title clause as without such priority, the characterisation as a 
floating charge would severely weaken parties priority position, subordinating charge-holders position 
behind fixed charged holders and preferential creditors. However, to retain the super-priority status, 
the rule must apply within narrow limits as evidently, if every secured creditor were to obtain a 
position of super-priority, this would render the rule completely futile.1071 As such, assigning the super-
priority status would have to operate in narrow limits.  
 
 
1067 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 264.  
1068 See McEntire v Crossley Bros [1895] A.C. 457 HL at [462]; Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG, op cit fn 
629 at [351-354], the super-priority is justified by bringing business new value from the goods.  
1069 Law Commission, Consultation Paper on Registration of Security Interests, Law Com No 296 (2005). 
1070 L Gullifer “’Sales’ on Retention of Title terms: is the English law analysis broken?”, op cit fn 60 at 265.  
1071 L Gullifer, “Retention of title clauses: a question of balance”, op cit fn 209 at 288.  
241 
 
One of the main concerns with the recharacterization approach is the uncertainty that ensues. A key 
issue at present is the lack of certainty of the current framework and thus by introducing radical 
reform measures as suggested, this may cause further upheaval within the market. Would all 
mechanisms which perform the function of security be characterised into this new form? Put simply, 
what transactions would qualify for recharacterization? As emphasised by Calnan ‘this is particularly 
problematical because issues of this kind are not ones which lawyers and judges are well qualified to 
answer.’1072 Furthermore, it would also be uncertain whether this form of security interest would 
require registration, which poses further issues to consider.   
 
7.3.2 The requirement of registration  
 
The next difficult question relates to whether this new characterisation as a floating charge should be 
registrable. A controversial prospect with notable benefits and issues to take into consideration, all of 
which have been explored thoroughly in a previous chapter. To ensure that retention of title clauses 
strike an effective balance between competing interested parties, the clause would arguably have to 
be registered as a company charge. In this way, an appropriate balance between retention of title 
claimants, competing secured creditors and any insolvency representatives can be maintained. 
However, the ongoing debate surrounding whether retention of title clauses should be registered, 
remains highly controversial.  
 
The main benefit of recharacterizing a retention of title clause as a floating charge, is that the existence 
of the rights would be effectively publicised as the registrations would be recorded within a system of 
registration. As the register is open for public inspection, this can effectively alert parties of the scope 
of a company’s financial status and thus, arguably improve the overall transparency within the market. 
A transparent registration of security ensures that parties can be made easily aware of the existence 
of the security interest, and as such can make an informed decision based on the register information. 
To this end, imposing the requirement of registration would allow creditors to search the register to 
find out whether any security has been created, and thus enhancing transparency. A transparent 
registration system would also tackle the issue of false wealth, where a business appears to have more 
assets than it has, and as such a registration system could overcome such a problem.1073 Additionally, 
costs are kept to a minimum as there are no notarisation fees, so registering a charge or searching the 
 
1072 R Calnan, “What Makes a Good Law of Security” in F Dahan (ed), Research Handbook on Secured Financing 
in Commercial Transactions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015, at 471.  
1073 L Gullifer, “Retention of title clauses: a question of balance”, op cit fn 209 at 287. 
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register would only incur a small fee and any solicitor remuneration.1074 Accordingly, registering a 
security interest does not incur any other transactional costs which ensures that payments are kept 
to a minimum. The value of the registration system is that security interests can be created informally, 
and the register makes the security interests transparent for third parties.1075  
 
Imposing the requirement of registration on this newly categorised retention of title would provide 
one way of capturing interests which would otherwise not be grouped as involving the creation of a 
security interest, despite their equivalent function of security. This would be beneficial as it would 
ensure that similar mechanisms are treated the same by the law, and thus simplifying the legal process 
to a certain extent. This would serve the courts as courts expend great time in deducing whether the 
retention of title provision in question constitutes a registrable charge.1076 This would follow the 
approach taken by other common law systems which treat transactions which serve the function of 
security as secured transactions such as Australia and the United States.1077  
 
This may also provide a degree of uniformity to this area of law, by reducing the possible avenues in 
which creditors can gain priority in the insolvency process, ahead of the claims of other secured 
lenders and unsecured creditors. The courts would thus be able to strike an appropriate balance back 
to determining priority as competing security interests which are subjected to the hierarchal order of 
the pari passu principle. This may solve some of the current dissatisfaction of the existing priority 
rules, which at present can be bypassed relatively easily by the use retention of title clauses which 
involve the use of absolute title by way of security.1078 Once the newly characterised charges have 
been registered, the priority afforded to the charge holders will be effected based on the date of 
creation. From the perspective of the seller, registration is necessary to preserve his priority. 
Accordingly, the priority afforded to fixed charge holders will be determined on the order of creation 
and it is common practice for creditors of floating charges to enter into a priority agreement with 
secured creditors to promote awareness amongst creditors.1079 This in turn will produce a degree of 
fairness as the system of registration would be consistent with the general rule that earlier claims 
 
1074 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, op cit fn 256 at 50.  
1075 R Calnan, “What Makes a Good Law of Security”, op cit fn 1072 at 475. 
1076 See Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products [1981] Ch 25; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd, 
op cit fn 642; Pfeiffer Weinkellerei- Weineinkauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Limited, op cit fn 648. Re 
Peachdart Ltd, op cit fn 124.  
1077 See further section 81 of the Australian Personal Property Securities Act 2009. 
1078 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, op cit fn 256 at 59.  
1079 The author acknowledges that the priority rules subjected to charges are largely dependent on the nature 
of the assets and that floating charges are governed under different rules, which has received considerable 
criticism for its lack of simplicity and clarity. See further, G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and 
American Law, op cit fn 256 at 61.  
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should prevail over later claims, thus promoting fairness amongst charge holders. Securing the title 
retaining hybrid within the scope of registration would bring a degree of uniformity within this area 
of law.   
 
The main opposition to the characterisation of retention of title clause is the issues surrounding 
registration under the current English law relating to registration of company charges. This notion has 
been discussed at various points of this thesis. The fundamental issue with the process of registration, 
is that registering each individual interest would be incredibly burdensome and almost impractical for 
suppliers of goods. In the commercial environment, it is common practice for goods which are subject 
to a retention of title clause to be delivered over a prolonged period of time. If the date of creation 
purports to cover every single delivery invoice, then this would be considered extremely burdensome 
on behalf of the seller or supplier. Accordingly, ‘it is simply not feasible to expect a seller to register 
each contract of sale individually.’1080 Due to the ubiquity of retention of title clauses in the commercial 
market, if the clause were to constitute a registrable charge, the burden of registering for thousands 
of customers would be completely impractical and highly onerous. Although it has been acknowledged 
by Bridge that this may not be as problematic as initially thought for instances involving retention of 
title clauses for goods with limited shelf life and value1081, the author respectfully disagrees with this 
claim as the question remains whether there is any benefit for suppliers of goods to register their 
interest for goods of such low value and short duration of existence. Since most retention of title 
clauses transactions are transient in nature, it is questionable whether a system of registration is the 
most viable option. It is abundantly clear that the process of registration would be impractical for 
suppliers of repeat supply contracts who would have to duly register on each and every occasion.1082 
Due to the short-term nature of many of these transactions, this reduces the benefit of registration 
and may accrue costly expenses for the sellers. At present it is also argued that retention of title 
clauses do not intrude on bank’s security and as such the notion of reforming the law to register such 
interests may correspondingly have negative impacts on other parties within the financial market. The 
inconvenience of registering may lead to conflicts with existing bank lenders which may inhibit 
borrowing for buyers.1083 In line with this reasoning, McCormack emphasises that ‘legal advisers, 
however, feel comfortable with the existing precepts, and the advantages of familiarity are not easily 
forsaken. Moreover, and more importantly, the credit industry as a whole- and banks in particular- 
 
1080 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 73.  
1081 M Bridge “The UK Supreme Court decision in The Res Cogitans and the cardinal role of property in sales 
law” op cit fn 892 at 359.  
1082 See Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG, op cit fn 629.  
1083 A Hicks “Reservation of Title: A Pious Hope”, op cit fn 173 at 105.  
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see no obvious merits in moving over to a new system and this reluctance seems well 
founded.’1084Accordingly, from the perspective of banks and other lending institutions, the current law 
has much to commend it and does not warrant radical change by registering such interests.1085 If all 
retention of title clauses should be changed to create a registrable charge, there may be reluctance 
from parties who will have to regularly enforce their own charges in priority.1086  
 
It is argued that the provisions relating to the registration of company charges are not drafted to 
accommodate retention of title clauses. For a charge to be registered, one of the most fundamental 
requirements is to list the date of creation of the charge. This issue can be problematic in situations 
where the contractual agreement includes more than one type of retention of title clause. If a contract 
of sale purported to include a simple and aggregation retention of title clause, then it would be difficult 
to determine which date of creation would be applicable if the clause constituted creating a charge. 
This issue was raised by McCormack, ‘what if a contract of sale of goods includes an aggregation clause 
as well as simple reservation of title provision- is the date of creation, the date of the making of the 
original supply contract or the date of manufacture?’1087 Such a situation raises vital uncertainties 
which can undermine the effectiveness of registering charges. In practical terms, if the date of creation 
referred to the aggregation clause, then it would be seemingly impossible for the seller to complete 
the registration requirement as the seller would not be precisely aware when the goods were to be 
mixed in the manufacturing process.1088 Accordingly, the provisions relating to the registration of 
company charges are not adequately adept to accommodate retention of title clauses at present.  
 
Clearly under the current law of registering company charges, imposing the requirement of 
registration on a new categorisation of a retention of title floating charge would be incredibly 
burdensome for sellers who would have to deliver certified charge documentation for the purposes 
of registration. The only way the requirement of registration would be commercially feasible would 
be if the entire system were to be reformed into a notice filing system1089, in which case the process 
of registering interests would be as accessible as possible, a process which can be used in a rapid and 
 
1084 G McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law, op cit fn 256 at 69.  
1085 ibid at 68. 
1086 D Fox, R Munday, B Soyer, A Tettenborn, P Turner, Sealy and Hooley’s Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, op cit fn 42 at 484.  
1087 G McCormack, Registration of Company Charges, op cit fn 515 at 73.  
1088 ibid.  
1089 The notion that English law should be reformed to a system of notice filing, similar to the US position 
under Article 9 of the UCC has been extensively documented. See generally, G McCormack, Secured Credit 
under English and American Law, op cit fn 256; G McCormack “Notice Filing versus Transaction Filing- A 
Comparison of the English and US Law of Security Interests” (2002) 5 Insolvency Lawyer, 166-174; D Baird 
“Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership” (1983) 12(1) The Journal of Legal Studies, 53-67 
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cost-effective manner. Arguably, a notice filing system would ensure a degree of flexibility and 
convenience for all parties involved. However, as summarised aptly by Calnan ‘the practical problems 
associated with trying to require the registration of quasi-security outweigh any benefit that might be 
obtained from registering them.’1090 The debate on whether the requirement of registration should 
be imposed remains a contentious matter.  
 
7.4 Summary of proposals 
 
In summation, this section has explored possible responses to the problems identified throughout the 
course of this thesis. The first suggestion is tailored to providing a short-term solution to the 
uncertainty caused by the decision of Bunkers of categorising contracts including a retention of title 
clause as not contract of sales but controversially as sui generis contracts. As such, the first suggestion 
advocates for the revaluation of the passing of property, whereby title passes immediately before the 
goods are consumed or destroyed, and thus ensuring that any future cases analogous to the Bunkers 
case would firmly fall within the familiar context of the law of sale of goods.  
 
The second suggestion put forward would not warrant immediate and urgent reform if the first 
proposal would be adopted as the non-applicability of the Sale of Goods Act would be directly 
addressed. As aforementioned, any future cases involving a retention of title clause which 
subsequently mirrors the contextual background of the Bunkers litigation would once again be 
characterised as a contract for sale, rather than a sui generis contract. Accordingly, this solution would 
address one inherent problem of the non-applicability of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 for contracts of 
sale on retention of title terms. However, this would not address the problematic issues of the 
inherent unsuitability of the current Sale of Goods Act, which fails to reflect the modern business 
context and thus, the practical environment in which retention of title clauses operate. Due to the 
complexities involved in advancing with the second proposed suggestion, it is argued that amending 
or reforming the Sale of Goods Act should be part of a much wider initiative for reform to ensure that 
the Act remains a progressive piece of legislation. It is conceded that any changes in line with the 
second proposals which advocates for statutory intervention will not be done on an imminent 
timescale but it is hoped that such matters will be addressed at some point in the forthcoming years.  
 
 
1090 R Calnan, “What Makes a Good Law of Security?”, op cit fn 1072 at 479.  
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The third suggestion once again requires substantial work to be feasible and must consider all the 
relevant factors, most of which have been referred to above. The recharacterization of the retention 
of title clause must be done in a way which accommodates the main advantage associated with the 
clauses under the present regime, which is affording the retention of title claimant with super priority 
status. Without maintaining this advantage, it is difficult to justify any radical reform measures. 
However, by far the most controversial aspect of the third suggestion is whether to impose a 
requirement of registration. There is still substantial divergence as to the correct recourse for this and 
thus, the author eagerly awaits how this area of law will develop in the future considering the 
arguments opposing and proposing the requirement of registration. Evidently, the second and final 
suggestions are catered for providing more robust and comprehensive long-term solutions and as such 
should be part of a wider initiative for reform. It is acknowledged that such proposals for reform are 
highly technical but it is hoped that the above discussion can in some way aid and contribute to any 
future reform initiative efforts. In addition, the suggested proposals outlined in this section intend to 
illustrate how the current research enquiry can be developed further for future research.  
7.5 Conclusion  
 
This research has demonstrated that the way in which the courts have dealt with retention of title 
clauses thus far, has been significantly problematic and disjointed. The fragmented and incoherent 
approach to retention of title clauses can be evidenced across a broad range of legal disciplines, 
spanning from the law of sales to the law of agency, to the way the clauses are handled during 
insolvency proceedings. The general reluctance of the courts to enforce such claims can be seen from 
the way the clauses are interpreted as a contractual provision, the way the interest of the seller is 
categorised and how the intention of the parties is construed by the courts with regards to retaining 
title to goods supplied. Evidently, the piecemeal and ad hoc way in which these types of clauses have 
been dealt with by the courts, exacerbates the uncertainty of law in this area and serves to obstruct 
parties from implementing their retention of title clauses in an effective and functional manner. It has 
been argued that the recent judicial outcomes of cases have produced detrimental and uncommercial 
implications which have hindered the functionality of the retention of title clauses to the point of 
insurmountable legal uncertainty. The consequences of the decisions reached were unpredictable and 
have disrupted any shred of consistency achieved up until the last decade or so. The courts fail to 
consider not only the commercial practicality of such decisions but also fail to take into account the 
systematic consequences of such outcomes, which bears unprecedented uncertainty for those parties 
seeking to rely on retention of title clauses. Recent judicial decisions such as Wilson v Holt and Bunkers 
demonstrates a complete change of direction from preceding cases, which has invariably led to 
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complexities and far-reaching consequences. It is contended that insufficient consideration has been 
given to the true construction of retention of title clauses which has inevitably prevented judicial 
decisions from providing the legal certainty desired and required for achieving the clauses functional 
objectives.  
 
Difficulties with legislation and terminology has also been exposed whereby the legislative basis fails 
to reflect the modern environment or understand the nature of the clauses and the way they operate 
as a quasi-security device. The unnecessary definition prescribed to retention of title clauses under 
the Insolvency Act 1986 as a ‘hire-purchase arrangement’ and the antiquated terminology employed 
by the Sale of Goods Act 1979, demonstrates this point clearly. It is fair to say that the clauses are 
hindered by legislative uncertainty and controversial judicial decisions and reasoning.1091 The lack of 
any clarification in the legislative instrument has resulted in the piecemeal development of the law 
which is left in an uncertain state. From a terminological perspective, the utility of retention of title 
clauses is hindered either by the lack of existing definitions provided by relevant legislation or is 
hampered by the inconsistent approach to terminology and contractual interpretation employed by 
the courts.  
 
As argued throughout this thesis, retention of title clauses have been treated in a cursory way by the 
courts, which has led to difficult legal implications, and often produces contradictory and 
unpredictable results for sellers. As evidenced by the spate of cases, different rationales are employed 
by the courts to suit different circumstances, which makes it entirely impossible for this area of law to 
be coherent and uniform. As highlighted previously, this judicial hostility obstructs the functional 
objectives of retention of title clauses as its proven exceptionally difficult to draft a clause which the 
courts will enforce.1092 The lack of overriding guidelines pertaining to this area of law, leads to many 
disputes about both the interpretation and application of retention of title clauses, resulting in a lack 
of uniformity and predictability for those seeking to rely on such clauses in similar contexts. The 
eagerness of the courts to strike down such clauses on a relatively consistent basis renders sellers in 
a vulnerable and dismal position of being left with an unsecured claim for the supplied goods. This 
thesis has demonstrated that as a commercial mechanism, retention of title clauses have been 
obstructed by legal uncertainty and general reluctance in enforcing claims pertaining to title retention. 
Such obstruction has detrimentally impacted on the primary objectives of these clauses which is to 
mitigate sellers’ risk and to afford parties priority in the event of a buyer’s insolvency, neither of which 
 
1091 For the discussion on legislative uncertainty see sections 3.3 and 6.1.2. For an analysis of the controversial 
judicial decisions and reasoning see sections 5.2 and 5.3.  
1092 See section 4.4.  
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is accomplished if the seller is left with an unsecured claim for the supplied goods. The wording of 
retention of title clauses is of upmost importance and is arguably the critical component as to whether 
the provision will be effective in retaining title to the goods supplied. Despite the availability of 
different types of retention of title clauses, the courts impose an increasingly challenging and highly 
technical threshold to meet for the precise wording of the different clauses and as evidenced, falling 
short of this standard will result in the retention of title clause being struck down by the courts.1093 
Under the present legal regime, it is almost impossible for more complicated retention of title clauses 
such as a prolonged or aggregation clause to succeed1094, which is of great detriment to those seeking 
to rely on the clauses as a way of mitigating risk.  
 
By way of summary, this thesis has arrived at a number of deductions, most importantly that there is 
still substantial uncertainty and difficulty in resolving claims involving retention of title clauses. Old 
and recent legal developments discussed throughout the course of this thesis, serve to support the 
contention that legal developments continue to herald an uncertain era for claimants seeking to rely 
on retention of title claims. Clearly, retention of title clauses as a commercial mechanism are 
continuously hindered from achieving their functional objective of mitigating sellers’ risk in the event 
of a buyer’s insolvency.  As encapsulated aptly by Finch ‘poor information on the use of quasi-security 
devices and legal unknowns produce unnecessary uncertainties; and that quasi-security devices do 
not, in reality, deliver real protection for creditors who resort to them.’1095 As evidenced throughout 
this thesis, it is apparent that retention of title clauses are hindered from achieving their primary 
objective of providing protection to the seller in the event of an insolvent buyer by significant 
conceptual and practical issues. Retention of title claimants are subjected to significant hindrances in 
the wake of insolvency proceedings and potential barriers to the use of retention of title clauses are 
caused by the statutory moratorium. Recent judicial decisions have also impacted the way these 
clauses are used in practice by limiting the available options for suppliers to effectively use the clauses 
as a defensive mechanism in times of economic hardship. The combined impact of both the courts 
inconsistent and reactive approach to insolvency matters and the unnecessary separate definition of 
retention of title clause enshrined in the legislation, evokes further uncertainty and ambiguity for the 
operation of retention of title clauses in the insolvency market. 
 
 
1093 Revert back to Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion on the nuances in contractual agreements which result 
in the courts striking down retention of title clause and to exhibit the difficult threshold that retention of title 
claimants have to meet when specifically dealing with aggregation retention of title clauses.  
1094 See sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 for a comprehensive discussion on the difficulties of prolonged and 
aggregation retention of title clauses.  




The profound uncertainty and unpredictability around the legal position of a retention of title clause 
complicates matters tenfold and as such the depiction of this area of law as a legal minefield remains 
more relevant than ever. By focusing on how the clauses are hindered from achieving their functional 
objectives, the research has highlighted a number of significant issues pertaining to the current legal 
position of retention of title clauses.  
 
Clearly, the clauses are predominantly obstructed by legal uncertainty and judicial disfavour, which 
has been repeatedly demonstrated across the array of legal fields in which these clauses operate. The 
ramifications of the current legal position, exacerbated by the general reluctance of the courts to 
enforce the clauses and the flawed direction adopted by the courts in recent judicial decisions, 
reinforces the argument that there is still much uncertainty and unpredictability in the legal position 
of retention of title clauses. It is almost impossible1096 for retention of title clauses to operate 
effectively under the present regime as often the clauses will be struck down by the courts or thwarted 
from retrieving the supplied goods. It can be claimed that retention of title clauses as a commercial 
mechanism do not in fact mitigate the risk of a non-paying buyer effectively. Evidently, the clauses are 
not providing sellers with an economic lifeline during the event of an insolvent buyer, as it has become 
increasingly common for the clauses to be rendered ineffective by the courts for issues with 
incorporation, inferring the creation of a registrable charge, constituting a contract of agency, 
characterised as a sui generis contract or that the title retention claim is heavily disputed during 
insolvency proceedings. All these issues have undoubtedly had huge repercussions for the practical 
operation of retention of title clauses and leaves significant uncertainty as to their standing. Thus, the 
law in relation to retention of title clauses is destabilised by uncertainty and it is contending that the 
law is confusing, contradictory, and unsatisfactory in its current form.  
 
In recognition of the uncertainty as to the current standing of retention of title clauses, three proposals 
were put forward for a reanalysis of the legal position pertaining to retention of title clause. It was felt 
that the three proposals directly addressed the most problematic issues obstructing the functional 
objectives of retention of title clauses. The first proposal advocated for the revaluation of the passing 
of property, whereby title passes immediately before the goods are consumed or destroyed. The 
second recommendation suggested statutory intervention with the amendment and redrafting of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 as part of wider reform initiatives. The final suggestion examined the viability 
 
1096 The only type of retention of title clause which effectively operates with very little contention is the simple 
retention of title clause. See section 4.4.1 for further detail.  
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of the recharacterization of retention of title clauses as a registrable charge. The potential merits and 
difficulties of each proposal were examined in detail and it was contended that any future reform 
initiatives must take into account the super-priority status afforded to sellers under the current 
regime.  
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
 
By way of a final conclusion, this thesis has sought to explore the breadth of the legal minefield relating 
to retention of title clauses and the various deficiencies and unpredictable ramifications in English law. 
The arguments put forward have demonstrated the interplay between the varying legal fields which 
often leads to significant legal uncertainty on the practical operation of retention of title clauses. The 
reactive and piecemeal approach adopted by the courts has led to an unsatisfactory development of 
the law, which has continuously undermined the functional basis of retention of title clauses. Areas of 
legal uncertainty, inconsistency and unpredictability have thus been highlighted to illustrate the 
difficulties encountered when seeking to rely on such clauses under the present regime. In considering 
the central research question of this thesis, the arguments put forward have evidenced that the 
current legal environment lacks the certainty, consistency and predictability required to 
accommodate the functional objectives of retention of title clauses.  
 
The proposals suggested in this final chapter, generate their own set of complications and evidently, 
reforming this area of law will not be a straightforward accomplishment. Nonetheless, it is argued that 
there is a strong case for a proactive and strategic reform process to address the significant issues 
which impact retention of title clauses as a functional mechanism for their objective. Reforming this 
area of law is the only viable option to navigate a path through this current legal minefield. The legal 
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